Inheritance / Disavowal

Commemorating and Representing the Nation-State in Turkey from Empire to Republic, 1908-1940s

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This thesis represents partial submission for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Royal College of Art. I confirm that the work presented here is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

During the period of registered study in which this thesis was prepared the author has not been registered for any other academic award or qualification. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted

Emin Artun Özgüner

Abstract

This study aims to understand the role of urban spatial commemorative culture and their diffusion via print practices for the representation of the nation-state in Turkey, between 1908 and the 1940s. Encompassing three major phases in Turkish history (the proto-nationalist revolution of 1908, the republican nation-building after WWI and the more liberal tendencies in the post-WWII era) the period studied is testimony to a major shift from an empire to a modern nation-state.

Accounts of political history on the state culture of the period often emphasize the role of a top-down transformation in politics in explaining the arrival of secular republican culture. This thesis indicates, however, to the agency of a cultural revolution in changing the values of the society, through a plethora of modern material devices such as print media, monuments, electric illumination, illustrated journals, and photography. When these are observed through the gradual nationalisation of the cosmopolitan network of designers, artists, and publishers, the period seems to have accommodated a more disparate use of modernism than the monolithic tone, political history often suggests.

This study focuses specifically on the redefinition of the spatial memory landscape through the construction of monuments and the orchestration of commemorative events, along with attempts to diffuse these as a cohesive narrative through print media, first in the efforts of the Ottoman modernizers, the Young Turk elite and later by its republican successor under the aegis of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. While print culture affords the permeation of these new memory landscapes through postcards, stamps, illustrated journals, newspapers, and banknotes, the very materiality of these artefacts reveals the tensions between politics, design resources, and technologies at hand. Hence, a close attention to the agency of monuments in commemorative events and their representation in print demonstrates how the transition to a nation-state was made to operate by the ruling political elite through the endorsement of some inherited legacies and the disavowal of others. Thus, a corollary amnesia was evident both in the practices of the Young Turk modernizers between 1908 and 1923 and their republican successors from the early 1920s on, as they approached design as a material tool for the self-assertion of national modernity.

The research aims to provide new knowledge on the history of Turkish modernity by arguing how both regimes projected similar commemorative practices on a prevailing memory landscape for the claim of different legitimacies through an artefact-led design history methodology. By doing so it also highlights the role of design materialities in the non-Western paradigm as simultaneous agents of social cohesion and emancipation rather than its outright denunciation as emulation.

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Note on Transliteration and Translation

Because the standardisation of Turkish-Ottoman language, then written in Arabic script, started during the early twentieth century, orthographic conventions tend to vary between the varios periods and localities of the late Ottoman Empire. Especially for the transliteration of manuscripts, orthographic signs were used to overcome the problem of vocalisation in writing Turkish with Arabic letters, and their placement can be quite determinative in discerning private nouns. For this matter, the thesis required expert-level transcription support on early twentieth-century Ottoman-Turkish material. I am indebted to Asst. Prof. Serkan Şavk for his help and guidance on these matters.

I am also grateful to my friends Fotini Patrou and historian Sofia Petsa, for their support and enthusiam on the transcription and translation of my sources in Greek, equally to Ingrid Kasarjian for her guidance on Armenian texts. All other transcriptions and translations from French, Italian and Turkish are mine.

List of Abbreviations

Abbreviations of Turkish terms given here are those commonly used in literature. Whenever these were not available I provided my own translations of the terms and the abbreviations accordingly. For archive and journal titles the abbreviations are based on the language of origin.

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
APIKAM	Ahmet Priştina Izmir Kent Arşivi ve Müzesi (Ahmet Priştina Izmir City Archive and Museum)
BCA	Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Prime Ministry Republican Archives)
CDI	*Cumhuriyet Devrinde İstanbul* (Istanbul in the Republican Era)
CND	*Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (Committee of National Defence)
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DP	Democrat Party
GI	*Güzelleşen İstanbul* (Embellishing Istanbul)
IBBAK	*İstanbul Büyük Şehir Belediyesi Atatürk Kitaplığı* (Istanbul Greater Municipality Ataturk Library)
LTK	La Turquie Kemaliste
MPC	*Museo Pietro Canonica* (Pietro Canonica Museum)
PRP	People's Republican Party
RMIS	*Rumeli Muhacirîn-i İslâmiye Cemiyeti* (Rumelia Muslim Immigrants Society)
RTM	*Resimli Tarih Mecmuası* (Journal of Illustrated History)
SCNCA	*Milli Arma Müsabakası Şartnamesi* (Specifications for the Contest on the National Coat of Arms)
SME	Small or medium-sized enterprise
GNAT	Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM)

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In many ways this PhD journey has been a challenging one not only for me but also for my family. Yet, they have welcomed it so wisely and gracefully from the beginning. I don't think their belief in me could have been tested by any other means. Thanking them will not suffice since I owe them everything. I only wish to have the opportunity to offer the same support to someone else in the future.

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for my mother, father and brother.

Introduction

In 1993, I started private French middle school in Izmir as a very candid teenager, straight from the state elementary school. I remember that our first assignment was to describe our city to the newly arrived Mme. Vindret through visuals. I cannot recall how or why, but I ended up with an early twentieth-century postcard of Izmir, on which the caption read "*Les Quais de Smyrne*". I can still recall my astonishment with the discovery of the French caption, the foreignness of the editor's name and above all how different everything else looked. What had happened to transform that entire material world into the city -and even for worse in to the very street- I had grown up in since 1982?

Following my training in design studies and visual communication, these questions became more prominent. Throughout the early twentieth century, cosmopolitan material legacies in the Mediterranean basin like Izmir (Thessaloniki, Trieste, and Alexandria) seemed to have lost their prevalence in the new political order of nations. After my first account on learning about the Izmir fire of 1922 that had marked the genesis of the national city, I become more intrigued in learning not only about cultural forgetting but also its counterpart, cultural construction, both triggered by the nation-states. How culture and the material world remind us of things and through what means? In her pioneering study on remembering and forgetting in Turkey, Leyla Neyzi points that knowing about the political and economic parameters of the republican era does not necessarily entail us to infer on how this history was experienced by people, and how they shaped it in return.[147] Neyzi's work concerns the oral histories of disenfranchised individuals that were largely negated by Turkey's heavily positivist culture after the transition from empire to nation-state. In a similar manner, the material culture of Turkish nationalism; that is, how objects were conceived and delegated to resonate ideals on national modernity, and how then they were

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[147] Leyla Neyzi, *Istanbul'da Hatırlamak ve Unutmak: Birey, Bellek ve Aidiyet* (Tarih Vakfi Yayınları: Istanbul, 1999), p.2.

experienced and/or shaped, appropriated in the communities is also not thoroughly inquired within the literature of Turkish modernity.[148]

Despite the fact that a considerable amount of historical landmarks in Turkish cities pertain to a modernising (and to some degree nationalizing) empire, nationalist historiography of early twentieth century, based on the autobiographical accounts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1888-1938, the founder of modern Turkey and its first president) largely denies any attribution of modernity to an imperial legacy and delineates this period as one of a decline and antagonism.[149] This is also true for *Les Quais de Smyrne*, the Izmir embankment mentioned above, an urban modernisation project of the city in 1870s.[150] However, as has been increasingly shown by political historians since the 1960s, Niyazi Berkes, Şerif Mardin, Kemal Karpat and Selim Deringil, to name a few, elements of continuity in Ottoman-Turkish modernity can be traced back to the reign of Selim III (r.1761-1808) and the ensuing *Tanzimat* (Reforms) charter of 1839, an extension of Mahmud II's reforms, when the centralisation of the Ottoman state instigated a new period of Westernisation.[151] The following constitutional reformations of 1876 and 1908 are also crucial aspects of this transformation, the exclusion of which, as was often done in 'orthodox' Turkish history writing of early twentieth century, presents a disrupted history of Turkish modernity, as found in textbooks and official publications.[152] To what degree then the layer of national modernity introduced by the Turkish Republic is accountable for

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[148] My emphasis here is on ephemral and circulating design objects rather than fix and permanent as architecture and urban planning, the literature on which is widely studied as will be discussed and referred to throughout the thesis. I wonder if this should be in the main text?

[149] Eric Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905-1926* (Leiden: Brill, 1984), pp.172-173.

[150] Şeniz Çıkış, 'Nineteenth-Century Izmir Dwellings as "Modern": Formal and Conceptual Similarities', *METU JFA*, 2 (2009), 211-233.

[151] For a continuous thread of evolution on Ottomon-Turkish modern thinking see; Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London: Hurst & Company, 1998); Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernisation of Turkish political Ideas* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000); Kemal Karpat, ed., *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads* (London: Zed Books, 2001); Şerif Mardin, 'Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes', *Turkish Studies*, vol.6:2, (2005), pp.145-165 and Douglas A. Howard, *The History of Turkey* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2016). Selim Deringil, 'The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1809 to 1908', *Society for Comparative Studies in society and History*, vol. 35, (1993), pp.3-29.

[152] Zürcher, Ibid.

the ways it represents and commemorates the past, considering the peculiarity of all national historiographies, that they are written on the basis of inclusion/exclusion of material legacies? How did this tacit knowledge of living in a nation-state settle and what were the roles assigned to objects conceived for this purpose? How did it operate, who were its conceivers, makers and its audience? And what can the material world tell us about this?

A great deal of scholarly work has been done on the design and materialization of national identities during the transition from late Ottoman to early republican Turkey. I go on to discuss these later. This thesis, however, takes an innovative approach to the material culture of this period, in two dimensions. Firstly, it excavates a group of objects pertaining to the commemorative practices both in built environment and in print, which have been significantly less studied than formal architecture, images and texts. I argue that these objects give us a more intimate knowledge of how the transition from empire to republic was experienced by individuals and groups than can be gained from the institutionally driven transformation of the built environment. In particular I seek to uncover through them the dialectics of the official commemorative rhetoric of two distinctly defined political elites in orthodox history writing in Turkey, that of the Young Turks and their later republican successors in the first decades of the twentieth century.

I use this approach to challenge commonly accepted views of the relative lack of modernity and refashioning of the idea of the nation in the late Ottoman era compared to the early republican era. To achieve this, I apply two conceptual frameworks to the structures and objects I analyse. This methodology, as will be delineated in more detail, is the second dimension of innovation in the thesis. I use Igor Kopytoff's and Karin Dannehl's model of the biography of objects to illuminate how the life cycle of material things can both reflect and challenge commonly held historical narratives, and enable us to drill down to individual and group experience. Alongside this, I use the lens of Bruno Latour's actor network theory, placing the individual object and its biography within the network of phenomena, which brought it into being and influenced its life cycle. These phenomena range from the historical, political economic, to the material and technological. Central to my analysis is actor network theory's concept of agency. I examine the

commemorative monuments of the period and their print and performance ephemera as actors with agency in the creation of Turkish modernity and national identity, and in the process of memory construction and forgetting within that.

This approach also allows us to use the Turkish case as an example of global modernity. Going beyond the West/non-West dichotomy, this study bases itself at the level of the object to look at how design and technology was delegated in the making of national identities by the political elite through commemorative practices in built environment and print and to underscore how this operated in a network of actors through peculiar ways of appropriation, adaption or reinvention. The micro scale of the national allows us to better see these global threads. Treatises on the convergence of material culture and nationalism in similar topographies in the history of design have previously drawn such connective threads on a global design history level, without necessarily empowering a centre-periphery discourse, or establishing binary constructs of comparison. To name a few; Victor Margolin and Katherine Verdery on the Eastern block; Melanie Trede and Gennifer Weisenfield on Japan, and Rudy Koshar and Adrian Forty, Susanne Küchler on the unification of Germany have shown how global trends in design have helped shape a cultural politics of difference within a globe of national modernities. Similarly, my point in the thesis is not to indicate or argue for what is specific or unique to Turkey by placing it in relation to what happened elsewhere. By drawing connections from Turkey's entanglement with design with respect to national modernity, by researching local experiences of design actors on the ground, I intend this thesis to offer an example of how is it possible to understand common practices of trying to disseminate or participate in nationalism through visual material and spatial artefacts/activity/practice play out in other countries/places in this period.

Research context

As mentioned above accounts in Turkish socio-political histories (in both Turkish and other languages) have been increasingly wary of the continuities between the imperial and republican modernities, breaking down the narrowly structured republican historical narrative and offering a wider understanding of the political and social ramifications of this

transformation. However, by their nature, these often fall short of delineating the transformation of the material world from empire to nation-state, given the absence of material agencies.[153] Yet, since the late 1980s Turkish design historians have taken on the task of understanding the complex agencies and discourses involved in the material modernization of the empire predating the alleged radical modernity of the republic.[154] These mainly focus on the architectural heritage of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Turkey with respect to nationalist thinking, and thus naturally offer a relatively narrow perspective on its relation to print culture. They largely owe their perspectives to the expansion of the nationalist doctrine and especially of the modernist, materialist approaches to the constructs of nationalism as high culture by Ernst Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson.[155] For instance, Sibel Bozdoğan's pivotal work illuminates greatly how an Ottoman-Turkish political elite invested architecture, a stable form of commemoration, with the ubiquitous attributes of visuals in print media.[156] Her work, however, is not equally informed on the subsets of architecture, national monuments and commemorative structures and their dissemination in print media, which were equally pragmatic design tools to mediate notions of identity for the political elite. Thus, despite their valuable and pioneering ways, these studies are mostly engaged in the transformation

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[153] For renown treatises on Turkish social-political histories, see, Eric -Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993);; Ezel K. Shaw and Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 1808-1975, Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968); Şerif Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006) and Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* (London: Routledge, 2006).

[154] To name a few, Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986) for a discussion on the urbanization attempts of early nineteenth century Ottoman reformers. Gülsüm Baydar Nalbantoğlu, *The Professionalization of the Ottoman/Turkish Architect* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) for a discussion on the shift in the traditional education of Ottoman architects towards a discourse of modernity. Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001) traces the national architecture movement of the early twentieth century to its roots in the Young Turk national modernist thinking. On the state of industrial design see, Alpay Er, 'The State of Design: Towards an Assessment of the Development of Industrial Design in Turkey', *METU Journal of the Faculty Architecture*, 1.1-2, 1995, pp. 31-51.

[155] Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 72-113. See also, Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).

[156] Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).Bozdoğan.

of the built-environment within the traditional-modern dichotomy, often falling short of foregrounding the ubiquitous visual aspects of material culture. It could be safe to assume this as the outcome of Turkish architecture history having a somewhat disproportionate prevalence within the design historical discourse on Turkey, since it was the first design historical academic programme, inaugurated in Ankara's Middle East Technical University in 1988.

Visual material culture, illustrated media, albums of photography, ephemera and/or postcards, largely from private collections, are often studied or documented in isolation without presenting material continuities (actors, resources, landmarks, graphic elements) in a critical analysis between the late Ottoman modernity and its republican successor.[157] The deficit feels particularly acute when Turkish design histories are compared to the many extant studies of the visual material transformation of modern nation-states through design, in which historians have demonstrated how various design disciplines converge and cooperate to create and disseminate distinct ideologies of national modernities.[158] These studies have combined a hitherto extinct attention to the more visual aspects of material culture, inquiring on the paths of circulation, dissemination, mediation and reception of nationalist ideas through artefacts, to argue how political entities use design to "advance their political and economic agendas, while also showing how designed objects and images have contributed to the formation of national and global sensibilities", as is argued by Victor Margolin.[159] It should also be noted that this study is not an inquiry to delineate how design is constituted in a national context, such an ambitious undertaking for Turkish

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[157] See for instance, *Souvenir of Liberty: Postcards and Medals from the Collection of Orlando Carlo Calumeno*, ed. by Osman Köker, (Istanbul: Bir Zamanlar Yayıncılık, 2008). Even materially driven approaches on print culture remain at the level of presenting biographical facts, see, *Kemal'in Türkiye'si La Turquie Kemaliste*, ed. by Bülent Özükan (Istanbul: Boyut Yayin Grubu, 2012).

[158] For material historiographies of national design, see, *Ireland, Design and Visual Culture: Negotiating Modernity 1922-1992*, ed. by Linda King and Elaine Sisson (Cork: Cork University Press, 2011); Kjetil Fallan and Grace Lees-Maffei, eds., *Designing Worlds: National Design Histories in an Age of Globalisation* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016); Eleni Bastéa, *The Creation of Modern Athens: Planning the Myth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Marina Emmanouil, '"Modern" Graphic Design in Greece After World War II', *Design Issues*, 30.4 (2014), 35-51; David Crowley, *National Style and Nation-State: Design in Poland from the Vernacular Revival to the International Style* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993); Yuko Kikuchi and Yunah Lee, 'Transnational Modern Design Histories in East Asia: an Introduction', *Journal of Design History*, 27.4 (2014), 323–34.

[159] Victor Margolin, 'A World History of Design and the History of the World', *Journal of Design History*, 18.3 (2005), 235-243 (p. 242).

design still waits.[160] This research rather looks into how design and material culture constitutes and conditions our understanding and experience of the national through the particular example of commemorative practices both in built environment and in print.

The lack of a dialectical understanding of commemorative practices and materialities of Ottoman-Turkish modernity through the agency of visual materials tends to delineate a very crude view of Turkish modernity whereas practices such as Abdülhamid II's (r.1876-1909) photographic albums sent over to Western libraries by the end of the nineteenth century or the very first illustrated postal stamps of the Young Turk administration in 1910s, creating a visual redefinition of the patrimony, were not very different from the Kemalist trajectories followed in the later 1930s.[161] Of recently however, this picture is changing and as Ottoman historians begin to tackle more the aspects of agency, production and reception behind imperial visual materialities, parallel threads become more eminent. Writing on Turkish reading materials during the early twentieth century, Benjamin Fortna suggests that an emphasis on 1923, the foundation year of the Republic and the 1928 Romanisation of the Turkish script law have obliterated the continuities from empire to republic, presenting a monolithic view on the republican narrative of advancement in literacy.[162] Lately, Ahmet Ersoy published extensive research on how Hamidian (referring to the reign of Abdülhamid II, in standard history-writing) photography albums and illustrated media were purposefully used under the aegis of the sultan and his bureaucrats to create and disseminate nation-foundation myths and to project

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[160] For similar design historiographies on national design see, Kjetil Fallan and Grace Lees-Maffei, eds., *Made in Italy: Rethinking a Century of Italian Design*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2014) or Kjetil Fallan, Scandinavian Design: Alternative Histories (London: Bloomsbury, 2012).

[161] *Les Jeunes Turcs* (Young Turks) a term coined in French to refer to the late twentieth-century Ottoman advocates for modernisation, which had become a diaspora operating largely from Paris in the aftermath of Hamidian political exiles. About the time this thesis was to be submitted an extensive study has been published on the albums of Abdülhamid II, concerning the proliferation of the agency in their making, circulation and their afterlife in the West, see, Erin Hyde Nolan, 'The Gift of the Abdülhamid II Albums: The Consequences of Photographic Circulation', *Trans-Asia Photography View*, 9.2 (2019), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7977573.0009.207> [accessed 13 May 2019]. Both the article and Nolan's PhD dissertation reflect a growing international recognition of the importance of practices of photography and the various actors involved with the medium in shaping domestic and international images of nation-ness in this period.

[162] Benjamin Fortna, *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic* (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2011), p.20.

a favorable image of the empire abroad.[163] Pointing to a shared sensibility of the Ottoman-Turkish political elite in what Deringil has called as "a constant effort to present a good, or at least a defendable image towards the outside world", and an almost obsession with their image as a "reaction to what would today be called Orientalism" Ersoy's work complements Deringil's pivotal study where he points to an unprecedented level of visual control and dominance during Abdülhamid's reign for the legitimisation of imperial power, both within and without the borders of the empire.[164] Deringil's observation of the late Ottoman Empire is noteworthy here since he asserts that it had already headed towards a "nationally imagined community", as Ottoman identity assumed an increasing Turkish character, albeit infused with universalist Islamic traits.[165] Following the same line, Zeynep Çelik and Edhem Eldem have recently discussed Ottoman photography in the Hamidian era at the crossroads of production, circulation, and reception in an edited volume.[166]

Although in many aspects the Hamidian era can be seen as the instigation of nationalization (thanks also to the expansion of communication, transportation and education networks) it is still one of absolute monarchy and thus different from the print culture of post-1908 constitutional revolution where, at least in theory, power is sought after from public consent. What then followed the Abdülhamid-led pictorial turn, when in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution and the upheaval of oppression, public outcry and dissent could be voiced more easily on ethno-religious sentiments on print media? For instance, Palmira Brummett gives us a very clear picture of the heterogeneous production milieux, new readership models and circulation patterns of satirical imagery in the post-1908 Ottoman print.[167] Yet similar concepts remain unanswered about the print boom in nationalist imagery in the same period up to the break of First World War, and its relation

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[163] Ahmet Ersoy, 'The Sultan and his Tribe: Documenting Ottoman Roots in the Abdülhamid II Photographic Albums', in *Ottoman Arcadia: The Expedition to the Land of the Tribal Roots 1886*, ed. by Bahattin Öztuncay and Özge Ertem (Istanbul: ANAMED Publications, 2018), pp.31-63. Also, Ahmet Ersoy, 'Ottomans and the Kodak Galaxy: Archiving Everyday Life and Historical Space in Ottoman Illustrated Journals', *History of Photography*, 40:3 (2016), pp.330-357.
[164] Deringil. pp.52, 174.
[165] Ibid., p.11.
[166] *Camera Ottomana: Photography and Modernity in the Ottoman Empire 1840-1914*, ed. by Edhem Eldem and Zeynep Çelik (Istanbul: Koç University Press. 2015)
[167] Ibid., p.20.

to the formation of a new national print culture afterwards. Especially, how these late imperial print materialities, resources and commemorative practices of the Young Turks were appropriated within the republican practices of nation-building needs further investigation. Not the least, the significance of revived ethnic sentiments on material constructs, argued by Anthony D. Smith and the everyday, banal aspects of nationalism, which seamlessly permeate into daily life, asserted by Michael Billig, need also to be taken into account in this transformation.[168] Such an inquiry would raise key questions when we examine the history from a perspective informed by material culture and design history. As much as Deringil has endeavored to understand the "Ottoman self-conceptualisation as an imperial power", we need to revisit the succeeding Young Turk and early republican Turkish political elite in their commemorative endeavors to legitimate national modernity, which worked to create a particular, simultaneously modern and historical image of the country inside and outside the borders. In doing this, it should also be remembered, as Gavin Brockett has warned us, outright links with an Ottoman political community and a republican national one presents the potential pitfalls of overestimating the span of the effect of contemporary media.[169]

This negotiation of global modernity within local experiences of design is also a relevant issue in history of design. In talking about the Turkish architects' endeavor to synthesize the vernacular tradition with a rational/modern architectural language in the 1930s, Gülsüm Baydar asserts that in a non-Western context the duality of traditional/modern was not necessarily seen or experienced as an antagonism in the discourse of national architecture.[170] Baydar thus underscores that despite the increasing

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[168] Anthony D Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (Routledge: London, 1998), p. 226. See also, Anthony D Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1955) and Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).

[169] Gavin D. Brockett, *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk: Provincial Newspapers and the Negotiation of a Muslim National Identity* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), p.58.

[170] Here Baydar refers especially to the movement of *Heimatschutz* in Germany, which was derived from a critique of the ills of urban life, capitalism, and the environmental impacts of industrialism and thus idealized the vernacular versus the modern. She asserts that the vernacular utopia of the Turkish architects in the 1930s stemmed rather from a hope to fill the cultural void of the self-conscious denial of the immediate past, since they did not experience such eminent threats from modern life, see, Gülsüm Baydar Nalbantoğlu, 'Between Civilization and Culture: Appropriation of Traditional Dwelling Forms in Early Republican Turkey', *Journal of Architectural Education*, 47.2 (1993), pp.66-74.

prevalence of post-modern relativism, modernity construction projects such as the Turkish case can still be grasped through their critical powers and emancipatory premises "to construct a cultural politics of difference beyond nationalistic chauvinism and anonymous universalism"[171] Similarly, the understanding of Turkish material culture on nation building as a mere emulation of Western models of national modernity for the rejection of imperial legacy entails an implicit disavowal of the experiences of makers/designers and the material histories (architectural styles, monuments, banknotes, stamps, journals, photography or electric illumination) through which the succeeding political elites differentiated themselves from their predecessors. As Anna Calvera also notes, if modernity is explained only in terms of westernisation as an imported, negative factor to suit economic and geopolitical interests, then understanding local realities and the originality of the design experiences they offer becomes quite obscured.[172] Thus, going beyond preconceived dichotomies (West/non-West, traditional/modern), this study aims to expand its focus to look at how design practice was used to construct and project national identities by an increasingly self-conscious national political elite, through commemorative practices in built environment and in print and to see how these practices were appropriated, adapted and/or reinvented in a synthesis by design actors and received in the public within the particular context of Turkey.

A focus into the context of the national as a micro scale of the larger global picture is a pertinent way in providing this point of view. Grace Lees-Maffei and Fallan assert that despite the prevailing global culture where the nation-state has seemingly lost its political-economic or socio-cultural significance in the formation of our identities and experiences, the regional and/or national histories of design remain nevertheless crucial networks for the discussion of common socio-economic, cultural and identity issues.[173] They offer us a perspective on "how design cultures are formed and operationalized in the complex and contested processes of forging societies, communities, collective institutions and

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[171] Ibid., p.73.

[172] Anna Calvera, 'Local, Regional, National, Global and Feedback: Several Issues to be Faced with Constructing Regional Narratives', *Journal of Design History*, 18.4 (2005), 371-383 (p.378).

[173] Kjetil Fallan and Grace Lees-Maffei, 'Introduction', in *Designing Worlds,* pp.1-21 (p.2).

identities".[174] My approach to the study of the national within design history owes many affinities with this framework set by Fallan and Lees-Maffei. It is informed both by Hobsbawm and Anderson's materialist approaches for understanding the role of top-down, high culture, as well as Smith and Billig's approaches for a better consideration of the bottom-up reception of national identities as is also argued by Javier-Gimeno Martinez for the study of national identity in design.[175]

Finally, it is important to note here that the thesis is not attempting to denounce a sense of nation-ness. What is asserted is not the falsehood of nations but their imaginative attributes, as Anderson notes, to understand the motivations of politicians, designers and publishers in shaping, conditioning particular national identities. Especially for the political elite, nation building often presents a *tabula rasa* to fill with exclusive attributes whose counterpart in the public sphere leads to divisiveness and distress. In pointing to the shift in the methodology and the position of the researcher in the study of the nationalist doctrine, Gimeno-Martinez argues that the scholar is now in a position to observe the causes that entail the rise of a particular nationalism rather than condemn it.[176] Therefore, the thesis operates within this insight to formulate how the republican rhetoric on the discontinuity between the empire and the nation-state eclipsed the undercurrent continuities in material practices.[177] Here the thesis aims to bring a visual and material culture informed perspective to complement existing similar arguments made in other disciplines.

Research questions and aims

A primary focus of my research is the interrogation of the material constructs of nationalism amongst a new political community of Muslim Turks in the aftermath of the 1908 constitutional revolution, and its relation to the formulation of the nation by the republican elite. The shift from Ottoman to republican Turkey entailed the official

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[174] Ibid., p.5.
[175] Javier Gimeno-Martinez, *Design and National Identity* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), p.23.
[176] Gimeno-Martinez, p. 9.
[177] For such discontinuity theories, see, Deniz Kandiyoti, 'Identity and its Discontents: Women and the Nation', in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, ed. by Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).

disavowal of the traumatic experience of the empire's decline and demise; constant territory losses, Muslim refugee crisis, the mass deportations and massacre of Armenians and the 1924 population exchange with Greece culminating in the construction of a new national narrative by the ruling elite. That this disavowal was increasingly communicated in a new official narrative as of 1923 is reminiscent of Anderson's argument that all profound changes in consciousness -as with modern persons so with nations- bring about specific amnesias, which are compensated by narrative identities.[178] Within this framework, the research particularly looks at intertwining material trajectories; commemorative artefacts (permanent/temporary monuments and/or landscape) with respect to print and photography practices that helped construe things simultaneously as national, historical and modern. To what extent did the conception of these materialities contribute to a conglomeration of a distinct sense of modernity with a peculiar narration of the nation's past? What roles did the Ottoman/Turkish political elite assign to design resources; graphic designers, illustrators, sculptors, architects in keeping up with this rhetoric? And finally, how design actors oriented themselves within these top-down projected roles? By articulating and analysing the answers to these questions, this thesis aims to offer a visual and material-culture informed perspective on the history of modernity in Turkey. It aims to complement existing political histories of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey and to add the role of visual and material artefacts and their makers, disseminators and users, to the narrative of political and social change in this period. In doing so the thesis aims to offer a fresh view on how the dissemination of core political messages through material practices of design were negotiated by design actors, in their own experiences to synthesize the tensions that arose from the amalgamation of global modernity with a top-down narration of a collective national identity.

A second aim is to bring a closer observation of the gradual nationalisation of the cosmopolitan network of design actors. At the 2012 Balkan Locus-Focus Symposium, in whose organisation I am grateful to have taken part at an earlier stage in my career, Jilly Traganou underlined the importance of counterweighing the contemporary aggressive and

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[178] Anderson, pp.204-205.

defensive nationalism and to avoid repeating the pitfalls of national insularity.[179] Traganou's emphasis is on the acknowledgement of the nation's internal diversity and the role of transnational networks in the construction of what is the national instead of a monolithic focus on the nation-state.[180] Thus, an attentive look on what constitutes the nation-ness of a design actor adds important complexity to the narrative in the concomitance of modernity and the nation. As Fallan and Lees-Maffei also argue, the assignment of nationality to a designer is cumbersome and often not confined to a region.[181] They rather point to the acknowledgement of not just the culturally diverse background of the designer but also the team that creates the artefact and moreover to the processes of transculturation where an artefact is endowed with new meanings in geographies other than its country of origin.[182] This allows us to situate Turkey within a larger global discourse on the history of design and material culture in the argued period.

A third aim of the thesis is to offer a more accurate picture of the complex net of visual material agencies, their commissioners, makers and reception whose role is crucial for understanding the transformation of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. The term "genesis amnesia", coined by Pierre Bourdieu, is apt here in referring to the historicist material practices, which engender oblivion of history to the extent that new imaginations are taken as seamlessly evident facts.[183] Although the official amnesia that followed the nation building of 1920s is often pinpointed as the eclipse of Ottoman modernity, the last decade of the empire seems also marked by new nationalist narratives that had already presented new ways of remembering the empire's past. This underscores the importance of the study of material practices for the propaganda of official amnesia and

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[179] *Balkan Locus-Focus: Visual Communication Design Histories in the Long 20th Century Symposium Proceedings*, ed. by Marina Emmanouil and Jilly Traganou (Izmir University of Economics, Department of Visual Communication Design, in collaboration with Parsons The New School, NYC, USA, 2012), p.10 <https://issuu.com/balkanlocus-focus2012> [accessed 10 November 2018].
[180] Jilly Traganou , 'From Nation-Bound Histories to Global Narratives of Architecture', *in Global Design History*, ed. by Glenn Adamson, Giorgio Riello and Sarah Teasley, (London: Routledge, 2011), p.166.
[181] Kjetil Fallan and Grace Lees-Maffei, 'Introduction: The History of Italian Design', in *Made in Italy: Rethinking a Century of Italian Design*, ed. by Kjetil Fallan and Grace Lees-Maffei (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp.1-34 (p.5).
[182] Ibid.
[183] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.78-79.

the diffusion of new nationalist narratives by the political elite. The narration of the past and politics of memory seem to have been politically pragmatic for both the Young Turks and the later republican elite, through an interplay of memory with forgetting and remembering, as is made manifest in the materialisation of commemorative artefacts, argued by Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler.[184] Challenging the Aristotelian assumption that the material (read monuments) is an indispensible substitute for the evading memory, Forty argues that a monument may contribute less to memory than to forgetting and points to the dual capacity of monuments in both forgetting and remembering.[185] On a parallel line, Paul Connerton asserts the prevalence of embodied acts and rituals that have equal significance in how societies remember.[186] As such, it seems difficult to locate the work of forgetting/remembering imbued in the artefacts but more likely to seek for it in a network of different material agencies. Therefore, the thesis refrains from a singular focus on a certain medium/design discipline, adhering rather to an object-centered perspective advocated by Glenn Adamson, Giorgio Riello and Sarah Teasley as will be further explained in the methodology section.[187]

It should also be noted that this study does not question contemporary official practices and displays of memory where in the post-modern context Ottoman and Republican legacies are pitted against each other in an even expanding polarity.[188] This study rather looks into how the republican practices of narrating the nation's past owed to the invented traditions of imperial modernity dating as far back as the Hamidian era. The transformation from empire to nation-state articulated through the conjunction of commemorative artefacts in built environment and print (permanent and temporary monuments, postcards, journals, leaflets, advertisements, electric illumination) remains an important inquiry since it shifts from the orthodox focus on the national to the exploration

[184] *The Art of Forgetting*, ed. by Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler (Oxford: Berg, 1999).
[185] Adrian Forty, 'Introduction' in Ibid., pp.1-18 (pp.12-16).
[186] Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
[187] Sarah Teasley, Giorgio Riello, Glenn Adamson, 'Introduction: Towards Global Design History', in *Global Design History*, 1-10 (p.5).
[188] With the rise of political Islam in Turkey since the early 2000s this has been a relevant theme of the studies of memory and affect, see especially, Gönül Bozoğlu, *Museums, Emotion and Memory Culture: The Politics of the Past in Turkey* (Routledge: New York: Routledge, 2019).

of networks operating beyond the mental and physical national borders set by the political elite, as is argued by Traganou.[189]

A final, methodological aim is to trace the interaction of material agents within their socio-political context to mitigate the historicizing effects of nationalist historiography. This also aims to reveal the "loosely woven" net of history that is always producing itself against the current of historical determinism as is argued by Riello.[190] Historians of design and material culture suggest that if the visual and material can be used for myth-making, so too can researchers seek recourse in the material world to tell facts from myths. As is argued by Karen Harvey, material culture can free historians to challenge historical narratives as it presents a tool to unlock the daily life of the past, to infer on human agency, balancing social and cultural contexts with the physical evidence of things.[191] Harvey asserts that objects are not merely conveyors of meaning but are also actively meaningful in the creation of experiences, identities and relationships.[192] Informed by this approach, the 'object-driven' studies take objects as evidence of complex social relationships seeking to reconnect them to their historical contexts; as Bernard Hermann asserts.[193] Similarly, Henry Glassie points that objects are like texts, which can be made meaningful by relocating them in their contexts.[194] Marina Moskowitz even argues that landscapes can be approached as resources for material culture studies since they dynamically inscribe historical change over time.[195] Therefore as an interdisciplinary design historical research, the research questions a wider array of material practices in the constructs of official Turkish nationalism.

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[189] Jilly Traganaou, 'From Nation-Bound Histories to Global Narratives of Architecture', in Ibid., 166-173 (p.166).

[190] Giorgio Riello, 'Things That Shape History: Material Culture and Historical Narratives', in Ibid., pp.24-46 (p.42-43).

[191] Karen Harvey, 'Introduction: Practical Matters', in *History and Material Culture: A Student's Guide to Approaching Alternative Resources*, ed. by Karen Harvey, (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp.1-23 (p.13).

[192] Ibid., p.5.

[193] Bernard Hermann, in Ibid., p.2.

[194] Henry Glassie, *Material Culture* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p.47.

[195] Maria Moskowitz, 'Back Yards and Beyond: Landscapes and History', in *History and Material Culture: A Student's Guide*, pp.67-84 (p.70).

Periodisation

The research examines the period that starts with the 1908 constitutional revolution in the Ottoman Empire and ends in the late 1940s following the post-WWII trantision to multi-party democracy. In their valuable study on the continuities between Ottoman-Turkish modernization, Dietrich Jung and Wolfgango Piccoli argue that Turkey remains in a deadlock of Kemalist modernization by not acknowledging "the depth and solidity of the authoritarian, elitist, and patriarchal structures that the Kemalist state and its representatives have unconsciously inherited from the Ottoman past." Thus they both argue that in retrospect, the period of the decline of the Ottoman Empire could be read retrospectively as the first formative period of the Turkish nation-state.[196] This relatively long time span was chosen with a similar motivation, to facilitate the examination of the convergence of commemorative practices in built environment and in print between empire and republic. It is required to see the more organic relations and transformations within the commemorative practices of the political elite, the transformation of the print culture within the general empire-to-nation scheme and the life cycle of objects. It highlights the "discursive space" attributed to objects by humans, that is their accumulated documentary evidence through their life cycle, as delineated by Karin Dannehl.[197] It also corresponds to an accepted periodisation for Turkish modernity. Some political historians go as far back as to the rule of Sultan Selim III (r.1798-1809) to offer a more complete picture.[198] Certainly, the peculiar oscillations between modernity and tradition during the succeeding Hamidian era (1876-1908) greatly shaped Turkish modernity.[199] This thesis, however, sets its parameters at the

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[196] Jung and Piccoli, pp.199-200.

[197] Karin Dannehl, 'Object Biographies: From Production to Consumption', quoted in *History and Material Culture: A Student's Guide*Ibid., pp.123-138 (p.126).

[198] For example, see, Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*; Şerif Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey*; Selim Deringil, *The Invention of Tradition* and Eric -Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*.

[199] Hamidian refers to the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid (r.1876-1908) in standard history writing. For instance, on the span of photography and cinema that coincided with the Hamidian era see, Camera Ottomana: Photography and Modernity in the Ottoman Empire 1840-1914, ed. by Edhem Eldem and Zeynep Çelik (Istanbul: Koç University Press. 2015)Çelik and Erdem; Nezih Erdoğan, 'The Spectator in the Making: Modernity and Cinema in Istanbul', in *Orienting Istanbul: Cultural Capital of Europe*, ed. by Deniz Göktürk, Levent Soysal and İpek Türeli (London: Routledge, 2010). For Sultan Abdülhamid's peculiar use of photography albums for foundation myths, see, *Ottoman Arcadia: The Expedition to the Land of the Tribal Roots 1886*, ed. by Bahattin Öztuncay and Özge Ertem (Istanbul: ANAMED Publications, 2018).

introduction of constitutional monarchy in 1908. This is for reasons of length and scope possible within the PhD thesis; to allow close attention to the continuities between the Young Turks' and their republican successors' visual and material commemorative practices during this period; and as introducing practice during a period of absolute monarchy as well would require attending to the shift between absolute monarchy and constitutional monarchy, again outside the possible scale of this PhD thesis. Likewise, some of materials discussed have definitely been assigned different purposes and meanings in their life cycles after the 1950 handover of political power to Democrat Party, but this pertains to a more prolific discussion of the initiation of post modernity and thus outside the scope of the thesis, apart from offering a few hints. Overall, such a timeline offers a more organic perspective to question the widespread textbook orthodoxy on Turkish national modernity, which turns a blind eye on the parallels between Young Turk and later republican agencies, representing Turkish History uncritically as something "entirely new and wonderful", as argued by Zürcher.[200]

The periodization also challenges the idea of modernity with its alleged connotation of an industrialist movement, as is commonplace in paradigmatic Western design historiographies. Within the "countries of periphery" it is cumbersome to coin the term "modern" to any period given the term's particular relationship to a lifestyle constrained by Eurocentric industrial output and wealth.[201] Nevertheless, as is pointed out by Daniel Huppatz this stems from a general identification of design with industrialisation, technological innovation and mass manufacture peculiar to earlier design historiographies.[202] As Calvera also argues, the practice of design in peripheral geographies to the dominant Eurocentric design paradigms need not be explained through industrial production but simply with a wish for economic development, attesting to a culturally changing society, which "adopts design models as a way to reinforce its changing

[200] Eric Jan Zürcher, 'The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic: An Attempt at a New Periodization', *Die Welt des Islams*, 32.2 (1992), pp. 237-253, and see also, Eric Jan Zürcher, 'Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: identity politics 1908-1938', in *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, Karpat, ed. pp. 150-179 (p.238).
[201] 'countries of the periphery' is a term coined by Victor Margolin and barrowed from Gui Bonsiepe to denote the recognition of Eurocentric histories of design, see, Victor Margolin, quoted in Calvera, p.373.
[202] Daniel J. Huppatz, 'Globalizing Design History', *Journal of Design History*, 28.2 (2015), pp.182-202, pp.188-189.

aspirations in the social area".[203] For instance, as is asserted by Gökhan Karakuş, despite a disinterest in mass production, Turkish furniture design throughout the late 1950s and 1970s had become the synthesis of modern materials and traditional handcrafting techniques, allowing a reconciliation of modernity with the country's pre-modern nomadic cultures, enabling us to situate Turkey within the history of global design.[204] Baydar similarly argues that attempts of Turkish architects at reconciling traditional forms with modernity in 1930s were far from being a critique of modernity but a wishful way to filling a cultural void created by the self-conscious denial of the immediate past. In a similar fashion, Marina Emmanouil asserts that, in the case of Greek graphic design, tradition has been an equally indispensable part of formulating a modern Greek identity tantamount to industrialisation.[205] Thus as Gui Bonsiepe has also argued, for the countries on the periphery, design has become an important tool to come to terms with modernity as much as industrial production, especially within the realm of social organization.[206] Thus, in writing design histories of the peripheral geographies we need to be wary of hegemonic periodisations empowering the centre, acknowledging, as Calvera does, the possibility of multiple centres, approaching cultural diversity on a global dimension.[207]

Similarly, despite the lack of mass manufacture, the early twentieth century, addressed in the first three chapters, with its Young Turk and later Republican social reforms, their emulation to modern styles (sartorial, architectural and print/graphic) suggests a period inspired by modernism and the shifting aspirations of the elite and the society, offering an equally prolific discourse on design history as is argued by Calvera. Finally, the post-WWII period, dealt in the fourth chapter, is marked by neo-traditionalist and liberal tendencies in the aftermath of PRP's loosening one-party regime in mid 1940s. Thus, the periodisation encompasses the relatively more polyphonic ambience of the late 1940s where bottom-up responses to the earlier top-down projects can be observed. The

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[203] Calvera, p.377.
[204] Gökhan Karakuş, 'Handmade modernity: Post-war Design in Turkey', in *Global Design History*, pp.123-133.
[205] Marina Emmanouil, 'Graphic Design and Modernisation in Greece, 1945-1970' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Royal College of Art, 2012), p.14
[206] Bonsiepe quoted in Fallan and Lees-Maffei, eds., *Designing Worlds*, p.10.
[207] Calvera, p.373.

materialities discussed in the chapters run more or less parallel to central design historiographies with the "chronological delay of cultural experiences" attributed by Calvera to peripheral countries.[208] Nevertheless, they illustrate the different peripheral narratives and draw connections with them following Calvera's co-centric approach.[209]

Hypothesis

The thesis explores the assertion that commemorative practices for national propaganda in built environment and print –temporary/permanent monuments/buildings and photography/print practices- played an indispensible role in the creation and mediation of a first official and later popular Turkish national identity. It hypothesises that an Ottoman-Turkish political elite instrumentalised design and material culture through commemorative trajectories to construe things as national. Such a peculiar material character of Ottoman-Turkish bureaucratic reformers is intriguingly eminent even in the pre-Tanzimat era of late 1700s.[210] Thus a material transformation can be said to always precede institutional, structural transformation within the context of Turkish modernity. The thesis grasps this through the gradual or at times haphazard reformulation of design resources (human/non-human) from cosmopolitan actors to allegedly more "national" ones. Especially, tensions between the politics, resources and technologies in the state commissions for buildings, monuments and print media attest to instances of official identity construction as well as the stylistic preferences for these projects that act as aesthetic meta-level communicators for these official identities. A tangential aspect of this hypothesis is also the extent to which these top-down materialities were shaped, appropriated and/or adopted by bottom-up responses, whose understanding of what constituted national modernity did not always overlap with the official rhetoric.

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[208] Calvera, p.373.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Mardin, *Turkish Islamic Exceptional,* p.150. Mardin here refers to the reports of first Ottoman envoys to the West, stressing to the 'materiality' of their content, focusing on the material elements of life instead of the religious or political institutions they found in the West.

A particular aspect of this inquiry is also to offer a better understanding of the transition from empire to nation-state from the perspective of material culture. In his valuable treatise on the continuities between the upbringing and motivations of Ottoman and republican reformers Karpat argues that continuity should not be sought merely in the politics since the new republican regime "still relied on Ottoman material and spiritual culture"[211] Similarly, Mardin argues that the attribution of Turkey's modernization to the aftermath of the foundation of the republic presents a simplistic image, neglecting the continuities between the nineteenth-century Tanzimat reforms and the Republic itself.[212] Selim Deringil also points that the generation active in the foundation of the nation-state nevertheless possessed an Ottoman intellectual baggage, a personification of a "cross-civilisation synthesis", which had come to being in a thread of reforms since the *Tanzimat* era.[213] On a parallel line, the thesis investigates the continuous material threads through which the republican elite instrumentalised the Ottoman past for its rhetoric on nation-building. Following the lines of post-structural criticism, the thesis supports the view that this rhetoric on the material advancement and superiority of the nation-state in arts, architecture and technology was disseminated through binary oppositions, subjugating the imperial legacy to make the rhetoric more meaningful.[214]

A third hypothesis thus relates to what the thesis will describe as a sort of republican amnesia, not only in operation for its imperial past but also for successive periods within the history of the Republic. This is exemplified in the works of Esra Özyürek and Leyla Neyzi pointing to the struggles of individuals to forget and remember the tensions arising from the political modernisation of the country.[215] This thesis however focuses on the making of material agencies (visual, material and spatial practices, e.g.

[211] Karpat, *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*. This is an aspect that has certainly caught the attention of social anthropologists; see for instance, Ildiko Beller-Hann and Chris Hann, *Turkish Region: Culture and Civilization on the East Black Sea Coast* (Oxford: J. Currey, 2000).
[212] Mardin, *Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism*, p.145.
[213] Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, pp.175-176.
[214] According to Jacques Derrida and post-structural criticism, binary oppositions are semiotic constructs to generate meaning prevalent in Western thought, where one term defines itself through the other's supposed lack, see, Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), pp.114-115.
[215] See, Neyzi, *Istanbul'da Hatırlamak ve Unutmak*; and Esra Özyürek, *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), pp.8-9.

monuments) that helped to diffuse this official amnesia, which eclipsed late Ottoman modernity in Mustafa Kemal's early republican rhetoric. Connerton argues that "memorials conceal the past as much they cause us to remember", pointing to the reciprocal relationship between memorials and forgetting.[216] The primary research conducted for this thesis supports the hypothesis that Connerton's argument is valid for republican Turkey as well. As sites, monuments, buildings, graphic elements become reloaded with meaning with respect to new political definitions of national identity; the succeeding political elites paid little or no respect to their former or initial functions or creators. The thesis argues that it is the multi-layered materiality of these artefacts, composed of tensions between the contemporary politics, resources and technologies, which reveals the works of forgetting in operation.

Sources and Resources

Before further dwelling on methodology, a wider account on the materials and sources handled in the thesis is necessary. The research drew primarily on visual resources; postcards, photography albums, illustrated journals, newspapers, money bills, stamps, paintings, leaflets and advertisements. This proliferation allows a multi-faceted view on both centripetal and centrifugal dissemination of nationalist constructs through design disciplines in the history of the argued period, especially in contrast with a mere focus on a specific kind of top-down construed object. In that sense the study also takes into consideration, as is also suggested by Billig, a fluid demarcation between products of high culture and everyday objects, those emerging from the popular culture, which are equally treated.[217] As to the resources, for Ottoman-Turkish visual primary resources major archives consulted were the SALT Research and Istanbul Municipality's Atatürk Library (IBBAK), both in Istanbul, as well as the Ahmet Priştina Izmir City Archive and Museum (APIKAM). Whilst these are largely digitized archives, unless the source is a digitized donation, they also enable researchers to examine the originals. For journals and

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216 Paul Connerton, *How Modernity Forgets* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.29.
217 Billig, pp.44-77.

newspapers, the National Library of Turkey in Ankara and partly the British Library in London have also been indispensible.

An important aspect of design historical research methodology is the approach in handling the source material, especially in dealing with visuals. Here, a materially concerned approach was maintained as outlined by Janice Hart and Elizabeth Edwards who argue that the visual material is not only an image surface but also a three-dimensional, meaningful and historical object.[218] Thus the research took into consideration its material attributes; wear and tear, and inscriptions. Therefore, whenever the archival limitations allowed visual sources were observed from their originals. Particularly, understanding the material attributes of printing technologies; lithography, collotype or half-tone reveals many clues on the geographical, economic and technological limitations of the publishers even when the material bears no clue of its consumption phase. Similarly, for the first chapter, dealing with the 1908 post-revolutionary postcard craze, closer inspection of the material was indispensible since I have extensively followed a more ethnographic approach in line with Susan Stewart's remarks on the authentication of the sender's experience through the inscription.[219]

The examination of the source material at hand often presented some difficulties during the primary research on historical visual/print and material culture, which should be mentioned here. These are either not well preserved or confined to private collections, and archival procedures can hinder access. Particular difficulties the research has faced were those arising from the digitisation of the archives and access to private collections. The digitisation of the archives whilst offering ease of scanning greater amounts of material also entails limitations in terms of observing the originals. Especially in Atatürk Library, bureaucratic procedures hinder viewing the original documents unless the researcher is able

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[218] Elizabeth Edwards and Janice Hart, 'Introduction: Photographs as Objects', in *On Photographs Objects Histories: On the Materiality of Images*, ed. by Elizabeth Edwards and Janice Hart (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

[219] Susan Stewart, *On Longing, Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). It should also be noted that for matters of not generalizing the level of physical evidence offered by the objects, psychoanalytical critique as a conceptual tool, as famously offered by Jacques Derrida on *The Postcard, From Socrates to Freud and Beyond* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980) was not consulted.

to defend their exigencies convincingly through a challenge. Often very crucial information on editorial credit or private inscriptions are located on the retro side of the visual material, which is not scanned on grounds of being devoid of image content. Such information goes beyond the visual to grasp the material as a meaningful object embedded in history as argued by Edwards and Hart, therefore I tried as best as I could to challenge the bureaucracy to examine the originals. Access to private collections has been less heartening. My pleas for research in the Orlando Carlo Calumeno collection, which contains a considerable amount of post-1908 postcards, were unanswered and at worse unwelcomed. Added to that is the unfortunate case with the archive of the Directorate of Press in Ankara, a most important source for this research, which however, remains inaccessible to the public.[220]

On the other hand, the principal textual primary resources consulted in the thesis come from correspondences between municipal bodies and the ministries of the Ottoman/Turkish state. These are located in the Prime Minister's Republican Archives (*Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi*, BCA) in Istanbul, encompassing both the Ottoman and Republican periods.[221] They were addressed in order to understand the modalities of state commissions and contests, their funding and the level of freedom allowed to designers thereof as well as the particular steps taken by the official bodies in the preparation of commemorative events within the political milieu. A note has to be made here on the nature of these sources. Unfortunately, precisely what percentage of the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is made public to the researcher in BCA is unknown and by law the Ministry of Interior and the General Directory of Security are restricted to make their archives public. This being the case, I acknowledge that the arguments and the findings in the thesis are admittedly and unfortunately an outcome of whatever material is made public in the aforementioned archives and libraries of Turkey. Whatever lies hidden in state departments –as in the case with the Directorate of Press- remains out of the reach of the thesis and open to the further development of the study.

[220] Selen Akçalı, 'Political Propaganda During the Single-Party Regime in Turkey, 1931-1946' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Boğaziçi University, Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, 2016).
[221] In the recent transition to presidency in the Turkish political system, these archives have been handed over the office of the President of Republic as of July 2018.

In addition, some of the primary sources discussed pertain to monuments and buildings, which have survived until the present day. As Harvey also points the incorporation of the researcher's own sensory and emotional experiences of objects into the analysis can be valuable, which has also been practical for this research.[222] For this research too, a walk around the monuments and the surviving landmarks has been useful to convey a sense of the scale and the ambition of the projects. However, site visits can also be problematic for historical research. Even in the relatively short span of time from the onset of the research in 2016 up until recently, public squares in Ankara and Istanbul have changed dramatically. I have observed this recent transformation in my frequent visits to Istanbul and Izmir throughout the research and my excursions to Ankara in 2016 and 2018 and have documented it with photographs. Both in Ankara's *Ulus* and Istanbul's *Taksim* squares constructions of mammoth concrete mosques have been erected by Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party. Therefore, problems with the examination of the surviving public spaces in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir was that they were at times dislocated, restored or partially demolished and thus not in a state to convey the complex relationships with their surroundings at the period of the study, which was a crucial aspect of the research.

That is why; sensory experiences of scale were combined with supporting historical documentation of their contemporary visuals in published albums or postcards, as well as in comparison to drawings, maps and models. As will be seen in detail in the relevant chapters, the examination of previous maps showed that both Ankara's *Ulus* and Izmir's *Cumhuriyet* squares were projected on former fire grounds and the examination of Istanbul's tramlines in the early 1910s proved for arguing on the accessibility of monuments. Similarly, the Canonica Museum in Rome was visited, to compare any initial models for the sculptor's work in Turkey in late 1920s and early 1930s; while this was ultimately not possible, the visit proved useful in accessing the artist's unpublished memoir.[223]

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[222] Harvey, p.12.

[223] In my discussion with the director of the Museo Canonica, Bianca Maria Santese in November 2017, I was told that initial proposals of the artist were sent over to Turkey for the approval of official committees thus were not in the inventory of the museum. But I have nonetheless had the opportunity

An important aspect of working with primary resources relating to commemorative practices in built environment and print was the understanding of how these were experienced by diverse audiences. Although oral histories are considered an important source of information in design history, this was not a viable option given the time period studied. To compensate for this lack, I consulted articles in period art and design journals - which are few in number but surprisingly offer prolific discussions- and memoirs of designers and political actors of the period in as far as it was possible.

As argued also in the research context, secondary literature consulted in the research ranged across political and social modern Turkish history and methodologically relevant studies in the history of design, and in visual, print and material culture. For the literature on the continuities between the empire and the nation-state I consulted a comparative reading of Şerif Mardin, Selim Deringil, Bernard Lewis and Stanford and Ezel Kural Shaw, and Erik Zürcher, whenever their arguments offered the most material implications on the discussed period. For a more recent view on aspects of nationalism and demographics Soner Çağaptay's work has been helpful.[224] An extensive historiography of Turkish print culture and graphic design still awaits, therefore studies on Turkish print culture by Orhan Koloğlu, Alpay Kabacalı and Emin Yalman have been useful despite their prose style, as well as Ömer Durmaz's biographical accounts of Istanbul's graphic designers and illustrators.[225]

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to closely examine some plaster casts of the monuments of Izmir, Taksim and Zafer, at a level of detail not possible on the actual monuments. It should also be added that the museum does provide some contradictory information on the sculptor's work. For instance, while the pedestal of the Taksim monument (1928) is commissioned to architect Giulio Mongeri, (see, Özlem İnay Erten, *Şişli'de bir Konak ve Mimar Giulio Mongeri* (Bozlu: Istanbul, 2016), p.75), the captions on the architectural drawings designate it as Canonica's work. After Santese's retirement in June 2018 my pleas for the further clarification of this have not yet been answered.

[224] Çağaptay, *Who Is a Turk?*

[225] Ahmet Emin Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co, 1914); Orhan Koloğlu, *Türk Basını: Kuvay-i Milliye'den Günümüze* (Istanbul: Boyut Matbaacılık A.Ş, 1993); Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın* (Istanbul: Literatür Yanyıncılık, 2000), and Ömer Durmaz, *İstanbul'un 100 Grafik Tasarımcısı ve İllüstratörü* (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşheir Belediyesi Kültür A.Ş Yanyınları).

Research Methods

Doctoral and masters students in the V&A/RCA History of Design programme are encouraged to address not only design historical methodology but also an interdisciplinary field of historians. This being the case, the thesis has paid utmost attention to combine an interdisciplinary approach between history of design, art history, visual culture, material culture studies, history of technology, and political history in the analysis of the material. Interdisciplinarity takes into consideration the advantages of the wide range of resources and methodologies offered by the various disciplines of the sciences in the understanding of objects. It also acknowledges the intertwinedness of the social, economic, political and technologic realms in the making of an object. For instance, material-wise a publication can on the one hand, manifest the implications of production; printing technologies, resources and economic concerns and on the other consumption; tears, wear or inscriptions left by the user. Content-wise it may reveal aspects contingent to photography/design artisanship and/or political manipulation. Therefore, revealing such trans/interdisciplinary connections highlights particularly new insights to the materials.

This interdisciplinary approach requires a peculiar methodology. Earlier on, I have described the objective of this thesis as the use of commemorative practices in built environment and print by the political elites to challenge the commonly held views of Turkish national modernity in the late Ottoman era compared to the early republican era, and in particular to excavate through them the experience of the Turkish political elite. In doing this, I apply two conceptual frameworks to the structures and objects I analyse; Dannehl's model of the biography of objects and Bruno Latour's Actor Network Theory (ANT). This combination, to be detailed below, permits an examination of how the life cycle of material things can both reflect and challenge commonly held historical narratives, and enable us to drill down to group and/or individual experience. Alongside this, ANT permits the situating of the individual object and its biography within the network of phenomena, which brought it into being and influenced its life cycle. Central to my analysis is ANT's concept of agency. I examine the commemorative monuments of the period and their print and performance ephemera as actors with agency in the creation of Turkish

modernity and national identity, and in the process of memory construction and forgetting within that. The two frameworks work together to reinforce my object-led analysis of this contentious period of Turkish history.

This approach is also tangent to an ongoing phenomenon; that of the increasing prevalence of the agency of objects in social and national histories. In their grand projects to tell a global history of the world through objects, Neil MacGregor and Victor Margolin have both shown that objects are not subordinate but active agents in political social histories.[226] In the introduction to his influential book, MacGregor thus points to the increasing importance of things in the redefinitions of history and therefore national, communal identities.[227] One wonders then, in as much as MacGregor has attempted to take an oblique look at world history through 100 distinct objects at the British Museum, can a study on Ottoman-Turkish modernity formulate a similar methodology through commemorative artefacts?

An immediate answer to this question lies in the aforementioned methodological approach to things. Underlying the approach to objects as agents in history and its narratives, this dissertation too refers to Latour's ANT as a conceptual framework in the interpretation of the findings of artefact analysis.[228] An awareness of ANT enables design historical research to acknowledge that there are multiple forms of actors within a network, which may not necessarily be all human. Rather than explaining why the network exists, ANT unveils the mechanisms at work, which hold the network together. Consequently, this outlook presents, as Fallan argues, an "analytical space for the material components of our world and their contributions to our life" which are "missing in most established modes of sociological thought."[229] It thus follows that in a design process actors who are not exclusively all human do not shape resources/technology as diverse from a social world,

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[226] Victor Margolin, *World History of Design, Vols.I, II* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015) and Neil McGregor, A History of the World in 100 Objects (London: Penguin Books, 2012).
[227] MacGregor, p.XXV.
[228] Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[229] Kjetil Fallan, 'Architecture in action: Traveling with actor-network theory in the land of architectural research', *Architectural Theory Review*, 13:1 (2008), pp.80-96 (p.82).

but that they are rather, constantly re-defining a sociotechnical world. This methodological outlook offered by ANT is also useful for this research in highlighting how top-down uses of design resources and/or technology were not merely projected to the masses but that they were also equally shaped and in return were shaped by that social stratum, and mediated by the material, functional, physical, spatial and geographical phenomena within their network. Where archival limitations allowed, these networks were delinated in more detail as in the construction of monuments and the use urban illumination technologies for the national commemoration days.

Alongside ANT the thesis also uses Dannehl's aforementioned hybrid methodology of object biographies and the life cycle model. This is because the network within which an object operates is not frozen immutably at a single point, and the kinds of agency enacted change through time. To give this dimension to my analysis Dannehl's hybrid methodology allows the thesis to establish a direct link between the stages in the object's biography and the configuration of the network as it changes through historical time. Expanding Igor Kopytoff's elaboration of the singularisation (decommoditisation) of a commodity, its' becoming the product of cultural shaping by its careers, Dannehl's hybrid methodology points to the shifts in context (ownership, status, value, category), which can emphasize both the exceptional and generic features as it also accommodates the design historical approaches aiming to bring a synthesis between the visual and textual primary sources.[230] These two approaches permit the exploration of how the network and the object within it both define and are defined by the historical context. This perspective is central in this thesis.

Crucial in this methodology is understanding the shifts of agency within the network, and the shifts of role and meaning of the object in their life cycle, by suggesting that meaning is fluid and socially constructed. In doing this, discourse analysis provides an understanding of the construction and delegation of the meaning of objects within the contemporary social sphere, it makes the network of agencies argued in the ANT more

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[230] Dannehl, pp.123, 126. See also, Igor Kopytoff, 'The Cultural Biography of Things: commoditization as a process', in Arjun Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things* (Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press, 1986).

apparent by giving a balanced account of human and non-human agencies (artefacts, technologies). According to Michael Foucault, discourse (not merely linguistic but also through rules and practices) is a socially agreed upon system of representing meaning or knowledge embedded in social practices that are specific to a topic and moment in history.[231] His model of discourse analysis suggests that discourse works as a system of representation through practices, language and texts, which can be observed to reconstruct the exclusive meaning that is particular to that discourse.[232] Departing from this perspective, Dannehl's discursive space also allows historians to bring together production and consumption trajectories, particularly when artefacts are not available or have been modified while artefact analysis reveals the peculiar social, economic and political fabric, out of which the object has come about and matured through its life cycle.[233] Therefore discourse analysis enables this thesis to formulate both the shifts of agency within the network, and those in the role and meaning of the objects in their life cycle.

The underlying assertion of the thesis being that nationalisms can be made to operate through artefacts and material culture, a theoretical framework of mediation through design was inevitable. Even as a political historian, Mardin points that Turkish modernity is the outcome of the republican elite's commitment to change the values of society through the realm of culture.[234] This cultural dimension of Turkish-Ottoman national modernity forces us to think of aspects relating to the mediation of design artefacts along their production and consumption argued by Grace Lees-Maffei. Lees-Maffei points that of equal importance to the historical main study areas of design history; the cycles of production and consumption, there is also that of mediation, the study of what happens between the former two, "illuminating the role of designed goods as mediating devices, mediating identity, mediating between individuals".[235] The PCM (Production-Consumption-Mediation) paradigm thus, as Lees-Maffei adds, brings a richer

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[231] Stuart Hall, 'The Work of Representation', in *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, ed. by Stuart Hall (London: Sage Publications, 1997) pp.43-45.
[232] Ibid.
[233] Dannehl, p.126.
[234] Şerif Mardin, 'Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution', *International Journal of Middles East Studies*, 2 (1971), 197-211.
[235] Grace Lees-Maffei, 'The Production-Consumption-Mediation Paradigm', *Journal of Design History*, 22.4 (2009) 351-376 (pp.303-308).

understanding of the object of design history, revealing the fact that design is more than the object, a complex web of practices and discourses as in a social practice.[236] This stress on the dimension of mediation/circulation aims to allow the thesis to contribute new perspectives to existing political and social histories of Turkey within the period.

That said the thesis does not support the view that an overriding cultural revolution can be solely accountable for such a transformation of the values of society. The thesis acknowledges the distributed agency of the 'state' in the sense Michael Foucault argues, as not being an autonomous source of power but composed of multiple agencies, of relations and interactions of individuals that embody it.[237] As Gimeno-Martinez suggests after Foucault, contextualizing the state not as a monolithic entity but composed of a multiplicity of practices underscores the agency of individuals and the networks in which they participate in establishing and orienting design policies, helping design historians better analyze the representations of the state by design.[238] Nevertheless, it has often proven to be difficult to articulate this distributed agency to the level of individual actors. This is often attributable to the specific nature of archival documentation in Turkey, which makes it cumbersome to trace the individual actors in an authoritarian state culture. Given the prevalent inclination of not even crediting the artists, designers and/or photographers in state contests and publications, micro-scale state actors remain all the more invisible. Therefore, the thesis acknowledges that in complex situations the balance on agency is articulated differently, dwelling on the implications of legislative and economic measures.

Last but not least, my position with respect to the inquiry is also important. As noted in the beginning of this introduction, a major interest in this topic arises from my own experiences as a Turkish citizen growing up in the 1990s when the effects of the 1980 military coup were still evident. This latter exacerbated the already substantial historical amnesia, cutting ties even with the recent past and further curtailing political freedoms. I became conscious of these only as an adolescent in early 1990s. As Esra Özyürek argues, especially in those years, in post-Cold War Turkey, commemorative materialities of 1930s

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[236] Ibid., p.372.
[237] Michael Foucault, quoted in Gimeno-Martinez, p.143.
[238] Ibid.

state-led modernity, which this thesis tries to unfold, have gone through new singularisation processes for the self-expression of personal political orientations motivated by the nostalgic longing of the more secularly inclined Turkish citizens who resented the unfulfilled promises of republican modernity against the rise of political Islam.[239] Such later singularisation patterns all the more obscure the initial networks in the making and perception of these commemorative materialities as they introduce them as new signifiers as if in a new Barthesian semantic order. This all the more points to the importance of reveling the original networks in their making, mediation and perception. Having witnessed these later periods, I am aware that I myself am a product of the same nation-building rhetoric, inclined to situate these artefacts within the most contemporarily familiar cultural and political reading. As historian Sir Moses Finley warns us, the temporal distance of the investigated period does not protect the investigation from the influence of present-day concerns, therefore keeping an objective stand from the still turbulent contemporary Turkish politics in our day required some diligence.[240]

Contribution to knowledge

The principal contribution of the thesis is in the field of history of design as it aims to contribute to a clearer and more accurate account of the role of visual material culture and design in the representation of Turkish national modernity by delineating and underlining the agency in the commemorative practices and artefacts in built environment and print for the construction and mediation of the imperial legacy as national, and to map these from late Ottoman modernity to early Turkish nation-state. As discussed earlier, this is an aspect often overlooked in the political and social histories of Turkish modernity. There is thus a contribution to the design history of modern Turkey, which goes hand in hand with political and social history, as two thematically overlapping but often separate fields. As stated above, the existing design historical literature often confines its subject matter to either late

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[239] Esra Özyürek, *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), pp.8-9.
[240] Finley quoted in Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (California: University of California Press, 1996)*, p.14.

Ottoman modernity or its republican successor in the built-environment, thus a correlative survey of design-oriented material culture on Turkish national modernity, encompassing both periods, not only investigating centripetal trajectories through the built-environment but also looking into their mediation in print media is often overlooked.

A tangent aspect of the design historical contribution is the underpinning of the connections of peripheral modernities with the dominant paradigms of design history, also known in contemporary scholarship as "alternative modernities" discussed by Timothy Mitchel as recurring misrepresentations of an already incoherent and shifting original.[241] The paring of modernity with Western industrialism and capitalism has long cast a shadow on the material histories of modernity in the peripheral geographies without a distinct industrial climax, making the cultural dimensions of modernity invisible if not ignored, especially in Anglophone design historical scholarship. As Charles Taylor asserts, dismissing the cultural aspects of Western modernity thus imposes a "falsely uniform pattern on multiple encounters of a non-Western culture with the exigencies of science, technology, and industrialization"[242] Alternative modernities on the other hand, lead us to consider the local agencies that are operational in the processes of appropriation, hybridization, and adaptation (rather then merely adoption) of global cultural forms to local necessities, attitudes and conditions.[243] In trying to think out of the box, alternative modernities recognise modernity as a plural cultural phenomenon and underscore the agency that redeploys Western cultural, material, discursive and social forms.[244] Similarly, what the thesis does is providing a looking glass into how these processes were experienced within the micro scale of Turkey.

The scholarship on alternative modernities has also echoed in design history discipline, where Eurocentrism has been decisively challenged in the research and

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[241] Timothy Mitchell, 'The Stage of Modernity', in *Questions of Modernity*, ed. by Timothy Mitchell (London: University of Minneapolis Press, 2000), pp.1-34 (p.23).
[242] Charles Taylor, 'Two Theories of Modernity', *The Hastings Center Report*, 25.2 (1995), 24–33 (p.32-33).
[243] Bill Ashcroft, 'Alternative Modernities: globalization and the post-colonial', *ARIEL: a review of international English literature* 40.1 (2009), 81-105, (pp.82-84).
[244] Ibid., p.85.

teachings of many scholars that aim to present a more accurate view on design activity with multiple centers and peripheries. Thanks to the ICDHS (International Conferences on Design History and Studies), since 1999 a platform has also been available for design historians to present, share and discuss their research on an increasingly decentralizing body of scholarship. As Tevfik Balcıoğlu argued for the ICDHS 2002 meeting in Istanbul, that it had overruled the maps, turning the academic isolation to solidarity.[245] This is a discussion, which the findings of this thesis also aim to contribute, offering a globally connected level of understanding to the relation of nation to design in the history of design.

An underlying contribution of a more general, methodological nature is also within the literature of national modernity on Turkey. As mentioned above it is also the expectation of the field of History of Design to contribute to general history through the investigation of design. In this study, this comes from the inquiry on the commemorative aspects of Turkish revolution through an ANT-informed artefact analysis approach. As such the thesis hopes to set an example of how it is possible to study Turkish national modernity through objects and the networks they have established both as themselves as non-human actors and with their human makers/commissioners. This helps the historian to re-contextualize the social fabric of the artefact, highlighting the discrepancies of the public/private commissioning bodies as well as those in the object's intended purpose and public reception. The thesis therefore places the artefact at the core of the studies of Turkish modernity, and advocates for critical material analysis in the understanding of history. Such a cultural view of the Turkish revolution carries a further hope to initiate a discussion on the gradual transformation of the imperial legacy by pointing to the ways design has been used as a political tool, pragmatic for the mediation of official amnesia.

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[245] Tevfik Balcıoğlu, 'Mind the Map', *ICDHS* (2008) <http://www.ub.edu/icdhs/docs/ist-balcioglu.pdf> [accessed 18 December 2018].

Structure

The chapters of the thesis follow a main chronological thread. They address a variety of design practices and materialities in the commemorative trajectories (both in built environment and in print) of the period when these are evident in the national narrative-making. Certain chapters treat specific materialities and practices (print media, monuments, electric illumination or urban development) more exclusively, when these forms dominated practice in that period.

Chapter 1 starts with tracing the first public commemoration efforts of the Ottoman Empire's cosmopolitan print culture through the medium of postcards following the 1908 constitutional revolution. Working from postcards from evidence around their production, circulation and consumption as singularized commodities through textual inscriptions, the chapter asserts that as products of the cosmopolitan print culture of the Ottoman Empire, postcards have been priming agents for popularizing new image reading models for a popular national culture, which gained ground parallel to the top-down official rhetoric of the political movement of the CUP (1909-1920). Continuing along the material paraphernalia of the Young Turk revolution, the chapter then moves on to reconstruct and analyse the construction of the first Ottoman national monument and the mobilisation of the sultan as the public image of CUP in an entanglement of photography with pageantry and print media.

Chapter 2 charts the spatial mapping of the new nation through the construction of Mustafa Kemal monuments first in major city squares in the late 1920s then throughout Anatolian towns.[246] It asserts that the positioning of the monuments with respect to their physical surroundings, implicitly suggested amnesia towards the urban populations with their repression of the formerly cosmopolitan attributes of these urban spaces. It also aims to give an overview of the network in operation in the making and erection of monuments,

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[246] In modern Turkish, Asia Minor is referred to as *Anadolu* (Anatolia), from a Roman-Greek derivative designating the eastern districts of the Byzantine Empire. .In modern Turkish, Asia Minor is referred to as *Anadolu* (Anatolia), from a Greek derivative designating the direction of east, see, Zürcher, p.109.

with technology, resources, and a critical intelligentsia on the one hand and pro-PRP actors under the aegis of Mustafa Kemal on the other, both asserting to instrumentalise monuments to centripetally disseminate notions of ideal citizenry through the communicative power of statuary. The chapter then moves on to discuss a centrifugal diffusion of the monuments in print media through graphics in dailies, journals, advertisements and maps. This argues that monuments acted in cooperation with a pro-government print culture, also part of the network in disseminating the republican amnesia through the communicative power of the monuments, mediating new identity models for a new political community of Turks.

Chapter 3 addresses the discussions on the official visual representation of the new nation-state within three distinct trajectories, graphics, visual arts (painting and photography) and commemorative pageantry. Following the strict press control and the near-collapse of the illustrated press as a consequence of the script law of 1928, thus the end of political opposition, a pro-PRP network of academics, artists and bureaucrats under the auspices of Mustafa Kemal began to deploy a highly materialist agenda to give form to a new republican culture. This unfolded first with the Ministry of Education's 1926 contest for an exclusive coat of arms of the new nation-state. A parallel venture was in pictorial arts with a state-supported call for propagandist art in the restructuring of the Istanbul Academy of Fine Arts by its new director Namik İsmail. Finally, the chapter inquires commemorative electric illumination technologies as the utmost form of this official culture. As a non-human actor of this period, festive illumination technologies were made to crystallize the republican rhetoric on technological superiority in state-sanctioned representations of the new republic in the built environment during the republican pageants.

Chapter 4 continues to discuss the paradox of representing and commemorating a new nation state during the presidency of İsmet İnönü. This era is known by his efforts to consolidate national unity after Mustafa Kemal's death in 1938 and from Turkey's isolation in the Second World War to the immediate post-war era. In architecture history, this period consists especially of a diversion to a classicized modern aesthetic from the Mustafa Kemal-led radical modernism of late 1930s. The chapter however, attempts to question this

transformation rather as an aesthetic symbiosis to connote a peculiar sense of Turkish modernity. It investigates this symbiosis as the outcome of a larger network where new nationalist art historiographies of Turkish art historians endeavored to appropriate a retrospective and nationalist reading of Turkish decorative arts and architecture within a modernist framework, which were then interchangeably used with modern design tools, be it in graphics for money design, print or historical preservation. Such aesthetic ideals also resonated on the built environment through new İnönü monuments and urban embellishment works in Istanbul. The chapter investigates this remodeling of the imperial capital under the mayoralty of Lütfi Kırdar through the municipality's propaganda publications as particular propaganda venues of the era. These journals were particular in their use of modern visual communication tools to legitimize the demolition works and assess the popularity of the PRP municipality.

I   Chapter / Re-thinking the Empire

Print culture and revolution have been companions on many turbulent occasions of history. As noted by Robert Darnton, the printed word is not only a record of what happened but also an active force in history since to seize power one has to seize the word and spread it.[1] This is apparent in Benedict Anderson's "print capitalism" as well, underlining a parallel between the increase in literacy and a shared sense of nation-ness.[2] According to Anderson the invention of the printing press and its subsequent role in the diffusion of a collective imagination through standard print languages played globally an important role in the rise of national consciousness.[3]

Both Darnton and Anderson's observations hold true for Ottoman national modernity. The *Tanzimat* restoration period as of 1839 had instigated a reform period in the Ottoman Empire continuing until 1876, aiming at the centralisation and Westernisation of the Ottoman state with which the use of printing press had become widespread. However, in 1878, within two years of his succession, Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909) suspended the constitution and re-established absolute power, citing the Ottoman-Russian War. Nevertheless, newspaper publishing grew dramatically during the Hamidian era, with 103 new newspaper titles between the constitutional restorations of 1876 and 1907.[4] Vjeran Kursar argues that this growth with an new interest in fiction was necessitated by the increasing modernisation of the country and a centralized education system.[5] In 1908, with the proclamation of the second constitutional revolution, the strict Hamidian regulations were suspended and some 240 new dailies were launched with ninety-seven publishers actively working in Istanbul.[6] This brief cross-section of the expansion of printing presses

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[1] Robert Darnton, *Revolution in Print: The Press in France 1775-1800*, ed. by Robert Darnton and Daniel Roche, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. xiii.
[2] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities.*
[3] Ibid.
[4] Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press 1908-1911* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), p.4.
[5] Vjeran Kursar, 'Carigradska Tiskara "Zellich"', *Knjizevna Smotra*, 46.3 (2014), 91-110 (p.96).
[6] Brummett, p.4. *Hamidian* refers to the reign of Abdülhamid II, 1876-1909.

in the Ottoman Empire also indicates a correlativity between central modernity and print capitalism in the Ottoman example.

This chapter focuses on the first public commemoration efforts on a national scale in the Ottoman Empire following the 1908 constitutional revolution. It aims to investigate the role of non-national agencies in the imagination of the nation before the nation, imbued in the works of the empire's cosmopolitan print culture and the materiality of the monuments (both ephemeral and permanenet) and their dissemination through print media. When the revolution broke in July 1908, prompted by the secret political organization of *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP), the empire's cosmopolitan print culture and especially the postcard producers were able to reciprocate an immediate response to the events aroused by the reinstitution of the constitution. In the revolution CUP supposeddly aimed to create a new society of Ottomans with equal constitutional rights to all citizens.[7] As Karpat argues Ottomanism presented a territorial and ideological framework as well as the concept of an Ottoman nation, and sought to inspire loyalty to the territory or the fatherland, especially among non-Muslim communities.[8] As easily produced and affordable commodities postcards were ideal mediums to popularize this nation-building rhetoric for Ottomanism, since they allowed a space for the authentication of sender's experience of the public sphere. Moreover, as the chapter will demonstrate, after the ensuing 1909 counter-revolution and the 1913 power-seizure of CUP, the production, mediation and consumption patterns of nationalist imagery no longer appealed to the unity of a -partly idealised- heterogeneous Ottoman political community but increasingly sought to define and narrow-down nationalism in graphic elements, actors, resources and audience. Thus, as singularized commodities postcards help us understand how the 1908 revolution was experienced in the social sphere through their object biographies.

Lagging behind the prompt response of postcards in the public sphere, CUP's official

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[7] The CUP was not an open democratic organization, even contrary to its unifying aspirations, its member base, almost all men, was greately composed of Muslim Turks (sparingly some Kurds and Arabs) with a small number of Jews and no Christian members at all. What bound the members together was not a bourgeois background but more so educational and professional networks, see, Zürcher, *The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic*, p.241.

[8] Karpat, *Historical Continuity and Identity Change*, p.15.

ideology on Ottomanism was manifest in parallel through the commemorative practices of constitutional monarchy (monuments, pageants) and an emperor-centered vision of nationalism as these were diffused in print media (stamps, illustrated journals, photographs), increasingly after the 1909 counter-revolution.[9] In the second section thus, the chapter will move across the agency in built monuments, photographs and print media to display the inner incoherencies of this rhetoric, unfolding a variety of agencies and contexts through visual, textual and material evidence, as well as the role of Istanbul and other important urban hubs of the empire within a larger network of cosmopolitan cities. This offers an account of how heterogeneous actors of this era assigned roles and disseminated them for others to play, to seek for proposed and/or attempted associations of human and non-human actors leading either to successes or failures.

I.I The Legacy of the Imperial Print Culture: Commemorating the Nation before the Nation

In 1874, the publisher of the journal *Musavver Medeniyet* (The Illustrated Civilisation), Mehmet Arif, published a line engraving of the crown prince Yusuf İzeddin on its cover.[12] This appearance of an Ottoman crown prince on a journal cover not only attests to the loosening of orthodox Islam's iconoclastic credo but also to the power invested in images since this was a propaganda agreement between the publisher and Sultan Abdülaziz to manipulate public opinion for the succession of his favorite son.[13] Thus, from the onset, far from official or religious contempt, the circulation of images in Ottoman print media had a lot of affinity with the promotion of an image economy advocating the aims of the political elite.

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[9] I am borrowing the term 'emperor-centered nationalism' from Takashi Fujitani, as a vision of nationalism that converges history and culture in the imperial institution, see, Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), p.3.
[12] *Musavver Medeniyet*, 1.4 (1874).
[13] Orhan Koloğlu, *Basınımızda Resim ve Fotoğrafın Başlaması* (Istanbul: Engin Yayınları, 1992), p.21.

This fact also explains the relation of the Ottoman state to print media given the financial burden in printing images. A prominent figure of the Turkish printing industry, Ahmet İhsan Tokgöz (1869-1942), publisher of the notable *Servet-i Fünun* (The Wealth of Knowledge) illustrated journal, recalls that for early Ottoman illustrated journals around 1870s, the printing of images and photographs was troublesome due to the unavailability of *gillotage* (zincography).[14] This led publishers to resort to buying second-hand woodcut blocks or plates (stereoplates) of picturesque scenery and renowned portraits from Istanbul's foreign journals or from Europe, which were then adapted to the content of the journal as "fillers".[15] A major disadvantage of this was that with no image-text correlation it often deceived the readers' expectations of original content, reducing the popularity of these publications.[16] By the 1890s, the introduction of rotary machines made the illustrated press more affordable where *Servet-i Fünun* reached the mid-two thousand mark with provincial subscribers amounting to more than half this number, in a community with rising literacy rates.[17] To supply the demand, woodcut became a popular technique, later replaced by wood engraving whose masters could be trained at Istanbul's Imperial School of Fine Arts.[18] For more advanced photomechanical processes though, publishers still depended on outsroucing as commissioning Austrian companies or hiring European engravers to produce plates with relevant image content.[19] This equally increased printing costs, as prominent publisher Ebüzziya Tevfik (1949-1913) lamented; the cost of publishing images was so great that it was impossible to cope with them with circulation rates below one thousand.[20]

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[14] Ahmet İhsan Tokgöz, in Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa*, *Basın ve Yayın*, pp.104, 107.

[15] Ibid. Precursors of Ottoman illustrated Ottoman periodicals can be listed as; *Musavver Medeniyet* (1874), *Mirat-ı Alem* (1882-1883) and *Reb-i Marifet* (1886), see, Ibid., pp.104, 107.

[16] For more on the repurposed plates and their criticism in 1890s press see, Koloğlu, *Basınımızda Resim*, pp.19-20, 23, 25.

[17] Ahmet Ersoy, 'Ottomans and the Kodak Galaxy: Archiving Everyday Life and Historical Space in Ottoman Illustrated Journals', *History of Photography*, 40:3 (2016), pp.330-357 (p.337). Rates of literacy are highly disputed in this era but as Ersoy points a safe estimate is possible within the single digit level for the whole imperial territory with an upward trend, Ibid., p.339. On literacy in the Ottoman Empire, see also, Johann Strauss, 'Les Livres et l'Imprimerie à Istanbul (1800-1908), in *Livres d'Hier, Livres d'Aujourd'hui*, ed. by Paul Dumont (Strazburg: Centre de Recherche sur la Civilisation Ottomane et de la Domaine Turc Contemporaine, 1992)

[18] Ibid., p.337.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Kabacalı, p.106.

As argued at the onset of this chapter, the subsequent Hamidian press control (1876-1908) was fierce, but besides the mouthpieces of the regime, it nevertheless offered financial support to indepenedent (nevertheless regularly screened and censored) publications as well, like *Servet-i Fünun*, so long as they too promoted the sultan's actions.[21] This was part of the sultan's mastery in "image manegement" as Selim Deringil argues for the Hamidian regime, deploying diverse media strategies to control the image of the empire both witihin and without the borders.[22] Abdülhamid's state subventions eventually turned into a tightly controlled censorship, where the licensing of illustrated journals and their content depended on the consent of the sultan.[23] What went through was all the Hamidian public work; new railroads, hospitals, mosques and schools with a strict censor on the publication of the photographs of the sultan and the royal family.[24] Postcards too were often found inappropriate if they depicted the interiors of shrines on grounds that they offended the sanctity of religion.[25]

However, after the 1908 revolution, as Ahmet Ersoy also underscores, the Hamidian mastery in "image management", in Selim Deringil's words, came to an abrupt end, when this peculiar organisation of the Ottoman mediascape left its place to relaxed measures, euphoria and a plethora of new publications.[26] This section thus looks at print practices of commemorating the 1908 revolution and beyond after the collapse of the Hamidian state-sanctioned pictorial turn as argued by Ersoy and Deringil. Deringil mentions that seeds of an imagined community of Ottomans had already been sawn in the Hamidian era by schools, railways and telegram, noting that this had a primarily Islamist character,

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21 Ersoy, p.339.

22 Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp.135-149.

23 Arguably, the Hamidian censorship aimed at a wishful avoidance of improper conduct as it even banned photographs depicting the assassination of foreign rulers and statesmen, see, Ibid, pp.28-29. Initially, *Servet-i Fünun* was to receive 3240 piasters monthly, which was followed by other press organs, see, Ibid., p.108. Similarly, publisher Ebüzziya Tevfik also had hardships coping with high costs of commissioned plates, see, Ibid., pp.25, 27.

24 Ibid., pp.30, 31. Nudity was consented in so far as it pertained to fine arts, see for instance, *Servet-i Fünun,* 25. 641 (1903).

25 BCA, fol.DH.MKT.00983.00004 / 00078 2 July 1905.

26 Ersoy, p.339.

excluding Christian elements as potentially subversive.[27] How then publishers were to visualize and diffuse the Young Turk official ideology of a seemingly unified heterogenous political community? Most importantly who were these publishers and their target audience?

Who made images for whom?

Before dwelling on the post-revolutionary zeal with postcards it would be productive to have a general view on the production and circulation venues of images in early twentieth-century Istanbul's print culture. It is safe to assume that the imperial capital had a more or less segregated print culture with different media targeting different audiences based on ethnoreligious groupings. This was also evident in the cosmopolitan structure of artisans in the image reproduction industry. By the 1900s, both Tokgöz and Tevfik had mastered the technique of zincography along with five other non-Muslim plate makers in Istanbul in 1909, pointing to the spread of the technique on the eve of the constitutional revolution.[28] The lithography studios too had increased from merely six in 1900 to a total of ten in 1909, but all were run by either non-Muslim or Levantine businesses.[29] Similarly, of the thirty-one engravers in 1909 only one was Muslim.[30] Despite a considerable level of collaboration within the printing sector, as Ersoy points, in terms of readership too target audiences were differentiated according to group affiliations based on ethnoreligious affiliation, as in Muslim, Jewish, Greek or Armenian.[31]

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[27] Deringil, p.11.
[28] Koloğlu, *Basınımızda Resim*, pp.25 and Kabacalı, p.114. The *Annuaire Oriental* of 1909 lists five platemakers under the category of '*clicheurs*', see, *Annuaire Oriental du Commerce de l'Industrie de l'Administration et de la Magistrature, 29me Année 1909* (Constantinople: The Annuaire Oriental & Printing Company Limited, 1909), p.1094.
[29] *Annuaire Oriental du Commerce de l'Industrie de l'Administration et de la Magistrature, 16me Année 1900* (Constantinople: The Annuaire Oriental & Printing Company Limited, 1900), p.718 and *Annuaire Oriental 1909,* p.1172. I do acknowledge that these assumptions are based on the numbers of subscribed businesses to the *Annuaire Oriental*, which might render some smaller businesses invisible. It should, however be noted that as of 1912 subscription to the directory was free of charge, see, *Annuaire Oriental 1912,* p.1018.
[30] *Annuaire Oriental 1909*, p.1145.
[31] Ersoy, p.333.

To some degree this heterogeneous composition of the print industry had its roots in the general imperial social structure. Ahmet Evin also remarks that in urban areas of the empire, spatial demarcation of communities based on confessional or occupational groupings was sharper, and that mostly the two went hand in hand as some professions were reserved to certain religious communities.[32] In 1909 this was still valid, Muslims only ran nine out of the thirty-four bookstores, which were all located in old Istanbul, confined to the historic peninsula. The remaining twenty-nine were run largely by Levantine businesses in the bustling modern neighborhood of Galata.[33] However, to assert a location dichotomy is not that clear-cut. Author and journalist Ahmet Rasim (1864-1932) points that although known as the cradle of Muslim publishers, the Babıali Street of peninsular Istanbul, housed an equally cosmopolitan community of publishers, composed of Muslims, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Germans, Catholics and others.[34] Hence, it is more likely that the divide was product-oriented. Bookstores in old Istanbul mostly handled the second-hand market or the lithographic printing of traditional publications of religious or folkloric themes. Here, despite its obsolescence in Europe, lithography was still an important business because unlike typesetting, it allowed the direct transfer of the manuscript from stone to paper, facilitating the reproduction of manuscripts and allowing a continuity with the calligraphic tradition.[35] Publihsers in Galata, on the other hand, targeted a market more orientated to Western patterns of consumption with wider photomechanical reproduction resources and image-based media.[36] The concentration of photography studios, increasingly

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[32] Ahmet Evin, 'Communitarin Structures and Social Change', in *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change*, ed. by Ahmet Evin (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1984), pp.11-24, (p.18).

[33] *Annuaire Oriental 1909,* pp.1170-1171.

[34] Ahmet Rasim, in Orhan Koloğlu, *Bir Zamanlar Babıali* (Istanbul: Erdini Basın ve Yayınevi, 1998), p.5. *Babıali* was a street parallel to the 'Bab-ı Ali' gate of the Topkapı palace, named as Sublime Porte in the West, where, traditionally, public announcements of official decisions were made, thus its importance for Turkish journalism and print culture. Judging by their surnames in 1909, the area housed as much as eighteen Armenian and seven Christian/Jewish bookstores, see, *Annuaire Oriental 1909,* pp.1170-1171.

[35] Kabacali, pp. 68-72. Kabacali mentions that there was a considerable Persian diaspora working in the lithographic printing business. That this is not covered on the *Annuaire Oriental* also raises a question in terms of ethnoreligious groupings in the printing sector.

[36] Kabacalı argues that the second-hand bookstores in the Beyazıt area mainly dealt with the publication of traditional lithographic prints whilst others targeted an audience with more modern tendencies, see, Kabacalı, p.101.

in Galata by 1909, also seems to attest to the vibrant, modern atmosphere of this neighborhood.[37]

Clear demarcations are impossible to draw, as subjective identities must have been more intertwined than in today's national demarcations. Nevertheless, it is highly possible that by the turn of the century an image economy, in the modern sense, was maintained by a cosmopolitan structure, whose consumers were equally diverse but shared collectively modern venues. As social historian Reşad Ekrem Koçu (1905-1975) recalls, by the turn of the nineteenth century, the three vendors of nude photography were of Greek and Jewish origin, yet the male audience they targeted were consumers of a modern life style, frequenters of modern venues of entertainment in Galata and Kumkapı neighborhoods.[38] One such venue was the *Bon Marché* department store in Galata, introducing the Ottoman society to Western modes of consumption while simultaneously producing an orientalized version of it through its postcards.[39]

This suggests that once images find a material support as "visual currencies", to offer a fully chronological reading of them with respect to the societal structure in which they most effectively circulated seems cumbersome.[40] As Palmira Brummett notes on the circulation of satirical imagery in the 1908 post-revolutionary Ottoman print, even though the press was produced by the elite, its symbolic repertoire was not an elite one, evolving from Ottoman literary, artistic and theatrical cultures.[41] Thereby Brummett points to Roger Chartier's remark on the importance of recognizing the fluid circulation and shared practices that cross social boundaries between particular cultural objects and specific social

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[37] By 1850's, Galata's high street, the *Cadde-i Kebir* was filled with photography studios, thanks to foreign professionals passing by the city for the Crimean War, see, Koloğlu, *Basınımızda Resim*, p.8. Koloğlu argues that since European and Levantine photographers often hired non-Muslim apprentices, this must have facilitated the spread of the profession among minorities, see, Ibid., p.12. By 1890 eight out of fourteen photography studios were located in the Galata district, see, *Annuaire Oriental du Commerce de l'Industrie de l'Administration et de la Magistrature*, 9me Année *1889-90* (Constantinople: Cervati Frères & Compagnie, 1890), p.494. In 1909 of the twenty photography studios, sixteen were in the Galata area the rest being in Istanbul, see, *Annuaire Oriental 1909,* p.1208.
[38] Koloğlu, *Basınımızda Resim*, p.10.
[39] Brummett, p.202.
[40] John Tagg, *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographs and Histories* (London: Macmillian, 1988), p.164.
[41] Ibid., p.20.

groups.[42]

In an anecdote by writer Sermet Muhtar Alus it is possible to sense Chartier's stress on this fluidity.[43] By the turn of the nineteenth century, Galata had already become a bustling modern neighborhood with department stores and theatres, of which the *Concordia* was one. In one of its spectacles, the Morgans, a European family of acrobats, had gained remarkable reputation. A notable political-military figure of the time, Fehim Pasha, had bluntly declared his affection to the older daughter, Margaret, upon seeing her selling postcards at the end of the performance. In the ensuing love affair, Margaret became the topic for everyday small talk, so much so that the stationery stores *Loeffler* and *Max Fruchtermann* of Galata ordered postcards of her photographs in up-to-date fashion, to a Viennese publisher [Fig.1.1].[44] These, captioned *Margarethe Fehim Pasha* were sold in secrecy, initially to a young male audience but later also to young women, who aspired to Margaret's fashionable looks, and were sought after as collectible items or displayed in rooms.[45] Today there are around forty variations of this genre in the Atatürk Library, some even embossed with gilded details on her dress pattern and jewelry. Thus, although venues like the *Concordia* were circumscribed to Istanbul's mercantile, bureaucratic and military elite circles, the assorted supply of *Margarethe Fehim Pasha* postcards helps us assert, despite a lack of solid circulation data, that images on postcards must have permeated farther than this elite audience, leaving a wider impact on a Westernizing urban society.

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[42] Roger Chartier, in Brummett., p.20.

[43] Sermet Muhtar Alus, 'Margrit Fehim Paşa', *Resimli Tarih Mecmuası (RTM)*, 2 (1950), p.50-52.

[44] Alus argues that Loeffler Fruchtermann was a Greek stationary owner. However, arguably these were two different businesses. Max Fruchtermann was mainly a framer and F. Loeffler a publisher, however both were involved in postcard publishing, see, *Annuaire Oriental 1909,* pp.1131, 1160.

[45] Alus, p. 52.

Figure I-1: N.T.G. (c. 1900). Margarethe Fehim Pascha '*A Margarethe Fehim Pascha postcard published in Vienna*'
©Atatürk Library, Istanbul.

Nevertheless, the effect of the span of modern media should not be overestimated. As Niyazi Berkes points, even though the 1908 constitutional revolution had brought "a sense of community to the Turkish masses", thanks to its simultaneous dissemination through the Hamidian telegraph network, this popular "like-mindedness" was far from encompassing the rural areas.[46] Gavin Brockett similarly adds that a nucleus of print culture that would later evolve into a mass public culture in republican Turkey did emerge in early twentieth-century Istanbul.[47] This was though largely confined to the urban and provincial elite, without the capacity to integrate rural Ottoman Muslims.[48] Despite its limited span, the investigation of what constituted this nucleus, in other words, the role of the non-national in the imagination of the nation before the nation can add a different perspective in the understanding of Turkish national modernity. Rather than a disavowal of these artefacts as

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[46] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, pp.328-329.
[47] Gavin D. Brockett, *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk*, pp.58-59. Brockett argues that even in the census of 1935, 76.5 percent of the country's population lived in provincial Anatolia, lacking an infrastructural development for their integration to the centers, which would follow a few decades later.
[48] Ibid.

occurring outside the boundary set by the nation-state, the materiality and object biographies of postcards can show us the hybrid nature of design, the micro-level narratives on foreign aesthetic influences of graphic elements, styles and methods and the way local publishers appropriated these to create their own synthesis, especially at a time of political upheaval within the empire's diverse centers of political and economic power; Istanbul, Salonika and Izmir.

Postcards in the late Ottoman Empire

As souvenir artefacts, postcards peculiarly allow a simultaneous graphic manifestation of the social sphere through their image side and an individually authenticated experience of that sphere through the correspondence. As Susan Stewart argues, the desire for souvenirs stems from experiencing events that are not repeatable but reportable, events whose materiality has escaped us, which can only be retrieved through narrative.[49] Especially on postcards Stewart underlines that they became influential souvenir objects in the reduction of dimensions, in reducing the public, the authentic three-dimensional context of the site into two-dimensional representation, which then can be appropriated to the private view of the individual subject through his/her inscription.[50] This is also relevant to what Igor Kopytoff argues as the singularisation of the ubiquotus commodity by the consuming individual, the sender of postcards in this case.[51] The inscriptions on postcards help us go beyond the visual content to question the object-biographies on how the commodities were appropriated by the experiencing individual.

This peculiarty of postcards crystallized all the more so during the Paris exhibition of 1889 when visitors to the newly built Eiffel tower were able to authenticate their climbing experience by sending a postcard from the top of the tower.[52] The advancements

[49] Susan Stewart, *On Longing*, p.135.
[50] Ibid., pp.137, 138.
[51] Igor Kopytoff, 'The Cultural Biography of Things: commoditization as a process', in Arjun Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things* (Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press, 1986).
[52] Richard Carline, *Pictures in the Post: A Short Story of the Picture Postcard and its Place in the History of Popular Art* (London: Gordon Fraser Gallery, 1971), p.43.

on half-tone printing of photographs in late 1880s had also brought new perspectives to postcard industry.[53] In 1903 the Universal Postal Service agreed on the use of divided-back postcards, allowing a hitherto unavailable space for correspondence.[54] This further encouraged the authentication of sender's own experience through their own inscription within the authenticity of the site. Moreover, postcards were also responsive to consumer trends as publishers endeavored to adapt them to new socio-political shifts in the community, as is also exemplified in the assorted supply of *Margaret Fehim Pasha* postcards.[55] Hence, with their simultaneous references to the public and private spheres, the object-histories of postcards can help us discern clues on the formation of a popular national culture within the late Ottoman print industry.[56]

Postcards are likely to have gained prominence in the post-1908 revolution era of the Ottoman Empire. Illustrated postcards are listed for the first time as a distinct business category in the trade directory of *Annuaire Oriental* in 1909 with eleven publishers, rising up to seventeen in 1912.[57] Most of these businesses were located in the modern neighborhoods of Pera and Galata, which were reserved for the construction of modern hotels, peninsular Istanbul being exempted.[58] Thus, as argued, the early modernisation of Galata and Pera at the turn of the century, might have promptly allocated these publishers with an audience accustomed to Western modes of consumption; cafés, nightclubs, theatres,

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[53] It must be added that half-tones did not immediately replace the former woodblocks which were used extensively well into 1900 in UK and France. They were financially more costly as they required a special, fine-grained paper and painstaking to produce, see, David Crowley and Paul Jobling, *Graphic Design,* p.28.

[54] Marian Klamkin, *Picture Postcards* (Newton Abbott: David and Charles, 1974), p.36.

[55] Carline, p.9.

[56] As is asserted by Jeff Weintraub the public/private distinction is not unitary but variable, see, Jeff Weintraub, 'The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction', in *Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspective on a Grand Dichotomy*, ed. by Jeff Viennatraub and Krishan Kumar (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 1-42 (pp.2-7). Therefore in the public/private dichotomy the thesis implies the approach asserted by nationalist thinking where a state is different from the people, the political communities subject to its rule and on whose support its legitimacy depends, see, Craig Calhoun, 'Nationalism and the Public Sphere', in Ibid., pp.75-102).

[57] *Annuaire Oriental 1909*, p.1083 and *Annuaire Oriental: Commerce, Industrie, Administration, Magistrature de l'Empire Ottoman, 1912* (Constantinople: The Annuaire Oriental & Printing Company Limited, 1912), p.848.

[58] Büyükdere, Üsküdar and Prinkipo were also among quarters where hotels could be built according to the imperial order of 1865; Zeynep Çelik attributes this pattern to the preference of foreigners who concentrated around Pera, see, Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), p.87.

department stores, and a public transportation system, allowing access to the south (old) and north (modern) areas of the Golden Horn.[59] In contrast the relatively lower number of postcard publishers in peninsular Istanbul attests to the aforementioned inclination of this cosmopolitan network of publishers to a rather traditional market.[60]

Most Ottoman postcard publishers were either from the non-Muslim communities of the empire or Levantine businesses established in the capital around 1850s. The *Tanzimat* charter of 1839 had further facilitated the trade activities of European merchants operating in the empire, widening the benefits of restrictions imposed on Ottoman fiscal policies by the Capitulations. Western industrialism had brought a rising supply of cheap goods into the empire at a time when social Westernisation fueled an increasing demand for Western goods, further weakening the incompatibility of the empire's industry.[61] Hence, publishers like Max Fruchtermann, who is accredited as the first postcard publisher in the Ottoman capital with his first lithographic series of 1895, often came to take a leap of faith in the Ottoman capital from less industrialized parts of Europe.[62]

Postcards of revolution

In various chronicles the aftermath of the 23 July 1908 constitutional revolution is recorded as an unforeseen level of euphoria in the public sphere.[63] This was especially more

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[59] Ibid., pp.133-134.

[60] In 1909 the Istanbul area had only one shop (that of Moïse Jsraelowitz) out of a total of eleven listed in the illustrated postcard business, see, *Annuaire Oriental 1909,* p.1083. However in 1912 it housed as many as five of the eleven postcard publishers, see, *Annuaire Oriental 1912,* p.848.

[61] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp.456-458.

[62] Ambiguities in the *Annuaire Oriental 1909*'s illustrated postcard category must be mentioned here. While Jserlowitz and Ludwigshon are listed under the category of illustrated picture postcards, Zellich and Fruchtermann who are known to have extensively published postcards are listed under different categories (print, frame and/or stamp shops) see, *Annuaire Oriental 1909*, p.1083. It is onerous to give exact numbers on the print run of postcards due to the script reform of 1926, which banned the sale of reserves with the former Arabic script, entailing the perishing of records. Nevertheless, Sandalcı gives a vague estimate of about 600,000 postcards published by the Fruchtermann house only, see, Mert Sandalcı, *Max Fruchtermann Kartpostalları, Vol.I* (Istanbul: Koçbank, 2000), p.14.

[63] Sir Edwin Pears, *Forty Years in Constantinople* (Essex: Anchor Press, 1916) and H.G. Dwight, *Constantinople, Settings and Traits* (London: Harper, 1927). On contemporary ephemera the dating of

so for the non-Muslim communities in the major cities of Izmir, Tarsus, Mersin or Damascus who had become equals before the law for the first time.[64] According to historian Bedross Der Matossian, 1908 marked the beginning of the public sphere with local print culture and ritual, allowing these ethnically and religiously diverse communities to participate in the culture of the Ottoman nation.[65] Matossian adds that the emergence of this new public sphere over the ancien regime required new categories of social and political definitions, new symbols seeking consensus and interaction among ethnic groups by sharing information about the revolution.[66] This initiation was also to be taken over by the now rising print culture. From July 1908 onwards there was a steady increase in the number of jobbing publications. As journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman argued in 1914, a bulky street literature in pamphlets, pictures and cartoons was created in weeks and found wide circulation, arguably more likely so for Istanbul.[67]

Postcards were also part of this new image economy, published as a direct response to the revolution, testifying to the momentum of this public symbol making. They mostly had content-generated graphic layouts, deprived of narrative and composed of promptly repurposed woodblocks, manifesting a reconciliatory image where the sultan was equally praised as the CUP-led insurgent Balkan army who had actually enforced the constitution's reinstitution. As such they reflect the political ambiguity of the post-revolutionary maze through their multi-referential iconography pointing both to the monarch -through the imperial coat of arms/portrait and/or *tuğra* (monogram)- and the revolutionary army.

A peculiarity of the first wave of post-revolutionary postcards was their reintroduction of the imperial portrait. Deringil notes that until Abdülhamid II the Ottoman sovereign had already established a certain level of visibility, which allowed a personal

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the revolution is often referred to with both its Julian (10 July) and Gregorian (23 July) dates. The *Rumi* (Julian) calendar remained in official use well until 1926.

[64] For a general perception of the revolution in major towns of the empire, see, Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Revolution in the Late Ottoman Empire* (California: Stanford University Press, 2014), pp.23-31. Zürcher argues that while even in modern nation-states the concept of equality before the law was an ideal but not a reality, in the Ottoman Empire it was not even an ideal well into nineteenth century, see, Zürcher, Turkey: *A Modern History,* p.14.

[65] Matossian, p.24.

[66] Ibid., p.24-25.

[67] Ahmet Emin Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*, p.88.

manifestation of state legitimacy.[68] Although Abdülhamid did continue to appear in the public Friday prayers, he had abstained from the circulation of his portraits during his reign, dwelling on "vibrations of power" without being seen.[69] His contempt of portraiture had extended beyond the empire's borders when in 1904 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed about postcards with the portraits of the sultan being sold in Rome, in an attempt to seize them.[70] This makes his reappearance on post-revolutionary postcards all the more intriguing. To this end the lack of Abdülhamid's contemporary portrait photographs must have been a major obstacle for publishers. In many instances even the European illustrated journals had to manipulate the sovereign's few former photographs for contemporary necessities creating an ambiguity on the looks of the sultan.[71]

A postcard of this kind is published by Istanbul's *Zellich* printing house [Fig.1.2].[72] The woodblock portrait of Abdülhamid, has a stiff appearance since it is possibly developed from his photograph of 1876 by W. & D. Downey to have an aged look [Fig.1.3]. A digital overlaying of the two images also suggests this [Fig.1.4]. Considering the postcard was sent on 6 August 1908, it must have been commercially available within less than two weeks from the revolution. Similar woodblocks could be bought or rented relatively cheaply from surrounding journals such as the *American Bible House* and the composition of a postcard of this sort would have been rather easy given the compatibility of the relief-cut woodblocks with the letterpress, allowing simultaneous printing of word and image.[73] This imperial portrait appears surprisingly on top of the crossed flags of the revolutionaries, a symbol of the political organisation of the CUP whose rise was at odds with the sultan. As a simplified version of the Ottoman coat of arms, it singled out the pillars of Ottoman identity, the green flag for the universal caliphate and the red for the

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[68] Selim Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains,* p.18.

[69] Deringil points that it is not possible to clearly point whether the Sultan's abstention was related to Islamic orthodoxy or obsessive prudence, see, Ibid., p.22. Gulru Necipoglu, quoted in Ibid., p.59.

[70] BCA, fol.Y.MTV.00260.00124.003.

[71] The two photographs of Abdülhamid taken as a crown prince were those by Abdullah Fréres (1869, Istanbul) and W. & D. Downey (1867, London). Throughout his reign these have been repurposed and manipulated to fit contemporary themes, see *L'Illustration*, 1750 (1876), n.p.; 'Une Paire d'Amis', *L'Illustration*, 2904 (1898), n.p.; 'Abdülhamid Khan Souverain de l'Empire Ottoman', *Le Petit Journal*, 327 (1897), n.p. and Eldem, in *Camera Ottomana*, pp.116-120.

[72] This postcard is in the private collection of Orlando Carlo Calumeno and is accessed through Osman Köker, ed., *Souvenir of Liberty*, p.66.

[73] For the woodblock process, see, Crowley and Jobling, pp.12-13.

Ottoman dynasty.[74] The juxtaposition is captioned in Ottoman Turkish, "Long live the sultan!" and to the left by the French tripartite motto with a new addition, the concept of justice. On the interpretation of text and images on postcards, Roland Barthes' view could be relevant here. Barthes argues that the text on an image compensates for the image's otherwise ambiguous references, accompanying the reader through the image and anchoring the message of the maker, circumscribing alternative interpretations.[75] Similarly, the postcard's caption assures that the sultan will be recognized in a wider context and credited for the attributes of the new political setting.

Figure I-2: Zellich-Constantinople (1908). '*The Zellich postcard with the imperial portrait and the crossed flags*' ©Osman Köker.

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[74] Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, p.26.
[75] Roland Barthes, 'Rhetoric of the Image', in *Image, Music, Text*, ed. by Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1997), pp.32-51 (p.39-41).

Figure I-3: William and Daniel Downey (1876). *'The photograph of Abdülhamid as crown prince'* ©NYPL Picture Collection.

Figure I-4: Artun Özgüner (2019). 'Digital overlaying of the Downey photograph with the woodblock imperial portrait used in the Zellich postcard.' ©Artun Özgüner.

The postcard was sent by one Ohannes, likely of Armenian origin, from Istanbul to a Madame Duzyan in Paris. He writes in French;

> Dear, cousin. What events, and what exemplary punishments for the guilty [reacted]. What a big revenge since 1894. What else are we to see? My love to the family. Yours Ohannes.

We do not know if Ohannes was of Ottoman citizenship but the choice of communicating in French within the family circle points to a common trend of the era in affluent Ottoman mercantile classes.[76] Ohannes presumably refers to the unrest that rose in the eastern Anatolian provinces in 1894, caused by the friction of the Abdülhamid-empowered Kurdish elite and the Armenian communities provoked by Russia.[77] In 1896, the outrage spread to the capital with the assault of the Dashnak Party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) on

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[76] In his memoires, professor of Greek literature Mario Vitti recalls that, even up until 1930s French was sort of a lingua franca within the non-Muslim community of Pera and Galata since it facilitated communication within their cosmopolitan community of Armenian, Jewish and Levantines with various backgrounds. This dialect of French would often slip into the family circle as well through the French nursemaids in charge of children's instructions, see, Mario Vitti, *Doğduğum Şehir İstanbul: 1926-1946* (Istanbul: Istos, 2017), p.39.

[77] Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p.83

the Ottoman Bank headquarters, resulting in public unrest.[78] The calamities caused by the incident was also recorded on a postcard in 1902, where a brutal lithographic print depicts a decapitated Abdülhamid, hung on a butcher's hook with the French caption "Turk's hook in use in Armenia. For steady butchers" [Fig.1.5].[79] The credentials of the publisher remain unintelligible but the printing of a hand-written text on the lithographic master without the use of movable type -and therefore printing press- points to their limited resources, suggesting an eagerness to disseminate a counteractive image of the sultan within limited means. A similar counter propaganda at this vernacular level has not been found in the research as a response to the calamities committed to the Ottoman Armenian communities in the 1915 purges. This might point to the disintegration and dissolution of these communities and the loss of their cultural means and civic status to a point where they could no longer respond proportionately to these events. In any case the silence of the archives might also be suggestive on this matter compared to this 1897 sample.[80]

With respect to 1897 events, however, Ohannes' words offer a sense of confidence that the new regime will reinstate justice as he describes it tantamount to a "revenge" for the atrocities of the Hamidian administration, adding up expectations of a brighter future where he says, "What else are we to see?". This makes Abdülhamid's coexistence in the postcard all the more questionable. While Ohannes makes no mention of dissent towards the sultan, part of his message is scribbled right after the word, "*coupables*" (the guilty). It is unlikely that Hamidian censorship could have interfered given that the card was sent through the French post, which had political immunity. Ohannes might have rather self-censored himself due to the dissent implicit in his message. Since close inspection of the

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[78] Ibid.

[79] BCA, fol.FTG.2016.001. The original caption reads '*Crochet Turc en Usage en Armenie. Pour Bouchers CONSTANT!*'.

[80] This commentary concerns dissident acts through print media. Photographic presence of Armenian communities in Anatolia before the 1915 mass deportations and massacres have been widely catalogued especially through the postcards in the Orlando Carlo Calumeno Collection, see, *100 Yil Once Turkiye'de Ermeniler, vols.I, II,* ed. by Osman Koker (Istanbul: Bir Zamanlar Yayincilik, 2013). The aforementioned inaccessibility of this collection makes it unfathomable whether if any such responses to the 1915 events exist.

card has not been possible, it is not conceivable what clues the retro side may present.[81] It must also be remembered that due to collectible properties of postcards, image-inscription correlativity, as manifested by Ohannes here, is rare. For instance, on an identical postcard that was sent on 11 August 1908 from Istanbul to Corbelin, France, the sender wrote in French "A souvenir from our revolution that will do well in your collection", reserving the retro side for private matters.[82] This makes Ohannes' correspondence invaluable.

Figure I-5: Anonymous publisher (c.1890s). *'The postcard demoting Sultan Abdülhamid'* ©Prime Ministry Republican State Archives.

Despite his contempt of portraiture, Abdülhamid is said to have taken advantage from this misapprehension on his role in the revolution but the motives behind the reappearance of the imperial portrait seem to be manifold.[83] In 1894 *Zellich* had won the merits of the sultan with a *Médaille des beaux-arts* (medal for fine-arts) for its

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[81] Unfortunately my pleas for a research in the Calumeno collection have been refused.

[82] SALT Archives, fol.ANUH00109.

[83] Since Hamidian censorship hindered the dissemination of accurate news in the capital, the sultan had presented his own account of the events, see, Zürcher, p.93.

accomplishments in lithography printing.[84] This did not render it exempt from Hamidian censorship; its postcards depicting interiors of Muslim shrines, or worshipping Muslims were often banned on grounds that they offended the sanctity of religion.[85] However, these sanctions were futile as most publishers were not of Ottoman citizenship meaning that their goods and trade activities were protected by foreign concessions.[86] Ottoman authorities could not interfere with mail bearing stamps of a European postal service operating in the empire, unless through relevant embassies.[87] Nevertheless, for over thirty years of Hamidian reign, these sanctions must have necessitated some fine-tuning for publishers, who seem to acknowledge the polyvalent references of images they were printing. On an almost identical assortment of the same postcard *Zellich* merely replaced the imperial portrait with the imperial coat of arms, which Abdülhamid himself had diligently worked to refine in order to ubiquitously represent his power on public buildings [Fig.1.6].[88] Especially in the unsettled atmosphere of the revolution, paying due respect to the sultan's symbols -iconic or graphic- would be more attentive as he was still incumbent.

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[84] Kursar, p.99.
[85] BCA, fol.DH.MKT.00983.00004 / 00078, 2 July 1905. On another instance Zellich was even accused of conspiracy for publishing material for French monks against the Ottoman state, see, BCA, fol.HR.TH.214.5.
[86] In desperate cases the authorities had to purchase all the stocks or the editors were informed via the embassies, see, BCA, fol.DH.MKT.00983.00004 / 00078 2 July 1905.
[87] British, French, German and Belgian postal services were operative in the Ottoman Empire.
[88] Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, pp.29-35. For the postcard, see, Köker, p.65. On this postcard the caption reads in French; '*Vive S. M. le Sultan!*' and '*Vive la constitution!!!*'.

Figure I-6: Zellich-Constantinople (1908). '*The Zellich postcard with the imperial coat of arms and the crossed flags*'
©Osman Köker.

Given the aforementioned resource constraints of late Ottoman print culture, it would not be surprising to see the imperial portrait printed by *Zellich*, appearing in similar layouts by different publishers. An example from Istanbul's *Aristovoulos et Anastasiadis* house carries a similar woodblock portrait of the sultan, possibly developed overlaying a same master [Fig.1.7].[89] This was also sent immediately in the aftermath of the July revolution, on 17 August 1908 from Samsun to London. Since close inspection was not possible, inscriptions on the retro side, if any, are beyond reach but the graphic layout is nonetheless helpful.[90] Compared to *Zellich*, *Aristovoulos et Anastasiadis* was a smaller enterprise without a lithography press and in the trade directories it was not classified as a postcard publisher.[91] Hence, the fact that both publishers used a similar woodblock portrait could attest to the limited availability of resources in the market, given the scarcity of the monarch's image. As with the *Zellich* card [Fig.1.2], here too captions worked to anchor the context of the commemoration to the image, moreover so with the inclusion of Armenian

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[89] The original of this postcard too is in the private collection of Orlando Carlo Calumeno, it is accessed through Köker, p.60.

[90] Unfortunately Köker's *Souvenir of Liberty* only depicts the front side of postcards. Since access to the Calumeno collection was not granted for this study, the sender's inscription is unknown.

[91] *Annuaire Oriental 1909*, p.1172.

and Greek along with Ottoman Turkish and French. However, they point to different messages. French and Greek versions refer to the original three concepts, liberty, equality and fraternity while the Ottoman caption adds to it "homeland" and "justice" and the Armenian version merely reads, "Long live the constitution". It is difficult to discern why the revolution would resonate differently within the various public spheres of the empire, given that the exclusivity of the concept of homeland to Turkish seems to suggest a direct connection with patriotism and language. It is likely that Armenian patriotism may have been marginalized in the aftermath of the aforementioned 1890s terrorist attacks of the Dashnak Party, whereas Ottoman Greeks -as were the publishers- were relatively less discernable from their Muslim compatriots, even sharing some rituals.[92]

Figure I-7: *Aristovoulos et Anastasiadis* (1908). *'Postcard with a similar layout with the Zellich card.'* ©Osman Köker.

A similar postcard is from *Pierre N. Vasel* of Izmir, who was specialized in postcard publishing [Fig.1.8].[93] In Izmir as well, the postcard industry had a slight boom compared to 1900. Along with *Vasel*, there were two more specialized publishers *Th.*

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[92] Evdokya Epeoğlu-Bakalaki, in Taylan Esin, 'Yunanca Kaynaklara Göre 1916 Ankara Yangını', *Toplumsal Tarih,* 227 (2012), 22-34 (p.27). Ersin refers to the shared rituals and superstitions between Greek Orthodox and Muslim citizens, quoting from Epeoğlu's memoir.
[93] *Annuaire Oriental 1909*, p.1902. The postcard has been accessed in IBBAK, fol.Krt_012060.

Homere and *Zachariona et Couri*.[94] *Vasel*'s graphic arrangement bears a lot of affinities with that of *Zellich*'s [Fig.1.2]. Both their typeface and woodblock for the crossed flags seem to be from the same source. By 1900 most postcard publishers in industrial Europe had begun printing postcards with integrated text-image designs from the onset, but in the Ottoman sphere this fine-tuning of image-text correlativity had not yet occurred.[95] Even so, a slight visual hierarchy is present in the *Vasel* card. Publishers like *Vasel* used larger fonts and bold lettering, as Michael Twyman argues, as an anticipator of experimental psychologists in increasing the impact of the message by enlarging the most important words.[96] Implied also in the Vasel card is the use of capital and bold lettering for the captions that praise the constitution "*Vive la constitution!*" and the army "*Vive l'armée*" with varying tones. Nevertheless, letterforms are used without relevance to their implicit aesthetic contribution to the visual narrative through their form, suggesting the likelihood of a common mass supplier. In fact, big companies like the French type foundry *G. Peignot et Fils* had subsidiaries in Istanbul, Izmir and Cairo, and the foundry of Hatchik Kevorkian in Istanbul's Babiali Street seems likely to have remained the major supplier of the era, even in the provinces; offering a wide variety of French, Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian, Georgian and Hebrew types.[97]

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[94] Ibid. It must also be added that in 1900 Izmir had no lithographers, but in 1909 it had five of them, all non-Muslims, see, Ibid., p.1913.

[95] For the transformation of typography as a formal evocation of the image in late nineteenth-century Europe, see, Crowley and Jobling, pp.80-81.

[96] Michael Twyman, *Printing 1770-1970: an illustrated history of its development and uses in England* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1970), p.14.

[97] *Annuaire Oriental 1909*, pp.1139, 2588, 2646.

Figure I-8: P.N. Vasel – Smyrne (1908). 'The Vasel postcard crediting the army's role in the revolution' ©Atatürk Library.

Despite its visual emulation of the *Zellich* postcard, *Vasel*'s peculiarity lay in its blatant appraisal of the army's role in the revolution with larger font. Ignoring the sultan's new constitutionalist public image altogether might be explained with the publisher's remoteness to the capital. Another postcard from Izmir's *Coyonninan & Co.* had a similar caption in French and Ottoman-Turkish; "Long Live the Army!" along with crossed flags, cockades and the imperial coat of arms [Fig.1.9].[98] At a time when the Hamidian network of espionage was still effective, within a few miles range of the palace, *Zellich* would have refrained from such a blunt phrasing, praising the army. Whereas Izmir was distant from the capital and with a remarkable non-Muslim community, dissent towards the sultan could be manifested more explicitly.[99] Indeed, following the revolution, in August 1908, fierce protests against the ancien regime have culminated in an assault to the Hamidian clock tower, originally built in 1901 to commemorate the sultan's silver jubilee. The mob threw

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[98] IBBAK, fol.Krt_012073.

[99] Such an assumption is all the more plausible since there is another example also from the city of Izmir by editor *Coyonninan & Co.* with the caption '*Vive l'armée*' (Long Live the Army!) along with crossed flags, cockades and the Imperial coat of arms, see, IBBAK, fol. Krt_012073.

stones at the tower in a fury to demolish it with sledgehammers until guards could intervene.[100]

Figure I-9: Coyonnian & Co. (1908). *'The Coyonnian postcard from Izmir praising the role of the army in the revolution'* ©Atatürk Library.

It was Alice who sent the *Vasel* postcard from Chios Island to Mme. Demonchy in Paris, on 2 September 1908. She writes her personal account of the revolution (in French) on the front side of the postcard, reserving the retro for private matters. It goes as follows; "A historical day pointing at the beginning of a new period in the pages of Turkey, whose motto is almost the same as ours. Alice".[101] Similar to Ohannes, Alice also points to a break in time brought in by the current political changes, ending Hamidian oppression. When she shares her thoughts on the similarities between the French Revolution of 1789 and the current events, she seems likely motivated by the graphic layout of the postcard. This was hardly coincidental as Brummett also points to the emulation of French symbolism in the post-1908 satirical cartoons, asserting that there was a need in the press to look for preceding notions of popular sovereignty, which were absent in the Ottoman print

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[100] Olcay Pullukçuoğlu Yapucu, 'II. Meşrutiyet, İzmir ve Siyasal Seçimler', in *Izmir Kent Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 1,* ed. by Oktay Gökdemir (Izmir: Imaj Basim Yayin Reklamcilik ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti., 2013), 206-216 (p.207).
[101] IBBAK, fol.Krt_012060.

culture.[102] As such how the publishers delineated the revolution through these adopted, barrowed styles and then synthesized it through local elements seems to have mediated the social perception of the revolution.

Despite the prevalence of Galata's cosmopolitan publishers in so promptly welcoming the revolution, a postcard published by Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi (1876-1963) should also be mentioned, as a singular example found in this research coming from a Muslim publisher of peninsular Istanbul [Fig.1.10].[103] Hilmi had started as a publisher of religious and later martial books, but in 1908 he had joined the revolutionary zeal by publishing a short-lived daily, *Millet* (Nation) and later contributed to the emancipation movement by publishing historical, scientific, philosophic books and textbooks.[104] In many ways he was a pioneering Muslim-Turkish publisher in peninsular Istanbul's print culture, and way after the 1908 revolution, his ABCs and readers were subject to orthodox iconoclast bans on grounds that they depicted animals and human beings.[105] As such the singularity of Hilmi's postcard coming from a Muslim publisher as he was, further underlines his aspirations to the medium-specific properties of postcards in materializing social change.

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[102] Brummett, pp.11, 73-78.
[103] IBBAK, fol. Krt_12031.
[104] *Millet* was only published in eighty three issues, between August-October 1908, see, Başak Ocak Gez, 'Bir Babıali Yayıncısının Portresi: Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 74 (2000), 53-57 (pp.54-55). In 1910, Hilmi published a first reader for children, see, Benjamin Fortna, *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic*, p.116.
[105] Gez, p.55.

Figure I-10: İbrahim Hilmi (1908). *'Postcard published by Hilmi'* ©Atatürk Library.

The postcard simultaneously advertises the publisher's newspaper and politically orients it to the pro-constitutionalist front with its caption on the retro, "Read *Millet Daily!*". It was sent on 1 August 1908 from Istanbul to Hague, Holland, within weeks after the revolution of 23 July. Therefore, it is also likely to be promptly composed of various repurposed woodblocks as the stylistic discrepancies between the Art Nouveau embellishments on the left side, the saluting soldier and the typeface suggest. More intriguing is the depiction of the sultan. The woodblock print for the imperial portrait looks distinctly different than the former *Zellich* and *Aristovoulos et Anastasiadis* cards, given its far resemblance to Abdülhamid. It is even doubtful if it has been carved by the same agency at all, as it almost introduces another, younger sultan. Pointing to the aforementioned intercommunal collaboration in the Ottoman print industry, argued by Ersoy, this postcard was printed by the French *E. Souma* in the Galata district. The sender, Şakir Bey's inscription on the retro is rather short "Liberating greetings!" in French but on the front side, he adds "*VIVE!*" (Live!) in capitals above the printed tripartite motto, possibly to revive the otherwise static narrative of the image, suggested by the rigidly

rendered soldier.

Returning to Stewart's argument that postcards can potentially reduce the public into two-dimensional representation, which is then appropriated to the private view of the individual, it is plausible to assert that the above correspondences emerged from within a public sphere with expectations of order and justice emulating Western ideals. Although it is quite onerous to argue the pervasiveness of this view, communicating through postcards in French, can be interpreted as implicit markers of senders' affluent social class. As French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues cultural consumption and taste are less invisible markers of social class but equally important as economic capital.[106] Therefore, although the "fluid circulation" of these images is harder to assess, both the agency of publishers in promptly responding to the revolution through new commodities and the peculiar singularisation of these artefacts by senders indicate an aspiration of the Ottoman urban cosmopolitan classes to both Western modes of consumption through the postcard and Western politics through the endorsement of the new regime.[107] Production-wise, despite their limited resources and political constraints, publishers seem to have been active agents in the mediation of the revolution in a hybrid graphic synthesis, by imbuing the postcards with a synthesis of foreign influences of the French Revolution and local dynastic/political references. The considered correspondences also highlight this view.

It should also be noted that, as Edhem Eldem also points out, most correspondences on postcards in the late Ottoman era do not necessarily refer to the image due to prevalent collecting habits, making their handling difficult through Stewart's aforementioned approach.[108] Yet, even as collectible items postcards are no less meaningful objects and as will be seen, at times even conceived from the onset for such purpose. Akin to what John Tagg argues as the "visual currency value of images", once visuals change hands, they find

[106] Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979).
[107] I am indebted to Johann Strauss from Strasbourg University for clarifying this observation. Having an immense body of research on Ottoman postcards Strauss also confirms that postcard correspondence beyond the Ottoman elite and especially for less affluent Muslim sects of the population was quite uncommon.
[108] Edhem Eldem, in *Camera Ottomana*, p.139.

different uses, meanings and values in diverse social practices.[109] That is, how postcards were made meaningful; banned as obscene objects, or instrumentalised for propaganda, is an equally crucial part of the history of the period, which is the theme of the next section.

Postcards of counter-revolution

In 12 April 1909, a counter-revolution broke out by mutinying soldiers demanding the restoration of religious law and monarchy. This had proved the weakness of the new regime with respect to the sultan's power to mobilize his orthodox Muslim subjects.[110] Although it did not spread to the provinces, particularly in Adana a suspiciously simultaneous pogrom ended up with the massacre of thousands of Ottoman Armenians.[111] The CUP members fled the capital while Sultan Abdülhamid allegedly profited from the turmoil to restore his powers.[112]

A prominent journalist and politician, Falih Rıfkı Atay (1894-1971), recalls that on the day of the counter-revolution, he was stopped on his way to school by a mob of mutinying soldiers and orthodox fanatics, who began tearing the illustrated pages from his textbooks, urging him to "repent from ungodliness".[113] This incident hints on the shifting role of images within the competing social spheres of the empire, especially during political upheaval. On April 24, order was finally re-established with the deployment of the Action Army from the Balkans, under the command of Mahmut Şevket Pasha and composed mostly of Albanian volunteers under Niyazi Bey's control. However, the spirit of the revolution was lost since the suppression of the counter-revolution had shifted all the power to the army, making all its aims stand above the law with extended martial laws well into

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[109] Tagg, p.164.

[110] Zürcher, pp.95-99. The incident is known as the *31 March Case* in Turkish historiography, due to the Julian calendar then in use.

[111] Lewis, p.217. Lewis refrains from giving exact numbers but Zürcher gives an estimate of around twenty thousand Armenian deaths, see, Zürcher, p.99.

[112] Ezel K. Shaw and Stanford J. Shaw, *The Rise of Modern Turkey*, p.281. Abdülhamid's complicity in the event is disputed and beyond the scope of this thesis but at the very least, he seems to have taken advantage of the situation.

[113] Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Batış Yılları* (Istanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2012), p.43.

1912.[114]

The counter-revolution's suppression did not immediately entail a censorship on images but rather with its pace of events made photographic narratives abundant in the postcards of this period. The printing of postcards ensued, but publishers increasingly espoused a propagandistic, content-generated narrative through more advanced image-making resources; photography and lithographic narratives, in line with the new regime's patriotic zeal. This section will thus deal with this shift to visual and photographic narratives in postcards in the counter-revolution era. Although the resources scanned in this research have not yielded any inscribed postcard sent in the aftermath of the counter-revolution, it will offer a snapshot of the network in operation as publishers and photomechanical processes were increasingly entangled in social commentary. As Ahmet Ersoy also reminds us following Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, that Ottoman publishers, editors and photographers were almost always driven by profit, which explains their adaptability to new strains.[115] The ensuing production of images may also reflect a ruling ideology where social change, as in the arrival of freedom, is replaced by a change in images and understood as the freedom to consume images and goods.[116] Either way, photography was globally becoming the basis for the postcard, reproduced and reprinted on cards through the processes of photogravure, collotype, chromolithography, or half-tone engraving.[117] In Istanbul too these techniques were becoming widespread. Especially, in 1909 the number of zincographers in the whole city had reached six compared to just one in 1900.[118]

An example of this is a snapshot of Enver and Niyazi Bey in front of the Taksim *Topçu* (Artillery) barracks, which was printed both by *Max Fruchtermann* and *Moïse Jsraelowitz*, pointing to a common resource [Fig.1.11, 12].[119] These barracks were one of the places where the insurgents had concentrated their fight during the counter-revolution

[114] Zürcher, p.100.
[115] Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, *The Coming of the Book: The Impact of Printing 1450–1800 (1958)*, quoted in Ersoy, p.337.
[116] Sontag, p.140.
[117] Beth Ann Guynn, 'Postcard', in *Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography, Vol.I*, ed. by John Hannavy (London: Routledge, 2008), 1162-1164 (p.1163).
[118] *Annuaire Oriental* 1900, p.768; and *Annuaire Oriental 1909,* p.1243.
[119] IBBAK, fols. Krt_00009 and Krt_028146.

and the postcards by relying on photography's indexical "it has been there" effect testify to Enver Bey's presence in the re-conquest of the space.[120] However, recalling Barthes' argument on the ambiguity of the image, this photograph is also "physically mute" unless it "talks through the mouth of the text", its caption, as Jean-Luc Godard and Jean-Pierre Gorin also assert.[121] The caption on the *Fruchtermann* copy suggests the beholder that the indiscernible figure is the revolutionary "hero" Enver Bey who is "chatting [...] with his father" in front of the mutinying barracks [Fig.1.11]. Likewise the *Jsraelowitz* copy mentions that he is "receiving congratulations" for the seizure of the barracks [Fig.1.12]. Thus, through a random activity, they both implicitly suggest Enver Bey's regain of control of the barracks. As their dot pattern under magnification suggests -reminiscent of the half-tone screen- both postcards were possibly reproduced from the same negative, out of which various half-tone screens or photogravure etching plates were made through photozincography, a process then common in Istanbul.[122] In talking about the market-driven ambitions of Ottoman photography studios Ersoy also notes that despite undertaking official commissions Ottoman photographers did not refrain from circulating the same images in the public domain.[123] However, the half-tone process required higher initial costs than printing photographic cards, thus the demand in the market must have been solid enough to recover these. Ideally then, the snapshot and its half-tone screens might have been serviced to the publishers to popularize Enver Bey's damaged reputation through a new official rhetoric. In the Ottoman print media, especially, the half-tone process often presented "persuasive reproductions of original photographic prints" which bore traces of human intervention.[124] In this case, the *Fruchtermann* and *Jsraelowitz* copies also seem to suggest this motivated intervention.

[120] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), p.115.
[121] Jean-Luc Godard and Jean-Pierre Gorin, quoted in Sontag, p.84.
[122] However, given the wide concentration of lithographers in Galata, all ten of them located in the area, they could also have been developed into two different half-tone photolithographic plates, see, *Annuaire Oriental 1909,* p.1172.
[123] Ersoy, *The Sultan and his Tribe*, p.42.
[124] Ersoy, *Ottomans and the Kodak Galaxy*, p.338.

Figure I-11: Max Fruchtermann (1909). '*Postcard depicting Enver Bey in front of Taksim barracks*' ©Atatürk Library.

Figure I-12: Moise Jsraelowitz (1909). '*A similar shot of Enver printed by the Jsraelowitz house*' ©Atatürk Library.

Part of Enver Bey's rhetoric on the counter-revolution was his stress on the multi-ethnic composition of the Action Army. In a common burial site for the martyrs of the counter-revolution, he had emphasized that "Muslims and Christians were lying side by side in token that they, living or dying, were henceforward fellow-patriots who would know no distinction of race or creed".[125] This rhetoric is materialized by *Max Fruchtermann* in a series of thirty-five hand-tinted, half-tone postcards printed in December 1909. These came with a special envelope captioned, *Collection de 35 Cartes Postales Coluriées-Investissement de Constantinople par L'Armée Rouméliote-Le 11-24 Avril 1909* (Collection of 35 Coloured Postcards-Capture of Constantinople-11-24 April 1909), which enables us to assert that they were conceived as collectible items.[126] The series start with portraits of military actors; commander Mahmut Şevket Pasha, Enver and Muhtar Pashas and Niyazi

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[125] Pears, p.282.
[126] Sandalcı, *Vol.III*, p.983-982.

Bey, framing the procession of the Action Army in a chronological narrative, emphasizing the role of Greek and Armenian volunteer bands. Two of the postcards, showing the Armenian volunteers in the Izmit train station, as told by the captions, are markedly in circular shape [Fig.1.13].[127] This suggests the use of a portable Eastman Kodak camera, which increased the mobility of picture taking with a low-cost photographic process, enabling amateur masses to engage with the medium.[128] It is thus no coincidence that both frames capture a spontaneous moment while the volunteers were still in transit to reach the capital. Kodak cameras were widely available to the Ottoman public. In an anecdote that appeared in the *Servet-i Fünun* journal in 1895; when Western tourists wanted to secretly photograph veiled Muslim women with their supposedly unnoticeable hand-held Kodak camera; the women, realizing the plot, not only turned their gazes away from the camera but also waved back their own Kodak cameras at the tourists.[129] Hence the connotations of the circular frame, the mobility and the promptness of the volunteers must have been legible to a larger urban public in 1909. By the turn of the century, photography's relation with social turmoil was also becoming commonplace. As Peter Jackson argues, the popularisation of photography with the Kodak camera distanced it from art, making it increasingly instrumental for political commentary and social reform as evidenced in the works of American photographers Jacob Riis (*How the Other Half Lives*, 1890) and Edward Sherriff Curtis (*The North American Indian*, 1907).[130] Similarly, the official narrative on the unity of an Ottoman nation in the fight against the insurgents might have influenced Fruchtermann to publish the series. What is more interesting is that print actors like *Fruchtermann* reciprocated the inclusive rhetoric of CUP through such print commodities. This highlights to the wide span of the network in question, offering a sociotechnological commentary (suggesting unity through photography and photomechanical processes) of the public domain.

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[127] The second shot numbered A14 can be found in Ibid. An identical hand-tinted copy of it is also published by *Jsraelowitz*, once again highlighting their common photographic resource, see, IBBAK, fol. Krt_027471.

[128] The 1889 Kodak camera ran on rolls of films instead of paper and produced circular pictures, see, Johan Swinnen, 'History 7: 1880s', in *Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography*, *Vol.I,* 698-702 (p.700).

[129] *Servet-i Fünun*, 237 (1889).

[130] Peter Jackson, 'Constructions of Culture, Representations of Race: Edward Curtis's "Way of Seeing", in *Inventing Places*, ed. by Kay Anderson and Fay Gale (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1992) pp.89-106 (p.91).

Figure I-13 Max Fruchtermann (c. 1909). Collection de 35 Cartes Postales Coluriées-Investissement de Constantinople par L'Armée Rouméliote-Le 11-24 Avril 1909 *'The postcard developed from the Kodak shot'* ©Atatürk Library.

The claim of photography on objective representation could also be incorporated with symbolic content for emotional expression to visually direct certain messages.[131] Known as "revolutionary kitsch", this construction of sentimental narratives for the commercialisation of a populist version of social change was also commonplace in the West.[132] Susan Sontag argues that although photography cannot take a moral stand it can nonetheless reinforce or help build new ones, a logic with which the revolutionary kitsch operated.[133] This is crystallized in a postcard printed by the *Jsraelowitz* house, where staged, studio photographs of children dressed as soldiers are printed as half-tone postcards [Fig.1.14].[134] The postcard euphemizes a lust for martial power through the miniaturisation of expected malehood patterns, making them seem less intimidating. Similar to the former postcards of the Taksim barracks, the same shot was published by separate bodies through different processes, like the one by the *Jacques Ludwigshon* house, suggesting again a common

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[131] Tom Allbeson, 'Visualising Wartime Destruction and Postwar Reconstruction: Herbert Mason's Photograph of St. Paul's Re-evaluated', *The Journal of Modern History*, 87 (2015) 532-587.
[132] I owe this term to Sontag, pp.102, 133.
[133] Ibid., p.13.
[134] IBBAK, fol.Krt_1959.

resource for propaganda.[135] Although none of these samples bear any inscription, here a legislative dimension of the network might be suggestive. Following the suppression of the April counter-revolution, in August 1909, new legislations had passed, prohibiting political associations for ethnic groups and the conscription of non-Muslims in the army.[136] This was exacerbated by the first large-scale political boycott, orchestrated by the CUP as a response to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the unification of Crete with Greece but had rather inflicted the non-Muslim businesses of the empire.[137] In describing the publication of reading materials for children, Benjamin Fortna also points to the increasing martial tone as of 1911, which obliged non-Muslim publishers to espouse Turkist and militarist contents for commercial survival, gradually shrinking the eclecticism of late Ottoman print culture.[138] Such an agenda of social cohesion was at odds with Enver Bey's former rhetoric on an inclusive public domain. Nevertheless, the adoption of such assimiliation policies through the sympathization of militarist lust in circulating imagery testifies once again to the concomitant use of photomechanical technologies and social commentary to shape the public domain.

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[135] For the *Ludwigshon* sample, which is identical with the IBBAK card, see, Köker, p.100. A very similar postcard with same children and props appears in a black and white colloytpe print, albeit without the publisher information, see, IBBAK, fol.Krt_000067.
[136] Lewis, pp.217-218.
[137] Zürcher, p.104 and Lewis, p.460.
[138] Fortna, pp.85, 86.

Figure I-14: Moise Jsraelowitz (c.1909). Les enfants de la liberté *'Postcard depicting children in military attire'*
©Atatürk Library.

Besides photography, publishers also used lithography to construct sentimental narratives. An example from publisher *Vicopoulos* of Salonika, the second most important port-city of the empire, is suggestive, illustrated by a Greek lithographer, Sotiris Christidis [Fig.1.15]. Originally, Christidis' work was printed by the *ΛΙΘΟΓΡΑΦΊΑ ΤΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΉΣ ΑΥΛΉΣ Γ. ΣΤΑΓΓΕΛ & ΣΑΣ ΑΘΗΝΑΙ* (Lithography of the Royal Court, G. Staggelis, Athens), as is suggested by the centre bottom box with the publisher credit on the *Vicopoulos* card. It was a coloured lithographic print, unlike the monochrome *Vicopoulos* sample. This only makes sense because compared to Istanbul Salonika's image-making resources were minimal. In 1900, the number of lithographers was only three with only two photography studios, albeit with a considerable amount of bookshops and paper suppliers of which *Vicopoulos* was one.[139] In 1909, the city had no specialized postcard publishers and only one lithography studio, whereas photography studios had boomed to eight.[140] In such a technically constrained environment, *Vicopoulos* reproduced Christidis'

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[139] In 1900's Salonika there were around fifteen businesses listed under the category of "*librairies et papetiers*", see, *Annuaire Oriental 1900*, pp.1137-1138. For lithographers see, Ibid., p.1137.
[140] *Annuaire Oriental 1909*, p.1810, 1813.

original work through a collotype copy, discernable from the moiré effect in close-up examination. As a photomechanical process, collotype required skill and had lower print runs, but was nonetheless a popular process widely used for the production of inexpensive quality postcards until WWI.[141] Christidis' work was also published through another collotype reproduction by Athen's *Nana Dimitriou* bookstore, which probably is closer to the lithographic master without cropping [Fig.1.16].[142] There has also been found a third sample in the Orlando Calumeno Collection, possibly also a collotype judging by the white margins, all suggesting the use of different plates by different bodies.[143] As is suggested by the CUP coat of arms on the upper left, it seems likely that the CUP headquarters, then still based in Salonika, commissioned the illustration to Christidis in Athens as an established illustrator for partisan propaganda. Christidis was also a native of Salonika but was active in Athens in the illustration of patriotic scenery, reviving the Greek and Byzantine past in order to incite a popular nationalist fervor for the Greek cause.[144] His simultaneous involvement in the CUP propaganda suggests the hybrid attributes of designers in this era, crossing the more fluid social and national boundaries, while the various formats of his illustration suggest the postcard's ability to cross the technical limitations of publishers. This also represents another dimension of the network where actors are confined to the available technologies which delegate how they can operate in a sociotechnological world. Both the work of Christidis on the propaganda of an increasingly Turkish Islamic formulation of nationalism and its various formats in print should not be taken as coincidential outcomes of artistic choice but rather as the actors' agency being cast in a sociotechnological network. The graphic elements used also suggest this.

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[141] Luis Nadeau, 'Collotype', in *Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography, Vol.I*, 313-315 (p.314).
[142] For the Vicopoulos version, see, IBBAK, fol. Krt_12320. The Nana Dimitriou version is in SALT Archives, fol.AFDIVH106.
[143] This postcard was accessed through Köker, p.69. Publisher information is not given.
[144] Thalia Stephanidou, 'The Panhellenic Desire', *Dimitria Festival* (2017)
<https://dimitria.thessaloniki.gr/events/σωτηρησ-χριστιδησ/> [accessed 7 November 2018].

Figure I-15: Sotiris Christidis. (c.1909). *'Postcard published* by Nicolas G. Vicopoulos *of Salonika depicting both the army and intelligentsia heroes of the 1908 revolution.'* ©Ataturk Library.

Figure I-16: Sotiris Christidis. (c.1909). *'Same lithographic work of Christidis published by Nana Dimitriou, Athens'* ©SALT Research.

On Christidis' work, what seems to be a hybrid, Turkic from of the French Marianne is seen unchained by Enver and Niyazi Bey and raised by Young Turk intelligentsia. Brummett also points to the wide availability of this Turkic Marianne in the iconography of

the satirical press, arguing that it had remotely suggested the glories of the French Revolution.[146] However, her appearance comes in contrast with the confines of the former orthodox Islamic conduct of Hamidian image economy. In 1902 when the invitation cards for the second exhibition of Ottoman painters in the *Salon de Constantinople* had pictured a lavishly drawn art-nouveau figurine with a crescent-shaped hairpin, its affiliation with a Turkic essence was not so welcome. Abdülmahid's court painter, Fausto Zonaro (1854-1929) had commissioned these to a Milanese publisher. As he recalls, the head of the Censorship Committee had seized the cards in the customs office, asserting that such depiction of the crescent was inappropriate.[147] Zonaro then summoned three of his students to blot out the crescent pin with strokes of pen on each of the thousand invitation cards so that they could be cleared from the customs authority.[148] As this instance suggests, such representations of the homeland through female allegories may not have been so widely acceptable, especially for the sensibilities of an orthodox Muslim ethic. What makes Christidis' hybrid Marianne more pervasive in less than a decade later is less likely the suspension of Hamidian censor on images but is more likely to be found in the wider dissemination of the image which was possible through the postcard's adaptability to various photomehcnaical processes within local technological and financial limitations. In other words, there was not an agency towards images unbound by technology but rather both the social approach to images and reproduction technologies were changing simultaneously to offer new image reading models.

Similar lithographic narratives abounded, published extensively by the non-Muslim actors of imperial print culture, heroically glorifying the CUP actors.[149] As Vicky Goldberg also suggests, in wartime, leaders seem greater than real life, which went also true for Enver Pasha and Niyazi Bey, around whom publishers were eager to commodify a new cult

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[146] Brummett, p.83.

[147] *Twenty Years Under the Reign of Abdülhamid: The Memoirs and Works of Fausto Zonaro*, ed. by Erol Makzume and Cesare Mario Trevegine (Istanbul: Geniş Kitaplık, 2011), pp.179-180.

[148] Ibid.

[149] For examples of the new hero cult, published both in Galata and Istanbul, see, Köker, pp.79-83. For anonymous lithographic narratives on postcards of Enver and Niyazi on horseback, see, IBBAK, fol.Krt_026283, and SALT Archives, fol.ANUH00160.

of personality.[150] In 1912 when the Balkan War broke out, the ensuing dissolution of the empire marked an irrevocable social change, likely to have terminated this hero cult. The competing public spheres of various ethnic groups, yearning for independence, was contested heavily by postcards. Actors hitherto operating in various public spheres, like Christidis, would find themselves enclosed in a more polarized professional camp.

Postcards of revulsion

In the aftermath of the 1909 April counter-revolution, Hamidian censorship finally ended with the deposal of the sultan, who was succeeded by his brother Reşad. Nevertheless, the Balkan Wars starting in 1912, within two years of his ascension, once again complicated matters. The loss of nearly all-European territories, including the city of Edirne -the early fifteenth-century Ottoman capital- led to the influx of Muslim refugees to the capital. This had also meant a major demographic shift, where now, for the first time, ethnic Turks became a majority of the population.[151] The ensuing armed coup by the CUP in 1913 shattered the promises of constitutional freedom forever, and abruptly terminated its all-inclusive political rhetoric on Ottomanness.[152] Karpat argues that the ethnic cleansing of the Balkans from Muslim communities by Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians in the wars of 1877-8 and subsequently in the Balkan Wars were culpable in replacing cultural and linguistic differences with a unifiying Ottomanist and Islamic consciousness.[153] Zurcher on the other hand asserts that regardless the disillusionement with the reactions of the Christian minorities, the leading Young Turks were even before the 1908 revolution committed to an Ottoman Muslim nationalism.[154] Either way, this was an era where nationalism came to be defined increasingly in terms of ethno-religious sentiments on postcards. Especially WWI and the Allied occupation of Istanbul in 1918 aggravated the

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[150] Vicky Goldberg, *The Power of Photography: How Photographs Changed our Lives* (London: Abbeville Press, 1993), p.152.
[151] Zürcher, p.109.
[152] Ibid., pp.106-109.
[153] Karpat, *Historical Continuity and Identity Change*, p.12.
[154] Zurcher, *Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists*, p.173-174.

tensions in Istanbul's cosmopolitan print culture, where image production and reproduction technologies became a prominent agent in disseminating political messages leading to a segregation of the imperial print culture.[155]

This section will thus look at postcards, propaganda vehicles for war, both as singularized commodities and actors of the network seeking to define ethno-religious conflict and nationalist affiliation. It will highlight how postcards, through various printing technologies, mediated the public perception of conflict and aggression to inflict a change on the social sphere. As is argued by Matossian, the interaction within the communities of the empire was not always cooperative but rather a contested terrain where various ethnic groups competed to create a national political culture.[157] In that respect to defend a certain nationalist ideology became more and more tenable with a single (nationalist) agency which concerned both the projection of that ideology through available media resources and its printing as commodities.

Hamidian censorship had always been wary of the implications of the depiction of martial victory in print, and on many occasions it had even censored it, especially if it connoted the superiority of constitutional monarchy by the defeat of an absolute monarch as in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War .[158] In 1914, similar sanctions came back when the Ministry of Internal Affairs published a new decree on the ban of import and postage of postcards depicting the Greco-Ottoman War, asserting that it was offending "the feelings of Ottomanness".[161] A postcard of this kind was published by the Istanbulite *Julius Kaufmann*

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[155] Koloğlu, *Bir Zamanlar Babiali*, p.6. The Zellich printing house seems an exception in this case as it seems to have adapted to new circumstances, supporting the *Izmir Mudafaa-i Hukuk-i Osmaniye Cemiyeti* (Society for the Protection of the Ottoman Rights), a pioneering opponent organisation to the Allied occupation. Zellich printed the manifesto of the society *Un Appel à la Justice* (A Call for Justice) in 1919, claiming the rights of Turks to their homeland.

[157] Matossian, p.24.

[158] Zürcher, p.89. Japan was a sought-after model of development well into 1910s for the Young Turks, hence seen by implication as a threat for Hamidian bureaucracy. In a poem by Mehmet Akif (Ersoy) the advancement of Japan was attributed to the uncorrupted nature of Buddhist ethics, which was seen essentially Islamic or it was often iterated as a paragon of material development by intellectuals like Abdullah Cevdet, see, Berkes, pp.342-362. For the Hamidian sanctions on the circulation of depictions of the Russo-Japanese War see, BCA, fols.DH.MKT.851.38, 15 May 1904 and DH.MKT.883.12, 23 August 1904.

[161] BCA, fols, DH.I.UM.EK.86.83, 29 January 1914 and DH.I.UM.EK.02.59, 29 January 1914.

house as a photolithographic print [Fig.1.17].[162] It heroically depicts the fierce battle, which took place in Epirus, Greece. *Kaufmann* seems to have repurposed this image from a master, possibly created by a Greek publisher in New York, as the painted-over watermark on the bottom right suggests. It was then reproduced by the *ΒΙΒΛΙΟΠΩΛΕΙΟ ΑΝΔΡΕΑ ΠΑΣΧΑ* (Andrea Pascha Bookstore) in Athens, enlarged with two bleed bands on each side, ideally to make the illustration match in size as a postcard. The *Kaufmann* copy is likely to have hand-tinted the red and blue emphasis for the blood and flags later on. As such, the materiality of the postcard itself highlights the lifespan of the image showing us the proliferation of agency in the Ottoman postcard network in the early 1910s. It suggests that the agencies in the making of the image and in the printing of the postcard were multifarious.

The *Kaufmann* postcard in question was sent on 25 December 1920 to the Princes Islands, Istanbul with a short, unsigned inscription; "A memory of your son, Dimitriou Laoutos". Whether Dimitriou fought and died in the Balkan Wars nearly a decade ago or during the then ongoing Greek occupation of Western Turkey remains elusive since the postcard might have been valid as a visual currency for both occasions. Of interest is how a mass-produced image can be seen, simultaneously, offensive in one public sphere and internalized as memorabilia in another within the same print culture. What is more interesting is, *Kaufmann* must have been aware of this discrepancy since he had also printed postcards with heroic scenes of the Ottoman army when the city of Edirne was retaken from Bulgaria in 1913, appealing rather to a Turkish Muslim audience.[163] It is then safer to suggest that the commodification of nationalist affiliations was not merely mediated by clear demarcations of nationalist or ethno religous affiliations but to some extend also by market relations and by the limitations of the print media technologies. This was largely due to the discrepancies between the agencies in the making of the image and the printing bodies. As Ersoy had reminded us Ottoman publishers were mostly driven by profit and thus a nationalist ideology on merging the agencies in image-making and publishing might have taken some time to settle.

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162 IBBAK, fol.Krt_009489.
163 For a similar example of the same series juxtaposing Reşad's portrait in front of the heroically advancing Ottoman army, see, IBBAK, fol.Krt_011671.

Figure I-17: Julius Kaufmann & Co. – Constantinopel (c.1913). '*Postcard for Greek war propaganda in Epirus.*' ©Atatürk Library.

However, the acquisition of image making and reproduction technologies with respect to nationalist affiliations, must gradually have crystallised a line of demarcation within the empire's cosmopolitan print culture and must have directed publishers towards a single agency in the making of postcards. Adherers to the Turkish nationalist movement too responded with publications and images to counterweigh the anti-Ottoman propaganda of the Balkan League countries. Publisher İbrahim Hilmi had himself written a book in 1913, titled *Türkiye Uyan!* (Turkey, Wake Up!), explicitly delineating the atrocities committed on the Muslim communities of the Balkans, through locally produced lithographic illustrations as well photographs of the victims, overlapping the agencies in image making and printing.[164] Fortna also underlines that for children's reading material, the delineation of local realities through the use of local sartorial, architectural and cultural objects peaked from the Balkan Wars until the War of Liberation (1919-1923).[167] This was also true for

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[164] Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi Çığıraçan, *Uyan Türkiye* (Istanbul: Kitabhane-i İslam ve Askeri, 1913; repr. 2013).

[167] Fortna, p.114.

postcards, whose printing technologies were now increasingly adopted by Turkish Muslim associations, for their social commentary, fuelling the local production of images for the popularization of the Turkish national movement.

One prominent national front was the *Rumeli Muhacirîn-i İslâmiye Cemiyeti* (Rumelia Muslim Immigrants Society, RMIS) founded in 1908 to advocate for the rights of Muslims remaining in the lost territories of the empire.[168] As Karpat asserts between 1856 and 1914 around seven million migrants fled to Anatolia from the Caucasus, Crimea and the Balkan states, making migration a remarkable factor in identity transformation.[169] Contrary to the Anatolian communities, the Rumili Turks were more susceptible to nationalist political indoctrination and mobilization because they were not tribally or ethnically subdivided, thanks to wider communication and transportation networks available in their former provinces.[170]

In the turmoil of the Balkan Wars RMIS published postcards to counterweigh the propaganda of the Balkan League. These were rapidly made ink sketches, as is suggested by the free brush strokes, which were developed into monochrome half-tone plates and printed on imported postcard paper. Although circulation numbers cannot be known, the use of the half-tone process once again points to a higher quantity of prints, which the RMIS must have aspired to. The two examples found in APIKAM depict rather repulsive, agonizing scenes.[171] On one of them the caption reads "The calamities that await their revenge. Our brothers of religion are ambushed by treacherous Greeks in a trick to offer them water, and martyred shamelessly" [Fig.1.18]. The inscription of the sender, Lieutenant Dr. Hüseyin Hüsnü accompanies the illustration by saying "I am leaving for Istanbul tomorrow. Here, the treachery of Greeks. For the sake of Allah, please do show everyone!"[172] The illustration on the second card depicts a more violent scene;

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[168] RMIS also published a journal voicing the needs of the Muslim refugees, although for a brief period for about ninety issues between 1909-1910, see, Züriye Çelik, 'Voice of the Rumelia Immigrants in Turkish Press During the Ottoman Empire's Harsh Times: "The Immigrant" Newspaper (1909-1910)', *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 28 (2010), 403-413 (p.409-410).
[169] Karpat, p.22.
[170] Karpat, p.11. See also Evin, p.19.
[171] APIKAM, fols.Gorsel_00014-1,2 and Gorsel_00013-1, 2.
[172] APIKAM, fol.Gorsel1_00013_2.

dismembered female bodies lying lifelessly on the ground to which high rank Bulgarian officials gaze upon [Fig.1.19]. Again the sender writes, "Only Muslims can help each other. Show this immediately to neighbour [illegible]".[173]

Figure I-18: RMIS (c.1913). Les atrocités Grecs '*Postcard sent by Dr. Hüsnü*' ©APIKAM.

Figure I-19: RMIS (c.1913). Sauvagerie Bulgare ©APIKAM.

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[173] APIKAM, fol.Gorsel1_00014_2.

Although we do not know where the senders purchased the cards, their firm belief that the further display of the postcards could persuade a wider audience supports Stewart's claim that postcards can operate as transformers of the public into private, mentioned earlier. Moreover, the postcard's caption "our brothers of religion…" and both inscriptions point to a seclusion towards a social sphere that is defined on the basis of religion, an idea becoming increasingly popular to mobilize the political communities of the empire. In producing these images as commodities, RMIS must have aspired to evoke this kind of peculiar singularisation of the commodified image as an agent disseminating a persuasive narrative. As argued earlier, publishing or commissioning bodies like the RMIS were increasingly becoming aware that the creation of a persuaisive narrative for their cause depeneded on the limits of their media technologies which was narrowing down for the sake of a singular agency in the making of these commodities. In other words, market relations of the former imperial print culture were being replaced by nationalist sentiments and affiltiations.

Here the role played by media technologies and resrouces then becomes all the more crucial at a time when these were subject to nationalist scrutiny. Established actors like Christidis, whose work on CUP propaganda was previously argued could no longer be deployed for an Ottoman cause. Conversely, Christidis' work too concentrated on the Greek nationalist cause. On one of his later lithographic works he had depicted an angel of victory replacing Hagia Sophia's *alem* (bronze crescent placed atop a mosque's dome) with a cross, anticipating the re-Christening of the shrine with a religious myth. Thus it must have been the loss of both human and non-human resources that has led to a nationalization of the imperial print culture rather than the agency of a political elite who envisioned its top-down nationalization. In other words, whichever front possessed skilled image making resources and up-to-date reproduction technologies could create a more persuasive visual narrative for their cause. This accentuated the formerly disregarded ethno religious boundaries in the empire's print culture, terminating any previous collaboration trajectories. More than deploying adequate image making resrouces the question must have turned in to "who?", the identity of the maker.

Postcards published by a similar nationalist association, the *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (Committee of National Defence, 1913, CND) express this bifurcation more clearly almost a decade after the 1908 revolution. In October 1916, the committee sent a local painter, İsmail Hakkı Bey (1863-1926) to Munich to gain expertise in colour photography printing techniques who would then be operational in making CND's postcards depicting local ambiance and types to promote volunteer enlisting and mobilize public opinion. Part of the decree issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on İsmail Hakkı's assignment also concerns the "purchase of necessary equipment" for an unspecified printing technique.[175] İsmail Hakkı was a navy engineer and an established painter of seascapes whom had previously resided in Germany during the construction of the Ottoman fleet, which must have made him an ideal candidate for the campaign.

Although it has not been possible to substantiate İsmail Hakkı's work for the CND, another series produced by the committee during the Turkish War of Liberation (1919-1923), also made by a local Turkish-Muslim artist, is remarkable in its evocation of local attributes. These, illustrated by İzzet Selahattin, were published in Istanbul by the *Matbaa-i Osmani* (Ottoman Ptinting Press). They were printed as photographs and hand-tinted -red for the flag-; a cheaper and easier way of producing postcards, albeit with less print runs than half-tones and consequently lower circulation rates. As a series they appeal to awaken nationalist sentiments through a female allegory for homeland, dressed in local attire with a veiled head. It has been highlighted that local attributes were used to familiarize the national struggle, yet it is the hybridity of the iconography that is interesting; Selahattin's work has many affinities with the international iconography of nationalism mostly deriving from the French Delacroix-like revolutionary patriotism. It invents the nation before the nation through adopted, repurposed, appropriated Western manners that find a new visual currency. One of them crystallizes this as it illustrates a Turkic Marianne raising a Turkish flag while leaning on an Ottoman coat of arms on the ground [Fig.1.20]. The arid landscape in the background is reminiscent of middle Anatolian steppes where the War of Liberation was ongoing. The caption reads, "*Espérance*" (Hope) in French and Turkish, pointing to

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175 BCA, fol.HR.SF.04.00696.44, 16 October 1916.

the risen flag. This resonates with Zonaro's former quarrel with the orthodox Muslim sensibilities of Hamidian bureaucracy for the Turkic female allegory in 1902. However, Selahattin's hybrid Marianne rather than Zonaro's art-nouveau inspired, languorous one points to the prevalence of new image reading models that, after ten years of post-revolutionary print media, must have been legitimate and intelligible to a wider Turkish Muslim public. What has made these new image reading models permeate was as much as the appropriation of Western graphic elements, also the adoption of new image reproduction technologies to create a combined agency in the making of these postcards to disseminate the committee's social message. This realignment of image production and reproduction resources on ethno-religious basis was the defining factor that led to form a nucleus of a national print culture as argued by Brockett.

Figure I-20: CND (c.1920). Espérance ©Atatürk Library.

All in all, this trajectory of postcards in the final decade of the Ottoman Empire testifies that starting with the 1908 revolution, print media technologies became an

increasingly crucial mean to dissemiante a persuasive political message to appeal to the disintegrating political communities of the Ottoman Empire. The multifaceted production venues of the Ottoman postcard industry illustrates how human and non-human actors within this network operated to offer a sociotechnological commentary through these commodities, while their peculiar singularisation by senders highlights, as Grace Lees-Maffei argues, the role of designed goods as mediating devices for identity.[176] Identity was a crucial factor since in the war economy having image production and reproduction resources meant the dissemination of desired political messages and the mobilization of new political communities. Printing technologies themselves then, rather than the agency of a political elite, must have contributed to the condensation of the heterogenous imperial print culture along the lines of a more nationally defined print culture at least for an urban elite. This is suggested by the rising single agency in the production of images and their reproduction as commodities (postcards) for the dissemination of hybrid images of nation-ness, by ethnically and/or religiously defined bodies such as the RMIS, CND and individual actors like İbrahim Hilmi. Contemporary to this phenomenon were commemorative practices of a CUP-led emperor-centered nationalism, a network that aimed to inculcate notions of popular leadership, entangling human (including the new sultan) and non-human actors (monuments, print media) which will be delineated in the following section.

I.II Promoting a New Nation

The suppression of the April counter-revolution resulted in an increasingly more pervasive CUP-led state control, gradually emaciating the post-revolutionary atmosphere of freedom in the press.[177] Led by Enver Pasha, the CUP's ardent will to conquer the capital was also manifested in the crowning of Sultan Reşad as Mehmet V, a direct reference to Mehmet II whom had conquered Constantinople in 1453.[178] Reşad was preferred by the Unionists for his mild, pro-constitutionalist character, as a figurehead for the CUP given his

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[176] Grace Lees-Maffei, *The Production-Consumption-Mediation Paradigm.*
[177] Çağaptay argues that an immediate consequence of the Balkan War in 1913 was a direct adoption of Turkish nationalism as an exclusive ideology from which it had previously shied away, as is evidenced in the making of Turkish language a compulsory element of high school education, see, Çağaptay, p.8.
[178] Zürcher, p.98.

outward and photogenic character.[179] Behind CUP's aim to popularize the Ottoman dynasty in the persona of Sultan Reşad, lay also a motivation to converge history and culture in the imperial institution, as Takashi Fujitani argues for Japan's Meiji restoration.[180] This should not be coincidential since starting from the 1905 Russo-Japanese war Japan's constitutional monarchy had become a role model for many Young Turks.[181]

These changes also implied a shift in the direction of power, after the abolishment of absolute monarchy, the character of the sultan was less of a concern. No longer descending from God to the sultan, power now ascended from ruled to the ruler, which required claiming a new political community, defined on ethnic, cultural or local solidarities.[183] Especially after the April counter-revolution, the consolidation of the former religious and political elites brought in a new need to define a political community that was not contained within the state apparatus. Within the European central-state model, this wider political community as diverse from the former political elite, was to constitute the legitimacy of the state and therefore its opinion had to be convinced through various ways to ensure its participation in the new regime.[184] This led emerging nation-states or nation-empires to invent new ways of claiming legitimacy, which would be achieved through a social mobilisation process. Eric Hobsbawm asserts that ever since the French Revolution of 1789, states have increasingly manipulated the constituent elements of their political community *vis á vis* the non-historical nature of the nation-state, through a diversity of "invented traditions", material practices of ideologies that imply continuity with the past.[185] Hence he claims that nationalism precedes nations in that nations do not create nation-states

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[179] This was highly in relation to the Sultan's relation with the camera apparatus. Photographer Ferit İbrahim recalls that Sultan Reşad was very fond of being photographed and when caught by the cameras, would straight himself up, his fez and collars, and smile, see, Koloğlu, *Basınımızda Resim*, p.57.

[180] Fujitani, p.3.

[181] Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p.89.

[183] Calhoun, p.78.

[184] John Horne also argues that while bureaucratisation and technology have intensified the state's capacity for surveillance and repression, the involvement of the masses in the political life has made the legitimacy of the ruler a vital condition for the state's effective operation, see, John Horne, 'Mobilising for Total War, 1914-1918', in *State Society and Mobilisation in Europe During the First World War,* ed. by John Horne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.1-18 (p.2).

[185] Eric Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.1-14 (pp.1-2).

but the other way around.[186]

This was a similar period for the Ottoman Empire. Bernard Lewis also argues that
following the suppression of the April counter-revolution; the CUP became the real masters
of Turkey.[187] As mentioned above, new legislations on conscription and ban of ethnic or
religious associations aimed at social coherence policies.[188] Within this state of affairs the
CUP government brought new commemorative practices without precedents in the
Ottoman state, as material manifestations of the new laws claiming legitimacy in the eyes
of both its disintegrating subjects and the rival European powers. These were namely, a
secular holiday for the nation, *Iyd-i Milli* (National Holiday) and a monument symbolizing
the freedom of the nation, *Abide-i Hürriyet* (Monument to Freedom), both conceived as
material tools to foster a unified political community of Ottomans and a collective memory
of the revolution.

This section delineates this Young Turk network in operation for the dissemination
of their short-lived promise of Ottomanism. This operated through the practices (pageantry,
rituals) and materialities (medals, stamps, photography, electric illumination) of CUP
actors, which reformulated the historicity of the empire before the break of Balkan War, as
an "alternative legitimacy" for a proto-nation-state.[189] As argued by Rudy Koshar, the
dissemination of monuments and commemorative trajectories via print media acts as
"mental images of the nation" becoming fully incorporated into daily life and exchange,
enabling the political elite to reach a wider audience, extending the availability and effect
of monuments on the political community they addressed.[190] The Ottoman experience with
Abide-i Hürriyet has many parallels with this view. The dispersion of the official culture
through illustrated periodicals, medals, stamps and postcards turned *Abide-i Hürriyet* and
the memory landscape into what Koshar calls a virtual one. An equally importat part of this

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[186] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, p.10.
[187] Lewis, pp.217-218.
[188] Ibid.
[189] 'alternative legitimacies' a term borrowed from Benedict Anderson, to imply the reconfiguration of the memory landscape so as to incorporate the former ancient prestige of old sacred sites, see, Anderson, p.181.
[190] Rudy Koshar argues a similar point on Prussian unification monuments, see Rudy Koshar, *From Monuments to Traces* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.49.

network is the "emperor-centered" nationalism where the CUP actors redefined a nationalist rhetoric around the Ottoman sultan, which acted in unison with on illustrated journals and stamps, designating a new Ottoman patrimony through new visual currencies.[191] As new as these practices were, their legitimizing power for the new ruling elite was nevertheless a choreographed historicity of the Ottoman dynasty.[192] Consequently, the sultan himself was mobilized, deployed by the CUP on a state visit to the Balkan provinces to promote solidarity in the ethnically mixed region, as will be finally demonstrated.[193] The section thus offers an understanding to the ways heterogeneous actors in this era (Enver Pascha, his political movement and the designed materialities) defined and distributed roles to mobilize public opinion, which turned into attempted or proposed associations between disparate actors leading to successes and/or incoherencies in disseminating notions of a nationhood of Ottomans.

The monument and the holiday

The idea to build a public monument for the revolution seems a little anachronistic since it follows the April counter-revolution of 1909 and not the actual revolution of July 1908.[194] Most arguably, the counter-revolution might have acted as a legitimating factor for an as yet alien architectural form in the Ottoman tradition. This reservation is well rooted within the architectural practice of monuments in the Ottoman tradition; Alev Erkmen argues that precedent attempts to construct secular monuments for the occasion of the *Tanzimat* charter in 1839 were not well received by the public, even when disguised as

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[191] Fujitani, p.3.

[192] For instance, Brockett argues that for Sultan Reşad's coronation in 1909, the customary visit to the Eyüp Mosque and the *türbe* (mausoleum) of *Eyüp Sultan* (Abu Ayyub, a seventh-century martyr of the Arabian siege of Constantinople) was re-invented as the Girding of the Sword ceremony, see, Gavin D. Brockett, 'When Ottomans Became Turks: Commemorating the Conquest of Istanbul and Its Contribution to World History', *American Historical Review*, 119.2 (2014), 399-433 (pp.405-406).

[193] Erik-Jan Zürcher, 'Kosovo Revisited: Sultan Reşad's Macedonian Journey of June 1911', *Middle Eastern Studies*, p. 35.4 (2006), 26-39 (p.26).

[194] Klaus Kreiser argues that there had been attempts to build a monument before the April counter-revolution of 1909, where architect Vedat (Tek) was thought of for the design, see, *Tanin*, 25 November 1908, p.2, in Klaus Kreiser, 'Özgürlük Anıtı', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 291 (2018), 12-17 (p.13). It is still likely that the counter-revolution had created an environment more receptive for a new architectural form.

fountains and were subsequently dismissed.[195] Therefore, that the discussion for a public monument comes in a period when the opponents to the new regime were finally suppressed should not be coincidental.

Of crucial importance were also the stylistic aspects of the monument. Of the entrants to the official contest, architect Alexandre Vallaury represented the earlier generation and had been very influential in the instruction of architecture in the *Sanay-i Nefise Mekteb-i Alisi* (Istanbul's Academy of Fine Arts).[196] Whereas Konstantinos Kyriakidis, Mimar Vedat and Muzaffer represented the new generation who accused their masters of contaminating Ottoman architecture by an orientalized eclecticism as they sought to revive its classical glory through a search for genuinely Ottoman forms.[197] The winning entry of Mimar Muzaffer Bey -who had also worked in the construction of Vedat Bey's monumental Sirkeci Central Post Office building (1909), a pioneer of this proto-nationalist architecture style, adhered to this contemporary Ottoman revivalism, the National Architecture Renaissance.[198] According to Sibel Bozdoğan, for Ottoman artists and architects who were primarily concerned with preserving the empire, the revivalist style stood most of all for the patrimony of the Ottoman state.[199] Yet this concern was equally related, as we shall see, to the status of Muslims within that empire.[200]

In July 1911, *Abide-i Hürriyet* was inaugurated thanks to public donations to which all sects of society had been expected to participate, including government officials and

[195] Alev Erkmen, 'Bir Anıt İçin Biyografi Denemesi: Abide-i Hürriyet', *Arredamento Mimarlık*, 211 (2008), 108-117 (p.110). A monument proposal for *Tanzimat* statesman Fuad Pasha (1814-1869) was rejected by Grand Vizier Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha on the grounds that customs and religion obliged not to erect monuments in the memory of deceased, see, BCA, fol. HR.MTV 26.10, in Kreiser, p. 12. For a through account on mostly stillborn Ottoman projects of public monuments, see, Günsel Renda, 'Osmanlılarda Heykel', *Sanat Dünyamız*, 82 (2002), 139-154.

[196] For the list of entrants to the contest, see, Reşad Ekrem Koçu, 'Abide-i Hürriyet', *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, *Vol.1* (Istanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1958), 169-171 (p.169). Unfortunately, not much is known about the actors involved in the organisation and decision processes of the contest as well as any of their suggested models. Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, p.50.

[197] Bozdoğan, p. 28.

[198] Erkmen, p.110.

[199] Bozdoğan, pp.21-22.

[200] Zurcher, *Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists*, p.173.

non-Muslims alike [Fig.1.21].[201] Like the timing of the monument its location too seems calculated, on what was baptized as *Hürriyet-i Ebediye Tepesi* (Hill of Eternal Freedom). As Paul Connerton argues when names are assigned to places, it is done with a consciousness of memories the political elite wishes to impose on them as in revolutionary France (1792-1794), where names reminiscent of monarchy and church were replaced by new toponyms representing the revolution as the "origin of history".[202] Similarly, the new toponym assigned the hill a symbolic function; it was where the Action Army had stationed before entering the city during the April counter-revolution.[203] Yet for a monument that was expected to become a new focus of collective memory, it was located on the outskirts of the city, relatively closer to the new modern neighborhoods in Şişli, instead of old Istanbul. The horse-drawn trams, in operation since 1883, nonetheless connected the northern terminus Şişli to the southern historical neighborhoods in Galata and in peninsular Istanbul.[204] However, as Zeynep Çelik points, this is unlikely to have established major connectivity with the underdeveloped Muslim neighborhoods in the old city.[205] Added to that was the ticket tariff that always worked at the disadvantage of long-distance riders until the adjustments made in 1918.[206]

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[201] For the funds arriving respectively from Ankara and Sivas, see, BCA, fols.DH.MKT 2904.23, 18 August 1909; DH.MKT. 2810.26, 12 May 1909. A cheque of twenty liras was donated by Mr. Eugenides highlighting the contribution from the non-Muslim elite of the empire, see, Ibid., DH.MKT.2860.78, 29 June 1909. Interestingly government officials were also asked to donate for the monument, see, Ibid., ZB. 602.59, 9 May 1909.

[202] Paul Connerton, *How Modernity Forgets*, pp.11-12.

[203] Erkmen, p.10.

[204] Vahdettin Engin, *İstanbul'un Atlı ve Elektrikli Tramvayları* (Istanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası, 2011), p.105.

[205] Çelik points that for Pera residents, the tram was well integrated into daily life (free admission to the Taksim Municipal Gardens for ticket holders) but for Istanbul residents commuting between southern and northern parts of Galata was not appealing given the disparate condition of tramcars and streets in low-income neighborhoods, see, Çelik, pp.94-95.

[206] Engin, pp.104-105, 186-188.

Figure I-21: Moise Jsraelowitz (c. 1911). Monument de le Liberté *'Abide-i Hürriyet in a contemporary postcard'*
©Atatürk Library.

Thus the location points likely to an ideological motivation to create a new memory landscape, a "*milieu de mémoire*" of the new regime.[207] According to Pierre Nora, this is a spatial manifestation of a forged collective identity, where the modern ruling classes shift the meaning of commemorations to different environments by underlining specific moments that constitute memories, legitimising the present by remembering the past.[208] From this perspective *Abide-i Hürriyet* can be seen as a new contested field, a unique sacred place at the convergence of imperial past and a new national authority.

Given the remoteness of public monuments in Ottoman society, a monument as such had to undergo a certain cultural appropriation. This was embedded first in its location, superimposed on a gravesite. The name of the hill itself was given as such once the martyrs of the counter-revolution were buried there in a common grave in April 1909.[209]

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[207] Pierre Nora, 'Between Memory and History: Les lieux de *mémoire*', *Representations,* 26 (1989), 7–24.
[208] Pierre Nora, quoted in Brockett, *When Ottomans Became Turks*, p.403.
[209] Koçu, p.170.

As argued above, Enver Bey's speech on the site had emphasized that Muslim and Christian martyrs were fellow patriots without any distinction of race or creed.[210] Conversely though, the monument could also function as a masjid or an open-air prayer ground, since it had a *mihrab*, a vaulted niche, indicating the direction of Mecca for Muslim prayers.[211] This functional disguise as a Muslim shrine contradicted Enver Bey's inclusive promise on which the monument was built. Materially the monument did not speak the language of a unified heterogeneous Ottoman public but that of a Muslim one. However, of the three marble epigraphs identifying the martyrs, one name is particularly of interest as it reads, "Selko Bin Dalyan".[212] Presumably of Slavic, non-Muslim origin, Dalyan's name remains as a faint reminder of Enver Bey's narrative on the ethnical inclusivity of the Action Army.[213] A similar case is the donation of twenty liras by a banking tycoon, Mr. Eugenides, one of the many benefactors from non-Muslim communities.[214] As Adrian Forty argues all commemorative artefacts peculiarly allow only certain things to be remembered at the expanse of others to be forgotten.[215] Within the disguise of its Islamic functions thus, the monument seems rather to suggest an oblivion towards its secular unifying promises. As a material actor it is rather a failure or a slippage of the network pointing to the fact that, as Zurcher also argues, from the onset the CUP actors were rather dedicated to an Ottoman Muslim nation, which did not include all of the Ottomans, all of the Muslims nor all of the Turks.[216] Theirs was a peculiar nationalist program based on ethnicity whose membership was determined by religious determination; a political blend of Ottomanist, Turkist and Islamist ideologies in so far as any of them was pragmatic in the survival of an Ottoman Muslim state.[217]

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[210] Pears, p.282.

[211] Erkmen, p.111. Building monuments under functional disguises such as fountains or clock towers was also a characteristics of Abdülhamid II's monuments for his silver jubilee in 1901, see, Alev Erkmen, *Geç Osmanlı Dünyasında Mimarlık ve Hafıza: Arşiv, Jübile, Abide* (Istanbul: Ofset Yapımevi, 2010).

[212] Koçu, p.170.

[213] According to historian Ali Suat Ürgüplü, Selko's name is highly reminiscent of the Slavic name 'Zeliko' and his father name 'Dalyan' also suggests a non-Muslim family background, see, in Kreiser, p.16.

[214] BCA, fol.DH.MKT.2860.78, 29 June 1909.

[215] Adrian Forty, 'Introduction', in *The Art of Forgetting*, p.9.

[216] Zurcher, pp.172-174.

[217] Ibid.

Commemorating the Ottoman nation

On June 1909, the Parliament passed a decree concerning the erection of a public monument and the celebration of every 10 July as the anniversary of the revolution, named as *Iyd-i Milli*. [218] The decree served to anchor the importance of the day within collective memory and create a new platform for the promotion of constitutional regime.

Although the inauguration of the monument had to wait until 1911, from 1909 on the CUP started choreographing a new official folklore on the Hill of Liberty for new rituals; coronation anniversaries or bestowals of medals and orders.[219] The monument must have been so anticipated that it even appeared on the cover of a satirical journal, *Hayal-i Cedid* of Mehmet Rauf, published as a lithographic illustration while it was still under contruction. [Fig.1.22]. As a journalist and writer Rauf was a prominent advocate of Western froms of literature, reputed by his novel, *Eylul*, a psychological fiction, and his publishing works predating the 1908 revolution. That the launch of *Hayal-i Cedid* coincided with the right aftermath of Sultan Abdulhamid's dethronement must also work as an indication of Rauf's zeal on the promise of the Young Turk revolution. This cover illustration, published on the occasion of the *Iyd-i Milli* of 1910, represented an imagination of *Abide-i Hürriyet* amidst a fervent pageantry, as if it had been completed. In an anachronistic twist; the lithographic work placed the monument in the company of the Action Army led by Mahmut Pasha as if it were 1909. While Mahmut Pasha is escorted by an angelic allegory of victory, Niyazi and Enver are seen chaining a dragon, an allegory for the ancien regime. The vertical cover image and the monochromatic red ink are unusual for the journal and point to the particularity of the issue. The cover suggests that even at an uncompleted stage the revolutionary press envisioned the monument at the centre of commemorative rituals, as a unique mark on the landscape that could be transformed into a ubiquitous icon within new practices of circulation and consumption. After its inauguration

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[218] Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi (Chronicles of the Ottoman Parliament, MMZC), 4.1 (19 May 1909), pp.86-87, in Sanem Yamak, 'Meşrutiyetin Bayramı: "10 Temmuz Id-i Millisi"', *İ.Ü. Sosyal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi,* 38 (2008), 323-342 (p.327).
[219] The term 'official folklore' is borrowed from Fujitani, in referring to how a regime envisions and imposes a monolithic, top-down view of its political community as distinct from the local and heterogeneous cultures of the masses, see, Fujitani, p. 20.

in 1911, the monument was integrated into the state iconography through a new gold medal of merit whose first recipient in 1911 was the architect himself, Mimar Muzaffer.[220] This medal was the work of sculptor Mesrur Izzet Bey (1873-1952) who had graduated from Istanbul's *Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi Alisi* (Academy of Fine Arts) as a student of the Ottoman-Armenian sculptor Yervant Osgan (1855-1914).[221]

Figure I-22: Hayal-i Cedid (vol. 37, July 23, 1910). '*Abide-i Hürriyet imagined in a narrative before its completion*'
©National Library of Turkey, Ankara.

In this conglomeration of non-human actors there were also a new series of stamps issued between 1913-1914 in the turmoil of the Balkan Wars when Ottoman patriotism became more nationalistic. The March 1913 series, issued by the Ottoman Postal Services, ended the longstanding iconoclast tradition by breaking away with the centrality of visual elements like the sultan's monogram and the crescent-star since the first issue of Ottoman

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[220] BCA, fol.I.MBH.6.59, 23 July 1911.
[221] Celil Ender and OrhanOkay, 'Heykeltraş-Ressam, Para, Pul ve Madalya Modelcisi-İstiklal Madalyasının Heykeltraşı Mesrur İzzet Bey (Ahmet Mesrur Durum)-(1873-1952)', *Türk Nümizmatik Derneği Yayınları,* 5.1 (2003), pp.41-43 (pp.51-55).

stamps in 1863.[223] Designed by Mimar Muzaffer and printed by Bradbury Wilkinson Co. Ltd. in London, the series depicted Mimar Vedat Bey's revivalist Central Post Office building (1909) in Sirkeci where Muzaffer had also worked as an apprentice [Fig.1.23].[224] Although barely recognizable, printing the new building on the stamps can be interpreted as a display of national pride and authority, given the revivalist style's aforementioned patriotic resonances. For the Ottoman elite by 1910s Ottoman revivalism, to which the monument also adhered stylistically, was consonant with Turkish attributes rather than imperial as it came to stand for the national patrimony.[225] However, this pompous display of pride through the building on an internationally circulating currency should not be coincidental. The Ottoman postal services enjoyed full control of the market only in 1909 when the foreign postal services operating in the empire were abolished. Although established in 1841, the development of the Ottoman post had been severely hindered due to strong competition of foreign postal services operating in the empire since the early eighteenth century.[226] There was also the fact that since the capitulations (trade concessions given to European powers as of the seventeenth century) forbade interception of their operations, the Ottoman authorities had no control of the subversive material circulating into the empire, as previously argued for postcards.[227] This explains why the colossal new building, designed by a Turkish-Muslim architect in the Ottoman revivalist style seems resonant of this pride.

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[223] Donald Reid, 'The Symbolism of Postage Stamps: A Source for the Historian', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 19.2 (1984), 223-249 (pp.233-234).

[224] The designer and publishing company information was provided through a visit to the PTT (Turkish Postal Services) Stamp Museum, Ankara in June 2016.

[225] Bozdoğan, p.21-22. See also Sibel Bozdoğan, 'Transforming Tradition', in *Ways to Modernity in Greece and Turkey: Encounters with Europe, 1850-1950*, ed. by Anna Frangoudaki and Çağlar Keyder (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 113-131 (pp.121-122).

[226] Mainly Austrian postal services operated in the Ottoman Empire from the early eighteenth century onwards, followed by concessions given to British, Russian ones and later in the nineteenth century to French, Greece, Germany, Egypt and finally Italy, see, Shaw and Shaw, p.229.

[227] Ibid.

Figure I-23: Mimar Muzaffer for Ottoman Postal Services (1913). '*The stamp of 1913 series depicting Istanbul's central post office building*' ©PTT Stamp Museum, Ankara.

When the capitulations were abolished in 1914, the series was extended to include a redefined memory landscape for the commemoration of the occasion.[228] As Anderson also argues, for the political elites, the invention of new sites of prestige is as pragmatic as the reconfiguration of the prestige of old sacred sites for the claim of alternative legitimacies and national authority since the former seeks its prestige from the latter.[229] Thus the series now depicted landmarks such as the Roumelian Castle, Leander's Tower, Constantine's Column, the Obelisk of Theodosius as well as the Ahmet III Fountain, Sultanahmet Mosque, the monumental gateway of the Ottoman Ministry of Defence building and finally, *Abide-i Hürriyet* [Fig.1.24]. To the astonishment of orthodox Muslim sensibilities they had even portrayed Sultan Reşad in attempt to cultivate a popular sovereignty.[230] As Koshar also argues, the redefinition of national heritage and its inclusion into the memory landscape are all as much a search for a collective identity as building new monuments.[231] Pre-eighteen-century landmarks were then established cannons of classical Ottoman architecture having partaken in the first dynastic art-historical text, *Usul-i Mi'mar-i 'Osmani* of 1873, prepared for the Universal Vienna Exposition to claim the historicity and rationality of Ottoman architecture.[232] Especially the Ahmet III Fountain was extensively

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[228] Information is provided by the visit to PTT Stamp Museum in 2016.
[229] Anderson, p.181.
[230] Reid, p.233.
[231] Koshar, p.53.
[232] Mairie de Launay et al., *Usul-i Mi'mar-i Osmani / L'architecture ottomane / Die ottomanische Baukunst* (Istanbul: Imprimerie at lithographie centrales, 1873). *Usul* was as a scholarly text, a canonizing manifesto conceived for the 1873 World Exposition in Vienna by French and Levantine Ottoman architects; Victor Marie de Launay, Léon Parvillée, Pietro Montani. It advocated for the historicity, rationality and the compatibility of Ottoman architecture with major European traditions through historical and analytical investigations accompanied by technical drawings. Its' influence was remarkable on the architectural education and historiography of upcoming generations, see, Ahmet A.

treated as a classical landmark of dynastic Ottoman architecture in *Usul*, and had even

represented the empire through a replica in the same exposition.[233] However, landmarks

such as the late-nineteenth-century gateway and *Abide-i Hürriyet* were relatively

newcomers in this club. Thus the reconfiguration of the prestige of old sacred sites *vis-à-vis*

the invention of new ones and their mobilisation on an internationally circulating currency

suggests a major comittment of the CUP actors in the roles ascribed to non-human actors

for the claim of national authority. In other words, *Abide-i Hürriyet* could not be made to

act in isolation for the legitimation of the revolution; it needed these other human and non-

human actors to support its legitimating claims.

Figure I-24: Mimar Muzaffer for Ottoman Postal Services (1914). '*The stamp of 1914 series depicting Abide-i Hürriyet*' ©PTT Stamp Museum.

   Consequently, the 1913 coup and the calamities of the Balkan Wars totally divorced

this patriotic zeal from its former democratic, unifying promises, if it had any, in what

became an increasing power seizure by Enver Bey and the CUP actors. Yalman also notes

that the over-zealous patriotism of CUP, seeing itself in charge of saving the empire,

demanded too much power and influence with a blind and aggressive Turkish

imperialism.[235] Like Karpat, he also asserts that this deepened the artificial barriers between

the Turks and non-Turks who had otherwise become closely similar in their customs and

habits over the centuries.[236] This was not only true for the non-Muslim subjects of the

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Ersoy, *Architecture and the Late Ottoman Historical Imaginary: Reconfiguring the Architectural Past in a Modernizing Empire* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), pp.16-19.

[233] For the treatment of Ahmed III Fountain in *Usul*, see, Ibid., pp.82-86

[235] Yalman, p.101. Karpat also agrees that Ottomanism with its priviledging of Muslims rather sharpened and politicized religious identities, see Karpat, *Historical Continuity and Identity Change*, p.10.

[236] Ibid.

empire whom like the Armenian communities had suffered massive purges and massacres in the 1915 deportations but also within the different sects of Muslim communities. The lifecycle of *Abide-i Hürriyet* also highlights this shift in the early 1920s. In a satirical cartoon published in the journal *Aydede* in 1922 two seemingly Muslim women, judging from their sartorial codes, discuss the meaning of *Abide-i Hürriyet*, using the double-entendre of the Turkish word *taş* (stone) both as a monument and a gravestone. The older lady asks a younger, modernly dressed passerby of the provenance of the (grave)stone, referring to *Abide-i Hürriyet* [Fig.1.25].[237] The young lady confidently answers that it is in fact the stone (read monument) to freedom. The puzzled older lady then sighs, saying, "So they have buried freedom here!"[238] The cartoon implicitly implies that in 1922 even within the various sects of the Muslim population the monument and the official ideology it was allagedly intended to disseminate had become more ambiguous, if it had ever been any more palpable.

Figure I-25: Rıfkı for Aydede (January 1922). *'The cartoon depicting the ambiguity of Abide-i Hürriyet's public reception'* ©National Library.

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[237] Rıfkı, *Aydede*, 2 (1338), p.2. The older lady inquires '*Bu kimin taşı böyle?*' (Whose *stone* is this?) *taş* means stone in Turkish and has a double-entendre as both a monument and a gravestone, both of which are embodied by *Abide-i Hürriyet*.
[238] Ibid.

The Sultan on the move

The cohesive policies of Enver Bey's Turkish imperialism on more effective tax collection, standardized education in Turkish and enforced military conscription had also led to the revolts of Albanians in the larger Macedonian territories.[239] A major imperial hub in the region, Salonika was the empire's most important centre of industry, especially in the production of cotton textiles, containing more than half of the production output.[240] Therefore its claim was necessary in more concrete ways than by the mobilisation of the memory landscape. In June 1911, before the break of the Balkan War, Sultan Reşad himself was made an actor of CUP's rhetoric, and sent on a state visit to the Macedonian provinces for what was an attempt to popularize the constitutional regime.[241] As Fujitani also argues for Japan's emperor-centered nationalism, "seeing the emperor facilitated the production of the nation-state", where people could easily imagine themselves as objects of observation within a bordered space of visibility.[242] Similarly, it was hoped that seeing the sultan would strengthen the feelings of Ottomanness as he had already managed to acquire a fatherly, pro-constitutional public image as the head of state.

A major relic of this trip of three weeks to Salonika, Skopje, Pristina and Manastır is a photograph album, prepared by the editor of the daily *Journal de Salonique*, Sam Levy, and gifted to Sultan Reşad when he returned to Salonika to proceed to Manastır.[243] More than the visual contents of its photographs, the album as artefact and a non-human actor itself crystallizes the CUP network in operation with its various human and non-human actors, disseminating notions of Ottomanness. It has right-bound leather binding, embossed and gilded with art-nouveau embellishments that frame Reşad's monogram on the front side

[239] Zürcher, *Kosovo Revisited*, p.26.

[240] Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi* (Istanbul: İs Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2017), pp.143.

[241] Zürcher argues that the Ottoman sultan had been visiting provinces of the empire before but during the long reign of Abdülhamid II these had already vanished from public memory. Among predecessors of such trips are Sultan Abdülmecid's (r. 1839-1861) visit to Izmir and Bursa in 1845 and Salonika in 1859; Sultan Abdülaziz's (r. 1861-1876) visit to Bursa in 1861, Egypt in 1863, Paris and London in 1867, see, Zürcher, *Kosovo Revisited*, p.27.

[242] Fujitani, p.25.

[243] İBBAK, fol.Alb_000077. *Manastır* or *Manastiri* in Greek is the modern day Bitola in the Republic of North Macedonia. For the connection with Levy and Sultan Reşad, see, *Senin*, 23 June 1911, p.2 in Mevlüt Çelebi, *Sultan Reşad'ın Rumeli Seyahati* (Istanbul: Akademi Kitabevi, 1999), pp.70-71.

and a crescent-star on the retro. It begins with the cortege route map in French and Ottoman and continues with photographs of the pageantry decorations for Salonika; around seventeen commemorative temporal structures built by CUP's municipal bodies, local communities and private enterprises.

It is not clear if the album residing today in Atatürk Library is Levy's original or a loyal copy [Fig.1.26]. The only reference that enables us to make the assumption that it might be the original is that in Levy's album the Ottoman/French cortege route map was drawn by an engineer called İzak Salim whose signature also appears in the album of Atatürk Library.[244] However, Levy's album was bilingual in its entirety whereas the image captions in the Atatürk Library album are only in a hand-written Ottoman-Turkish.[245] Although this slightly contradicts the initial view that the Atatürk Library album may be Levy's original, these are written over a scraped-off layer of stains, suggesting a possible overlyaing of the former French captions [Figs.1.29-34]. Further exploration of these stains remains unfathomable since the library authorities did not permit close observation.

Journal de Salonique, founded by Levy's father Saadi in 1895, was an advocate of the integration of Jewish communities, part of a larger international movement that sought to bring emancipation to the Jews of the orient, by taking the model of the French Jewish bourgeoisie whose integration into French society was idealized.[246] As an opponent of Zionism, Sam supported the view that Jews should integrate into their local communities and it seems thus the sultan's visit must have had an ideological appeal for him.[247]

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[244] *Rumili*, 29 June 1911.
[245] *Senin*, 23 June 1911.
[246] *Journal de Salonique* (1895-1910, founded by Saadi Bezalel Halevy) published French modern literature (in French) in the format of serials to connect the Jewish elite of Salonika with their modern Parisian counterpart with a clear agenda of emancipation and integration of the city's Jewish community. Its lack of Zionist propaganda had even caused it in 1909 to loose its subventions from the World Zionist Organisation to an Istanbulite journal, see, Hélène Guillon, 'Le Journal de Salonique (1895-1910): un journal de langue et de culture française dans une communauté juive orientale', *Hypothèses*, 1.8 (2005), pp.169-177.
[247] For Sam Levy's ideas on Zionism, see, Sam Levy, 'Nationaliste ou Sionisme?', *Le Journal de Salonique*, 8 July 1909, p.2.

Figure I-26: Sam Levy's photograph album (1911). *'Cover of the album gifted to Sultan Resad'.* ©Atatürk Library.

Unlike the photographs that appeared on *Sehbal* -a new post-revolutionary illustrated journal, published by Hüseyin Saadettin Arel (1880-1955)- for the occasion, the photographs in the album painstakingly delineate the commemorative arches with possibly their benefactors posing in front of them, while the captions credit the communities whom contributed to their construction.[248] A first look at the map of the imperial cortege, gives an idea of how the territory has been marked with new toponyms after the 1908 revolution to impose the memories of constitutional revolution as "origin of history".[249] The main axis from the fifteenth-century White Tower to inland neighborhoods now being named the *İttihat Caddesi* (Union Boulevard) with the *July 10 Square*, *Union Parc*, or *Mithad Pasha Avenue*, named after the respected Ottoman statesman, renown to have penned the first Ottoman constitution in 1876 but later assassinated by Abdülhamid.

Although no documentation has been found on their commissioners and designers,

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[248] For similar shots of the same arches, see, *Sehbal*, 41 (1911), pp.45-46.
[249] Connerton, *How Modernity Forgets*, pp.11-12.

the arches as non-human actors of Reşad's visit are suggestive in their stylistic eclecticism offering us clues on the economic, religious and ethnic dynamics of a modern Ottoman city in 1911 at the crossroads of Greek and Turkish nationalism. There are arches built by the Greek Orthodox, Bulgarian and Jewish communities as well as the city's municipality, the CUP headquarters, the Eastern and Salonika-Manastır Ottoman Railway Company and the city's notable Allatini family from the Jewish community. The Allatinis were tycoons having made their fortune largely in the agricultural sector but also ran distilleries, flour and brick plants, with investments in the banking sector.[250] The flour plant located close to the city's embankment was a major supplier for the Ottoman army.[251] The album particularly illustrates the Allatini arch with two views, picturing both facades, one with a daily crowd [Fig.1.27] and another one more precariously framed with the community posing in front of it [Fig.1.28]. As a reference to the family's industrialist roots, the arch, right next to the monumental White Tower, expands on two seemingly brick-columns reminiscent of industrialist chimneys and carries panels depicting the machinery and facilities of the family business.

[250] Rena Molho, 'Yenilenme', in *Selanik 1850-1918*, ed. by Gilles Veinstein (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp.68-84 (p. 74); also see, *Annuaire Oriental 1909*, p.1811.
[251] İdris Bostan, 'II. Abdülhamid'in Selanik'te Korunması ve Alatini Köşkü', *Tarih ve Toplum*, 27.16 (1997), pp.24-27 (p.25).

Figure I-27: (1911). Sam Levy's album of Salonika *'Photograph of the Allatini arch.'* ©Atatürk Library.

Figure I-28: Sam Levy's album of Salonika (1911). *'Photograph of the Allatini arch, presumably with the benefactors.'* ©Atatürk Library.

The album offers photographs of two more arches built by the Jewish community. One is by the New Jewish Club on the embankment, which was visited by the grand vizier and the deputies on their way back from Pristina, listening to the speech of the chief rabbi on the loyalty of Jews to the state and a eulogy to the CUP [Fig.1.29].[252] The second arch was built by the Jewish community itself on the Hagia Sophia Avenue [Fig.1.30]. Both had bulbous domes crowning the flanking columns and over-stretched horseshoe arches reminiscent of the Moorish revival style. Originating in nineteenth-century Germany, the eclecticism of the Moorish style had allowed for a synthesis of Western and Oriental elements for a common self-identity of the Western Jewish communities and had mushroomed in the synagogue architecture of various Western cities in the late century.[253]

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[252] *Senin*, 21 June 1911, p.1; *Ziya*, 21 June 1911, p.1; *İttihad*, 22 June 1911, p.2, in Çelebi, p.70.

[253] Ivan Davidson Kalmar, 'Moorish Style: Orientalism, the Jews, and Synagogue Architecture', *Jewish Social Studies, New Series*, 7.3 (2001), 68-100. For Moorish revivalist architecture in Salonika in relation to the *dönme* class, see, Marc David Baer, *The Dönme: Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries and Secular Turks* (Stanford: The Stanford University Press, 2010), p.40.

The style had become so resonant within Salonika's Jewish community that in 1902 when the *Yeni Camii* (New Mosque by Vitaliano Poselli, 1902) was built by the Jewish converts to Islam -referred to as *dönme* in Turkish- its façade was unusually reminiscent of a Jewish temple in the Moorish style.[254]

Figure I-29: Sam Levy's album of Salonika (1911). '*The commemorative arch built by the New Jewish Club on the embankment.*' ©Atatürk Library.

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[254] Arguably the Moorish revival style was popular among the wealthy *dönme* families, most notably of the Kapancı who owned a café called the *Alhambra Café* and a villa (Pierro Arigoni, 1900) with neo-Moorish elements, see, Kalmar, pp.36, 72.

Figure I-30: Sam Levy's album of Salonika (1911). *'The commemorative arch built by the Jewish community.'* ©Atatürk Library.

      The *dönme* acted pretty much like the *conversos* of nineteenth century, freed from their disadvantaged Jewish status, they profited from the new opportunities in global trade.[255] Their ability to operate within an expanded diaspora linked by a shared sense of identity made them key actors in the penetration of European goods and technologies into the Ottoman Empire.[256] A photograph in the album, is of another arch in the vicinity, on *Hürriyet Meydanı* (Freedom Square), which was built by the *Société Anonyme Ottomane pour la fabrication des tissus et fez* (Ottoman Limited Company for the Production of Fabric and Fez) [Fig.1.31]. This company was an initiation of another tycoon, a notable *dönme* family, the Kapancı, who played a significant role in the city's European trade.[257] Seen from the photograph is a modern structure with stripped-off supporting elements, with two showcases located on each flanking column, possibly used for the display of the textile products manufactured by the company.

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[255] Baer, p.69.
[256] Ibid.
[257] Ibid., p.73.

Figure I-31: Sam Levy's album of Salonika (1911). *'The commemorative arch built by the Ottoman Limited Company.'*
©Atatürk Library.

Although similarly modern, stripped-down structures also existed, the majority of the arches in the album has historicist eclectic styles and can be read within the context of self-orientalisation. Especially, in the arches of non-Muslim communities; the Greek and Bulgarian, the ogee arches and bulbous domes towering the flanking columns attest to the deployment of architectural styles as non-human actors of a discourse of adherence in an environment that was to become increasingly imperialist with the politics of CUP, which of all places was strongest in Salonika, the cradle of the Unionist movement [Figs.1.33, 34]. The visit abounded in declarations of loyalty by these communities. Great praise was made by the sultan to Evrenos Bey, the descendent of a fifteen-century Greek convert to Islam, Gazi Baba, whom had fought for the Ottomans in the conquest of southeast Europe, set by Reşad as a paragon of loyalty.[258] Cemal Kadafar points that similar cults of holy warriors from the pre-sixteenth century frontier era often received a shared veneration both from the

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[258] Zürcher, p.29.

Muslims and the Christians alike.[259] The legacies of these warriors and allies of the frontier era, however, were largely overwritten from imperial historiographies to consolidate a historical Ottoman presence.[260] Their revival at a time when the political elite sought for new models of adherence to the Ottoman nation for the Christian minorities reveals the infrastructure of the network in that their remobilization as actors in the sultan's speech was nonetheless dependent on the stylistic repertoire and the techniques available to construct the arches, and disseminate them on print media. Thus the album crystallizes these associations of discourse, materiality, technology and social commentary during the sultan's visit.

Figure I-32: Sam Levy's album of Salonika (1911).'*The commemorative arch built by the Greek community.*' ©Atatürk Library.

Figure I-33: Sam Levy's album of Salonika (1911). '*The commemorative arch built by the Bulgarian community.*' ©Atatürk Library.

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[259] Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p.24. Kafadar refers to the frontier region to distinguish the peculiar ways of pre-sixteenth century Anatolian Muslim settlements from the central lands of Islam, see, Ibid., pp.43-44.
[260] Ibid., p. 416.

One such particular technologic aspect of the arches that is not graspable from the photographs is the electric illumination works, which adorned these structures. Despite the fact that with the invention of highly sensitive dry plates in 1870s, cameras had become more functional at night and the genre was booming with the works of Paul Martin and Alfred Steiglitz, the album has no night photography illustrating this aspect.[265] At a time when the capital still did not have the infrastructure of electrical power, which it would have to wait for until 1914 as a consequence of Hamidian oppression, Salonika had enjoyed electricity since 1907.[266] Therefore electric illumination was a major component of the preparations in the city, for the illumination of the historic White Tower area alone some 5000 francs were spent.[267]

One such illuminated arch was built by the CUP headquarters on the embankment [Fig.1.34]. It was composed of two wings, one stretching vertically over the embankment, the other facing the bay. In the pro-CUP Istanbul daily *Senin*, journalist Hakkı Tarık described this as a crescent-star made of light (of 700 candlepower) while its waterfront side with the CUP coat of arms "adorned the gazes of onlookers with glow".[268] In total the CUP commemorative arch had 17,000 candlepower and together with the fireworks from the navy ships in the bay, it must have offered an extraordinary sight.[269] The following day Tarık would publish the headline "Twenty Four Hours of Day", writing zealously; "it was past seven o'clock, but I assure you night could not fall […] light emanated from everywhere and created its trees of light in every corner of the city".[270] As partisan as

[265] Sophie Leighton, 'Night Photography', in *Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography, Vol.I*, 1006-1008 (pp.1006-1007). This might nevertheless be an implication of a shortage of resources. In 1909 there were six photographers operating in Salonika compared to just two in 1900 but still they might not have been well equipped for night photography, see, *Annuaire Oriental 1909*, p.1813 and *Annuaire Oriental 1900*, p.1139.
[266] Baer, p.89. For Istanbul's electrical power, which will be dealt in detail in the third chapter, see, Zafer Toprak, 'Aydınlatma: Tanzimat Dönemi', *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, Vol.I* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1994), 476-478 (p.478). See also, Necla Geyikdağı on Abdülhamid II's personal reservation for electrical power in the capital. Necla Geyikdağı, *Foreign Investments in the Ottoman Empire: International Trade and Relations 1854-1914*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), p.116.
[267] *Rumili*, 14 May 1911, p.2, in Ibid., p.25.
[268] Hakkı Tarık, 'Babaros'un Mücevherleri', *Senin*, 10 June 1911, p.2, in *Çelebi*, p.32. *Senin*, later renamed as *Tanin*, was the unofficial press organ of the CUP movement and thus biased in its views, see, Zürcher, *Kosovo Revisited*, p.15.
[269] Ibid.
[270] *Senin*, 11 June 1911, p.2, in Çelebi, p.32.

Tarık's tone may be, the illuminated arches might nevertheless have had a centripetal effect in creating a spectacle, which now went beyond symbolically marking the space as the monarch's territory, to suggest the cooperation of the regime with the rule of industrially manufactured signs of domination.[271] Along with the Allatini and Kapancı arches, the album shows commemorative electric light arrangements by the newly built, modern *Splendid Palace* hotel on the quay, the *Au Louvre* department store on Sabri Pasha Boulevard with its twin crescent-star, composed of light bulbs and the *Crystal* coffee shop on Freedom Square.[272] Sultan Reşad's visit thus must have presented an unprecedented level of spectacle where electric illumination seems to have worked hand in hand with the commemorative arches, built by the city's modern, economic and diplomatic circles, to provide a homogenizing allegory for an ethnically and religiously diverse city.

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[271] I use the analogy offered by Thomas Richards where he argues the contrast of spectacle between former royal ceremonies and the later Universal Exhibitions where commodities replaced symbolic dominion, see, Thomas Richards, quoted in Connerton, *How Modernity Forgets*, p.113.

[272] The name of this department store in the photograph's caption can be transliterated as *Lüver* in Ottoman Turkish. It is most probably the one owned by Mehmet Kapancı on Sabri Pasha Boulevard, argued in, Baer, p.70. However, it might equally be the *Au Louvre* store, owned by *Fils de Mustafa İbrahim*, which sold electric light appliances, see, Mark Mazower, *Salonika, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), p.227.

Figure I-34: Sam Levy's album of Salonika (1911). '*The commemorative arch built by the CUP, the wing facing the seafront.*' ©Atatürk Library.

Although not all of the arches had built-in electric illumination or were built by non-Muslim communities, their intensity, about seventy of them within the range of a thirty-minute walk, still attests to a larger phenomena of public visibility.[273] The persuasion of Salonika's industrious elite was crucial for the Unionist movement since throughout the eighteenth century, non-Muslim mercantile classes, having established ties with the West, had been responsible in the spread of nationalist movements in Serbia and Greece.[274] It must be remembered that national identities were by no means monolithic at this time. Especially for the Ottoman Greeks, ethnic adherence to Hellenism did by no means encumber a political identification with the Ottoman state and its privileges as is suggested

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[273] The photographs in the album pertain to three distinct arches built by the municipality, one on Freedom Square (*Hürriyet Meydanı*), one on Hagia Sophia Avenue and another one across the high school of *İttihad ve Terakki*. Added to that is two more arches built by the army and the CUP, the rest seems to come from the public sphere of the city. The municipality had also refurbished the pavements and streets and built rows for the mob to sit during the trajectory of the imperial cortege, see, *Senin*, 3 June 1911, p.1 and *Rumili*, 22 Mayis 1911, p.2, in Çelebi, p.25. The estimation on the range of arches is given in, Hakkı Tarık, 'Yeni Dünya'ya Doğru', *Senin*, 8 June 1911, pp.1-2, 28.
[274] Pamuk, p.88.

by the Evrenos case or the aforementioned work of lithographer Chiristidis.[275] Thus, the sultan's visit was a political attempt of the CUP in mobilizing various human and non-human actors where the city's economically and religiously cosmopolitan elite could be made to operate, akin to what Fujitani argues for Meiji Japan, within a bordered space of visibility as objects of observation, partaking in the simultaneous legitimisation of the new regime and their own presence in it as a heterogeneous capitalist elite.[276] The album materializes the multifarious relations of the various social and economic layers of the Ottoman city -industry, religion, ethnicity- with the CUP's new rhetoric of a new proto-nation state.

Eventually, the sultan's visit failed in its aim of gaining the support of the Albanian Muslim communities and strengthening the feelings of Ottomanness among various ethnicities.[277] In 1913, Salonika fell to the Greek army when finally the town's mayor Osman Said handed over the city peacefully to King Constantine of Greece, an instance of national importance to many Greeks that ironically was also illustrated by Christidis on a lithographic postcard. With the break of the Balkan Wars, resonating Levy's commitment to the unity of the Ottoman Empire, the Jewish community lobbied to keep the city within the empire or to turn it into an international ground.[278] Especially the *dönme* communities writing to the Greek Prime Minister Venizélos, argued that to sustain the city's economic prosperity, its independence was crucial.[279] Conversely in 1917, after a vast fire, no less than three-quarters of the city was destroyed, decimating the historic Jewish and Muslim neighborhoods.[280]

On his last day in Salonika, Sultan Reşad had laid the foundation stone of a

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[275] Vangelis Kechriotis, 'Yunan Smyrna'sı: Cemaatlerden Tarihin Panteon'una', in *Smyrna, the forgotten city? Recollections from a great Ottoman port, 1830-1930*, ed. by Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 73-89 (pp.83-85). Kechriotis argues this for the case of the city of pre-1922 Izmir but I assert that the same hybrid identities must also have been valid for Salonika, as the second most important Ottoman port city.
[276] Fujitani, p.25.
[277] Zürcher, *Kosovo Revisited*, p.36.
[278] Çağaptay, p.24.
[279] Baer, p.112.
[280] Mazower, p.300.

monument to freedom on *10 July Square*.[281] Sam Levy's intention was to publish this album as a fundraiser for this monument, but both projects were stillborn.[282] The journal *Sehbal* (published by Hüseyin Saadettin Arel) did publish a photographic essay on the sultan's visit, although without equal stress and credit on the participation of the city's industrious elite in the commemorative arrangements.[283] *Sehbal*'s tone was rather partisan, underlining the achievements of the 1908 revolution in the press, the aptness of the journal's resources in so promptly illustrating an event of such big scale, using photographs taken by their own photographer in situ with a promise of "even more images in future issues".[284] In so far as modernity could be consonant with the level of printing technologies deployed in the dissemination of material narratives, the pride of the revolutionary press stemmed less from a sense of the unity of Ottomans but more from the printing resources now attained by a Turkish Muslim press organ.

Conclusion

With the 1908 constitutional revolution, print media technologies and postcards gained an impetus as visual mediums, offering a medium of social commentary for the disintegrating political communities of the empire. Their production/commodification and singulirisation (inscriptions/collection) patterns by a cosmopolitan urban class give us clues on how as meaningful artefacts and non-human actors they could be made to mediate the experience of social change through a synthesis of various image making/reproduction technologies, borrowed and hybrid graphic references. Starting with the Balkan Wars, political propaganda through postcards has accelerated the bifurcation of the imperial print culture on the basis of a single agency in the image production and reproduction resources, which enabled the publishing body to disseminate desired political messages and to mobilize new political communities. This primacy of resources in the making of images and printing of postcards as non-human actors of social commentary, has contributed to the

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[281] *Senin*, 11 Haziran 1911, p.1 and *Yeni İkdam*, 12 June 1911, p.2 in Çelebi, p.37.
[282] *Rumili*, 29 June 1911, n.p.
[283] *Sehbal*, 15 July 1911, pp.35-38. For instance a photograph of the Allatini arch appears but without an explanatory caption.
[284] Ibid., p.37.

permeation of new image reading models, which would be crucial in the formation of a nucleus of a national print culture in the later years.

Parallel to this incremental nationalization of print culture was a more top-down CUP-led network of human and non-human actors; permanent and temporary monuments, a new constitutional sultan, medals, stamps, print media and festive illumination which were all expected to enact their designated roles for the legitimation of the CUP rhetoric on Ottomanism. However, as is shown in the materiality and lifecycle of these and the remobilization of commemorative materialities through frontier era myths, slippages of this network point rather to the committment of the CUP political elite to Ottomanism in so far as it concerned the survival of a Muslim Ottoman state.

In sum, as members of an administrative elite, highly committed to positivism with a mistrust of masses and thus undemocratic inclinations, Young Turks increasingly saw themselves in charge of enlightening their people.[285] Such a top-down ideology has undoubtedly led to catastrophic policies as in the mass deportations and prosecution of Armenian communities in 1915. Nevertheless, as Zurcher asserts these must be seen in the light of their reactionary Muslim nationalism originating as a response to the traumas suffered by the Muslims of Empire, one quarter of whom were fugitives from the empire's lost territories in Caucasus and the Balkans.[286] This is an issue that brings us back to the disparity in access to image making resources and the commodification of agony. As Pratibha Parmar reminds us, images play an essential role in defining and controlling political and social powers determining how we think of others and ourselves.[287] Until the postcards made by RMIS in the late 1910s no such visual propaganda existed on the purges against the Muslims of the Balkans, ongoing from 1856 onwards and totaling some seven

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[285] Zurcher, *Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists*, p.151.
[286] Ibid., p.160. The deportation of the Anatolian Armenian communities still remains a controversial issue aggravated by the loos of certain archives on the Turkish side and forgeries on the Armenian. However, it is clear from evidence of the eyewitness reports and postwar Ottoman tribunal records that the Ottoman government was unlikely involved in an organized extermination campaign, whereas an inner circle within the CUP is most likely to have done so, see, Eric Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp.114-117.
[287] Parmar quoted in Bell Hooks, Black Looks, Race and Representation (Boston: South End Press, 1992), p.5.

million migrants in 1914.[288] The Armenian communities however, as shown through postcards, had adequate print resources to respond immediately to the 1890s massacres, but in 1915 they were disintegrated to a point where they too must have lost these resources to counter-react to the events through print. Nevertheless, thanks to their widespread provincial photography network, their negative presence in rural Anatolia can still be found in photographic archives.[289] Whereas that of the Muslim refugees with inadequate image resuorces is largely effaced apart from Abdulhamid's futile state-sanctioned attempts to empathise the European press with the Muslim victims of the 1877-1878 conflict through serviced photographs.[290] If, as Zurcher reminds us, the two calamities are consequential, such disparities in the empowering use of image and media technologies should also be underlined, which in return shapes social and political powers, as I also tried to underline in this chapter.[291]

As will be seen in further chapters, these commemorative practices in print and physical monuments established precursors for the upcoming Turkish republican elite. For this enlightened elite too, rather than mere nationalist sentiments, the pride in the commemorative events of nation-ness, depended equally on the level of new technologies and resrouces that could be deployed for the dissemination, permeation and persuasiveness of the social commentary these were ascribed to mediate. However, such top-down constructs, especially in the periphery, should not be seen through a monolithic highlight moment but within the special context in which they unfold, as this investigation has endeavored to do.[292] After all, despite their contempt for the sultan, the Young Turks and their later republican successors seem to have inherited a peculiar Hamidian obsession with

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[288] The numbers are given by Karpat, *Historical Continuity and Identity Change,* p.22.

[289] For the photographic presence of Ottoman Armenians, see, David Low, 'Photography and the Empty Landscape: Excavating the Ottoman Armenian Image World', *Études Arméniennes Contemporaines*, 6 (2015), 31-69.

[290] For Sultan Abdulhamid's attempt to emphatise the European press with Muslim victims of the Balkans, see Eldem, 'Powerful Images:The Dissemination and Impact of Photography in the Ottoman Empire, 1870-1914', in *Camera Ottomana*, pp. 106-153 (p.112).

[291] My point here concerns only the disparate level of media technology to which communities within the Ottoman Empire had access. There is no intention to compare inflicted human tragedy; all were horrific, and to compare would be grotesque.

[292] Anna Calvera, *Local, Regional, National, Global and Feedback*, p.374.

their image, not surpsiginly at a time when the power of popular press was at a global peak, as was argued by Deringil.[293]

[293] Deringil, p.148.

II   Chapter / Monuments for Illiterates and their Logos

In 29 October 1923, in the aftermath of the War of Liberation (1919-1922), the bipolar politics between the Ottoman government in Istanbul and Mustafa Kemal's national government in Ankara concluded with the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in its new capital, Ankara. The new nation-state led by Mustafa Kemal (later surnamed as Atatürk) and composed of a political body of former Ottoman generals, bureaucrats and members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) took over the Young Turk's national modernity project in radically secular ways.[1] Ottomanism had nevertheless bestowed upon Muslims their first political identity, which now led to the establishment of a Turkish political identity.[2] Embodied in the political movement of People's Republican Party (PRP), first in the lead of Mustafa Kemal and later İsmet İnönü, this transformative one-party regime lasted until 1946.

Despite a dramatic shift in politics, as Ahmet Evin suggests, the Turkish reformers continued to play the role of an enlightened, intellectual elite, amalgamating a utopian glory of the empire with top-down modernization trajectories to replace an Islamic community with the concept of Turkish nationhood.[4] Their tenability laid in their capacity to discredit the power-lust CUP legacy that had dragged the empire to exhaustion, causing immense tragedies in the Eastern provinces especially with the deportation and eradication of Armenian communities. Zurcher argues that orthodox Turkish history, modeled to a great extend after the 1926 purges against CUP members and Mustafa Kemal's autobiography *Nutuk*, published the same year, have accentuated the antagonism between to be Kemalists and the former CUP movement, disregarding the continuity between the former religious nationalist period and its role in the national resistance.[5] In sum, the switch to a Turkish

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[1] Turkish surnames appear with the 1934 surname law, nevertheless for actors born before the law their names and later surnames will be given fully to avoid confusions.
[2] Karpat, *Historical Continuity and Identity Change*, p.12.
[4] Evin, p.16.
[5] Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, p.172. Zurcher does agree that Mustafa Kemal himself was nevertheless a member of the CUP, reminding that the movement was not monolithic and contained opponent circles of which Kemal affiliated with but which lost popularity after 1914. Discussions on whether the

national and secular political identity, replacing the Ottoman-Muslim one was deliberate and prompt, and can only be explained by the commitment of Kemal and his circle to scientific rationalism and the nation-state model which they saw as coherent tools for modernization and "catching up with Europe"[6]

Thus, there began a steady transformation of the imperial state and its institutions. The abolition of monarchy in 1922 followed that of the caliphate in 1923. In 1925 worshipping in *tekkes* (dervish lodges) and *türbes* (mausoleums of historical persons) was banned. This was followed in 1926 by the adoption of Swiss civil and Italian penal codes, and suffrage for women in 1934. In 1928, the Ottoman-Arabic script was replaced with the Latin alphabet, which was more functional to the problem of vocalisation and apt for the creation of a national language, isolating the sanctity of the Arabic script to the private sphere.[7] What mitigated this change to a certain extend was also a demographic shift in the political community, in 1922, the demographics of Anatolia -the nucleus contained within the new borders of the nation-state- had not only suffered massive losses in the aftermath of a decade of wars but it was also religiously more homogeneous, composed of Muslims.[8] This also meant, as Yılmaz argues, a "psychological environment", which was more receptive for the imagination of a new community of Turks after the material deprivation of war, at least more so for the uprooted Muslim populations of the empire but less so for the native, non-Turkish speaking Muslims of Anatolia.[9] The former, constituting some forty

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nationalist resistance movement was a distinctly genuine one or a plot of the CUP to rid themselves of their bad reputation have their own convolutions, which are not part of this research. As Zurcher also asserts, a continuous thread of Muslim nationalism which then turned into Turkish nationalism after the disillusionement with non-Muslim and non-Turkish Muslim minorities is not tenable which is explained by the unpopularity of the Kemalist regime in large parts of the population, see, Zürcher, *Identity Politics*, p.175.

[6] Ibid.

[7] I owe this chronology of the republican reforms to Zürcher, pp.176-200.

[8] For the demographic impacts of the rates of mortality, the refugee crisis during the Balkan War and the deportations of Armenians, see also Zürcher, p.164 and Soner Çağaptay, *Who Is a Turk?*, pp.5-10. Zurcher argues that the human loss in percentage rate has no equivalent in modern world history, see, Zürcher, *The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic*, p.8

[9] Yılmaz, p.13. Çağaptay argues that although initially the Kemalist endeavor was to eliminate religion from public sphere, the Ottoman *millet* system where communities were divided on the basis of their religion never ceased to shape Turkish nationalism, see, Çağaptay, pp.14-15. However, the integration of the non-Turkish speaking, native Muslims of Anatolia concentrated in the Southeastern provinces into the new secular collective identity was a greater challenge, since unlike the Muslim immigrants of

percent of the population, were more susceptible to nationalist indoctrination since the wider communication and transportation networks of their former provinces had impeded the isolation of communities.[10] Nevertheless, the new state aimed at the social cohesion of a new secular nation without nostalgia for the past and therefore banned organisations based on ethnic, regional denominations.[11]

Overall, this peculiar transformation led by Mustafa Kemal aimed at a change of infrastructures through superstructural means.[12] In other words, as Hale Yılmaz also asserts following Şerif Mardin that it was rather in the sphere of culture than structure that the Turkish revolutionaries were truly revolutionary.[14] This means that the sustainability of the top-down reforms depended to a large extent on their persuasiveness claimed through the cultural sphere. As Antonio Gramsci points the social authority of a certain class over subordinate ones is not attained merely by oppression but by continually winning and shaping the consent of those classes.[15] This required, first of all, a convincing official narrative. The success of Mustafa Kemal and his circle laid significantly on the rhetoric they had managed to establish, which accounted them rightfully for the liberation of the country but disruptively as its sole reformers, eclipsing any legacy of Ottoman modernity.[16] As discussed in the first chapter, the "invented traditions" of late Ottoman national modernity in envisioning a nation through a refashioned historicity of the empire had already oriented the locus of commemorative practices from the dynasty to the nation from

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the Balkans they have not been uprooted from their homelands and therefore had reserved their cultural and social structures, see, Ibid., p.16-19.

[10] Karpat, *Historical Continuity and Identity Change*, p.11. See also Evin, p.19.

[11] Karpat, p.16.

[12] Emre Kongar, 'Turkey's Cultural Transformation', *The Transformation of Turkish Culture: The Ataturk Legacy,* ed. by in Gunsel Renda and Max Kortepeter (New Jersey: The Kingston Press, 1986), pp.19-68 (p.28).

[14] Here Yılmaz's stress is perhaps on the fact that some reforms were already under way in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution but that they had not permeated in the sphere of culture, see Hale Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early, Republican Turkey 1923-1945* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2013), p.6.The term 'revolutionaries' is applied by Mardin to refer to the larger political body that was active in the political scene from the onset of the foundation of People's Republican Party in 1923 as distinct from the actors in the War of Liberation, see, Şerif Mardin, *Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution*

[15] *Resistance Through Rituals*, ed. by Stuart Hall, John Clarke, Tony Jefferson, and Brian Roberts (London: Hutchinson, 1976).

[16] Zürcher, p.175.

1908 onwards.[17] Emre Kongar also agrees that many republican reforms can be traced back to the piecemeal reforms of the Young Turks.[18] Yet, what the Turkish revolutionaries did distinctively was to conceive for the resulting new political community after WWI, a new narrative identity through more radical historical ruptures.

Thus, under the auspices of Mustafa Kemal, the republican modernity was communicated as without antecedent, subjugating any imperial legacy of modernity, slowly settling in as a work of forgetting. This entailed a historical disruption, an amnesia through the narration of myths and postulations of history for the demarcation of a new official timeline, circumventing any undesired legacy in the reformulation of a national, modern, collective identity. As Benedict Anderson also argues, all profound changes in consciousness lead to specific amnesias that as in modern subjects so with nations, engender the need for a "narrative identity".[19] Hence, in the creation of Turkish national modernity from 1922 to late 1930s, this official amnesia selectively neglected certain legacies, while cultivating others underscoring the legitimacy and historicity of the nation for a new "narrative identity".

This chapter focuses on the peculiar ways this transformation was communicated by the Kemalist political elite in top-down trajectories, first to an urban enlightened community and then, to a lesser degree, to the masses. It centers this investigation first on the network operating in the construction of national monuments and then, in the second section, to that in the dissemination of the nationalist narrative imbued in public statuary through print media. More than a historical and biographical account of makers, publishers and commissioners, it aims to reveal the heterogenous network that arises on the one hand from the agency of the republican elite and on the other, the discrepancies of the human and non-human actors; artistic resrouces and foundaries. It begins its exploration with the

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17 Eric Hobsbawm, *Inventing Traditions*, pp.1-14. In certain aspects this can even be traced back to the *Tanzimat* era of reforms as of 1839, see, Selim Deringil, *The Invention of Tradition*, pp.3-29.
18 Kongar, p. 45. On the efforts of modernisation during the late Ottoman period, from emancipation of women rights, secularisation of the jurisdiction and state education to the amelioration of the urban infrastructure in Istanbul during 1910's to name a few, see, Ezel K. Shaw and Stanford J. Shaw, *The Rise of Modern Turkey*, pp.305-310.
19 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp.204-205.

republican elite's first commemorative incentive for the persuasion of the urban masses through public monuments, to distinguish the new political community from the former Ottoman public. These were first erected in 1926 in Ankara, Istanbul and later Izmir and by mid 1930s had spread to other cities; Konya, Amasya, Tekirdağ, Edirne, Samsun, Izmit, Elazığ, Tokat, Kayseri, Bursa, and Adana. This was reminiscent of what Maurice Agulhon calls as "statuomania", the use of statuary for instilling a more liberal and secular society as in nineteenth-century France.[20] Similarly, the discursive space on the construction of monuments highlights how various actors of a network of Kemalist elite and intellects assigned different roles and functions to the monuments. Even their spatial positioning was assigned a role, as the republican elite sought to construct a new republican memory landscape, which suggested amnesia towards the former attributes of these urban spaces. Coined by Pierre Nora, the term "*milieu de mémoire*" is also apt here as the monuments were envisioned as spatial manifestations of a collective identity, simultaneously legitimating the present by evoking a particular instance from the republican memory.[21] Another major preoccupation of the elite was to materialize the legacy of the War of Liberation in a standard iconography, with an assertion that this would be intelligible to a larger public as an educative feature of visiting the urban space, especially at a time when the dissemination of this top-down collective identity within a national print culture was still unlikely given the literacy rates just over ten per cent.[22] Equally important within this network is the individual reception of monuments in an emerging class of national artists and rising urban populations as their lifecycle points.

A second investigation is the manifestation of this monument-led narrative identity in print media. The reception of the monuments coincided with the silencing of the

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[20] Agulhon uses the term in referring to nineteenth-century France monumental sculpture, an inherent feature of modern urbanism and liberal and secular society, through which the French Republic would encourage and deepen its idealism, see, Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne into Battle*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.70.

[21] Pierre Nora, 'Between Memory and History: Les lieux de *mémoire*', *Representations,* 26 (1989), 7–24.

[22] As Benjamin Fortna argues literacy rates in this period are disputed, from as low as two percent in 1860s to under ten percent in 1920s. However, he asserts that François Georgeon's estimates of just over ten percent in late 1920s, with drastic differences between rural and urban areas and male/female seem plausible, see, Benjamin Fortna, *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic*, p.20.

opposition media through the 1925 *Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu* (Law on the Maintenance of Order). In 1928, challenges posed by the Romanisation of the Ottoman script -the decrease in circulation and hardships in the purchase of new equipment- exacerbated matters by making publishers dependent on state subventions, easing the government's control over Istanbul's opponent press.[23] What survived were merely the government press organs such as dailies *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (National Sovereignity, Ankara) and *Cumhuriyet* (The Republic, Istanbul).[24] Opposition dailies, if any, *Ikdam*, *Akşam* and *Vakit* had become milder or had basically survived for that matter. As a consequence, as Gavin Brockett also points out, the print culture in 1920s and 1930s became overtly Kemalist-oriented.[25] Thus as actors within the republican monument network, emerging pro-republican publishers and official propaganda publications made monuments circulate in "logoized", graphic form, channeling a particular image economy where national modernity would coalesce with Turkey's cultural geography on industrial catalogues, advertisements, children's reading material and maps.[26] As Anderson also argues, the appropriation of the state's patrimony, its "museumisation" of the architectural heritage for political pursuits and its subsequent virtualisation and logoisation of monuments, were instruments for the reproduction of the secular state through print and photography.[27] With the lack of press freedom throughout the 1920s and 1930s such a virtual reproduction of the nation-state seemed all the more plausible.

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[23] Between 1919 and 1928 there were 308 newspapers published in Ottoman script while in the following decade the number declined to 183, pointing most plausibly to the technical hardships posed by the transformation to the Latin script –decrease in readers, difficulty in retaining employees and purchasing new equipment etc.-. Between 1926-1927 individual metropolitan newspapers published 7000-8000 copies, with the most widespread being *Vakit* with a circulation of 7000-10,000, surpassed only by *Cumhuriyet* between 1937-1937 at 25,000-28,000 copies, see, Gavin D. Brockett, *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk,* pp.60, 61.

[23] Anderson, p.175.

[24] Zürcher, p.172. *Cumhuriyet* was the initiation of Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu), the publisher of Ankara's former daily *Yeni Gün*, whom upon Mustafa Kemal's encouragement transferred to Istanbul to counter-balance the opposition of the press in the old capital with a new daily, see, Orhan Koloğlu*, Türk Basını*, p.62.

[25] Brockett, p.67.

[26] Anderson refers to this phenomenon as the 'logoisation' of the state's patrimony through print-capitalism, which will be discussed in depth later on. Anderson, p.18.

[27] Ibid., pp.181-182. Anderson, uses the term 'museumisation' to imply the reconfiguration of memory landscape so as to incorporate the former ancient prestige of old sacred sites.

II.I Weaving New Monuments into a Memory Landscape

In the early 1920's Mustafa Kemal stated; "Let us admit it; a nation which cares not for painting, a nation which builds no statues, a nation which does not meet the exigencies of science and technology deserves no place on the path towards development".[34] At that time the first figurative public statuary in the Muslim world had been experienced in Egypt, when in 1873 Khedive Ismail (r.1863-1879) had erected a monument to the founder of the dynasty Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pascha by sculptor Alfred Jacquemart.[35] Mustafa Kemal was aware of the Egyptian experience and had asserted in a public speech in 1923 that Egyptians were equally Muslims but that they had built statues of their forerunners, concluding with the remark that it would be "an insult to the Muslim world to assert or maintain that an enlightened community could worship these pieces of stone".[36] From the onset then, he had set fine arts as a teleogical and cultural means for the nation-state and its adherence to Western modernity and civilisation.

Hence, began the republican statuomania under his aegis when in 14 March 1926, the Minister of Education, Mustafa Necati Uğural (1925-1929) wrote to the Istanbul prefecture;

> The initiative of erecting statues of *Gazi all over our country*, as the encouragement of our republic, is being carried out with delight. These monuments that are to adorn our cities and to animate our national pride in a lively manner should be executed with adequate artisanship worthy of their great duty thereof […].[37]

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[34] *Atatürk, 1881-1938: UNESCO Turkiye Milli Komisyonu* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Matbaası, 1963), p.70.

[35] Silvia Naef, *Islamda Tasvir Sorunu Var mı?* (Istanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2018), p.73. This was followed by a monument of his successor Ibrahim Pascha (r.1789-1848) by Charles-Henri-Joseph Cordier. In the 1882 Urabi revolts, these were targeted in the sheikh's assaults and partially destructed but later restored.

[36] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, quoted in Gültekin Elibal, *Atatürk ve Resim, Heykel* (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1973), pp.41-42. See also, *Atatürk, 1881-1938*, p.70.

[37] BCA, fol.180.09.01.01 / 07. Italics are my emphasis. *Gazi* can be translated as conquering or liberating hero. It was a title Mustafa Kemal was officially given after his victory in the War of Liberation in 1922 and thereupon widely referred to as such.

In the letter, Minister Necati urged also for the organisation of a special committee with the help of the *Sanayi-i Nefise Akademisi* (Academy of Fine Arts) in Istanbul, who would "evaluate the proficiency of the artists and the proposed projects".[38] Necati had actively served during the War of Liberation, campaigning for Mustafa Kemal's national movement with his publications.[39] As the minister of education he had efficiently reorganized the ministry and would be a crucial figure in the operation of the 1928 script reform.[40] Likely, his office in the ministry was equally accountable for the orchestration of this monument network that would materialize in a new official culture in the persona of Mustafa Kemal. Eric Zürcher argues that this personality cult of Mustafa Kemal served partly to compensate the new regime's lack of emotional appeal and its ideological incoherencies.[41] As this would have been an obvious motivation, the low literacy rates must also have driven the republican elite to associate the monuments with a communicative and educative role, that would "animate" the new official narrative in a lively manner as was stressed by the Minister.

This raises the question of the intelligibility of the monuments in an extremely illiterate community and whether if we can understand and reproach them today as such. Paul Stirton suggests that in dealing with public monuments, sites and environments play as crucial a role in shaping their meaning as the subject and design of the monument itself.[42] His stress is on the centrality of physical and cultural environments in the generation of meaning, especially where spaces and meanings are contested in cases of social constructions of group identities, which depend on the preservation of a collective memory.[43] Quoting from John Gillis, Stirton argues that collective memory also requires a

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[38] Ibid. The official name of *Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi Alisi* had been converted in 1928 to *Sanayi-i Nefise Akademisi* (Academy of Fine Arts).

[39] Zeki Arıkan, 'Milli Mücadele'nin Bir Öncüsü: Mustafa Necati', *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi,* 1.2 (1992) 51-85.

[40] Zeki Arıkan, 'Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Selçuklu, Beylikler ve Osmanl Mirası'nın Keşfi', *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, 39 (2012) 27-59 (p.47).

[41] Zürcher, p.193.

[42] Paul Stirton, 'Public Sculpture in Cluj/Kolozsvar: Identity, Space and Politics', in *Heritage, Ideology, and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe: Contested Pasts, Contested Presents,* ed. by Matthew Rampley, (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2012), pp.41-66 (p.42).

[43] Ibid.

sense of homogeneity in space and time, which in turn defines what is remembered.[44] In a similar way, in the spatial dissemination of the republican monuments, the elite sought to claim the new borders of the country by re-presenting each and every individual city as a homogeneous part of a whole. This was manifested in two ways; first in the disavowals implicit in the physical and cultural environments, which worked to override the former legacies of these sites, second in the standard and anachronistic depictions of the subject of representation, often Mustafa Kemal, which both worked to communicate a standard, ubiquitous narrative to an illiterate urban society.

The nation forgets to remember

In 23 May 1926, the Ministry of Education sent a letter to a number of European embassies, informing them on their search for an established sculptor for the commission of three statues; one equestrian, one standing and one portrait bust of Mustafa Kemal, with posing sessions to take place in Ankara.[45] In one of the responding letters now residing in the Republican Archives, a German sculptor, Herman Hahn addresses the ministry in French on 7 June 1926, writing that he would "start as soon as confirmed" but that his health impeded him from traveling to Ankara, inquiring if his excellency the president could "spend about ten days in Berlin", the time required for posing.[46] Hahn's pricing was; £5000 for the equestrian statue, £2000 for the standing and £1000 for the portrait bust, all cast in bronze. A second respondent was again from Germany, Edwin Scharff, professor at the Academy of Fine Arts in Berlin. His typewritten letter, also in French, stated that he would swiftly get to Ankara and put "all his capacity and force for the creation of a hitherto unseen work of art".[47] His pricing was considerably higher; £7500 for the equestrian, £7000 for the standing and £3000 for the bust, all cast in bronze 1.5 times the human scale. These correspondences present little clues on the modality of commissions or the level of artistic freedom, yet they do allow us to imagine the financial breadth needed to overcome the discrepancies of human and non-human actors; artistic resources and technology the

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[44] John Gillis, quoted in Stirton, p.43.
[45] BCA, fols.180.9.0.0 / 1.1.1, 23 May 1926.
[46] BCA, fols.180.09.01.01 / 10, 11 and 12 07 June 1926.
[47] BCA, fols.180.09.01.01 / 15, 16 11 June 1926.

monuments required. Funding was overcome by public subscription. Although the first monuments were constructed in major cities, provincial bodies from the cities of Maraş, Edremit, Zonguldak to Kırşehir had sent collected funds to Ankara.[48] Especially for Istanbul's Taksim monument, a considerable contribution would come from the city's non-Muslim population since it still operated roughly seventy percent of commerce activities.[49]

The committee of the Academy, which Minister Necati had urged for its creation was composed of painters Namık İsmail (then the director, 1926-1935), İbrahim Çallı, İsmail Hakkı, sculptor İhsan Özsoy and musician Musa Serya, and was chaired by architect Kemalettin Bey, a prominent advocate of the Ottoman revivalist style.[50] It held six meetings in Ankara between 5 and 13 September 1926, after which it reported to the Ministry of Education that principally, Italian sculptor Pietro Canonica should not be given the task to execute the monuments of Mustafa Kemal, calling rather for the appointment and patronage of Turkish artists for their encouragement.[51] The report also touched on issues concerning cultural policy, such as excursions to be made by students and tutors to understand the expanse of the heritage in Anatolia, the foundation of another fine arts academy in the new capital and a new art publication under the Academy's supervision.[52] Although, the committee's reservations about foreign artists can be explained by its fervent desire to encourage national artists, at that time there were only three Turkish Muslim sculptors, none of whom had experience for such large-scale projects, which explains Minister Necati's stress on artistic proficiency in the above letter.[53]

The correspondences does not highlight any connections with the Ministry but in August 1926, the PRP governor of Istanbul, Emin Bey (1881-1964, Erkul) agreed on a deal with the Austrian sculptor, Heinrich Krippel (1883-1945) for the first monument of the

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[48] BCA, fols.180.09.01.01 / 21-25 and for Zonguldak see BCA, fol.180.09.1.1.1.1.

[49] Ertan Ünal, 'Taksim Cumhuriyet Anıtı', Yarım Kalmış bir Simge', *Popüler Tarih*, 37 (2002), 62-67 (p.64). In 1922, out of 4267 commercial institutions, only 1202 belonged to Muslim Turks, see, Ahmet Hamdi Başar, quoted in Murat Koraltürk, 'Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında İstanbul', *Toplumsal Tarih* 59 (1998), pp.38-42.

[50] BCA, fol.180.09.01.01 / 32, 03 October 1926.

[51] Ibid. This document is signed by the director of the Academy, Namık İsmail.

[52] Ibid. The report is very extensive as it also touches on the foundation of a national theatre and a musical conservatory.

[53] Hüseyin Gezer, *Türk Heykeli* (İstanbul: Türkiye İşbankası Yayınları, 1987), p.57.

Republic.[54] Inaugurated in 3 October 1926, on Istanbul's *Sarayburnu* (Seraglio) point, the monument was cast in Vienna's *Vereingte Metallwerke* due to the lack of an appropriate foundry in Turkey but Krippel had come to Ankara to study his model from life [Fig.2.1].[55] The inauguration was ceremonial, as the daily *Vakit* declared, with an audience of about five hundred participators, which watched "a new phase of the Turkish revolution take scene […] all in tears".[56] Despite the partisan tone of the daily, the location of the monument in the imperial capital is intriguing given the ongoing tension between the imperial and national capitals. The new bureaucrats in Ankara resented the complicity of the former Ottoman bureaucrats and Istanbul's heterogeneous composition in the Allied occupation of 1918-1923. Istanbul's former bureaucrats on the other hand, bore a grudge against the official proclamation of Ankara as the new capital, which had left thousands of civil servants unemployed, and moreover, a long-settled tradition of allegiance to the caliph exacerbated this bitterness.[57] However, Governor Emin Bey had no affiliations with the old regime. He was a well-educated bureaucrat who had served in the War of Liberation as medical doctor and his appointment as Istanbul's first republican governor was not coincidental as he was "expected to actively participate" in the city's changing atmosphere.[58] Emin Bey was well informed on the current topics in urban planning, having translated a book from French titled *Şehircilik* (Urbanism) on the Haussmanian transformation of Paris in the late nineteenth century, which he had set up as a model for Turkish cities in the introduction.[59] Thus it seems, both his agency in the erection of the

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[54] Ibid., p.59. Interestingly, the inauguration of Sarayburnu monument is not featured in the daily *Hakimiyeti Milliye* but only on the pro-PRP *Cumhuriyet,* 04 October 1926, p.1. *Hakimiyeti Milliye* almost acted like a press organ of the state from the new capital, having its printing facilities within the range of the National Assembly headquarters in Ankara. In contrast, slightly opponent dailies of Istanbul like *Vakit* on both its issues of 02 and 03 October 1926 and *Akşam* on 03 October 1926 made the inauguration of the monument their headline, see, *Vakit*, 02 October 1926, p.1; *Vakit* 03 October 1926, p.1 and *Akşam*, 03 October 1926, p.1. This chapter concerns figurative sculpture, as public monuments. Other than that Arif Hikmet Koyunoğlu had already been commissioned in 1923 a cenotaph in Dumlupınar. On a very similar style and geometric plan to *Abide-i Hürriyet*, the Dumlupınar cenotaph can be read as a transitional phase with the addition of a figurative detail where a disembodied male hand raises a flag. Kıvanç Osma, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Anıt Heykelleri* (Ankara: Can, 2003), p.23.
[55] Gezer, p.87 and Osma, p.10.
[56] Vakit, 03 October 1926, p.1. See also *Vakit*, 02 October 1926, p.1 and *Cumhuriyet*, 04 October 1926, p.1.
[57] Zürcher, p.178-167.
[58] Osman Nuri Engin, quoted in Emin Erkul, *Op. Dr. Emin Erkul'un Milli Mücadele Anıları,* ed. by Melih Tınal (Istanbul: Zeus, 2013), p.9.
[59] Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul,* p.161.

Sarayburnu monument and his appointment as Istanbul's first republican governor were attempts to formulate a new relation between Istanbul and the new capital.

This was slightly hinted at through the location of the monument as well. In 1927 when Mustafa Kemal visited Istanbul for the first time after the foundation of the Republic, he had not paid tribute to the imperial pilgrimage sites for the holy nation (*ümmet*), namely the *türbe* (mausoleum) of Mehmet II the Conqueror and the imperial mosques.[60] However, the Sarayburnu point was reputed to be where he had embarked on his now legendary trip to Samsun through the Black Sea to instigate the national movement in 1919.[61] In that sense the monument's location could be an attempt to construct a new republican *lieux de mémoire*, which would act in the legitimation of the present through the ascribed memories to the urban space and their connotations on the collective identity.[62]

Even this relegation of Istanbul to the national grid of *lieux de mémoire* was consistent with the aforementioned tension between the two capitals through the iconography of the monument. The hill on the Sarayburnu point represented above all imperial legacy, housing the *Topkapı* palace, the residence of the Ottoman dynasty for over four centuries.[63] Krippel's figure of Mustafa Kemal, however, victoriously turns his back to this cradle of the empire with a clenched fist, facing the eastern shores of the Bosphorus, the Asian continent, the forgotten lands of Anatolia where the new capital is.

The dichotomy is deeply rooted in Turkish history. The Ottoman Empire was renowned with its affinity to the Balkan and Arab provinces, taking Anatolia into consideration only when it came to recruiting soldiers or for purposes of taxation.[64] With the loss of these provinces, the nation-state was confined to the borders of Anatolia, and orientated its cultural focus on these lands to claim its legitimacy. Measures were also taken to reformulate the state's relationship with the rural population of Anatolia. In 1924, the tax

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[60] Gavin D. Brockett, *When Ottomans Became Turks*, p.410.
[61] Fatma Akyürek, 'Atatürk Heykeli', *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi,* 385 (p.385).
[62] Nora..
[63] This is also the Byzantine acropolis, which the Topkapi Palace was deliberately made to overlay to legitimate the Ottoman dynasty in the Roman imperial tradition, see, Deringil, p.29.
[64] Zürcher, p.174.

on farming and livestock (*aşar* and *ağnam*) were abolished, reconfiguring the long-standing Ottoman tradition of tax collection from rural areas to urban economy.[65] This reading is also revealed on a contemporary postcard from the period [Fig.2.1].[66] The image on the postcard is developed from a photograph taken from the rear side of the monument, through a viewpoint so unusual that the photograph's representation of the monument is overshadowed by its implication of the monument's intended orientation. Such visual hierarchy where the orientation of the viewer is highly motivated also points to a *studium*, the work of the photographer not merely as the outcome of individual intentions but as an actor operating in a social and cultural practice, highlighting the social and culturally specific aspects of daily life, as argued by Roland Barthes.[67]

Figure II-1: Anonymous (c.1926). '*Postcard of Sarayburnu monument.*' ©Atatürk Library, Istanbul.

Emin Bey's disregard on matters of accessibility in the orientation of the monument also highlights his ideological intentions to invoke a *milieu de mémoire* for a republican Istanbul. For a public monument to anchor a collective identity, Sarayburnu was

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[65] Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, p.177.
[66] IBBAK, fol.Krt_012560. Publisher Fruchtermann, then run by his son Paul Fruchtermann, too had published a series of photo cards for the Sarayburnu monument, see, Mert Sandalcı, *Max Fruchtermann Kartpostalları, Vol.I,* p.1090.
[67] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida.*

out of reach of a bustling urban network of roads, the closest tram station being in Sirkeci, and without the connection of Kennedy Avenue constructed on reclaimed land in 1958. As early as 1931, the city council expressed its worries that the monument was covered in greenery, and not visible by any point at all.[68] Plans were discussed for its relocation on a more advantageous viewpoint and for its nighttime illumination, together with the renovation of the park to make it a more attractive leisure place.[69] This indicates that for the republican elite the site's new republican attributes within the nation-state's *lieux de mémoire* were more obvious than for the urban crowds whose attention they sought to capture by the monument. The site's further use also suggests this as in July 1928, Mustafa Kemal had announced the script reform here after a public performance.[70] This crystallizes Emin Bey's partisan way to win the hearts of Ankara's bureaucratic circles.

The sartorial codes of the monument were equally partisan in introducing to the imperial capital the new secular dress codes and this is an aspect that also relates to fashion history. Krippel's statue represented Mustafa Kemal in his new, civil, Western dress, suggesting a break with the past. The sartorial aspects of the revolution were still a novelty in 1926. In 1925, the hat reform had just been launched, substituting traditional religious headgear and the Ottoman fez with western style hats. The adoption of Western-style trousers, shirts and ties were crucial in the making of a unified and homogeneous modern nation by eliminating any visible demarcations; ethnic, religious, regional and/or occupational.[71] Emin Bey, having been informed of the upcoming reform by Mustafa Kemal, had taken great care in its implementation, replacing the headgear of traffic policemen with red, metal helmets and setting himself as an example in attending the municipality councils with a hat.[72] As was also recounted in *LTK* in 1934, he had been a fervent supporter of the reform appearing with a fashionable top hat.[73] Thus, the disavowal of imperial legacy imbued both in the location and posture of the monument must have

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[68] 'Sarayburnu Parkında Eğlence Tesisatı Yapılacak', *Cumhuriyet*, 7 September 1931, pp.1.
[69] Ibid., p.4.
[70] Elibal, p.209.
[71] Yılmaz, p.14.
[72] Emin Erkul, quoted in Tınal, p.17. Erkul had also consented to those who wanted to attend the meetings bareheaded.
[73] Édouard Herriot, 'Il Faut Venir à Ankara', *La Turquie Kemaliste (LTK)*, 1(1934), 10-28 (p.26).

been strengthened with the introduction of the new dress code as it simultaneously communicated a break with the former traditional sartorial codes and continuity in secular time.

It is hard to argue if this reading would be intelligible for the wider public of Istanbul in 1926, but for Istanbul's former political elite and still cosmopolitan mercantile classes the messages imbued in the Sarayburnu monument must have been nevertheless more obvious. As will be seen, the monuments to follow in Ankara and other cities were increasingly weighing on the militaristic traits of Mustafa Kemal, often in equestrian style. A similar exaltation of Mustafa Kemal in a Roman imperial manner never materialized in Istanbul possibly because of the city's still prominent attachment to the Ottoman dynasty and the caliph. Even years after, in 1943, on an editorial on *LTK* to promote the new national capital to a global audience of tourists, the anonymous writer had remarked that the "very impressive equestrian statue" of Ankara distinguished it from Istanbul, making the onlookers feel that Ankara embodied the spirit of new Turkey, which was "hard to find in Istanbul".[74] For the republican elite thus Ankara's malleability to a homogenous national capital was a source of pride, whereas Istanbul's still complex cosmopolitan structure was still a challenge if not a threat.

Monuments of disavowal

The following republican monuments were equally suggestive in the mediation of a collective identity, as their relations to the surrounding physical and cultural environments were calculated to make certain associations while overriding others.[75] As Deborah Cherry also asserts, monuments can often be deceiving as they may not always be what they claim or might have been displaced from their originally intended places.[76] Similarly, even though all republican monuments survive today, their physical surroundings and cultural references to them in the 1920s seem to suggest differences. Therefore, it is important to reveal their

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[74] 'Ankara-İstanbul', *LTK*, 47 (1943), 37-49 (p.44).
[75] Stirton has argued a similar point. See, Stirton, p.42.
[76] Deborah Cherry, 'Statues in the Square: Hauntings at the Heart of Empire', in *Location*, ed. by Deborah Cherry and Fintan Cullen, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp.128-165 (p.155).

original material connections to see how they communicated these disavowals to a contemporary public in the 1920s and 1930s, which will be delineated here.

Within a few days following the inauguration of the Sarayburnu monument, another work by Krippel was unveiled in Konya, a central Anatolian city [Fig.2.2].[77] Similar to Emin Bey's partisan undertaking, Konya's PRP Governor Kazım Gürel headed the city council to commission a monument to commemorate Mustafa Kemal.[78] Unlike his Sarayburnu statue, on Konya monument Krippel delineated a Mustafa Kemal in military attire as field marshal, which would later settle in as a standard iconography for later republican monuments. Here too the physical environment of the monument offers similar clues on the disavowal of former legacies, as the statue is literally superimposed on a late Ottoman legacy. What today is widely known as its pedestal was in fact the *Ziraat* (Agriculture) monument built by the CUP in 1917. Krippel had been invited to Konya by the governor to make observations on the *Ziraat* monument, pointing to the latter's commitment to appropriate the Ottoman monument.[79]

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[77] *Cumhuriyet*, 04 October 1926, p.1; *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 04 October 1926, p.1.; *Vakit*, 11 October 1926, p.1.
[78] Osma, p.34.
[79] Osma, p.35.

Figure II-2: Anonymous (1926). *'Contemporary postcard depicting the unveiling of the Konya monument in 1926.'*
©Atatürk Library.

This was also the design of Mimar Muzaffer following his fame after the erection of *Abide-i Hürriyet* (1911). Reminiscent of his former work there, Muzaffer's *Ziraat* monument also stylistically adheres to the National Architecture Renaissance; alluding to the Seljuk monuments, abundant in the Konya region.[80] This must have been practical to Konya's republican elite since the revivalist style was still officially endorsed as a materialisation of the national spirit in the late 1920s. Sibel Bozdoğan argues that the symbolic ambiguity of Ottoman revivalism; its simultaneity and interchangeability of the Turkish and Islamic connotations of Ottoman forms, in both representing the glory of the empire and the aspirations of the new nation, allowed a perfect materialisation of the specific historical, political, and ideological context of the transition from an Ottoman-Islamic identity to a nationalist Turkish one during this period.[81] Thus, placing the Mustafa Kemal statuary atop the *Ziraat* monument in this patriotic style might have offered a

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[80] Indeed Gezer suggests that Mimar Muzaffer was inspired by the Karatay madrasa in Konya. Gezer, p.63.
[81] Bozdoğan, p.42.

material instrument of legitimacy for the city's new PRP administration.

Surprisingly, the discursive space on the erection of the Konya monument is indifferent to this conglomeration as none of the newspapers announcing the inauguration of the monument mention the *Ziraat* monument. Even the daily *Vakit*, which cites the monument's height at sixteen-meters, surpassing Istanbul's recent Sarayburnu monument, offers no credit for Muzaffer's former structure.[82] Adrian Forty argues that such acts of iconoclasm, as with the Soviet monuments superimposed on sites previously dominated by other monuments, liquidate former memories.[83] However, the superimposition of the Konya monument does not annihilate its predecessor but overwrites it. By appropriating the *Ziraat* monument, it legitimizes and cultivates a new collective identity around the military persona of the liberator, the *Gazi*, Mustafa Kemal, whilst liquidating the former structure. This introduces another historical rupture where a simultaneous break with the late Ottoman legacy is suggested through a stress on the continuity of the nation state.

In November 1927, the Konya monument was succeeded by the first public monument in Ankara, the *Zafer* (Victory) monument. This was also executed by Krippel and funded through public subscription with the campaign of the pro-government daily *Yeni Gün* (New Day) published by Yunus Nadi Abalioğlu (1879-1945).[84] This consisted of an equestrian statue of Mustafa Kemal again as field marshal, as in the Konya monument, elevated on a high plinth, flanked by two figures of vigilant soldiers and a figure of the legendry guerilla fighter, *Kara Fatma* (Fatma the Black), seen shouldering a mortar shell at the very far back [Fig.2.3].[85] The whole complex raised on a kite-shaped, rusticated pedestal, seemingly a replica of the nearby medieval Ankara citadel. The *Zafer* monument is unique in that, unlike its precursors in Sarayburnu and Konya; it has friezes and epigraphs on the north, south and eastern sides of its plinth. The official daily *Hakimiyeti*

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[82] *Vakit*, 11 October 1926, p.1.
[83] Adrian Forty, 'Introduction', in *The Art of Forgetting*, p.11.
[84] *Cumhuriyet*, 24 November 1927, p.1 and *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1927, p.1.
[85] The *Kara Fatma* (Fatma the Black) figure, a materialisation of the Turkic Marianne is usually attributed to Fatma Seher Erden (1888-1955) who headed a guerilla group during the War of Liberation, mostly composed of women, and who then joined the Nationalist Army, see *The New York Times*, 23 April 1922.

Milliye, zealously reported that Krippel had carved these friezes in situ with chisels for which electric light fittings were arranged up to the pedestal.[86] In as much as the monuments were made to connote an ideal of national modernity, their construction too was made to connote a technological display of superiority to imbue them with national pride. The epigraphs in Ottoman-Turkish script (since the monument predates the 1928 script reform) however, seem likely to have been added up by another agency, as they are not on dedicated plates but are chiseled on the narrow cornice that runs through the top of the plinth. Given the original elevation of the plinth, they would have been quite illegible from the street level. Nevertheless, they work like captions for the accompanying friezes, anchoring the intended message of the commissioner elite against the ambiguity of the image as was argued by Barthes.[87] As the west epigraph of monument bluntly declares in Mustafa Kemal's own words; that "through the above symbol" the Turkish nation could find a "significant representation and a faithful narration" of the victory of its liberation, its independence struggle and its ensuing modern reforms.

Figure II-3: Anonymous (c.1926). *'Contemporary postcard, depicting the Ulus monument complex.'* ©SALT Research, Istanbul.

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[86] *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 24 September 1927, p.1.
[87] Roland Barthes, *Rhetoric of the Image,* pp.39-41.

As to the friezes, the north one illustrates the role and contribution of the masses to the War of Liberation through their humble means. The south one points to the centrality of the National Army guided by Mustafa Kemal and his companions, İsmet İnönü and Fevzi Çakmak. However, the frieze on the east, rear side aligning with the *Kara Fatma* figure, is particularly more graphic than iconic, delineating a mutilated tree trunk, which shoots a brand new sprout [Fig.2.4]. Here the epigraph reads "*Bulunur kurtaracak bahtı kara maderini – 12 Kanunisani 1337*" (Shall be found a savior, for your ill-fated mother – 12 January 1921). This was a pun to the verse of a poem by the revered romantic nationalist poet Namık Kemal (1840-1888), written during the Russian-Ottoman War (1877-1878), to which Mustafa Kemal had referred to in his address to the National Assembly on 1921, by replying to the poet's interrogative verse with a positive twist (the original reads "Isn't there a savior…?").[88] If the interpretation of the epigraph was bound to literacy, the recognition of the actors in the friezes equally depended on their reputation. Yet the "language of the visual form" as Marshall McLuhan argues, that of a shooting sprout, must have been rather widely intelligible, as a graphic visualisation of a simultaneous break with the past.[89]

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[88] This might have been a motto often used by Mustafa Kemal on several occasions, see, Hasan Duman, 'Atatürk ve Namık Kemal', *Milli Kültür*, n.p (1988) 27-33 (pp.29-30).
[89] Marshall McLuhan, quoted in Frank Hartmann, 'Visualising Social Facts: Otto Neurath's ISOTYPE Project', in *European Modernism and the Information Society*, ed. by W. Boyd Rayward (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2008), pp.279-295 (pp.283, 286-287).

Figure II-4: Heinrich Krippel (2018). *'Detail of the east frieze on Henrich Krippel's Zafer monument.'* ©Artun Özgüner.

To argue on the associations attempted on the original spatial positioning of the *Zafer* monument we need to have a closer look at its lifecycle. In the late 1950s the *Zafer* monument was relocated from the kite-shaped crossroads island to a square opened up just to the left of its original location, enclosing the monument within the entourage of surrounding concrete buildings where it still stands today. The displacement also deprived the monument from its original rusticated pedestal complex, which offered a similar play of continuity vs. break with the Ankara citadel, then still visible behind the monument. This crossroads, then newly christened as *Hakimiyeti Milliye Meydanı* (National Sovereignty Square) stood at the intersection of an axis.[90] To the west, the monument faced the *İstasyon Caddesi* (Station Avenue), where the city had been expanding since the arrival of the train line in 1839. This section was dominated with modern buildings, all in the National Architecture Renaissance style; the first Parliament building (designed originally as the CUP headquarters by İsmail Hasif Bey in 1917), the second Parliament building (designed

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[90] The square was later renamed as *Ulus Meydanı* (Nation Square) in a purer Turkish, following the script and language reforms of 1928.

originally as the PRP headquarters by Vedat Bey, 1926), which were later followed by *Ankara Palas* (an elaborate hotel complex for visiting bureaucrats-Vedat and Kemalettin Bey, 1927) and the lavishly ornamented İş Bank headquarters (Giulio Mongeri, 1929). As Bozdoğan also notes, by 1918 Ottoman revivalist architecture already connoted a Turkish national style in as much as later Victorians saw Gothic revivalism as a symbol of Englishness.[91] Hence, the material rise of national modernity in the new capital was strongly implied in this new architectural landscape, which the *Zafer* monument faced.

To the east, the *Anafartalar* neighborhood stretched to the older quarters of the Ottoman town, in a network of narrow, twisting roads, all the way up to the citadel, circumvented by the remains of the first-century BC Temple of Augustus and a later Roman bath. A fire in 1916, had devastated this western slope of the citadel, facing the rear side of the monument, decimating mainly the Jewish and Christian neighborhoods, and was still marked on the 1924 Ministry of National Defence map as the fire ground.[92] Taylan Esin argues that the 1916 fire was an instrument of the imperialist CUP policies for the dislocation and eradication of the economically superior non-Muslim minorities from the public sphere of Anatolian towns.[93] The material and civil devastation of the 1916 fire was also instrumental for the republican amnesia, since it presented an arid landscape where the material advancements of national modernity could be more visible and less accountable of an imperial cosmopolitan civil society. Interestingly, in some of the contemporary photographs, the monument is captured with the fire-stricken neighborhoods of the western slopes of the citadel in the background, a loss it does not commemorate, resonating what Forty argues as the inevitable feature of all commemorative artefacts, that they allow only certain things to be remembered by exclusion of others to be forgotten.[94]

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[91] Bozdoğan, p.34.

[92] *Müdafaai Milliye Vekaleti Harita Dairesi, 1924 Ankara Haritası* (Ministry of National Defense Map Department, 1924 Ankara Map) (Istanbul: İstanbul Matbaacılık, 1924), in Gökçe Günel and Ali Kılcı, '1924 Map of Ankara City: Recognizing Ankara with an Old Map', *Journal of Ankara Studies*, 3.1 (2015), 78-104 (p.84).

[93] Taylan Esin and Zeliha Etöz, *1916 Ankara Yangını* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), p.23.

[94] Forty, p.9.

This historical rupture, the work of forgetting the Ottoman Ankara was communicated by a "narrative identity" on the pedestal complex, as Anderson would have argued.[95] The rusticated pedestal complex, emulating the Ankara citadel behind it, originally had two wolf-headed fountains referring to the genesis myth of modern Turks, the *Ergenekon* [Fig.2.5]. This was another manifestation of a romantic nationalist poem by Ziya Gökalp (1871-1924), the ideologue behind the Turkish nationalist thinking. In his poem titled *Ergenekon*, Gökalp had revived the mytho-history on the genesis of tribal Turks in Central Asia.[96] This myth delineated an instance in pre-history when two Turkish tribes fleeing their enemies were landlocked for about four centuries in a mountainous area called *Ergenekon*. The tribes were freed only after a wolf called *Börteçene* had appeared to lead them to the passage out, which was a mountain melted down by a blacksmith, *Ergenekon*, the namesake of the myth. Gökalp's poem, published at the peak of the Balkan Wars in 1913, made outright connections with the myth and the current decline of the empire, urging for a similar awakening for salvation. Thus in the early republican era the myth was still a frequently addressed metaphor for the salvation of the homeland after WWI. Krippel had stated in an interview to the art journal *Hayat*, published by the Ministry of Education itself, that he was inspired by this very old Turkish tradition (*an'ane*) in carving these figures, and that he wished to remember of this national legend (*menkıbe*) whose glorious revival they were witnessing.[97] Again, it is cumbersome to argue on the intelligibility of these references to the larger public in 1926, but it nonetheless suggests how the republican elite saw the agency in monuments as non-human material actors which could be assigned the role of instilling a narrative identity in a largely illiterate society, compensating the break with the Ottoman past. Especially in cities like Ankara, where the city's civil society had disintegrated following the calamities of WWI.

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[95]Anderson, p.203.

[96] On Gökalp's structuring of the Turkish nationalist movement, see, Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp.343-352.

[97] 'Sanat Bahisleri', *Hayat*, 57 (1927), 9-13 (p.91). On *Hayat* (Life), see, Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın*, p.162.

Figure II-5: Hayat (1927). *'The photograph of the wolf-headed fountain as published in the journal.'* ©SALT Research.

Contemporary to Krippel were also works of Italian sculptor Pietro Canonica (1869-1959). As mentioned earlier, Canonica was not well received by the Academy's committee, but he was nonetheless commissioned as part of the aforementioned Ministry of Education's initial request of two statues and a portrait bust - all to be erected in Ankara-, at a cost of altogether £10,000.[98] After this project he went on to work for the Turkish government for two more commissions, one in Istanbul's Taksim square (1928) and the other for the city of Izmir (1932). Compared to Krippel's static figures, Canonica's monuments seem more ardent in conveying a narrative. When these were commissioned, Mustafa Kemal was already planning the upcoming script reform of November 1928 to replace the former Turkish-Arabic script; therefore he had advised Canonica not to include any epigraphs on any of his works, since this would sooner make them incompatible with the new Turkish-Latin letters.[99] This might also point to their increased narrative tone. Canonica's last work, the Izmir monument was an equestrian statue of Mustafa Kemal as field marshal with a frieze that envelopes the plinth as it starts in low-relief on the sides where the struggle for liberation is delineated, and evolves gradually to high-relief as it

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[98] *Cumhuriyet*, 12 October 1926, p.1.
[99] Elibal, p.209. It is also plausible that since the Turkish Arabic script was to a greater extent still perceived as sacred, it might have confused the viewers in their reception of a secular monument.

meets in the front, triumphantly climaxing the narrative with a full figure of the legendary woman fighter *Kara Fatma* marching forward, announcing the victory [Fig.2.6]. The equestrian figure too joins this forward momentum, as the figure of Mustafa Kemal points with his right index finger the direction of the sea, the Mediterranean. The setting reenacts a moment in the aftermath of the victorious Dumlupınar Battle of August 1922, when Mustafa Kemal ordered his armies to march forward to the Mediterranean, to the city of Izmir, then under Greek occupation.[100] The whole narrative is slightly disruptive as it tends to rewrite a representation of the resistance movement in a Delacroix-inspired secular, revolutionary iconography, overshadowing the role of religious sentiments, which had acted as a binding agent in the movement. Zurcher also asserts that the resistance taking place between 1919-1922 was relegated in republican history writing to the status of the prehistory of the Republic overwriting the role of religion in the mobilisatoin of masses.[101]

[100] Lewis, p.254.
[101] Zurcher, *Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists,* p. 163.

Figure II-6: Pietro Canonica (2018). 'The *side and front friezes of Canonica's Izmir monument.'* ©Artun Özgüner.

Izmir was an important port city, economically prosperous and only second to Istanbul. Thus its liberation from the Greek Army was crucial in the conclusion of the War of Liberation.[102] However, within a few days following its recapture by the Turkish National Army on 9 September, the city was greatly destroyed by a fire whose culpability to this day remains disputed.[103] The 1922 fire had destroyed irrevocably much of the Levantine merchant districts together with the Greek and Armenian neighborhoods. According to Biray Kulluğolu, regardless its culpability, the fire allowed the new state a *tabula rasa* where the Ottoman heritage could be overridden with a new collective identity.[104] Within this context, the Izmir monument like its precursors in Konya and Ankara, seems deceptive rather than remembering since it is made to play an enactment to

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[102] Shaw and Shaw, p.363.

[103] For the 1922 fire of Izmir, lack of access to the records of Turkish Military on the one hand and the selective reading of available material by researchers on the other seems problematic; see, Heath W. Lowry, 'Turkish History: On Whose Sources Will It Be Based? A Case Study on the Burning of Izmir', *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 9 (1989), 2-29, (p. 16). Leyla Neyzi's remarkable oral history narrative points to a bifurcation of two discourses in the local collective memory; one which accounts for the atrocities committed by the Greek Army, reiterating the official narrative and the other, moved by feelings of nostalgia for the loss of a cosmopolitan city, empathizing with the victims, see, Leyla Neyzi, '*Remembering Smyrna/Izmir: Shared History, Shared Trauma', History & Memory*, 20.2 (2008), 106-127.

[104] Biray Kulluoğlu Kırlı, 'Forgetting the Smyrna Fire', *History Workshop Journal*, 60.1 (2005), 25-40, (p.27).

to the forgetting of the pre-1922 Ottoman city. This tension is clearer on a contemporary postcard printed with a photograph by *Foto Cemal*, where we get a much clearer sense of the lifecycle of the monument and its surrounding. In the photograph, a new setting seems to emerge on this urban space, which is mostly replaced in the 1960s by a crescent of concrete apartment blocks. In the photograph, the monument is surrounded by a new set of buildings all in National Architecture Renaissance style, notably with the new port authority building in the centre right, while in the centre left, roughly ten years after the destruction of the fire, some debris is still visible [Fig.2.7]. As with the other first monuments the Izmir monument too was made to act out its role in association with these other, architectural and spatial materialities to convey its communicative role in the eyes of the republican commissioners.

Figure II-7: Foto Cemal (c.1932). *'Pietro Canonica's Izmir monument on a contemporary postcard'* ©APIKAM, Izmir.

As the PRP mayor of Izmir Behçet Salih also remarked at the inauguration of the monument in 28 July 1932, the monument had risen from what was ruins merely six months ago but now a beautiful seaside park.[105] At a time when local collective memory was still stricken with the trauma of war, and surrounded simultaneously with the material

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[105] 'Gazi Heykelinin Yüksek Huzurunda', *Yeni Asır,* 28 Temmuz 1932, p.3.

ruins of a decimated Ottoman port city and the construction of a national one, the meaning of Mustafa Kemal's indexical gesture becomes interpretable as a reminder of counter-memory, to forget the loss and move on with the new national collective identity.[106] This oscillation is also observable in the discursive space of the monument, the press. Pro-government dailies *Cumhuriyet* and *Hakimiyeti Milliye* only mention the inauguration as an ecstatic joyful event, with crowds cheering at Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's speech, pointing to the importance of the statue's indexical gesture in the collective memory, as a token for the place of the Turkish civilisation in the Mediterranean basin.[107] Only*Vakit* does mention that the monument stands at the place of the former *Kramer Hotel*, destroyed in the fire.[108] Similarly, *Akşam* slightly alludes to the past writing "the grievous memories of the occupation times" only to highlight how the *Gazi* "had brought an end to it".[109] Through this indexical gesture the monument suggests a new "narrative identity" which compensates for the loss, the historical rupture caused by the creation of the nation-state in a social environment conducive to assume a new collective identity in the desolation of post-war.

Overall, even the rhetoric of the republican monuments as the pionneers of public statuary was historically disruptive. In 1918, during the rising CUP-led patriotism of WWI, in Hafik, a town near Sivas, governor Muammer Bey erected a bust of the dynastic forefather of the Ottomans, Osman Gazi (1258-1326), which had been executed by an Armenian artist, whose anonymity is also suggestive of a deliberate erasure of the legacy of Armenian craftsmanship in the Eastern provinces. Mustafa Kemal also pointed to this bust as a "beautiful" example, an antecedent to the republican monuments.[110] However, in 1936 the town's PRP governor Nazmi Toker ordered its demolition asserting, "the times required no monument other than those of Atatürk".[111] For the republican elite the agency of the monuments was acceptable in so far as they were made to associate a desirable, disrupted

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[106] Kulloğlu Kırlı also interprets the modern reconstruction of Izmir as a counter-memory discourse, see, Biray Kulluoğlu Kırlı, 'The Play of Memory, Counter-Memory: Building Izmir on Smyrna's Ashes', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 26 (2002), 1-28.

[107] *Cumhuriyet*, 28 July 1932, p.1 and *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 28 July 1932, p.1.

[108] *Vakit*, 28 July 1932, p.1

[109] *Akşam*, 28 July 1932, p.1.

[110] Elibal, pp.42, 46-49.

[111] From an interview made with the then Hafik post office director Rahmi Türker, on 31 July 1972, in Ibid., p.47.

memory of the War of Liberation within that urban texture and in so far as the agency in their commissioning and execution overlapped with a single republican agency, inculcating a peculiar, homogeneous iconography, which is the following theme of this section.

A calculated republican look?

It was not merely with references to the surrounding physical and cultural environments that the political elite sought to communicate through monuments. The "communicative power of the visual languages of public statuary", the inner character and illustrative details of statuary, as Cherry argues, also has to be focused and homogenized so as to make the attributes of the commemorated subject more efficient, avoiding ambiguities.[112] As argued earlier, after Istanbul's Sarayburnu monument, which suggested the new civic values in the imperial capital, following monuments increasingly weighed on an iconography where Mustafa Kemal was represented with his clean-cut look in the field marshal uniforms of the national army, reconfigured in 1924.[113] As much as seeing the liberator in his new Western dress, this must also have been problematic since it was not a historically accurate representation. Mustafa Kemal was given the title of field marshal in 1921 whilst the War of Liberation was still going on, yet in 1923 he had become the president of republic, switching to a political career. This means that he had actually never worn the new 1924 designs of uniforms of the national army, while serving.[114] However, starting with the Konya and *Zafer* monuments, the later monuments increasingly represented him in the 1924 uniforms. For instance, on Canonica's Izmir monument, this is more at odds when considered with the accurate representation of the figures in the friezes in their contemporary unifrms and/or clothing style while Mustafa Kemal on horseback in his 1924 uniform seems ironically to lead them from the future.

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[112] Cherry, p.152.
[113] *Cumhuriyet*, 12 October 1926, p.1.
[114] For the change of uniforms in 1924 in the Turkish Armed Forces, see, *Harbiye Askeri Müzesi Üniforma Kataloğu* (Istanbul: Deva Matbaacılık, 2017), pp.124-133.

The main change in the new uniforms was the replacement of headgear, that of kalpak with a French-style kepi, first worn by Ankara's republican guard.[115] Especially within the light of the aforementioned hat reform, this was probably done intentionally to discontinue the CUP legacy, which had brought the kalpak headgear into official culture. The new cap was adorned with golden embroidery of laurel leafs which met at the top of a visor with an upright crescent-star. The introduction of this visor itself was problematic as it disabled soldiers from prostrating properly during prayers, for which matter they often turned it around.[116] As a matter of fact these outwardly Western aspects of the reforms caused great disturbance within the Muslim orthodoxy and repressed only after some 7500 detainees and 600 executions in 1926.[117] Notwithstanding, for the inauguration of the Izmir monument in 1932, *Cumhuriyet* had published a cover illustration where an idealized mob of republican citizens, all wearing identical western style hats, fervently cheered to the speech of the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in the presence of their new monument [Fig.2.8].[118]

Figure II-8: Cumhuriyet (28 July 1932). '*The inauguration of Izmir's republican monument*' ©Cumhuriyet Archives.

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[115] Ibid. and Herriot, p.28. *Kalpak* is a brimless hat made of leather or fur in the shape of a truncated cone, which originates from northern Black Sea provinces, of mainly Circassian and Tatar origin, see also Yılmaz, p.234.
[116] Herriot, p.28.
[117] Zürcher, p.173. Interestingly Herriot also talks about the repression of these riots on *LTK* with the execution of one imam and dozens condemned to death sentence, see, Harriot, p.26.
[118] *Cumhuriyet*, 28 July 1932, p.1.

Added to the sartorial aspects were also the facial features of Kemal. In all monuments he bears a clean-cut look, contradicting with his long-kept moustache during the war, although it was only in 1923 upon his appointment as president of republic that he had assumed the clean-cut look.[119] As Biddle-Perry and Cheang argue, hair is loaded with cultural meanings since it allows for a human capacity for self-conscious manipulation, management and display.[120] By the 1920s facial hair was increasingly seen as an unhealthy ornament whereas the clean-cut look had already become resonant with the modernist cult of the moral, hygienic aesthetic to which national modernity was contingent.[121] Hence, the visual language of statuary was made to communicate a likeness beyond historical accuracy; the new public image of the leader was retrofitted into the narrative of the War of Liberation to create a more homogeneous message. As argued above, such disruptive inaccuracies in the representative codes of the monuments introduced a liquidation of the religious essence of the resistance movement as a teleological part of the genesis of the secular nation state.

Hair was an equally important concept for the representation of republican women on Canonica's Taksim monument. Once again on an Istanbul monument, references to the civic, sartorial aspects of the republican reforms were made manifest in the medallion friezes on the narrow sides, contrasting a veiled woman in agony with an exposed, buoyant one, suggesting the freedom the nation-state bestows upon Turkish women [Fig.2.9]. Yet, the inclusion of women in state iconography was more problematic even when it signaled the gender-inclusive promise of the nation-state for the creation of a new public sphere. The legendary *Kara Fatma* figure that appeared on the *Zafer* and Izmir monuments as a reference to the female agency in the liberation was in fact Fatma Seher Erden (1888-1955) whom had joined the National Army with her guerilla group composed of women.[122] Yet when the *Zafer* monument was inaugurated, the daily *Cumhuriyet* only underlined the

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[119] A clear sequence of this transformation can be found in *Fotoğraflarla Atatürk*, ed. by Ahmet Abut and Ferit Düzyol (Antalya: AKMED (Suna ve İnan Kıraç – Akdeniz Medeniyetleri Araştırma Enstitüsü), 1998), pp.14-52.
[120] Geraldine Biddle-Perry and Sarah Cheang, 'Introduciton: Thinking About Hair', in *Hair: Styling, Culture and Fashion,* ed. by Geraldine Biddle-Perry and Sarah Cheang (Oxford: Berg, 2008), p.10.
[121] Ibid., p.68.
[122] *The New York Times*, 23 April 1922.

importance of the female figure as a token of Westernisation without even mentioning of Seher as a historical subject.[123] As Janice Monk also argues for American monuments, in contrast to the realism of the monument's male subjects, here too the female figure of Fatma remains abstracted, ubiquitous and thus mythified, which reflects the context of everyday gender relations.[124] Thus, the communicative power the republican elite imbued in the visual language of republican statuary seems likely to be an implicit avowal of the republican gender codes in exposing the masculine attributes of the state culture.

Figure II-9: Pietro Canonica (1927). *'Medallion friezes depicting the sartorial reform on the Taksim monument.'* ©Museo Pietro Canonica, Rome.

Nevertheless, it is cumbersome to pin down a single republican agency in the homogenization of this iconography to convey such particular narrative identities. Canonica notes in his memoir that Mustafa Kemal, having switched to a political carrier after the war, loathed wearing his military uniform even to pose for a sketch, which seems at odds with the aforementioned iconography.[125] However, this must nonetheless have been a deliberate, calculated attempt to define a particular communication of the War of Liberation as the genesis of a secular nation state, since the Ministry of Education did not easily tolerate demarcations from this iconography. Here, the case of Istanbul's Taksim monument can present a clue. When the Beyoğlu PRP Mayor Hamid Bey had consulted the ministry for the construction of an exclusive monument for Taksim Square in 1926, the

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[123] *Cumhuriyet*, 24 November 1927, p.1.
[124] Janice Monk, 'Gender in the Landscape: Expressions of Power and Meaning', in *Inventing Places*, pp.123-138 (p.126).
[125] MPC, *Memoir of Pietro Canonica*, p. 126.

ministry replied that it was not appropriate to have statues of the *Gazi* "with different aspects here and there", and that the decision would be made only after Canonica's submission of his three sketches.[126] Hamid Bey then requested a second petition asking for local autonomy in the design of the monument, stressing that the Taksim monument was to be erected "in the country's most important location" and therefore had to be "unique and exclusive".[127] It was only following this that the ministry granted Hamid Bey the permission to construct a disparate monument, which explains Canonica's historically more accurate delineations of Mustafa Kemal with a kalpak, unlike any other contemporary monument. The monument's distribution of agency in the nationalist struggle with a hierarchy of various figures also suggests this; İsmet İnönü, Kazım Karabekir and even some Soviet generals on the southern facade. Arguably then, the ministry was the responsible body for the standardisation of the narrative and representational codes on the monuments. If any, the Academy's role in the construction of monuments seems to have been largely overshadowed by the Ministry of Education acting as a mediator between Mustafa Kemal and the local PRP bureaucrats.

The public responds: a clash?

Despite this peculiarly calculated communicative role assigned to monuments as converyors of the national narrative of the elite, it is less likely and also harder to assume that their public reception corresponded fully to the communicative power they were supposedly imbued with. Even with a lack of press freedom, circles of intelligentsia and art were far from contend with the works of Krippel and Canonica and more likely deceived. As early as 1926 painter Avni Lifij asserted on the daily *Vakit* that Krippel's Sarayburnu monument did not do justice to its model and had better not be erected.[128] In response to these criticisms Krippel later contended on his ability to have represented the *Gazi* with the desired proud posture and asserted that his work was even praised by critiques in Vienna.[129] In 1931, on the occasion for an official contest to be held by the Ministry of Internal Affairs

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[126] *Cumhuriyet*, 12 October 1926, p.1.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Avni Lifij, *Vakit*, 22 April 1926, p.2.
[129] *Cumhuriyet*, 7 December 1927, p.3.

for the Izmir monument, even the pro-government daily *Cumhuriyet*, aggravated by some early signs of disintegration on its marble pedestal, overtly criticized Canonica's lack of zeal and pomp on his Taksim monument.[130] The daily bluntly declared that his Taksim monument was "far from beauty and liveliness" and lamented on the haphazard and hastened selection of artists without an official contest and the pretentious fixation with names like Canonica.[131] It finally added that the future Turkish generations would have known better, mocking Canonica's soldier figures as rather reminiscent of Napoleon's Imperial Guard, noting that there would not even be "one Turkish soldier of this type out of a ten thousand".[132] Similarly, author and aesthetics theoretician at the Academy, Ahmet Haşim (1887-1933) called Krippel's Sarayburnu monument a "heap of bronze", a mistake not to be repeated.[133] Haşim argued that "instead of building great monuments, we should rather erect a marble block with an epigraph reading; 'until a Turkish artist has been raised!".[134]

As the head of the Academy, Namik İsmail's earlier disapproval towards Canonica was also resonant of a protest against this monolithic comissioning body.[135] Canonica recalls in his memoir that the campaigning activities of the then Italian ambassador to Turkey, Orsini Baroni, a close friend of his, seems to have worked in his favor amidst many international rivals with a strong pressure from the French government.[136] It is intriguing that the Ministry of Education insisted appointing German and Italian artists while the French government had equally lobbied. There was also an affinity to French sculptors of the time within the circles of the Academy since many young artists were educated in their studios in Paris.[137] These later gathering in a nationalist art collective titled *Group D*

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[130] M. Nermi, 'Izmir'de Yapılacak Abide', *Cumhuriyet*, 1 March 1930, pp.1, 3. For the early structural problems on the monument, see, 'Taksim Meydanı', *Cumhuriyet*, 9 March 1930, p.3.

[131] 'Izmir'de Yapılacak Abide', *Cumhuriyet*, 1 March 1930, p.3.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ahmet Haşim, quoted in 'Abideler Meselesi', *Ar*, 5 (1937), 2-3 (p.5). Haşim probably uttered this critique much earlier but it wasn't possible to find the original source.

[134] Ahmet Haşim, quoted in Gezer, p.15. Gezer probably quotes Haşim from the same source as *Ar*.

[135] Although Namık İsmail's hostility towards Canonica was well known, to clearly point its cause seems cumbersome, see also, Behçet Ünsal, 'İlk Şehirci Mimarımız Burhan Arif Ongun ile Söyleşi', *Mimar*, 374 (1979), pp.62-64.

[136] MPC, *Memoir of Pietro Canonica*, p.123.

[137] For instance, sculptor Ali Hadi Bara was trained in Paris in the studio of Bouchard and Landovsky while Ratip Aşir had attended that of Bourdelle and Maillol, see, Elibal, pp.224-240.

lamented in their publication *Ar* in 1937, the choice of Canonica and Krippel over the "great French masters" Antione Bourdelle, Marcel Gimond, Charles Despiau or Aristide Maillol.[138] Many nationalist artists like the *Group D* collective, resented the early monuments of 1920s and 1930s rather than take pride in them. Painters Nurullah Berk, Namık İsmail, and sculptors Kenan Yontunç and İhsan Özsoy continued to campaign for the idea that only a monument built by a Turkish artist could be national.[139] A series of interviews made with prominent intellectuals in 1937 and published on *Ar* inquired if a foreigner was capable of executing a national monument at all.[140] These interviews were accompanied by visual juxtapositions of the works of national and foreign artists, with a bias on the former. In one of them poet Ahmet Kutsi Tecer (1901-1967) responded saying, "A monument is a memory of a nation's life. Such a memory can only be exalted by a partaker of that life".[141]

The Ministry of Education's appointment of German and Italian artists then might point to an affinity with the authoritarian political climates of these parts of Europe, which were more conducive to building future utopias. This was a rooted tradition as during WWI, Austrian painter Wilhelm Krausz (1878-1959) was also commissioned by the CUP government and İsmail's hostility towards Canonica stemmed partly from the resentment of his generation towards the ignorance of the political elite for young national artists.[143] In the late 1930s too this continued as portraits and sculptures were commissioned to German artists like Arthur Kampf and Anton Hanak, as in the top-down appointment of Austrian architect Ernst Egli (1893-1974) in 1930, introducing the principles of European modernism in the Academy's architecture studio but nonetheless triggering the resignations of the advocates of National Architecture Renaissance, Giulio Mongeri in 1928 and Vedat Bey in 1930.[144] It is also likely that due to a shared sense of defeatism Austrian and German

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[138] Ahmet Kutsi Tecer, 'Abideler Meselesi ve Münevverlerimiz', *Ar*, 5 (1937), 10-12 (p.10).
[139] Osma, pp.26-31.
[140] Zühtü Müridoğlu, 'Abidecilik', *Ar*, 5 (1937), 4-9.
[141]Ahmet Kutsi Tecer, 'Abideler Meselesi ve Münevverlerimiz', *Ar*, 5 (1937), 10-12 (p.10).
[143] Elibal, p.54.
[144] Ibid., p.157. For an account of how the studio's curriculum changed from the classical study of orders and ornamentation to the study of forms, see, Ünsal, pp.62-64. The university reform of 1933 ended the Ottoman madrasa (Muslim seminary) system, where about 180 German-speaking experts

artists might have faced less opposition than Canonica, as correspondence between the Academy and the Ministry of Education indicate no stand on Kampf's appointment on the Academy's part.[145] Nevertheless, the predominance of Austrian and German design actors must have also preoccupied Mustafa Kemal since he later declared his wish to assign a French planner for Istanbul's urban renewal to counter-weight the German-Austrian influence of architects appointed in Ankara.[146]

Either way, the commissioning of European artists by the republican elite testifies to their assessment of the local artistic resources (young generation of Turkish artists) as incompetant, while, ironically, their maturation was seen as a source of national pride. This is recorded in two instances when in 29 October 1926, a bust of Mustafa Kemal executed by the Academy graduate Ali Nejad Sirel (1898-1959), and later on 29 December another one by Kenan Ali Yontunç (1904-1995) made zealous headlines in the official dailies.[148] On the celebrations of the Republic Day that year, Sirel's work was proudly placed on a cart and proceeded through the pageants in front of the National Assembly, escorted by high school students.[149] In 1928, Yontunç himself meeting Mustafa Kemal, on the occasion of his own wedding, offered him a plea for the commissioning of national artists for his statues, to which Kemal consented.[150] Later in 1932, on supposedly the first republican sculpture exhibition by sculptor Zühtü Müridoğlu, the architecture journal *Mimar* addressing all municipal authorities who had commissioned Krippel and Canonica, urged them to reconsider Zühtü's competency in his art.[151] Such pleas gradually culminated in more commissions trusted to emerging Turkish sculptors, to name a few; the monuments in Edirne (1931), Çorum (1932), Elazığ (1933) by Kenan Yontunç and Bursa (1931), Izmit (1933) by Nejad Sirel. Like their Ottoman predecessors, the republican elite too was

were active in the shaping of the new higher education fields, see, Sibel Bozdoğan and Esra Akcan, *Turkey: Modern Architectures in History*, (London: Reaktion, 2012), p.51.
[145] BCA, fol.180.09.01.01 / 41-42.
[146] İpek Akpınar, 'The Rebuilding of Istanbul Revisited: Foreign Planners in the Early Republican Years', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 50 (2014), 59-92 (pp.77-78)
[148] For Kenan Yontunç's bust see, *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 29 December 1926, p.1; for Nejad Sirel's see, *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 01 December 1926, p.1. and *Vakit*, 29 October 1926, p.1.
[149] *Vakit*, 29 October 1926, p.1. In 1928 the same bust was placed again on a cart, ornate with emanating golden rays, accompanied by four young girls in white togas and golden laurel tiaras, see, *Vakit*, 31 October 1928, p.1.
[150] Yontunç, quoted in Osma, p.28. See also, Elibal, pp.262-263.
[151] Elif Naci, 'İlk Heykel Sergisi', *Mimar*, 21 (1932), 262-263 (p.262).

equally obsessed with the display of local resources and technology and the assignment of an increasingly single agency in the commissioning and making of the monuments, which to them must have equally connoted national pride.

This increasing pattern in the commissioning of young Turkish artists in the late 1930s points in fact to a rather bottom-up trajectory where the criticism of the art circles seems to have been taken into account by Mustafa Kemal, as was also manifest in Yontunç's personal plea. Especially, considering the discrepancies of human and non-human actors, lack of skilled Turkish sculptors and artistic resources for making large-scale bronze statuary in 1930s Turkey, such undertakings seem to be driven by an ideological zeal to overlap a nationalist agency in the commissioning and making of monumets. A very technological impediment for the local production of monuments was the lack of appropriate foundries. Casting statues in inadequate small workshops or navy foundries posed serious problems in production quality.[152] This was only overcome in 1938 when Yontunç agreed with Hungarian founder Fidzek Karoly, setting him up in a foundry in Istanbul's *Tünel* district, within the range of the Academy. There was also the fact that, as sculptor and later director of the Academy (1969-1976) Hüseyin Gezer (1920-2018) recalls, until the late 1930s Turkish sculptors did not widely use the pointing machine, which enabled artists to work on smaller scales and later develop their designs thereof.[153] These were only introduced to the Academy's sculpture department in 1938 coinciding with the appointment of German sculptor Rudolf Belling (1886-1972) as head. Before Belling's introduction of this technique, 1/1-scale models had to be made out of clay, which often collapsed under the weight of the material.[154]

These limitations hindered artists from creating more dynamic compositions and can explain the usual stiff and robust iconography of the works of new Turkish sculptors in this era. Through the early 1930s, Turkish sculptors followed the clean-cut iconography of Mustafa Kemal in his historically disruptive field marshal uniform, reinforcing the argued

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[152] Gezer, p.17. For an account of the technical hardships in casting monuments in the 1930s Turkey, see, Ali Nijat, 'Gazi Abidesi', *Mimar*, 13 (1932), 4-6.
[153] Gezer, p.17. Sculptor Hüseyin Gezer was Belling's former student and later served as the director of the Istanbul Art Academy (1966-1969).
[154] Gezer, pp.126-127.

role of the Ministry of Education in the top-down homogenisation of an increasingly static visual language of public statuary. This was however not merely a desired outcome of the republican agency but also a failure of the attempted associations of makers and resrouces/technologies. After all, the narratives the monuments could be made to "animate" depended highly on the aforementioned technological leaps. It must also be added that in taking into consideration the bottom-up pleas of national artists, the commissioning political elite seldom addressed the subject represented or the monument's disawovals in its communicative power, their concern seems only to be on the nationality of the artist who executed the work.

Apart from the intelligentsia and national artists, there remains also, the question of how the urban and rural masses received this top-down conception of monuemts. While acknowledging the fact that any response to this question will be partial and fragmentary we can attempt to tackle it from certain perspectives. Despite the argued disharmony between the intelligentsia and the commissioning political elite, monuments are not merely about the represented subjects but also the subjects who encounter them in the everyday life of the city.[155] In other words, as Cherry also asserts following Sigmund Freud, that personal reminiscence and public histories are intertwined within the daily encounters of the urban subject with the city's monuments.[156] This is especially relevant for the Taksim, *Zafer* and Izmir monuments. These remained at the locus of the urban texture, and have gradually become consonant with a private way of commemoration through private practices of photography as a republican way of seeing and documenting the experience of city excursions made by rural families from nearby towns or affluent urban women strolling with their kids [Fig.2.10]. With the dissemination of the highway network as part of the Marshall plan in the post-war liberal modernisation of Turkey, planners, among whom Karpat as a social scientist, emphasized the transformative effect of roads as nonpolitical measures of development, to increase the regular accessibility of the city for the isolated peasant classes, introducing them with urban ways and enabling them to join the national

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[155] Cherry, p.152.
[156] Ibid.

society.[157] These anonymous photographs, which can be found ubiquitously at various ephemera dealers in Turkey, do manifest a particular *studium* as Barthes argues.[158] They point to an overlapping of personal memory and public history, the official and the everyday. As Susan Sontag also argues, photography's association with the sensibilities of the middle-class *flâneur*, described by Charles Baudelaire, had allowed its maturation through the documentation of the unofficial realities of the city.[159] Yet following the authoritarian climate of the single-party regime, the argued disintegration of the civil society of the imperial past, the republican monuments must have centripetally drawn the attention of the urban *flâneur* as visual trophies for seeing the city and joining the theatre of the nation, especially for the visiting rural classes. With the proclamation of 29 October as a national holiday in 1925, the ensuing bureaucratic orchestration of the commemorations increasingly entangled these monuments in an official folklore with the pageantry of military parades, scout and student groups, for a conspicuous display of the rhetoric of republican emancipation and advancement, which was equally circulated on print media.

Figure II-10: Anonymous. (c.1950). *'Family photographs of an urban strollers posing in front of the republican monuments'* ©Artun Özgüner.

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[157] Begüm Adalet, *Hotel and Highways: The Construction of Modernisation Theory in Cold War Turkey* (California: Stanford University Press, 2018), pp.131-150.
[158] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida.*
[159] Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p.55.

Another instance is from the memoir of sculptor Canonica himself, which points to a centripetal effect of monuments in rural Anatolia even at a very early stage. When stuck in the countryside after a car breakdown on his way to Sivas, Canonica notes the veneration of locals upon hearing that he was Mustafa Kemal's sculptor; who hosted him without a charge, despite his insistence to pay;

> I was thanking them with kindest words, through my interpreter but they were replying that it was a duty to host strangers and a most happy one for them to have done it with me who had sculpted their liberator's and father's, the Gazi's -the victorious, that's how they called Kemal- effigy for whom they had a grand devotion…[…] Like children they asked about everything, they wanted to know where I was going and if I was going to make other monuments.[160]

This account of the reception of monuments in rural Anatolia suggests the degree of their effect, which the wide range of public donations coming beyond major cities must have conditioned, as argued earlier. As Gezer also notes, a major component of the republican monuments was to materially reconstruct a sense of pride, lost during a decade of war, which relates to the psychologically conducive environment argued earlier by Yılmaz.[161] The representation of the leader in a historical rupture with his new Western dress and its inculcation through public statuary can be said then to derive their legitimacy from Mustafa Kemal's reputation as the liberator, which might also have alleviated any iconoclast backlash of Islamic orthodoxy at least until the end of the single party regime.

II.II Mobilizing the Monument Network

It would be an over simplification to argue that the monument network operated merely through the physical monuments. In the expansion of the network there were not merely centripetal trajectories but also centrifugal ones, through the entanglement of print media and actors. As actors within the republican monument network, emerging pro-

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[160] Rome, Museo Pietro Canonica (MPC), *Memoir of Pietro Canonica*, p.131-132. My own translation from Italian.
[161] Gezer, p.19.

republican publishers and official publications were equally assigned roles to associate republican monuments in new visual narratives in "logoized", graphic form, channeling a new national image economy for the reproduction and legitimation of the secular state on print media.[162] As Brockett reminds us, given the lack of a popular culture on which to establish the nation, for the Kemalist elite print media constituted a means to popularize the regime and inculcate national loyalty in the people by providing a nationalist historical narrative in the collective memory.[168] He thus asserts that for the first two decades of republican Turkish history, the Kemalist elite deployed print media as an ideal tool for "uniting the nation and inculcating a progressive mind-set", and especially for rewriting a teleological account of history destined for the emergence of the modern nation.[169]

Within this account, monuments seem to have been a similarly pragmatic tool for the political and print elite, given that they could be made to interact with print in graphic form as icons for a visual connotation of their legitimating power. With the lack of press freedom throughout the 1920s and 1930s, as argued at the onset of this chapter, such a virtual reproduction of the nation-state seems all the more discernable. By 1930s the monument network had stretched as far as to Edirne in the west and to Elazığ in the east but their graphic reproduction in print could disseminate their message further. As Rudy Koshar argues, once monuments are virtualized in print media, they become naturalized as images fully integrated into daily life and exchange, which work to disseminate mental images of the nation.[170] Perhaps more than their ambiguous, historically disruptive references and disawovals of the former legacies of their surounding, the virtual reproduction of republican monuments must have made them recognizable to a wider audience, as visual referents of the legitimacy of national modernity on anything they were printed on.

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162 Anderson, p.18.
168 Borckett, *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk*, p.56-57.
169 Ibid.
170 Rudy Koshar argues this aspect of monuments for the unification monuments of late nineteenth century Prussia, see, Rudy Koshar, *From Monuments to Traces*, p.49.

Monuments in print

For an emerging class of Turkish Muslims entrepreneurs the legitimating power of republican monuments on national modernity must have been more eminent for as soon as the Sarayburnu monument was inaugurated, the same year it appeared on the cover of *Revue Commerciale, Guide de la République Turque* (Commercial Review, Guide to the Republic of Turkey) [Fig.2.11]. This trade almanac, published by M. Bediraleddin and Mehmet Bedreddin in Ottoman Turkish, contains a remarkable number of advertisements from Turkish-Muslim businesses, especially in contrast with the cosmopolitan structure of former trade directories of the empire that were often published in French.[171]

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[171] *Revue Commerciale, Guide de la République Turque,* (Istanbul: A. Gorayan ve Mahdumları Matbaası, 1926) p.1.

Figure II-11: M. Bediraleddin and M. Bedreddin (1926). Revue Commercial Guide de la Rebuplique Turque ©Atatürk Library.

There are specific demographic and legislative conditions that the almanac crystallizes. From 1923 onwards when the country's mercantile class of Greek and Armenian communities had been drastically decimated, measures were taken by the government to replace this vacuum by Muslim Turks in order to create a national merchant class.[172] These non-Muslim *ethnies* of the empire, in Anthony Smith's words, were not included in the nucleus of the Turkish nation therefore their economic power was no longer welcome.[173] Although in 1927 a quite insignificant portion, 2.64 percent of the population was still non-Muslim, the fact that this was still concentrated in the industrially developed regions of

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[172] Çağaptay, p.25.

[173] 'ethnie' according to Anthony D. Smith is the pre-modern, ethno-religious community that shares common values; ancestry, myths, culture, a link to historic territory and solidarity, see, Anthony D Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era*, p.57.

Istanbul and Marmara caused some tensions.[174] In fact, the review presented a slightly distorted view, as in 1922 out of 4267 commercial institutions, 3065 still belonged to non-Muslim businesses.[175] The review itself was printed in an Armenian print house owned by Arşak Gorayan since Istanbul's Armenian community was exempted from the pruges of 1915. The late 1920s were marked by some efforts to assimilate these economically active communities; a Turkish-only education system, a ban on ethnic identification along with a public campaign *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş* (Citizen Speak Turkish) in 1928 to make Turkish the only spoken language in the public sphere.[176] Throughout the 1920s the monuments were charged as a legitimating visual referent for the activities of this new national bourgeoisie. Similarly, in 1933, on a special publication to celebrate the decennial anniversary of the Republic, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce published a guide where it pictured the *Zafer*, *Taksim* and Izmir monuments as important milestones in the development of the nation-state tantamount to the industrial and economic restructuring of the country [Fig.2.12].[177] As such for the new Muslim merchant class the visual connotations of republican monuments as tokens of national modernity on these industrial and commercial publications must have helped to legitimize their lucrative ends *vis-à-vis* the decimating non-Muslim businesses.

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[174] Çağaptay, p.16.

[175] Ahmet Hamdi Başar, in Murat Koraltürk, 'Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında İstanbul', *Toplumsal Tarih* 59 (1998), pp.38-42.

[176] This applied more to Jews who were expected to integrate themselves into the nation whereas Christian minorities were marginalized, still held responsible for treason in WWI, see, Çağaptay, pp.27-28.

[177] *İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasi, Cumhuriyetin Onuncu Yıl Dönümü Fevkalade Hatırası*, (Istanbul: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, 1933) pp.i, 33, 35.

Figure II-12: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (1933). Ten Years of Republic in Turkey ©SALT Research.

However, nowhere this image economy overlapping economic pursuits with national modernity was better manifest than at its intersection with national radio broadcasting, starting in 1927 in both Istanbul and Ankara. As Meltem Ahıska argues, Turkish radio from 1920s well into 1970s was used as a tool to emphasize the importance of the revolution and instill Western forms of modernity through radio drama and talks, providing a "Western tool that facilitated the imagination of both the performance of change and the audience that would appreciate it."[178] Initially radio broadcasting started with the private initiative of *Türk Telsiz Telefon Anonim Şirketi* (Turkish Wireless Telephone Corporation) in 1927. Subscribers could apply through a post office by paying a fee and were then given a standard radio.[179] Over time Pye and RCA brand radios flooded the market, which were imported by Istanbul's Jewish magnate *Burla Birderler* Company, an import monopoly with closer ties to the government.[180] By the early 1930s subscribers

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[178] Meltem Ahıska, *Occidentalism in Turkey: Questions of Modernity and National Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), p.180.

[179] Ayhan Dinç, *İstanbul Radyosu: Anılar, Yaşantılar* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2000), p.65.

[180] On the span of radios as new commodities, see also, Victor Margolin, *World History of Design, Vol. II* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p.620.

had peaked to two thousands, in 1933 the company was bought by Turkish Postal Services, and by 1938 broadcasting became finally more regular with the inauguration of Ankara's new headquarters, a classicized-modernist structure.[181] This had also meant an expansion of the market, where various dealers from Phillips, AGA, General Electric started rivaling the RCA radios represented by *Burla Biraderler*. The same year the inauguration of Ankara's brand new headquarters had coincided with the celebrations of the Republic Day, presenting a challenge to all dealers. It was an occasion for the competing brands to espouse the importance of the event at national scale.

Without any reference to users, as commonplace in the advertisements of the era, both General Electric and AGA sought recourse to Ankara's *Zafer* monument to pin on the centrality of the voice of the national capital's radio station in their advertorial illustrations. General Electric's advertisement published on the *Cumhuriyet* daily, illustrated the new radio headquarters as an imaginary art deco building, dwarfed by a lower-angle, empowering *Zafer* monument, looking down on New York's Statue of Liberty and its skyscrapers [Fig.2.13].[182]

Figure II-13: Cumhuriyet (30 October1938). 'The advertorial illustration of General Electric, celebrating the new headquarters of the Ankara State Radio Station' ©Cumhuriyet Archives.

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181 Nuray Gürel, 'Radyolu Günler 82 Yıl Önce Başladı', *Radikal*, 06 June 2009
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/radyolu-gunler-82-yil-once-basladi-934623/> [accessed 29 January 2019].
182 *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1938, p.12.

Similarly, the Swedish brand, AGA illustrated the monument from the same monumentalizing angle to commemorate the occasion [Fig.2.14]. These advertorial illustrations were developed from the same lower-angle shot of the monument taken by state-employed photographer Othmar Pferschy (1898-1884) and disseminated abroad through *LTK* in 1934 [Fig.1.15].[183] In 1936 the same shot took centre stage next to a Mustafa Kemal portrait in a major photography exhibition in Ankara, organized by the Directorate of Press titled *Turkey: the Country of Beauty, History and Work*.[184] Although Margolin also talks about the flux of imported modern electrical appliances, it is through the argued monument network that we may understand such a nationalist cloaking of Western goods in the market at that time. That multiple formats of a monument's photograph could be deployed in a showground of commercial competition for Western brands, for a commodity that was equally used for instilling western dynamics of society in a discourse of national modernity is suggestive of how the monuments as agents were made to have an expanded visibility and recognised as tokens of the national rhetoric in late 1930s.

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[183] 'Ankara Construit', *LTK,* 2 (1934), 27-31 (p.27).
[184] Othmar Pferschy, 'Die Erste Photoaus-Stellung in Ankara', *LTK*, 12(1936), 18-21 (p.19).

Figure II-14: Ulus (31 October 1938). '*The advertorial illustration of AGA Baltic celebrating the new Ankara State Radio Station*' ©National Library of Turkey, Ankara.

Figure II-15: LTK (1934). *'Pferschy's photograph of Ankara's Zafer monument'* ©British Library.

Another medium that deployed similarly the legitimating power of monuments in print media was children's reading materials, instilling this rhetoric in the collective identity of the young. The republican rhetoric was based on the construction of a modern conception of childhood, as was also manifest in the proclamation of 23 April, the inauguration of the Turkish Parliament in 1920 as an international day of commemoration for children. Childhood with its promising and energetic attributes became a romanticized metaphor for the new Turkish nation-state often in contrast with the world's gerontocracies.[185] Thus children's publications in early republican period, as Nazan Çiçek argues, have increasingly worked to contrast this modern, Western vision of childhood with a non-modern, vilified version that was represented through its Eastern, Islamic and by implication Ottoman models.[186] A most prominent publication of this genre was the journal *Cumhuriyet Çocuğu* (Child of the Republic) [Fig.2.16]. The journal aimed simultaneously to popularize a Turkish history destined for the emergence of the Republic and incite a

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[185] Nazan Çiçek, 'The Interplay between Modernisation and the Reconstruction of Childhood: Romantic Interpretations of the Child in Early Republican Era Popular Magazines, 1924–19501', in *Childhood in the Late Ottoman Empire and After*, ed. by Benjamin Fortna (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp.27-28.
[186] Ibid., p.32.

scientific curiosity with photographic essays, photomontage and illustrations. Its cover illustrations -often by Hayri Tülin- for national commemorative days, revolved around Mustafa Kemal surrounded with idealized children in the entourage of over-scaled monuments. The journal is a fine example of how the monuments had permeated into the everyday practice of print actors, and how through their mediacy the lack of the historicity of the nation-state could be complemented on similar visual projections for commemorative occasions.[187]

Figure II-16: Hayri Tülin for Cumhuriyet Çocuğu (1938). '*Cover illustrations of the journal commemorating national days*' ©National Library.

Old geographies new monuments

On a more global level, a prominent actor of official propaganda for the centrifugal expansion of the monument network with a simultaneous mobilisation of a reformulated

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[187] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, pp.44-77

republican memory landscape was *La Turquie Kemaliste* (*LTK*). Published as of 1934 in French, German and English, and similar to its Japenese (*NIPPON*) and Russian (*USSR in Construction*) contemporaries, *LTK* envisioned the new nation-state as a place of attraction for an international modern audience through cutting-edge graphic techniques and photographic essays.[188] The journal had a print run of around five thousand copies annually mostly sent to embassies, consulates, renowned journalists and authors, prominently in France, Germany, Britain, USA, Yugoslavia, Greece as well as Egypt and Iran while the remaining issues were sent to People's Houses (*Halkevleri*), a PRP institution to disseminate the Kemalist message within a provincial network.[189] *LTK* had emerged in an era when political affinities with the Soviet Russia had reached a peak.[190] In 1932 the Turkish Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had visited Moscow where they had signed an agreement of an US $8 million loan for various Soviet-led industrial initiatives mainly for the textile industry.[191] For Soviet Russia as well, it was the years of Stalin's Five-Year Plan where Stalinism invested much of its avant-garde artistic know-how of the 1920s into state propaganda led by Alexander Rodchenko, Varvara Stepnova and El Lisstzky.[192] Their propaganda journal, *USSR in Construction*, published in this atmosphere between 1930-41 must have equally influenced the Turkish ministers visiting Moscow in 1932. Especially, their use of photomontage, a favored avant-garde technique that sought to construct actions rather than presenting static facts, was regarded as a progressive means to represent social reality in their works. Although in modest ways, *LTK* emulated the trio's ingenious designerly solutions.[193] In the photographic essays and

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[188] For NIPPON, see, Gennifer Weisenfeld, 'Touring Japan-as-Museum: NIPPON and Other Japanese Imperialist Travelogues', *Positions*, 8.3 (2000) 748-793.

[189] Selen Akçalı argues that within five years of its publication, the directorate had distributed a total of 119,690 copies of *LTK*. Exact numbers on *LTK*'s print run or circulation are unavailable since up-to-day the archive of the Directorate of Press has not been opened to public, see, Akçalı, *Political Propaganda During the Single-Party Regime in Turkey*.

[190] In 1935 the journal changed its name to *La Turquie Kamaliste* and remained so until 1937. This was in line with the purifications in Turkish language where even Mustafa Kemal had assumed the name *Kamal,* meaning 'army' in old Turkish, in substitution for the Arabic *Kemal*, see, Lewis, p.289.

[191] Ibid., p.285.

[192] Victor Margolin, *The Struggle for Utopia: Rodchenko, Lissitzky, Moholy-Nagy 1917-1946* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp.107-108.

[193] Interestingly, a major discrepancy is while *USSR in Construction* abounded in Stalin's imagery, *LTK* has never published photo essays on Mustafa Kemal, as is also noted in Bülent Özükan, 'Kemal'in Türkiyesi ile Empati Yapmak', in *Kemal'in Türkiyesi La Turquie Kemaliste*, ed. by Bülent Özükan (İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 2013), pp.6-9 (p.7).

photomontages of *LTK*, parallels with *USSR in Construction* seem evident as they also worked to convey a sense of unity and dynamism of the nation-state [Fig.2.17].

Figure II-17: La Turquie Kemaliste (1935). '*Various uses of photomontage in the journal*' ©British Library, London.

The editor of the journal, Vedat Nedim Tör (1897-1985), had been appointed as the head of *Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü* (General Directorate of Press) in 1933, and started the printing of *LTK* in 1934, with a proficient team.[194] Tör must have understood the technical challenge of the task, so he maintained that to achieve a "European standard" the journal had to be printed in the premises of the State Printing House, at that time the most advanced in Turkey.[195] His ideological affinity with socialism must have inclined him towards the photographic medium for its capacity to represent the dynamism of the new

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[194] *Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü* was founded in 1920 along with *Anadolu Ajansı* (Anadolu Agency) to counter the opponent press in the imperial capital. The two institutions have played key roles in propagating the official narrative on national modernity.

[195] Vedat Nedim Tör, *Yıllar Böyle Geçti* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009), p.26. The printing facilities of the State Printing House were then state-of-the-art where Ali Rıza Başkan, after having specialized in printing at the Academy of Fine Arts of Vienna (1924-1928) had served as its technical director until 1938. Başkan had worked on a very successful facsimile of a sixteenth–century world map of cartographer Piri Reis, through colur separation technique, see, Koloğlu, pp.193-194.

nation-state. As in Sontag's note "to collect photographs is to collect the world", Tör's photographic endeavor also seems driven by a desire to represent the distant and discrepant corners of the nation in photographs.[196] For *LTK*'s photo essays, Tör had sent a request to all provincial governors through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, asking for photographs of historical landmarks, archeological sites, touristic views and new construction within their region, but the results were far from expected, "terribly ugly, tedious and tasteless" in his words.[197] In his dissapointment it is impossible not to see a consequence of the dissolution of provincial Armenian communities with the purges of 1915, which were very actively engaged with the photographic medium with a widespread provincial studio network.[198] Tör's resenment also points to a shared preoccupation with Hamidian bureaucracy in presenting a good image of the homeland to the outside world, as has been argued by Deringil.[199] His revelation came when he met the aforementioned Othmar Pferschy, an Austrian national whom had settled in Istanbul to work in the photography studio of *Photo-Français*, run by Romanian-Jewish photographer Jean Weinberg. Eventually, Pferschy accepted Tör's offer and started to work as a full-time photographer for the directorate.[200]

In its photographic essays *LTK* presented a reconfigured memory landscape to a wider global and partly national audience through the People's Houses. On one of them especially, on the promotion of the country's touristic appeal, E. Mamboury, a professor from Istanbul's Lycée Galatasaray, compared the country's landmarks to other European nations in following words;

> Greece has only Hellenistic monuments to show: Italy, better shared between the Etruscans, Romans, some Byzantine works and the marvelous flowers of the Renaissance. But Turkey, she has works that stretch without interruption from fourth century BC to our day: Hittites, Phrygians, Bithynians, Greeks, Galatians, Romans, Byzantines, Turk-Seljuks, Turk-Ottomans, Turk-Kemalists, which have

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[196] Sontag, p.1.
[197] Tör, p.25.
[198] For the photographic presence of Ottoman Armenians, see, David Low, 'Photography and the Empty Landscape: Excavating the Ottoman Armenian Image World', *Études Arméniennes Contemporaines*, 6 (2015) 31-69.
[199] Deringil. p.52.
[200] Ibid., pp.25-26 and Engin Özendes, 'Othmar Pferschy ve Türkiye'nin Fotoğrafları', in *Kemal'in Türkiyesi*, p.16.

> succeeded indelibly from their suffused presence and arts in every corner of Anatolia.[201]

Reformulations of the past were crucial for the political elite in establishing an imaginative line of continuity with the former civilisations of Anatolia in order to claim alternative legitimacies for the new republic. As Suna Güven also asserts, the republican elite followed a cultural agenda that deliberately claimed the ownership of the classical and prehistoric heritage of Anatolia rather than its medieval Islamic past.[202] This selective claim on actual ownership of the country's past came at the expanse of representing the memory landscape in a historical pastiche, which implied to circumvent the Ottoman legacy of a passive inheritor.[203] This view often materialized on *LTK* as its last pages were devoted to a series of photographic essays titled *La Turquie, Pays de Soleil, de Beauté et d'Histoire* (Turkey, Country of Sun, Beauty and History) [Fig.2.18]. These juxtaposed monuments from different chronologies and geographies of the country on the flanking pages of the journal. From Ankara's Temple of Augustus, to thirteenth-century mausoleum of Rumi in Konya, to the imperial mosques and picturesque views of Istanbul, the journal's audience was presented a view of the heterogeneous memory landscape through a visually coherent narrative in black and white prints.

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[201] My translation from French.
[202] Suna Güven, 'Constructing the Past in Ankara', in *Perceptions of the Past in the Turkish Republic: Classical and Byzantine Periods*, ed. by Scott Redford and Nina Ergin (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), pp.35-54.
[203] Ibid., p.37.

Figure II-18: LTK (c. 1935). La Turquie, Pays de Soleil, de Beauté et d'Histoire ©British Library.

This resonates with what Joan Schwartz highlights as the role of photography in materializing Simon Schama's remark that landscapes are culture before they are nature; that once a peculiar view on a landscape establishes itself, it becomes more real than its referents.[204]

Likewise, official propaganda through these landmarks presented a cultural projection where the various layers of history and geography were flattened on a homogeneous, two-dimensional plane, and made to connote the nation. Similar to what James Ryan and Schwartz argue, these were attempts to construct imaginative geographies, where the medium of photography could enter seamlessly between the observer and material world, shaping and constructing the perceptions of place.[205] In 1941, the *Pays de Soleil* section juxtaposed a statue of deity Poseidon (of possibly AD 150), recently

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[204] Simon Schama, quoted in Joan. M. Schwartz 'The Geography Lesson: Photographs and the Construction of Imaginative Geographies', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 22.1 (1996), 16-45 (p.36).
[205] James R. Ryan and Joan M. Schwartz, 'Introduction: Photography and the Geographical Imagination', in *Picturing Place: Photography and the Geographical Imagination*, ed. by James R. Ryan and Joan M. Schwartz (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp.3-6. Ryan borrows the term 'imaginative geography' from Edward W. Said's *Orientalism*, (1978) where he explains the European perspective of the Orient as an incoherent construct of various ideas and images clashing on various levels, see, James Ryan, *Photography and Empire* (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), p.25.

excavated from the Roman agora of Smyrna (Izmir), with Canonica's Taksim monument in Istanbul [Fig.2.19].[206] By only 2,04 meters, the statue that once adorned the agora as high relief is much smaller than Canonica's Taksim monument. So the photograph of the Poseidon statue seems to have been enlarged to compete in size in the juxtaposition and thus legitimize its successor.[207] Moreover, the viewing angle of both photographs, from a slightly lower angle, further plays with their common monumental traits. Such photographic manipulations were implicit suggestions for the self-affirmation of the republican elite, especially in the Western minds in contrast with the alleged passive inheritor status of the empire. In claiming the actual ownership of the country's classical heritage through a visually interwoven agency of ancient and new national monuments, *LTK* simultaneously asserted the centrality of the new nation-state through the legitimacy of historical patrimony. Ideally this too might be a shared contempt with their Ottoman predecessors, as Deringil reminds us that the late Ottoman elite was equally wary of the Western image of the Orient as unchanging and exotic in an effort to represent themselves as modern.[208] Conversely, however, the *Pays de Soleil* section never featured a reference to the widespread early or middle age Christian heritage, which seems to have been overlooked in the formulation of these projections. Thus, as Güven also notes, the connective threads with the past in the service for creating a national identity and consciousness are never homogeneous: some are more useful than others depending on their political pragmatism.[209]

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[206] *LTK*, 46 (1941), n.p. The statue group was discovered by a group of archeologists led by Rudolf Naumann and Selahattin Kantar for the Turkish Institute of History between 1932-1941, see, Ekrem Akurgal, *Anadolu Uygarlıkları* (Istanbul: Net Turistik Yayınlar A.Ş.), pp.301-302. *LTK* made a similar juxtaposition again with the Taksim monument and an eighteenth-century BC Hittite relief, see, 'La Turquie: Pays de Soleil, de Beauté et d'Histoire', *LTK*, 15 (1936), n.p.
[207] 'Poseidon ve Demeter Yüksek Kabartmaları', *Arkitekt*, 7-8 (1944), 166-168 (p.167).
[208] Deringil, p.156.
[209] Güven, p.42.

Figure II-19: LTK (1941). *'Photographic essay contrasting the Roman agora in Izmir with Istanbul's Taksim monument.'* ©British Library.

Commemorating the Republic

There was also a textual basis for the republican elite's historical postulations and imaginative links with the country's memory landscape, all the more so with the pre-Ottoman heritage. This was materialized in 1930 with the Turkish History Thesis, penned by sociologist Afet Inan (1908-1985) under the supervision of Mustafa Kemal. This introduced a new fictive timeline, which formulated a continuous Turkish presence in Anatolia –extending beyond eleventh-century migrations- disanchoring the centrality of the Islamic period from the definition of the nation's past. As Stephen Kern also argues a nation's sense of future is predominantly based on its sense of the past.[210] Similarly this republican politics of time too simultaneously legitimized an imaginary past destined for

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[210] Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p.277.

the emergence of the nation while orientating itself towards an idealized future of material advancement. Thus for the emerging pro-republican print actors, given their evident self-denial of the near past, the visual mediacy of monuments in compensating for the lack of the historicity of the new nation-state must have seemed inevitable to deploy in visual narratives. Especially on the occasion of the decennial anniversary of the Republic in 1933, it is possible to observe these graphic inclinations through the ubiquity of republican monuments in print media. For instance, the daily *Cumhuriyet* on its issue for the decennial anniversary commemorations of the Republic in October 1933, suggested this new official chronology on a full-page cover illustration [Fig.2.20].[211] As a remarkable piece of technical proficiency the illustration broke with the daily's hitherto monochrome print code.

Figure II-20: Cumhuriyet (29 October 1933). *'Cover illustration of the daily for the decennial anniversary of the Republic'* ©Cumhuriyet Archives.

Cumhuriyet's illustration delineates the first republican decade through a map. As argued, maps are socially constructed artefacts that by the political position of their makers project an exclusive view of the physical world.[212] Deriving from Brian Harley, David Pinder underscores the importance of understanding aspects of symbolism and iconography imbued in maps that emphasize their rhetoric and power to convey control over a

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[211] *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1933, p.1.
[212] Pinder, pp.172-173.

territory.[213] This is also resonant with what Anderson refers to as logo-maps; maps deprived of their geographic context, becoming infinitely reproducible and available for any graphic use, rooting deeper in collective imagination as a strong political symbol for nationalism.[214]

These are helpful concepts in understanding *Cumhuriyet*'s cartographic projection. The illustrated map stresses the coherency between the topography and the nation through the logoised monuments of Ankara and Izmir, connecting them in a national fellowship. These seem to convey a sense of solidarity and historicity between the two cities, a collective identity from which Istanbul seems still excluded, given its representation by an imperial mosque. Nonetheless, it must also be remembered that the imperial heritage was politically pragmatic in so far as it was made to recall an idealized glorious past for the new nation, a role which Istanbul must have been attributed to. As globally commonplace in the 1930s propaganda publications, ideas of advancement are conveyed through the speed of airplanes, battleships and trains which frame the territory while the railroad network weaves an "iron web" around the nation, a term coined by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü.[215]

It is worth looking specifically at the railroads in this assemblage. Despite its high costs, throughout 1923 and 1940 railroad construction had ranked the highest item in the budget given that roughly 200 km of line were added annually to the network.[216] In the 1930s, especially the construction of new lines for the provinces eastern to Ankara were prioritized as 78.6 per cent of the new roads were projected in this area to sustain their connectivity with western Turkey.[217] However, the map subtly blots out the new lines to Elazığ, Diyarbakır and Erzurum, with a massive steam cloud. This is possibly because these lines were not completed until the late 1930s. However, as Soner Çağaptay also points railroads were means of establishing state control, especially in response to late 1920s

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[213] Ibid., p.177.

[214] Anderson, p.175.

[215] İsmet İnönü, quoted in Zeynep Kezer, *Building Modern Turkey: State Space, and Ideology in the Early Republic* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), p.160.

[216] Pamuk, p.179.

[217] '1923-1940 Dönemi Demiryolları', *Türkiye Mühendislik Haberleri*, 442.443 (2006), 24-25 (p.25) <http://www.imo.org.tr/resimler/ekutuphane/pdf/21.pdf> [accessed 23 January 2019].

public unrest and insurrections in the southeastern provinces.[218] Trains, as Zeynep KEzer asserts, were real material trajectories to facilitate the state's operations to "tighten its control over the newly forged and fragile geopolitical unit" to promote national unity.[219] Therefore the implicit intents of the national government to assimilate the prevailing Kurdish populations in these provinces, as also stated in the government's 1926 *Şark Islahat Raporu* (Report on Reform in the East), might have been at odds with this commemorative occasion.

Similar visual narratives abounded also in pro-government provincial press, endeavoring to connect local communities to the nation with credibility.[220] A local daily from Izmir, *Anadolu* thus celebrated the anniversary through a modest photomontage possibly due to a lack of design and printing resources tantamount with those of *Cumhuriyet* who enjoyed higher circulation rates [Fig.2.21].[221] *Anadolu* had been operating since the early twentieth century as a fervent supporter first of CUP's unionist rhetoric and later for Mustafa Kemal's nationalist movement, having even been shut down for that matter during the Allied-Greek occupation.[222] Similar to *Cumhuriyet*, its photomontage also alludes to ideas of advancement through steamships, trains and planes, projecting the republican past through the visual mediacy of Krippel and Canonica's monuments in Ankara and Izmir. As Brockett also argues, in Turkey the first signs of a public culture had not emerged up until late 1940s, thus the decennial anniversary of the Republic must have presented pro-PRP publishers an opportunity to inculcate a popular national identity through the communication strategies imbued in public statuary. Likewise, their use of ad hoc illustrations or prompt photomontage techniques crystallize an endeavor to narrate an imaginary past where republican monuments in graphic form could be instruments compensating for the self-imposed republican denial of past and thus the lack of the

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[218] Çağaptay, p.21. This was namely the Sheikh Sait rebellion in 1925 triggered by both religious radicalism and Kurdish nationalism, for details see also Çağaptay, pp.19-22.
[219] Kezer, p.160.
[220] Brockett, *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk,* p.6.
[221] Between 1919-1938, there were 582 dailies published in Turkey, of which 176 were from Istanbul, 54 from Izmir, 27 from Adana, 25 from Ankara, 24 from Bursa and 18 from Trabzon. *Anadolu* along with *Ahenk* and *Hizmet* had a circulation rate of about five to six thousand copies, see, Koloğlu, p.131.
[222] Zeki Arıkan, 'İşgal Dönemi İzmir Basını', *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, 5.13 (1988), 145-165 (p.146).

historicity of the new nation-state, cohering a sense of nationhood within the national borders. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that such elitist, top-down projections were received as expected in the wider public. Although it predates the construction of monuments, in 1925, when Mustafa Kemal's attempt to initiate a loyal opposition party, as a pro-PRP press organ, *Anadolu*'s headquarters in Izmir had been sacked by a furious mob of opponents with their unleashed resentment towards the single party regime.[223] An incidence that also hints at the fervent commemorative tone of both *Cumhuriyet* and *Anadolu* seven years later.

Figure II-21: Anadolu (29 October 1923). '*Cover photomontage of the daily for the decennial anniversary of the Republic* ©APIKAM, Izmir.

Mapping a new nation

In returning to the aforementioned implications of cartographic projections, it is worthwhile to put more stress on the connotative power of new monuments on the maps of

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[223] Zürcher, pp.177-179.

the new nation-state. Pinder argues that cartographic projections who claim scientific authority can be equally charged with particular agendas as much as the propagandist logo-maps like *Cumhuriyet*'s illustration.[224] As Brian Harley underscores, the "illusion of cartographic objectivity" must be questioned by approaching maps through the politics of representation, unveiling their inherent power relations.[225] In other words, Harley argues that maps can be approached as the product of a discourse, placing the knowledge and power relations argued by Michael Foucault at the centre of cartography, rather than accepting their claims for a truthful representation of nature as given.[226] This political malleability of maps applies for pro-government Turkish publishers whom in their cartographic projections aimed to visualize a coherent image of the nation throughout the 1930s. Fortna also points that in reading materials for children, maps and geography became a prominent way of instilling a sense of nationhood during the first years of republic. The new stable borders were visually more cohesive than the constantly shifting and shrinking empire and this entailed, for pedagogic matters, an identification of the nation with the new borders.[227] In this, pro-republican publishers proposed new associations of topography and monuments where the visual mediacy of the latter as logos was assigned a role in conditioning and cohering a nationalist reading of topography.

This is all the more evident in a close analysis of two educational maps, akin to Fortna's mention, one pertaining to pre-1928 script reform, arguably dating from late 1920s and the other from late 1930s. Both maps are large enough to infer that they could have been placed in a classroom and used for educational purposes. The older one is published by Istanbul's *Kütüphane-i Sudi* house, known for its affinity to the government, having also published Mehmet Saffed Engin's *Democratic Revolution in Turkey* in 1928, a fervent treatise on the necessities of Kemalist revolution, the author himself being in the close

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224 Pinder also makes a similar point, see, David Pinder, 'Mapping Worlds: Cartography and the Politics of Representation', in *Cultural Geography in Practice*, ed. by Alison Blunt, Pyrs Gruffudd, Jon May, Miles Ogborn and David Pinder (London: Hodder Education, 2003), pp.172-187 (pp.172-173)., pp.174-175.
225 Brian Harley, quoted in Pinder, p.172.
226 Ibid.
227 Fortna, *Learning to Read*, p.65.

intellectual circle of Mustafa Kemal [Fig.2.22].[228] Two allegories flank the *Sudi* map (65 by 97 cm); a liberating soldier and a *libertas* figurine, a Turkic Marianne whose emergence we have seen in the first chapter. She stands on a platform decorated with abstract Ottoman revivalist motifs, whose ideological implications we are now familiar with, while Mustafa Kemal appears inside a circular frame, adorned by a garland of laurel. Geographical information is roughly hinted at without a dominant hierarchy of representation among cities, except for detailed maps of Istanbul and Ankara. More evidently marked are the borders of provincial administrations and motor roads and railroads that connect them. These provincial administrations (*vilayets*) were laid out first in 1864, but ironically a national provincial system had been more applicable only with the law of 1913 after the loss of the predominantly Christian Balkan provinces.[229] Moreover, it wasn't until January 1921 that these provincial bodies were made directly dependent to the Ankara government by a new law.[230] These administrational zones were pragmatic tools for a more pervasive state control and the map delineates them as homogeneous parts of a whole under the aegis of the nation-state's military-led modernity. Although this hints at the visible meaning of the map, what is absent from map, its "political silences" are equal subjects of inquiry as what is presented on them.[231] The homogenous rendering of topography reveals little on the disintegration of the vibrant social sphere of Anatolian towns at the outcome of CUP-led mass deportations of Armenians and the decimation of Christian Orthodox communities with the 1924 Turco-Greek population exchange.[232]

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[228] IBBAK, fol.Hrt_Gec_001874. On Engin, see, Bahri Ata, 'Doç. Dr. Bahri Ata "Mehmet Saffet Engin"', Youtube (2013) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7-rAb4bWJk> [accessed 26 January 2018].
[229] Lewis, pp.120-121, 390.
[230] Ibid., p.392.
[231] Brian Harley, in Pinder, p.177.
[232] For a detailed picture of the demographic and cultural changes in Anatolian towns, see, Kezer, pp. 157-197.

Figure II-22: Kütüphane-i Sudi (c.1926). '*A pre-1928-script-reform map with Ottoman Turkish script*' ©Atatürk Library.

With roughly same dimensions (63 by 96 cm) the second map is from the early 1930s, and is published by *Emel Basımevi* (Emel Print House), Istanbul for *Ahmet Halit Kitabevi* (Ahmet Halit Bookstore) [Fig.2.23].[233] Ahmet Halit Yaşaroğlu was trained as a schoolteacher in Turkish and history and had been an active publisher as early as the 1910s, specializing most of all on educational materials.[234] By the end of 1930s, the Halit Bookstore had published forty storybooks for elementary school kids, about sixty textbooks and around forty books for teachers.[235] Thanks to state subventions, Halit's publishing business was one of the few ones to survive the 1928 script reform crisis, which had within a month made all materials in former Ottoman script unsellable.[236]

Coming roughly ten years later, the *Halit* map denotes the attributes of national modernity with more precision than the connotative *Sudi* map with its allegories. Illustrated

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[233] IBBAK, fol.Hrt_001406.

[234] Kabacalı, p.178.

[235] To that it can also be added, six historical novels, and fifty novels, see, Ibid.

[236] Nedret İşli, 'Babıali'de Yayınevleri', *Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi 42. Kütüphane Haftası Etkinlikleri*, (2006) <http://www.obarsiv.com/nedret_isli.html> [accessed 30 November 2017].

by a certain C. Yener, it delineates the country through an abundance of raw materials and new facilities of national industry. As Livia Rezende argues for the Brazilian pavilions in the Universal Expositions of late twentieth century, displays of raw materials signal the power and the promise of industrial expansion of the nation-state and are representative of the national identity formulated by the political elite.[237] Although on a graphic level, here too the nation is represented as a fertile land of raw materials, a promise of economic prosperity; local agricultural and alimentary products as well as crafts, ports and factories. These latter were built by state initiatives throughout the 1930s; Izmit Paper Factory (1934), Tokat Sugar Process Plant (1934), Gemlik Synthetic Silk Factory (1937) and they had partly been influential in sowing the seeds of a Turkish working class.[238] But this representation nevertheless brings with itself a dilemma as it represents the nation-state with self-colonial aspirations for the exploitation of its own geography. In fact above all cities, Ankara, the national capital is the only one that is not represented with a raw material despite its historically renowned Angora wool. It almost presides over other cities with Krippel's *Zafer* monument in the midst of a material abundance, claiming the nation-state's power and wealth. Istanbul, on the other hand, is represented again with icons connoting a distant imperial glory (an imperial mosque, the Obelisk of Theodosius) which simultanouesly affirms the republican rhetoric that contrasts the national capital with its imperial, cosmopolitan predecessor. As a matter of fact, even Mustafa Kemal's transformation of Hagia Sophia into a museum in 1935, had the political implication to secularize the prevalence of religion in the public sphere of the imperial capital. As the first republican director of the museum (1935-1944), Ali Sami Boyar (1880-1967) had asserted on *LTK*, that thanks to Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), "the legends and superstitions of the past" were left behind, and "a new period of archeological study" had begun.[239] Nothing is more reminiscent of Anderson's point on the political appropriation and museumisation of the

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[237] Livia Lazzaro Rezende, *The Raw and the Manufactured: Brazilian Modernity and National Identity as Projected in International Exhibitions* (unpublished doctoral thesis, The Royal College of Art, History of Design, 2010), p.25.

[238] Lewis, p.472. It should be noted that the Turkish statism of 1930s did not entail an awakening of the working class consciousness in a socialist sense, see Ibid., p.476.

[239] Ali Sami Boyar, 'Aya Sophia', *LTK*, 41 (1941), 13-21 (p.20). In 1943, Boyar published a monograph on Hagia Sophia, accompanied by his watercolur drawings of the museum-turned shrine, see, 'Ayasofya', *Arkitekt*, 139-140 (1943), p.187. His article on *LTK* also featured these illustrations.

state's patrimony for the visibility of the secular state.[240]

Figure II-23: C.Yener for Ahmet Halit Bookstore (c.1935). '*The economic map of Turkey in the early 1930s*'
©Ataturk Library.

As Cemal Kafadar argues, common definitions of the concept of homeland have been constantly shifting and changing within the modern day territory of Turkey.[241] Starting from the eleventh century, terms defining a larger cultural geography, as in the *Rumî* adjective, were often used in Turkish literary texts, referring to the contemporary inhabitants of the former Roman territories regardless of ethnic or religious origin.[242] First through dynastic and later in national historiographies the centrality of cultural geography in defining the homeland slowly evolved into more concise terms as Anatolian and later Turkish, pointing to the shared ethnical characteristics of a Turkish-Muslim *ethnie*.[243] This preeminence of *ethnie* in the definition of nation is possibly due to the lack of coherent territorial boundaries within settled civic and political traditions given the shifting borders of the empire all throughout the nineteenth century. These had only been fixed with the

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[240] Anderson, p.182.
[241] Cemal Kafadar, *Kendine Ait Bir Roma* (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2017).
[242] Ibid.
[243] Ibid., pp.75-95 and Smith, p.57.

treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and thus hitherto have not played a central role in the national mapping of geography as homeland. Hence the land and its memory landscape had to be marked, redefined, recoded according to the national rhetoric of the political elite. As such the graphic use of monuments by pro-republican publishers as indicators of the official narrative identity presents a further crystallisation in the replacement of geographic, cultural sensibilities with the constructs of the nation-state.

Conclusion

From the discursive space on the making of the monuments argued in this chapter, we can incur that the attempted associations of a heterogeneous network of republican actors; the political elite, public statuary, narrative identities, representational codes, physical urban space and a supposedly conceptive public in the republican monument network was not necessarily successful in the ways preconceived by the elite. The lifecycles of the monuments show us that many of these associations, implied to imbue monuments with communicative power through their relation to the physical surroundings, are today almost lost to an illegible degree. Although there seems to have occurred bottom-up singularisation patterns through the medium of photography, these are hard to measure but nonetheless show a glimpse of how personal memory and public history might have overlapped in not necessarily planned ways.

As with the materials argued in the first chapter, for the republican elite too commemorative materialities of nation-ness were resonant with pride not because merely some cultural or nationalist value was attached to the form or content of these. In the 1920s and early 1930s when monuments were being erected the association of these with statuary must have been still ambiguous, which also explains the zeal of PRP actors to define and fixate them. Thus for the republican elite pride stemmed also and equally from the new technologies and resources that could be deployed for the materialization of monuments and for the level of persuasiveness of the social commentary they were ascribed to mediate. However, it would not be wrong to assume that unlike the contemporary discourses on

architectural modernity, the foreign agency in monuments was more appalling to the nationalist sentiments of an emerging class of national artists and intellects. In talking about the appropriation of traditional dwelling forms to a discourse of modern architecture in early republican Turkey, Gülsüm Baydar underlines that traditionalism was dissociated from mere nationalist sentiments ascribed to indigenous forms, since both foreign and local architects sought to locate a rationalist essence in vernacular forms. It is interesting to see that such a rationalist discourse did not root in the design of monuments and the reception of the work of foreign sculptors was never detached from explicit nationalist sentiments, unlike foreign architects operating in Turkey. This is also evident in the zeal of Turkish artists to overcome the technological discrepancies – lack of skilled Turkish sculptors and artistic resources for making large-scale bronze statuary in 1930s Turkey- in order to overlap a single nationalist agency in the commissioning and making of monuments, which simply did not occur in architecture.

Despite this relative level of national significance, republican monuments did not enjoy a major centripetal effect; rather, they seem to have triggered a more centrifugal effect in print media through their graphic substitution of the lack of the new nation-state's historicity, which was a consequence of the republican self-denial of the past. As icons they helped to translate the religious essence of the resistance movement to that of the teleology of the secular nation state, and fixated this through their representational codes. For emerging republican publishers, who were equally driven by profit, especially after the financial hardships of the Script Reform, the association of such visual codes with print media must have established a trajectory to overcome the lack of a popular print culture in the early 1930s. As Tarnya Cooper explains, the association of a print image with a physical site entails the memories of that site to become substituted with the memories of viewing the representation in the viewer's mind.[244] This simultanoues refashioning of the cityscape through commemorative objects and print media has immense implications on developing a collective memory of the urban space, in perpetuating its mental images. Thus, like Kafadar argues, if the ethno-symbolist textual designation of "Turkey"

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[244] Tarnya Cooper, 'Forgetting Rome and the Voice of Piranesi's "Speaking Ruins"', in *The Art of Forgetting*, pp.107-125 (pp.109-110).

overwrote any previous legacies of a larger cultural geography, the monuments in print were made to operate as its modern visual referents. In other words, monuments in print helped to condense and represent a heterogenous topography and memory landscape, as destined for the emergence of the nation state and without the uncertainties of an imperial baggage. Such a visual propensity of the republican elite would not be an exageration since wider preoccupations of the elite on the representation of the nation-state on a visual, graphic level occurred in parallel to the republican statuo-mania which is the subject of the next chapter.

III Chapter / Making the Nation-State Visible

As also argued in the second chapter, the 1920s were difficult times for press freedom. The oppression of the opponent press through the *Law on the Maintenance of Order* of 1925 was exacerbated in November 1928 when the Ankara government put the script reform in operation.[1] This caused serious implications for the financial independence of the press. Since the late 1860s, Young Turk reformers had long considered the Romanisation of the alphabet an option; the lack of vocal letters in the Arabic alphabet was incompatible with Turkish phonetics and the Ottoman orthography was unsuited with printing press, hindering the span of education and cultural expansion.[2] Yet, as Bernard Lewis argues the switch was more socially and culturally oriented than pedagogic, as an indication of the break with the past.[3] This is also evident in the prompt transformation envisioned by the script reform, as it had made all printed reserve unsellable, and moreover required that printers purchase new letter blocks and train typesetters in the new script. The long years of war had already hindered the import of new printing machinery due to the scarcity of foreign currency.[4] These financial constraints were deepened by a fall in circulation numbers since newspaper and journal readership was not familiar with the Latin script. The print run of main Istanbulite newspapers, which amounted to 46500 (circulation 34259) in 1 December 1928, dropped to 29500 (circulation 19700) in 7 December 1928.[5] While many journals collapsed, the surviving press organs became dependent on state

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[1] The script reform introduced a very sudden change in the press. For dailies and journals the deadline to switch to the new Turkish Latin script was set to December 1928, whereas for books the beginning of January 1929, see, Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın*, p.172-174.

[2] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p.278-279. On previous attempts and discourses on the conversion to Latin script, see, Ibid., p.427.

[3] Ibid. Zürcher argues that in many cases the only literate person in a village would be the local imams, a fact, which on the eve of 1928 script reform still obviated the division of sacred script from a national print culture. Eric-Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p.205.

[4] Kabacalı, p.163.

[5] Orhan Koloğlu further argues that in the first six-months period following the reform, the fall amounted to fifty percent in dailies and almost to a total hundred percent in books and journals, see, Orhan Koloğlu, *Türk Basını*, p.64.

subventions.[6] The illustrated press suffered with even lower circulation rates.[7] This politically and culturally restrained environment was also manifest in the dissemination of the republican public monuments as logos themselves, yet there were more visual and graphic materialities, which the republican elite delegated for the dissemination of their nation-building rhetoric.

Parallel to the instrumentalisation of the communicative power of public statuary was a new debate of the republican elite on the graphic and pictorial visualisation of the revolution and the new political community of Turks in print media. This was partially motivated by an endeavor to find a visual equivalent to the still prevalent imperial insignia (monogram and coat of arms) adorning many official buildings or the public spaces. Like the homogenized communicative power of statuary this too required finding visual elements and forms representative of the narrative identity, which would also legitimize the historicity of the nation-state as the rightful political body. Thus like their Young Turk and Hamidian predecessors, the republican reformers were equally preoccupied about their image projected to the outside world, and were eager to create a network for its control and dominance.[8]

This chapter thus first investigates this visual preoccupation of the republican elite through the revival of the genesis myth *Ergenekon*, and its wolf motif, pertaining to the genesis of Central Asian Turks, introduced top-down as a mytho-historical postulation with the first republican stamps of 1922. It addresses the proposed associations of the myth through the discursive space of a public contest for the coat of arms of the Republic held in 1926 when the myth's ambiguous connotations were challenged. Here it is also crucial to look at the life cycle of the wolf myth as the network within which it operated has changed significantly over time. Continuing along the lines of the discursive space around the delegation of graphics and arts to mobilize the republican rhetoric on national modernity, the chapter then focuses on how the republican elite similarly delegated visual arts for the

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[6] Zekeriya Sertel argues that of the journals previously circulating at a rate of 15-20 thousand copies monthly, none survived the transition and that those who continued to be published did so with no profit or with some sort of financial support. Zekeriya Sertel, quoted in Kabacalı, p.174.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Deringil. pp.52, 174.

materialization of other historical postulations through Western-style academic painting and picturesque photography in pro-PRP publications.

A final analysis is on the delegation of commemorative illumination technologies as a non-human actor of this period for state-sanctioned representations of the nation in republican pageants. For the republican elite, the association of festive illumination technologies with their nation-building rhetoric was consonant with the technological superiority of the nation-state over its obsolete imperial predecessor. Especially from the decennial anniversary of the Republic on 29 October 1933 onwards, when urban illumination technologies were also advancing globally, the republican rhetoric on modernity and enlightenment all the more crytallised with these technologies. What the chapter does is highlight to the descrepancies of the network in the delegation of festive illumination through the discursive space of the commemorations and floodlighting. This highlights that electric illumination of the pageants resonated differently in Istanbul than Ankara given the former capital's predominantly imperial landscape, and its affluent mercantile class, still maintained largely by non-Muslims. A tangent point explored is how three distinct photographers, Jean Weinberg, Jules Kanzler and Othmar Pferschy whose non-national backgrounds would have diverse implications, largely photographed this commemorative setting of the city, as actors of the republican network operating in a social and cultural practice, photography.[9]

III.I Visualizing a New Political Community

In October 1927, Orhan Seyfi Orhon's (1890-1972) satire journal *Yeni Kalem* published a cover illustration, commemorating the fourth anniversary of Istanbul's liberation from Allied occupation. Seyfi was a prominent poet and had been an advocate of national literature from its beginnings in 1900s. This movement aimed to purify Turkish language and literature from its Persian and Arabic influences, which had made it a highly revered literary language in the Ottoman court up until nineteenth century. The illustration

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[9] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida.*

was a remarkable work of Ratip Tahir Burak (1904-1977), who was trained as a navy officer but had later decided to study painting in Paris between 1926-1928, which was funded by the Turkish government.[10] Tahir depicted Mustafa Kemal in his military uniform, breaking the chains of an allegory of the city towards the background of the Seraglio point [Fig.3.1]. The caption reads "My fellow sons, we will never forget this!".[11] The whole setting resonates familiar tunes with Christidis' illustration for the Vicopoulos postcard of 1909, argued in the first chapter, where prominent Young Turks were seen lifting from the ground a recently unchained Turkic Marianne [Fig.1.15]. These lithographic pictorial narratives centering on Mustafa Kemal were widespread in the pre-1928 republican press. However, after the 1928 script law even the pro-government press refrained from such pompous depictions, picturing rather austere, static portraits of Mustafa Kemal without allegories.[12] This shift suggests a break with the imperial eclecticism of hero-cult iconographies from earlier decades. Ideally, the above-mentioned deprivation of the illustrated press and its subjugation with state subventions were factors further curtailing press freedom. Although it is hard to pose a concrete argument, this seems akin to the visual regime posed by the Hamidian censorship with its circumscribed formulation of the representation of the sovereign.

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[10] Ömer Durmaz, *İstanbul'un 100 Grafik Tasarımcısı ve İllüstratörü*, p.60.

[11] *Yeni Kalem*, 6 October 1927, n.p.

[12] This was more so the case for satirical imagery. Previously, journals and dailies such as *Karagöz* and *Vatan* were often using Mustafa Kemal imagery in their satires but arguably the 1925 press law brought an end to it. For examples of this kind see, Koloğlu, p.57.

Figure III-1: Ratip Tahir Burak for Yeni Kalem (06 October 1927). ©National Library of Turkey, Ankara.

It was within this period that a prevalent concern within the republican elite has emerged; the substitution of the imperial insignia with a graphic republican coat of arms. As Maurice Agulhon argues for the political conflicts of nineteenth-century France, changing the state and its fundamental principles means also abolishing its symbols and therefore being obliged to invent new ones.[13] The transition to the Turkish nation-state must have provided a similar confrontation for the republican elite; after all they were as much concerned with the formal elements of change as the French Jacobins.[14] For the Turkish case though, this required first of all the definition of visual equivalents for the national political community as different from the imperial setting. As discussed earlier, the devastation of civic society and fluxes of refugees had turned Anatolia into a homogeneous

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[13] Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne into Battle*, p.186.
[14] Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Modernity in Turkey* (Washington DC: University of Washington Press, 1997), p.23.

political community of Muslims. However, the complex ethnic dynamics of native Muslims were far from a homogeneous representation of the nation-state.[15] This must have made the delegation of any graphic motif for the representation of a more unitary, collective identity a challenge. Similar to the ambiguities and hardships presented by the instrumentalisation of public monuments, finding a national successor for the imperial coat of arms entailed fervent debates entangling the opinions of the elite, public, and academic spheres.

The wolf and the crescent-star

In May 1925, the PRP government passed a decree for the removal of Ottoman insignia from governmental and official buildings and schools.[16] This was the second plea, the first having been made to the Ministry of Education earlier in 1924, inquiring on the cost of the undertaking and urging to initiate the process with government facilities.[17] The whole project points to the sensibilities of the republican elite in a formal subjugation of the imperial insignia, for in September 1925, the government had sent a letter to the Ministry of Education, inquiring for the organisation of a public contest for a new republican coat of arms.[18]

The contest launched a public call in April 1926, with the publication of the *Milli Arma Şartnamesi* (Specifications for the Contest on the National Coat of Arms, SCNCA) by the Ministry of Education. This manual of over fifty pages clearly delineated the rules of participation. It placed particular importance on to the crescent-star (*ay-yıldız*) motif, as the only prerequisite element for all entries apart from which participants were free to use further symbols as long as they were "taken from Turkish history".[19] However, for these latter, SCNCA gave a highly suggested repertoire of graphic elements and delineated the provenance and history of the wolf and the blacksmith with the crescent-flag. In the

[15] A majority of non-Turkish speaking Muslims were Kurds who were concentrated in the Southeastern provinces, see, Soner Çağaptay, *Who Is a Turk?*, pp.6, 16-19.

[16] BCA, fol.180.0.09. 7.42.3, 31 May 1925.

[17] BCA, fols.180.0.09. 7.42.1, 25 October 1924 and 180.0.09. 7.42.2, 2 November 1924

[18] BCA, fol.030.0.18.01.01.015.56.19, 9 September 1925.

[19] IBBAK, fol.Bel_Osm_0.00119, *Milli Arma Müsabakası Şartnamesi* (Specifications for the Contest on the National Coat of Arms, *SCNCA*) pp.3-4.

following pages SCNCA presented views of notable academic institutions on what should a republican coat of arms be composed of.[20] These discussions centered on the wolf figure of the *Ergenekon* genesis myth, revived by nationalist writer Ziya Gökalp (1871-1924). As argued in the second chapter, Gökalp's poem delineated an ancestral Turkish tribe in Central Asia, landlocked in a mountainous area (*Ergenekon*) and saved by a wolf (*Börteçine*) that had led them to the passage out by a blacksmith (*Bozkurt*) who had melted the rocks to set the tribe free.[21]

The academic institutions consulted in the SCNCA included, the faculty of literature of the *Darülfünun* (House of Sciences, later Istanbul University) and *Türk Tarih Encümeni* (The Society for Turkish History). The latter stated that in order to have an all-encompassing representation of the young republic, the new coat of arms should avoid undocumented myths by focusing on elements that were representative of historical facts, with symbols on which historians had a consensus. The Society suggested the use of the crescent-star as a widely accepted symbol, a shield for the persistence, strength and defence of the nation, wheat for agricultural potency, oak branches for the resilience of the new nation and finally an *İstiklal Madalyası* (Medal of Independence, given to veterans of the War of Liberation) as a token for sovereignty.[22] This society was also the initiative of a prominent actor of the monument network, Minister of Education Mustafa Necati Uğural (1925-1929), for the scientific classification and analytic study of historical documents pertaining to Turkish history.[23] As such its stress on the objectivity of the symbols should not be surprising.

In contrast, the faculty of literature at *Darülfünun* bluntly suggested that in order to have a fundamentally different coat of arms from the former empire, the oldest customs had to be revisited, pointing especially to the pre-Islamic genesis myth of Turks, the

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[20] 'Armamızda Neler Bulunsun?', in Ibid., p.14; 'Tarihte ve Efsanelerde Bozkurt', in Ibid., pp.14-17 and 'Çifte Kartal Arması', in Ibid., pp.20-21.
[21] Ziya Gökalp, *Ziya Gökalp Külliyatı I: Şiirler ve Halk Masalları, Vol. xlii*, ed. by Fevziye Abdullah Tansel (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989), pp.78-83.
[22] *SCNCA*, pp.4-5. The Medal of Independence was also designed by sculptor Mesrur Izzet Bey (1873-1952) whom had formerly produced the *Abide-i Hürriyet* Medal in 1911.
[23] Zeki Arıkan, *Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Selçuklu*, p.47.

Ergenekon.[24] The faculty's outright endorsement of the wolf motif should not be surprising since its head was historian Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (1890-1966) and there he had also been chairing the *Türkiyat Enstitüsü* (Institute of Turcology) founded by Mustafa Kemal in 1924.[25] Through the studies of the institute Köprülü worked to postulate continuity with the Central Asian and modern Ottoman-Turkish cultures.[26] These were published in the institute's journal, which also depicted the institute's logo on its cover, a wolf holding a torch. In the manual, the faculty had also given the institute's journal cover as a reference [Fig.3.2].[27]

Figure III-2: (August 1925). 'The logo of the Institute of Turcology as it appeared on the institute's journal'
©Atatürk Library, Istanbul.

As a metter of fact wolf had already penetrated into the official iconography in more top-down trajectories, although its details have not been possible to reveal. It had first appeared in the 1922 Geneva prints of stamps in a more iconic fashion, placed in front of a rising sun [Fig.3.3]. Later in 1926 with the London print series of stamps, it appeared in a more narrative context, accompanied by the mythic blacksmith *Bozkurt* whom had melted down the passage it had indicated [Fig.3.4]. This latter design was by Ali Sami Boyar

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24 *SCNCA*, p.5.
25 Arıkan, p.46.
26 Zürcher, p.396.
27 The Institute of Turcology was founded in 1924 within the *Darülfünun*, by the council of ministers and Mustafa Kemal as president of republic. With its research on Turkish language, history, literature and folklore the institute and its journal was an influential body on these cultural matters, see, Arıkan, p.46.

(1880-1967) painter and the first director of Hagia Sophia museum (1935-1944) as mentioned in the second chapter.[28] It was also around this time that Krippel had carved the fountainheads of Ankara's Zafer monument with a similar wolf motif [Fig.2.5].

These stamps were the subjects of a dispute in the debates of the SCNCA. Publisher and journalist Ahmet Cevdet Oran (1862-1935) pointed that modern Turks had nothing in common with Middle Asian Turks since they did not wear a kalpak nor drank kumis. But, military historian Ali Haydar Emir Alpagot (1886-1937) suggested that with the 1922 stamps, the wolf motif was already made official, advocating the necessity of strong references to Central Asian origins.[29] Historian Hüseyin Hüsameddin Yaşar (1869-1939) on the other hand, argued that the wolf had no place in the coat of arms since it was a "Mongolian fiction". He rather called for an understanding of its "meaning today in the larger Turkic world" which he deemed more crucial.[30] The dispute is resonant of a generational gap between the two fronts. Although all were equally nationalists in their ideological inclinations, Hüseyin Hüsameddin and Ahmet Cevdet were more traditionalists, the former having been raised in a madrasah (Muslim seminary). Ali Haydar Emir, raised in the military school and Fuat Köprülü were a generation younger and may have been more exposed to the pan-Turkist ideas through Gökalp's romanticized poems at a younger age. Later in 1932, at the *First Turkish History Congress* held in Ankara under the supervision of Mustafa Kemal, Köprülü would be one of the major opponents to the republican historical postulation that Turks had not migrated to Anatolia in the eleventh century but instead had been a brachycephalic race, which had founded the first civilisations in Central Asia, and disseminated it to the ancient world through prehistoric migrations.[31] Thus Köprülü's fondness of the *Ergenekon* myth can be understood in his later objection to the republican reformulation of history, which overruled the connection with Central Asia for a link with the Western civilisation.

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28 As argued in the second chapter, in 1943, Ali Sami had published a book on Hagia Sophia accompanied by his own watercolor drawings of the monument and advocating the transition of the shrine into a museum, see, 'Ayasofya', *Arkitekt*, 139-140 (1943), p.187.
29 *SCNCA*, p.14.
30 Ibid., p.15.
31 Cana Bilsel, 'Organicism and the Making of Humanist Culture in Turkey', in *Muqarnas, An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World, History and Ideology: Architectural Heritage of the 'Lands of Rum'*, ed. by Sibel Bozdoğan and Gülru Neciploğlu (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp.223-241 (p.225).

Figure III-3: (1922). *'Stamp with the wolf figure from the Genova print series'* ©PTT Stamp Museum, Ankara.

Figure III-4: Ali Sami Boyar (1926). *'Stamp with the grey wolf and blacksmith figures from London print series'* ©PTT Stamp Museum.

In the section titled *What Should Our Coat of Arms Include*, SCNCA also dealt with the crescent-star motif as a visual referent, whose representative qualities did not seem any more evident than the wolf.[32] Although in the initial section Minister Necati had delineated this as a prerequisite with the endorsement of the faculty of literature, this section asserted that the crescent was too reminiscent of Islamic provenance and thus unrepresentative of the modern Republic of Turkey.[33] Thus the section subtly suggested that the flag and the coat of arms were disparate things and that the latter did not necessarily need to refer to the same symbols.[34]

The evaluation of the coat of arms contestants too was conferred on a committee. Unlike that for the monuments, confined to members of the *Sanayi-i Nefise Akademisi* (Academy of Fine Arts of Istanbul), this one had a complex structure. The manual stated that the committee would be divided equally between members from the Academy and those from the Ministry of Education.[35] Besides the Minister of Education, this political wing of the committee also included the chair of the National Assembly, and the ministers of foreign and internal affairs. Members of the Academy on the other hand included, Mimar Kemaleddin (1870-1927), painters Namık İsmail (1890-1935) and İbrahim Çallı (1882-

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[32] *SCNCA*, p.20.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid, p.3.

1960), sculptor İhsan Özsoy (1867-1944) and the then director of the Academy (1918-1926) and painter Nazmi Ziya Güran (1881-1937).[36] Later, the Ministry of Education sent a letter to the committee to include Fuad Köprülü in the committee arguing that his membership was seen appropriate by all parties.[37] As argued above, Köprülü was an advocate of the Pan-Turkist references of the wolf myth, thus his top-down appointment by the ministry is suggestive.

The committee's ensuing proclamation of the finalists was equally controversial. In September 1926 through the pro-government daily *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, it declared that of the seventy projects evaluated, none had "the properties to represent the coat of arms of the Republic of Turkey without revisions".[38] Twenty more days were given to the three finalists, Namık İsmail, Muhsin Rıfat and Lütfi Bey to make necessary amendments for a resubmission.[39] They were also provided a briefing on the graphic elements that the revised versions should include whose details unfortunately have not been possible to unearth.[40] Nevertheless, the finalist works had already been published on various newspapers and with varied proportions and hierarchy they all referred to the *Ergenekon* myth [Fig.3.5].

[36] BCA, fol.180.0.09.000.000.7.42.5/18-20.
[37] BCA, fol.180.0.09.000.000.7.42.5/18.
[38] 'Armamızın Kat'i bir Suretde Tesbiti Yakındır', *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 15 September 1926, p.1.
[39] Ibid.
[40] 'Türkiye Armasını Kim Temsil Edecek?', *Vakit*, 16 September 1926, p.1.

Figure III-5: Cumhuriyet (17 September 1926). *'The daily announces the three finalists of the coat of arms contest'* ©National Library.

Correspondence sent to the ministry following this proclamation crystallized the public debates about the wolf motif. These generally lamented on the ambiguity of the graphic elements the finalists had used in their designs.[41] On 20 October, a certain history teacher named Emin Ali, warned the ministry before their revised decision;

> […] From the samples in the newspapers, it is likely that the coat of arms will have a wolf in it as if it commemorates a historical memory or represents a national symbol. I assume praising the wolf this much is treason to history […] and will come to mean the disruption of history that will erroneously suggest we are same as Mongolians.[42]

Another respondent argued that the Turkish flag was a haphazard Ottoman invention made during the War of Kosovo in the fourteenth century and urged for its disavowal since the Turk today "had ceased all relation to the Ottoman Empire".[43] It is hard to discern the general public opinion given the few numbers of correspondence in the Republican Archives. Nevertheless, of the eleven contest entries found today there, eight of them use the wolf motif together with the crescent-star, which gives a clue on the prevalence of the myth by the contestants [Fig.3.6].[44]

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[41] Ibid. and 'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arması İçin Yapılan Numuneler Beğenilmedi', *Cumhuriyet*, 16 September 1926, p.1.

[42] BCA, fol.180.0.009.000.000.7.42/8.

[43] BCA, fol.180.0009.000.000.7.42/11.

[44] BCA, fols.180-0-009-000-000-7-42/10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 030-0-010-000-000-199-357/10.

Finally, in 6 January 1927, the committee declared Namık İsmail's revised design as the winning entry [Fig.3.7].[45] This also centered a wolf placed atop an antique weapon called *harbe* (a Central Asian lance) appearing on a shield covered with the crescent-star flag and flanked by wheat bucks and oak leaves. Nevertheless, İsmail's design too has never been officially adopted and for a lack of documentation in the Republican Archives it has not been possible to articulate a clearer picture. The only correspondence that ensues roughly six months later, in July 1927, is that by the head of public works of Izmir municipality (*Nafıa komiseri*) to the Ministry of Public Works inquiring if the new coat of arms could be used in the city.[46] The reply of the ministry was simply that the coat of arms had not yet been determined.[47] This proves that even after the official proclamation of İsmal's design, official bodies were vacillating about the adoption of the coat of arms.

Figure III-6: (1926). '*Various entries submitted to the Ministry of Education for the coat of arms contest*'
©BCA.

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[45] 'Armamızın Kabul Edilen Şekli', *Cumhuriyet*, 06 January 1927, p.1 and 'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Yeni Arması', *Vakit*, 06 January 1927, p.1.
[46] BCA, fol.230-0-000-000-000-135-18/1-2, 3 August 1927.
[47] Ibid.

Figure III-7: Cumhuriyet (6 January 1927). *'Namık İsmail's winning design for the coat of arms contest'*
©National Library.

The Ministry of Education's ambivalence can be understood with the recurrent narrative of the republican elite on the exclusivity of the Turkish nation. This rhetoric simultaneously legitimized and overruled both the crescent-star and the wolf. The crescent-star was largely intelligible in the collective memory as a national symbol, which had its unquestionable place in the national flag as was argued by Minister Mustafa Necati in SCNCA. Yet it also stood for the Islamic *ümmet* (religious community) of which the republican elite wanted to differentiate itself. In that sense the coat of arms seems to have allowed an imaginary context where, unlike the flag, new romanticized elements – especially within the context of Gökalp's poetry- could be introduced to point to the exclusivity of the nation-state with respect to its imperial predecessor. However, the *Ergenekon* myth offered a particularity only in contrast to the Ottoman past, in its capacity to symbolize the Turkish *ethnie*, so advocated by fervent pan-Turkists like Fuat Köprülü.[48] Its further connotations within the wider Turkic world, its pan-Turkist claims in what was then the territories of Soviet Russia were other aspects, of which the milder political wing, presented by Minister Necati and Ahmet Cevdet, was apparently wary of.

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[48] For 'ethnie' a pre-modern ethno-religious community that shares common values; ancestry, myths, culture, a link to historic territory and solidarity, see, Anthony D Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era*, p.57.

There was also the fact that not all sects of the political community belonged to a Turkish *ethnie*. Minister Necati himself might have had a reservation, similar to that voiced in the scientific view of his Society for Turkish History in SCNCA. The society had urged for an "all-encompassing" representation avoiding romanticized myths. This was not in vain. Only in the summer of 1925 an uprising led by a coalition of Kurdish tribes and headed by a religious leader, Sheikh Sait had swept the southeastern provinces and suppressed with very strict military measures.[49] As Soner Çağaptay also asserts the integration of the native Muslims was harder since unlike the uprooted Muslim immigrants of the Balkans, their social and cultural structures were intact after the disintegration of the empire.[50] In suggesting "the crescent-star as a widely accepted symbol" perhaps the Society was well aware that religion was a far better social binding agent than an *ethnie*.

In more top-down commissions however, the wolf's permeation into official culture seems to have faced less ambivalence. Parallel to the coat of arms contest in the summer of 1926, painter Ali Sami was also commissioned to design the first republican banknotes.[51] During WWI high emissions to finance defence expenses had triggered high inflation with detrimental financial and political impacts.[52] Thus in the early 1920s per capita income was as much as thirty percent lower than in 1914, but it was steadily recovering to reach that level by 1929.[53] The new bills then symbolized a new source of pride given their due replacement of the stricken economy of the empire. These, printed by the Thomas De La Rue Company of London and known today as the E1 series, made a similar reference to the wolf myth by depicting a leaping wolf in front of a crescent-star that circled the Ankara citadel on the five and ten-lira bills [Figs.3.8, 9]. In July 1926, while the coat of arms contest was ongoing, a committee chaired by Abdulhalik Renda (1881-1957), then the Minister of Finance had already approved Sami's designs, which were then sent to London.[54] Due to shipment and operative difficulties though, the bills began circulating

[49] Zeynep Kezer, *Building Modern Turkey,* p.96.
[50] Çağaptay, pp.6, 16-19.
[51] Cüneyt Ölçer, *50 Yılın Kağıt Paraları* (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1973), p.7.
[52] Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi,* p.180.
[53] Ibid., p.183.
[54] Tanju Demir, 'Cumhuriyet Dönemi Paralarında Siyaset ve İdeoloji', in *75 Yılda Paranın Serüveni*, ed. by Mustafa Sönmez (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), pp.28-29.

only in December 1927 a year after Namık İsmail's coat of arms had already fallen out of regard.[55] Like İsmail's coat of arms, for the successive emissions of bills too in late 1930s the wolf motif would no longer be addressed. Although the details of the commission remain opaque, this further points to a failed association of the representative power of the *Ergenekon* myth and its advocating intelligentsia within a sect of the Kemalist elite in 1926, as it also highlights that the elite was not necessarily a monolithic body. This is also evident in Mustafa Kemal's subsequent change of track, asserting that none of the entries submitted to the contest could have represented "a new state founded in the world of our day".[56]

Figure III-8: Ali Sami Boyar (c. 1926). *'The one-lira bill notes of E1 series, in circulation as of 1927'* ©Turkish Central Bank, Ankara.

Figure III-9: Ali Sami Boyar (c. 1926). *'The ten-lira bill notes of E1 series'* ©Turkish Central Bank.

A concurrent event is also reminiscent of this divide within the republican network. In October 1927, on Mustafa Kemal's return to Ankara from a trip to Bursa, the daily *Hakimiyeti Milliye* announced the commemorative preparations to welcome the president in the capital.[57] Roughly nine months following the fervent debates around the constituent

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[55] Ibid.

[56] Mustafa Kemal, quoted in, Afet İnan, *M. Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım* (Istanbul: Yenigün Haber Ajansı Basın ve Yayıncılık, 1999), p.19.

[57] 'Sevgili Reis-i Cumhurumuzun Teşrifi Gününü Hararetle Tes'id için Şehrimiz Hazırlanıyor', *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 2 October 1927, p.1.

elements of the coat of arms, the festive arrangements used for this occasion are suggestive; triumphal arches built by new republican institutions such as the *Emlak ve Eytam Bankası* (Emlak Bank, founded in 1926 to finance development plans) and *Tayyare Cemiyeti* (Turkish Aeronautical Association), the latter measuring at a monumental scale of sixteen meters [Fig.3.10].[58] More intriguing than these though was a giant red crescent-star, illuminated by red incandescent bulbs and placed on one of the west-facing walls of the Ankara citadel covered with white plaster. The citadel's western facade faced the expanding new city towards İstasyon Avenue and was clearly visible from the busy crossroads where the *Zafer* monument was erected a year ago. Interestingly, a postcard in the Atatürk Library published seemingly a few decades earlier, shows the same facade bearing a giant imperial coat of arms painted on the wall [Fig.3.11].[59] This predecessor suggests that for the republican network active on the substitution of the imperial insignia the delegation of new signs was only meaningful in their potential to replace the former. In other words, to make itself visible this network seems to have followed the very imperial signposts used earlier.[60] Similar practices must have helped to consolidate the crescent-star as the visual successor to its imperial counterpart, triumphing over the ambigious connotations of the wolf motif. Yet, there was nevertheless a historical awareness in the project. Four months after the decree on the removal of imperial insignia, in September 1925, the prime ministry meeting under the auspices of Mustafa Kemal sent a second decree calling for the exemption of various national palaces and pavilions, pointing to the difficulty of the matter given the wide spread of imperial insignia on the epigraphs, artefacts and buildings.[61] Later in 1931, some of the dislocated epigraphs were displayed in chronological order, on a wall in the garden of the newly established Topkapı Palace Museum.[62] The daily *Cumhuriyet* presented these as relics of buildings "somehow

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[58] Ibid. and 'Ankaramız Gazi Hazretlerini İstikbal içün Yapdığı Hazırlıkları İkmal İtmek Üzeredir', *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 2 October 1927, p.1.

[59] IBBAK, fol.Krt_005045.

[60] Another similar practice was the replacement of the imperial insignia on the Hamidian clock tower of Izmir. However, with a lack of documentation, judging from contemporary postcards it remains a challenge to precisely date when this change took place. There also seems to be a transitive phase with a Young Turk crossed-flags logo before the replacement of imperial insignia with the republican crescent-star.

[61] BCA, fol.080.18.01.15.59.12, 16 September 1925.

[62] 'Kitabeler Müzesi', *Cumhuriyet*, 6 September 1931, p.1. It is ambiguous if some or all of these epigraphs have been dislocated due to the aforementioned decree but likely so.

demolished" without further detail.[63] Yet such historical awareness should not be amplified as the Topkapı Palace Museum, inaugureated in 1924, was in itself a materialization of the repuclican rhetoric in that it was used to glorify the earlier glories of the empire whilst vilifying its legacy in its subsequent decline.[64]

Figure III-10: Hakimiyeti Milliye (5 October 1927). *'The pointed arch and the illuminated crescent-star on the Ankara citadel'* ©National Library.

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[63] Ibid.
[64] Wendy M. K. Shaw, 'National Museums in the Republic of Turkey: Palimpsests within a Centralized State', *EuNaNus, European National Museums: Identity Politics, the Uses of the Past and the European Citizen conference proceedings*, Bologna 28-30 April 2011 (Linkoping University Electronic Press), pp.925-951 (p.933).

Figure III-11: Anonymous publisher (c. 1890s). *'Contemporary postcard showing the same facade of the Ankara citadel with the imperial coat of arms'* ©Atatürk Library.

As Çağaptay also points, in an ethnically heterogeneous Muslim political community, to a large extent Kemalist nationalism adhered to the former *ümmet* models of the empire, despite its commitment to secularism and belief in linguistic and cultural reforms.[65] This explains why for the politically milder sect of the Kemalist elite, presented by the Minister of Education Necati, the crescent-star was less ambiguous in its representation of the nation than the wolf with its *ethnie*-specific connotations. Nevertheless, the earlier official endorsement of the wolf myth had permeated it in the collective imagination. The E1 notes remained in circulation well into late 1930s. In 1939 the GDP per capita had only risen to 118 Turkish liras, which means that the lower-value bills with the wolf motif had retained their prevalence.[66]

The wolf in the public imagination

Well into late 1930s, the wolf inspired a collective identity for a national mercantile

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[65] Çağaptay, p.15.

[66] Feridun Ergin, 'Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda ve Atatürk Döneminde Fiyatlar ve Gelirler', *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, 3.7 (1986), 59-84 (p.84).

class. The decade was marked by statist industrial incentives, after the development of a "republican and populist way of life" and the maintenance of "order, needed for political, national and economic progress" were set as the foremost tasks on the agenda of the new PRP cabinet in 1931.[67] Economic historian Şevket Pamuk underlines that the creation of a Muslim-Turkish class of entrepreneurs, envisioned also by writer Gökalp, was seen as a crucial element in the development of the national economy.[68] However, following the eradication of former Greek and Armenian entrepreneurship, the private sector was far too weak to assume such a central role thus the government was not so eager to pave the way for a liberal economy.[69] Therefore, as Pamuk argues, the financial policies of the era consisted of a limited state intervention to strengthen the private sector.[70] In the 1930s, these new SME's, protected by the government and financed by the newly founded İş Bank (1924) led to a considerable increase in product output.[71] Yet, it was equally true that the PRP-led İş Bank had prioritized the financing of entrepreneurs with close ties to the PRP.[72]

What is interesting for this study is how a considerable amount of these private initiatives, from insurance companies to cement producers, quite outside of the republican network active on the substitution of the imperial insignia, delegated the wolf myth as a corporate identity in their economic activities.[73] On a photograph from the Sixth Izmir International Fair of 1936, a kiosk of *Halk Traş Bıçakları* (People's Razor Blades) can be seen advertising its new razor brand *Bozkurt* [Fig.3.12].[74] Regardless its ambiguous connotations and the reluctance on its official adoption, the wolf motif was conducive for further associations with other operating networks on national modernity as an image of an emerging nation-state. This bottom-up adoption of the wolf motif by the People's Razor Blades also testifies to the phenomena of the initial association of the national foundation myth and its representative graphic acting beyond their intentional purpose. Shaving had

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[67] Çağaptay, p.43.
[68] Pamuk, pp.180, 216.
[69] Ibid., p.181.
[70] Ibid.
[71] For instance in 1927, a new legislation of incentive (*Teşvik-i Sanayi Yasası*) was accepted for the support of companies producing, food, textile and construction materials, see, Ibid.
[72] Ibid., p.182.
[73] See for instance a real-estate company, 'Bozkurt Emlak', *Akşam*, 06 December 1950, p.2.
[74] APIKAM, fol.Gorsel.0000000006_00145.

clear implications on the new gender roles implied by the secular nation-state, also materialized in the standard clean-cut delineation of Mustafa Kemal in monuments. It was consonant with the modernist principle of hygiene and aesthetics, which the republican elite set as paragon.[75] Moreover the domestication of shaving, without daily visits to the barber, the invention of affordable and disposable safety razors by the *Gillette* Company coincided with the early 1930s and was globally resonant of new middle class consumption attitudes.[76] *Halk Traş Bıçakları*, adhering to the conditioning of republican gender models, not only allowed a convenient personal grooming tool, without daily visits to the barber, but it did so with the superior quality of being "Made in Turkey", which it promoted in its advertisements [Fig.3.13]. This was part of a public campaign titled *Vatandaş, yerli malı kullan* (Citizen use national products), seeking to promote nationally produced goods. Conversely, *Bozkurt* blades were imported from Germany and only packaged in Turkey. A closer observation of the brand's advertisement illustration on the *Cumhuriyet* daily reveals an unskillfully masked "Made in Germany" caption on the bottom right of the image.[77] Yet, the advertisement powerfully outweighs this detail with a logo-map. As discussed in the second chapter, the symbolic use of maps as emblems in advertisements suggests a rhetoric of conveying power over a territory.[78] The eye-catching leaping wolf over the map of the nation refers to the strength of the brand while emanating rays from Istanbul allude to its wide-availability. This message is accentuated with the bold, sans serif lettering for the brand name at the centre of emanating rays. Such a delegation of the wolf motif to act as a national cloak for a German commodity, by non-central actors of the republican elite, points to its successful association of middle-class consumption codes with the official rhetoric in order to substitute or disguise market relations.

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[75] Dene October, 'The Big Shave: Modernity and Fashions in Men's Facial Hair', in *Hair: Styling, Culture and Fashion*, p.68.

[76] Ibid., pp. 68-70.

[77] 'Bozkurt Traş Bıçağını Kullananlar Hayrette', *Cumhuriyet*, 19 October 1935, p.5.

[78] David Pinder, *Mapping Worlds*, p.177.

Figure III-12: Anonymous (1936). *'The kiosk of Halk Traş Bıçakları at the Izmir International Fair of 1936'*
©APIKAM.

Figure III-13: Cumhuriyet (19 October 1935). *'The advertorial illustration of Bozkurt brand razor blades appearing on the Cumhuriyet daliy, with the close-up detail of the concealed scripture'* ©Cumhuriyet Archives.

Moreover, the Izmir International Fair itself was a site of amnesia superimposed on the perished cosmopolitan neighborhoods -predominantly Armenian- of the city at the outcome of the 1922 fire, as discussed in the second chapter.[79] With modernist superstructures, monuments embracing the conjunction of the human body and machinery, pavilions and leisure activities, it was a ground for the conspicuous display of developing industry by the new Turkish bourgeoisie. It was, similar to Katerina Clark's observation of Soviet Russia, like a blurring line between fact and fiction, where the ordinary reality of

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[79] Biray Kulluoğlu Kırlı, *Forgetting the Smyrna Fire*, p.27.

masses came eye to eye with the high-order, almost fictive rhetoric of the regime on national modernity and progress.[80] Clark further adds that this ordinary reality of the masses was only considered valuable in so far as it reflected the high-order reality of the regime. This can also explain how the wolf had permeated in the collective imaginary. In 1933, when an errand boy from the city of Bursa, Halil Efendi made headlines in the daily *Milliyet*, it was because he had designed a pencil-drawn poster for the decennial anniversary of the Republic, delineating a similar leaping wolf over a map of Turkey with metaphors of national modernity; chimneys, trains and airplanes [Fig.3.14].[81] The daily noted on the recent fame of Halil with even some prospects of a scholarship to study painting.[82]

Figure III-14:Milliyet (21 October 1933). A Picture Drawn by an Errand Boy in Bursa ©Milliyet Archives

Here it is also crucial to look at the life cycle of the wolf myth as with Europe's changing political climate in the late 1930s, the network within which it was made meaningful and the kinds of agency it enacted remarkably changed. As an authoritarian Stalinism began to settle through the mid 1930s, the references of the wolf to the Central Asian provenance of Turks made it politically significant. For the right wing politics, it became resonant with a resenment against Soviet Russia since the larger Turkish world the wolf motif referred to, was under its dominion. For these irredentist pan-Turkists who scorned the Soviet dominion of Asian Turks, the likelihood of a German victory over the

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[80] Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp.146-147.
[81] 'Bursa'da bir Amelenin Yaptığı Resim', *Milliyet*, 21 October 1933, p.3.
[82] Ibid.

Soviet Union required political affinity with the German front.[83] Turkey's neutrality in the war made matters worse since it required turning a blind eye to German encouragement of pan-Turkists, which was seen politically pragmatic to assuage German demands.[84] This peculiar atmosphere led to the spread of pan-Turkist publications mostly published by Nihal Atsız (1905-1975), former assistant of Fuat Köprülü (an adovocate of the wolf motif in the coat of arms) at the Institute of Turcology, and Reha Oğuz Türkkan (1920-1910) who published journals advocating an overtly fascist tone with titles like *Gök-Börü*, *Ergenekon*, or *Bozkurt* all referring to the *Ergenekon* myth in their cover illustrations [Fig.3.15].[85]

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[83] This was the outcome of wartime politics where Turkey was under German pressure to transit rights to the east, allegedly provoking the pan-Turkists to stir the Turkish minorities under the Soviet Union, see, Ezel K. Shaw and Stanford J. Shaw, *The Rise of Modern Turkey*, p.398.

[84] Günay Göksu Özdoğan, 'Türk Ulusçuluğunda Irkçı Temalar: 1930 ve 40'ların Türkçü Akımı', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 29.5 (1996), 19-24 (p.19). A pan-Turkist committee was founded by German encouragement, with some Turkish generals visiting the eastern front and some likely minded pan-Turkists were taken in the cabinet in the event of a German victory, see, Zücher, p.205.

[85] Alpay Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Milli Kütüphane Basimevi, 1994), p.162.

Figure III-15: Reha Oğuz Türkkan (May 1939). 'The cover illustration of Bozkurt, one of the many publications of the pan-Turkist movement illustrating the Ergenekon mtyh on its cover' ©Atatürk Library.

Atsız, particularly in his writings went as far as to argue that the PRP elite was racially inept to rule the nation since they were merely *dönmes* (Jewish converts) from Salonika, a distinguished Muslim elite of the imperial city delineated in the first chapter.[86] Finally, in May 1944 when Turkey's political rapprochement with the liberal West seemed inevitable, Prime Minister İnönü declared; "We are Turkish nationalists but we are enemies of racism."[87] This followed the confiscation of all extreme right journals and the subsequent trials of their publishers.[88] This transfiguration of an official motif into an extremist political symbol explains itself in the discrepancies of official Turkish nationalism. While the republican elite theoretically defined nationalism on the French citizenship model, it

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[86] Özdoğan, p.21.
[87] İsmet İnönü, quoted in Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p.167.
[88] Ibid.

maintained pragmatic affinities with cultural and ethnic definitions as in Anthony Smith's *ethnie*, where national bonds were constructed through religion or common ancestry, facilitating the infiltration of such far-right ideologies in the official and public spheres. In other words, just like the Tanzimat era's ideal of a collective and secular Ottoman nationhood was troubled by the ruling elite's reluctance to appropriate the predominantly orthodox Muslim character of official imperial identity, as Ahmet Ersoy underlines, so had the republican elite inherited the same paradox.[89]

III.II Framing the Nation

In August 1933 Namık İsmail, the winner of the coat of arms contest and the head of the Istanbul Academy of Arts (1926-1935) presented a report to the Ministry of Education, titled *Güzel Sanatların Ülkemizde İnkişafına Dair Rapor ve Kanun Layihaları Esbabı Mucibe Raporu* (Incentive Report and Law Draft on the Development of Fine Arts in our Country) arguing a strict state patronage of fine arts.[90] This was commissioned by the Ministry of Education, penned by the Academy's board of artists (*Vekalet Sanat Müşavere Heyeti*) and endorsed by Turkish Fine Arts Union (*Türk Güzel Sanatlar Birliği*, 1909), composed of renowned painters and architects.[91] Published in the art and architecture journal *Mimar*, the report was a draft of law, whose examples were "numerous in European nations", providing measures to create a canon of nationalist art by Turkish artists and to sustain higher standards for national art and artists.[92] Acknowledging the low literacy rates and the role arts could play in the education of children and the peasantry, İsmail underlined the role of the arts in the penetration of revolutions since as he asserted; the "memory of the eye" is the strongest, a nation remembers and loves its past better in paintings and statuary than written history.[93] Aspiring to the far-reach of Russian propaganda art, whose movies were being screened in Turkey, he resented the limited span

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[89] Ersoy, *Ottoman Arcadia*, pp.54-55.

[90] Zeynep Rona, *Türk Ressamları Dizisi-1: Namık İsmail* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1992), p.32.

[91] Namik İsmail, 'Güzel Sanatların Ülkemizde İnkişafına Dair Rapor ve Kanun Layihaları Esbabı Mucibe Raporu', *Mimar*, 32 (1933), pp.252-257 (p.252). See also, 'Güzel Sanatların Ülkemizde İnkişafına Dair Rapor ve Kanun Layihaları Esbabı Mucibe Raporu', *Mimar*, 33-34 (1933), pp.322-325.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

of Turkish arts within Istanbul and Ankara, urging for policies that would help promulgate a similar propaganda art beyond the major cities.[94] Among his proposed actions were the restriction of commissions to foreign artists and the employment of Turkish artists by the state, the enforcement of art commissions treating historical or revolutionary themes in new official and private buildings, the creation of a committee in the Academy for the organisation and control of the public space (street signs, lampposts, theatre posters, commemorative arches and illumination), general outlines to be followed in numerous new art contests and finally the foundation of an *İnkılap Müzesi* (Museum of Revolution).[95] This latter proposal for a Museum of Revolution equally called for an art of persuasive quality for the propaganda of the revolution, copies of which would circulate in schools, military barracks and provincial town halls.[96]

As argued in the second chapter, behind İsmail's nationalist zeal lay a bitterness of the first generation of Turkish artists who resented the long tradition of commissioning foreigners by the Ottoman-Turkish political elite.[97] İsmail's report also seems to emulate the way the French *École des Beaux-Arts* functioned until late nineteenth-century for the communication of a morally and socially educating meaning.[98] In other words, it is innate with a desire for the state to impose a certain legitimate figurative representation of the world, an artistic control over the "production of legitimate images" and the endorsement of its producers through the Academy of Istanbul and its masters.[99] İsmail envisioned the Academy to function like a "central bank of symbolic capital" for the regime, a state monopoly that has "the power to say who is a painter and who is not, what is painting and what is not" that in return works for the accumulation of the state's prestige and recognition.[100] Conversely, what followed his zealous report aiming to delegate plastic arts for the materialization of a new state culture are sporadic state projects, failed attempts and

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[94] Ibid., p.254. For the span of Russian propaganda in Turkey, see, 'Rusların Yaptığı İnklap Filmi', *Cumhuriyet*, 17 September 1933, p.2.
[95] Ibid., pp.253-255.
[96] Ibid., p.255.
[97] Elibal, pp.54-78.
[98] Pierre Bourdieu, 'Manet and the Institutionalisation of Anomie', in *The Field of Cultural Production,* ed. by Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.238-253 (p.250).
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.

associations in a network of human actors that were not equally zealous as himself as will be discussed in this section.

Within the same year, Mustafa Kemal himself espoused these tendencies commissioning painter Ratip Tahir a diptych of the myth of *Ergenekon*. In the first panel, *Ergenekon I* Tahir depicted the myth in its widely known narrative. The wolf (*Börteçine*) is seen leading the Turkish tribe to salvation, out of *Ergenekon*, the narrow, rocky valley where they were stuck for centuries [Fig.3.16]. In the second, modern appropriation, *Ergenekon II,* the wolf as an indexical mark is metaphorically replaced by a monument of Mustafa Kemal, pointing to a utopian land of prosperity and progress, suggested by high-rises, factories and planes [Fig.3.17]. Here, a Turkish peasant is seen traversing the wreckage of a seemingly Ottoman past, progressing towards this utopia. *Ergenekon II* thus seems highly motivated by Gökalp's poem *Ergenekon*, which ended with a verse that plead for the reappearance of the mythic wolf, *Börteçine* to lead the way to salvation when the homeland was in threat.

Figure III-16: Ratip Tahir Burak (1933). Flight from Ergenekon I ©State Art and Sculpture Museum, Ankara.

Figure III-17: Ratip Tahir Burak (1933). Flight from Ergenekon II ©State Art and Sculpture Museum.

Mustafa Kemal had commissioned the diptych for the new headquarters of the *Türkocağı* (Turkish Heart Society), a society that had been active since 1912 in the spread of national resistance during the War of Liberation and had ever since been the hotbed of Turkish nationalism. Designed in the National Architecture Renaissance style by Arif Hikmet Koyunoğlu, the headquarters (1926-1930) was in the centre of a network of numerous provincial branches, all adhering to the same style.[101] Even Koyunoğlu's stucco centerpiece, a wolf head protruding from the theatre canopy alluded to the myth, a token that the design and construction of the building had earned the praise of Gökalp, who was himself the ideologue behind the organisation.[102] Yet, it was the society's central role in Turkish nationalism that politically charged Tahir's replacement of the wolf *Börteçine* with Mustafa Kemal. In what followed, despite the zeal the inauguration of the *Türkocağı* building received in the press -Kaaba of the Turk, a national Arafat- the Heart society was actually confiscated in 1931; a year after Koyunoğlu's building was completed.[103] The society's increasing popularity had become a threat to PRP's political monopoly on nation

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[101] Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, p.39.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid, pp. 39, 46.

building. The building was then consigned to the *Halkevleri* (People's Houses) in 1932, which similarly worked to disseminate the nationalist message but with a Kemalist twist since it was orchestrated by PRP itself.[104] Hence in an outright intimidating tone, Tahir's *Ergenekon II*, flanking the original myth on the building's staircase, declares that the new leader to follow is none else than Mustafa Kemal and his political movement, the PRP. The object's life cycle is all the more testimony to this as the network within which the paintings operated and the agency they performed has changed significantly over time. One particular detail that is not discernable from the painting *Ergenekon II* today, is the six-arrowed PRP logo (each corresponding to the Kemalist reforms) originally painted on the depicted plinth. In 1951 when PRP lost power, its legacy was consolidated by the new Democrat Party in power. People's Houses were closed down, the building was handed over to various ministries and it was suggested that the six-arrow logo of PRP on the plinth be painted over.[105]

Another incentive following İsmail's zealous report was a contest held four years later, in 1937, by the Ministry of Public Works, for a mural painting in the waiting hall of the Ankara train station. Although it comes two years after İsmail's death, it is consonant with his grand project, as in 1929 he had advised state-funded painting students in Paris to attend mural classes in the *École d'Arts et Métiers* in a hope to expand their practice areas.[106] This new streamlined station (1935-1937) was designed by Şekip Akalın (1910-

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[104] Emre Kongar also argues that People's Houses were used as disseminating bodies for the Kemalist ideology, and stresses on the centrality of PRP in tis organization since membership was open to public whilst administrative roles were reserved to party members, see, Emre Kongar, *Turkey's Cultural Transformation*, p. 32.

[105] 'Haberler', *Arkitek*, 229-230 (1951), 42-44, p.42. Contemporary photographs of the painting have not been found, yet today the PRP logo is not visible in the painting. It is difficult to know how far in history the building continued to have public access but from the minutes of the Grand National Assembly, we understand that it was the PRP minister of foreign trade, Teoman Köprülüler, who in 1978 had ordered the removal of the diptych from its original location on the monumental staircase, motivated by the wolf motif's strong association with extreme nationalist political wing, see, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, *Minutes*, B.102, O.1, 7 February 1978, p. 538. It wasn't until the early 1980s, through Köprülüler's center-right successor Halil Başol's attempts and possibly after the sweepingly depoliticizing effects of the 12 September 1980 coup that the paintings were restored in their former location when the building was remodeled as Ankara's State Art and Sculpture Museum where the author observed it in 2016, see, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, *Minutes*, B.50, O.2, 22 February 1980, pp. 627-628. As of 2018 the building is undergoing another restoration and new exhibiton practices of the permanent collection remain to be discovered.

[106] Deniz Artun, *Paris'ten Modernlik Tercümeleri* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), p.264.

1976) following a new tendency of favoring Turkish architects over foreign commissions as was also advocated on İsmail's report.[107] In *LTK*, it was presented as a paragon of modernity and its "freshly scrubbed appearance, the modernistic lines, the luxury of its fittings" were seen as unmatched even in "the most modern American city".[108] Although it has not been possible to reveal a wider picture on the network behind this undertaking in this research, the journal *Arkitekt* stated that the international contest required participants to treat the revolution under three themes; economic, social and cultural.[109] Of the twenty-five participants with fifty works, the ministry chose three finalists for the project.[110] The winning project by Nurettin Ergüven (1905-1979) and the other two finalists all refer to the treaty of Lausanne (1921) as a new milestone from which to measure national cultural and economic development with a persuasive propagandist tone [Fig.3.18].

Reactions to the contest were often mixed and politically charged. On its issue announcing the outcome of the contest, the art journal *Ar* lamented on the lack of Turkish painters' contribution in the revolution, praising rather Turkish sculptors whom had already transferred the revolution to next generations in their works.[111] Recalling İsmail's ideas for a persuasive art, *Ar* reminded that art could simultaneously be a foundation for a civilisation as well as "a terrifying weapon against it", giving the example of Eugène Delacroix's *Massacre at Chios* (1824) painting at the Louvre Museum, Paris;

> […] Doesn't Delacroix's 'Massacre at Chios', still cause a hostile propaganda by showing us Turks as a violent bandit gang to thousands of visitors each day? […] That is why the great change and developments the Turkish nation is going through nowadays has opened up an era of creation and activity for the Turkish artist.[112]

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[107] 'Ankara Garı', *Arkitekt*, 06.42(1934), p.190.
[107] 'Ankara-İstanbul', *LTK,* 47 (1943), pp.37-49.
[108] Ibid., p.40.
[109] 'Ankara Garı Resim Musabakası', *Arkitekt*, 9.81 (1937), 250-251 (p.251). The journal *Mimar* was retitled as *Arkitekt* as of 1934.
[110] 'Ankara Garı için Dekor Musabakası', *Ar*, 12 (1937), 10-11 (p.10).
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid., p.11.

Figure III-18: Ar (December 1937). *'Nurettin Güven's winning design for the contest as it appeared on the journal Ar'* ©SALT Research, Istanbul.

In the same issue of *Ar*, painter Nurullah Berk (1908-1982), an advocate of socialist art, plead for a statist art policy substantiating his claims through the examples of socialist Russian and fascist German and Italian art, which despite their political discrepancies, he argued, were all at the service of state for social persuasion and mobility.[113] The level of emulation to fervent revolutionary utopias of the republican artists in 1930s is not surprising; Delacroix's mastery in historical themes and the French Academy's monopolisation of the visual field, as argued above, had long been their source of inspiration. In 1933, painter Zeki Faik İzer (1905-1988) had also created a work titled *İnkilap Yolunda* (On the Path of the Revolution), which heavily emulated Delacroix's *Liberty Leading the People* (1830) as an allegorical expression of the republican revolution [Fig.3.19].

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[113] Nurullah Berk, 'Devlet ve Sanat', *Ar*, 12 (1937), 1 (p.1).

Figure III-19: Zeki Faik İzer (1933). On the Path of the Revolution ©State Art and Sculpture Museum, Istanbul.

Both Berk and İzer were part of the *Group D*, a collective of artists founded in 1933, following İsmail's report and welcoming his ideas to produce socially concerned works of art for the propaganda of the regime. The journal *Ar*, in fact, was the publication of the collective for the promotion of their ideas. Mostly composed of the students of French cubist painter Andre Lhote's (1885-1962) studio in Paris, the *Group D* artists resented the academic classicism of their elder forerunners, the first generation of Turkish-Muslim painters, known as the *Müstakiller* (The Independents) who had been ignorant to the nascent modernist movements in Europe during their state-funded educations in France,[114] In fact both group of painters had been sent to Paris for their painting education by the Minister of Education Necati Uğural (1925-1929) and the Academy, between years 1925-1932 for rounds of three years in Paris' first private art school, *L'Académie Julian*, where they were subject to a very strict academic education of painting, which was becoming

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[114] Burhan Toprak, 'D Grupu Resim Sergisi', *Arkitekt*, 133.134 (1943), 36-40, (p.38). Toprak was the head of the Academy until 1948, following İsmail's death in 1938.

outdated even in the *École des Beaux-Arts*.[115] This was a state tradition that dated back to the opening of the *Julian* in 1868, which had raised the first generation of Ottoman painters like, Şeker Ahmet Paşa (1941-1907).[116] Upon their return to Turkey in 1929, the first cohort (1925-1929) took the model of the French *Société des Artistes Indépendants* following in the lines of academic painting without necessarily espousing a collective style.[117] Whereas the next republican cohort less frequently attended the *Julian*, preferring rather Lothe's cubist studio, which was also tolerated by the Ministry of Education and the director of the Academy, İsmail, who directed the students' inclinations through an appointed student supervisor located in Paris.[118] Now, united as a leading network of artists *Group D*, these sought to instigate a Turkish renaissance by emulating cubist deformation to establish a distinct style whilst instilling their ideology in art.[119] Their delegation of Cubism and abstraction for this end, however, was quite different from the genre's Western representational, art-historical context, it was idealized for a formal expression of the rational advancement of the nation-state while content-wise the collective aspired to the social realism of the Soviets.[120] This paradox can also be seen in the centrality of Delacroix's romantic history painting style in the collective's works and discourse, as in İzser's aforementioned painting, as opposed to the later realism advocated by Gustave Courbet which had actually been influential for first cubist painters. In other words, Cubism was a gauge against which a mobilising, energectic aspect of the revolution could be measured and contrasted with the static compositions of earlier Turkish-Ottoman painters. The popularity of social realism on the other hand should not be surprising given, unlike Cubism, its capacity to project utopias. In 1935 *Soviet Arts Exhibition* was held in Ankara where masters of the Soviet social realist movement, Isaac Brodsky's *Lenin in Smolny* and Alexander Samochwalow's *Textile Factory* were displayed in the new monumentally

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[115] Artun, p.171.

[116] Ibid., p.277.

[117] Artun suggests that the French *Société des Artistes Indépendants* was founded in 1884 as a reaction to hierarchical state contests and juries, thus it acted merely as an emulation for the Turkish *Müstakiller*, since it is difficult to talk about a similar top-down structure in Turkey, adding that after all they were not so hostile to state support for art, see, Ibid., p.234-235.

[118] Ibid., p.265.

[119] 'D Grubu 1933-1951', *Yapı Kredi Sanat* (2004) <http://sanat.ykykultur.com.tr/basin-odasi/basin-bultenleri/d-grubu-1933-1951> [10 July 2018] and Elibal, p.64.

[120] This is an insight I owe to Gülsüm Baydar, who suggests that dichotomies like modern vs. traditional may assume very different meanings within their particular use in modernist or antimodernist positions in various cultural contexts, see, Baydar, *Between Civilization and Culture* p.66.

constructivist *Sergi Evi* (Exhibition Hall, Şevki Balmumcu, 1934).[121]

    Photography was also a preferred medium to narrate the social dynamics of the republican revolution. Throughout the 1930s the official press organs of PRP instrumentalized photography in a picturesque patriotism. Particularly, the daily *Ulus* (the former *Hakimiyeti Milliye*) dedicated a weekly photographic corner titled *Yurddan Resimler* (Pictures from the Homeland), on its middle pages [Fig.3.20].[122] Similar to *LTK*'s *Pays de Soleil* section, discussed in the second chapter, this offered picturesque views of the various landscapes of the country for a national audience. The prominent children publication, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğu* (The Republic's Child) published photographic essays titled *Yurd Albümü* (Album of the Country), showing the progressive development of Ankara under the republican aegis [Fig.3.21].[123] Such practices were reminiscent of the Ottoman illustrated press, where readers were encouraged to send photographs capturing urban views, new buildings or local dresses.[124] They were similar to what Jens Jager argues for the picturesque imagery in 1850s Britain, images of diverse landscapes presented as one nation despite regional diversity and constructed for a nationalistic reading with their presupposition on what should be considered as belonging to the nation.[125]

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[121] Von Walder, 'Sowjet Kunst im Aus-Stellungs- Gebäude Ankara', *LTK*, 5 (1935), pp.24-27.

[122] 'Yurttan Resimler', *Ulus*, 27 April 1939, p.6.

[123] 'Yurt Albümü', *Cumhuriyet Çocuğu*, 19 (1939), p.327 and 'Yurt Albümü', *Cumhuriyet Çocuğu*, 20 (1939), p.347.

[124] Ersoy, *Ottomans and the Kodak Galaxy*, p.351.

[125] Jens Jager, 'Picturing Nations: Landscape Photography and National Identity in Britain and Germany in the Mid-Nineteenth Century', in *Picturing Place,* pp.117-140 (p.126).

Figure III-20: Ulus (1937). Yurttan Resimler ©National Library.

Figure III-21 Cumhuriyet Çocuğu (March 1939).
'Ankara's progressive development' ©National Library.

During his term as head of Directorate of Press (1933-1937) Vedat Nedim Tör (1897-1985) was a central actor advocating photography's role in the revolution. He took initiatives popularizing and diffusing the practice of photography. As discussed previously in his diligence in hiring photographer Othmar Pferschy, he was aware of the medium's potentials in "fashioning a ruling ideology" for social change, as Susan Sontag puts it.[126] Tör recalls in his memoirs that after witnessing the low standards of photography artisanship during the publication of *LTK*, he was driven to a project of organizing photography contests within the aforementioned People's House branches.[127] The participants to these exhibitions were gathered from the various branches of the association, and the finalists would be displayed in a group exhibition in Ankara.[128] The initiative had a pedagogic agenda as well; to diffuse photography mastership, since People's Houses were administered by the Ministry of Education to disseminate nationalist, positivist and secular ideas through lectures, courses and exhibitions for the span of professional training in the provinces.[129]

In 1936, Tör similarly took the lead in the organisation of a major photography exhibition. For this occasion all Pferschy photographs for *LTK* were assembled together to form the body of an exhibition titled *Turkey: the Country of Beauty, History and Work*, also mentioned in the second chapter. The exhibition had travelled to Switzerland the same year where it was exhibited during the Montreux Convention but its Ankara leg was where Pferschy's work met a greater national audience for the first time.[130] Reminiscent of Jager's aforementioned argument, the exhibition, taking place in the new *Sergi Evi*, mediated ideas on what should be read as Turkey through a multitude of representations of landscapes; picturesque views of Ankara, its modern monuments, views of imperial Istanbul, provincial towns, pastoral and archeological landscapes, crafts, agriculture and the official cult of the regime. A catalogue in Turkish, French, German and English was also printed for the exhibition by F. Bruckmann AG., Munich.[131] This declared on its very first page that the

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[126] Susan Sontag, *On Photography*, p.140.
[127] Ibid, p.36.
[128] Vedat Nedim Tör, *Yıllar Böyle Geçti*, p.36
[129] Zürcher, p.191.
[130] Tör, p.36.
[131] IBBAK, fol. Alb_000117, *Fotoğraflarla Türkiye*.

Republic of Turkey was only "historically related to the Ottoman Empire" and that culturally, economically, politically and socially the two not only shared "no relation at all" but that they were rather "opposites".[132] In a sense then, the exhibition can be seen as the epitome of the republican elite's preoccupation with its formal, visual disavowal of the imperial legacy.

Two years later, in 1939, referring to the above photography exhibition, the pro-government *Ulus* daily asked "How can a corner of the nation be animated in a painter's brush?".[133] The daily argued that the 1936 photography exhibition had "given the audiences a sense of resentment", since it had "made them aware of their ignorance of the various views and layers of history and nature of the homeland".[134] In comparing photography to painting, the article articulated the former as mere chemistry and the latter as ennobling its subject matter (the nature) in the hands of the artist. It then argued that thanks to PRP's support artists today no longer had complaints but served to "elevate the citizen's appreciation of art and more importantly to raise their awareness of foreign art works".[135]

After this zealous endorsement, the daily then went on to announce the outcome of a recent project, again at the instigation of Tör. Tör lamented that Turkish painters almost always lived in Istanbul and usually treated the views of the same city; the Bosphorus, its mosques or still lifes.[136] He then proposed to the general secretary of PRP, Şükrü Kaya (1883-1959) that artists should be given an opportunity to face the real conditions of the country in organized trips.[137] This was also an undertaking that would allow the Independents (*Müstakiller)* to overlap their emulation of independence in French art with a patriotic zeal.[138] It was nevertheless the onset of war years, which had given these artists a dissapointment with the Western civilization and obliged them to espouse an inward

[132] Ibid., p.1.
[133] 'Yurt Köşesi Sanatkar Fırçasında Nasıl Canlanır?', *Ulus*, 26 April 1939, p.2.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Tör, p.37.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Artun, p.245.

look.[139] The trips would conclude with an exhibition in Ankara, where the ministries would purchase some of the art to adorn their headquarters.[140] The final exhibition, inaugurated by Şükrü Kaya, was held in Ankara's People's House headquarters in 1939, and hosted some 116 works by ten painters, among them Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu, Cemal Tollu, Zeki Faik İzer, Nurullah Berk and Şeref Akdik.[141] It was also published in *LTK* accompanied by the impressions of the painters themselves [Fig.3.22].[142] In one of them, Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu (1911-1975), notable by his efforts to instigate an indigenous painting style that took as inspiration the folkloric motifs of Anatolia, recounted how Jean-Baptiste-Camille Corot had came to his mind as he glanced over "the silvery leaves of willows", clearly demonstrating his delegation of Western landscape painting to connote a modern approach to the otherwise patriotic aspirations of the undertaking.[143]

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[139] Ibid., p. 267.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Yurt Köşesi Sanatkar Fırçasında Nasıl Canlanır?', *Ulus*, 26 April 1939, p.2.
[142] 'Young Artist's Tour', *LTK*, 31 (1939), pp.17-22.
[143] Ibid., p.21.

as I had never seen elsewhere throughout my trips in Anatolia.

Hamit Görel

İZMİR

I stayed in Izmir for about a month. From the view-point of abundance of natural beauty every corner of Izmir can be considered a painting. In fact Anatolia holds in her bosom innumerable subjects for painting.

For a painter Izmir is a land of colour and harmony. Ödemiş and the vicinity and especially the ruins of Bergama are so rich in subjects as to occupy a painter for years.

These picturesque sights, seen in a world of colours, beginning with the early caresses of the rising sun until they are hidden from view with the dark veils of the evening shadows, have enchanted me. It is beyond me to try to describe you in words the kind of beauty which my brush has been unable to interpret.

Sami Yetik

TRABZON

On one side of the ship, between the dark blue sea and the azure of the sky can be seen

as I wanted, but I shall consider myself happy if I have succeeded in painting that right shade of the blue in the sky.

Bedri Rahmi Eyuboğlu

ERZURUM

An endless sea of deep turquoise blue... Rows of pretty little towns scattered along the shores... Then one morning our autocar is on its way to climb the emerald heights of northern Anatolia a region with the charm of Switzerland... At last we are crossing the Zigana mountains. Here Nature seems perched high on her throne... She looks so dignified and imposing...

Erzurum is on a plateau hidden on approach behind lofty mountains. Her mosques with their tall minarets shaded by poplars; that clear sky of the Asiatic steppes, her magnificent mountains stretching away to the horizons, these all thrilled me... The colours are such

Figure III-22: LTK (1939).*'Various paintings partaken in the exhibition, published in the journal'* ©British Library.

Despite its nationalist zeal, İsmail's reformation of the Academy, his introduction of Western classical painting at the Academy with an obvious encouragment for Cubist tendencies , has led to opponent voices within the very republican elite. From 1932 on for about two years, the daily *Cumhuriyet* published the fervent correspondences between İsmail and painter Ali Sami (head of Academy, 1921-1922, discussed earlier for his work on the republican banknotes and stamps). Ali Sami, a state-funded alumnus of the *Julain* himself, overtly criticized İsmail's poor administration of the Academy, his reformulation of the curriculum favoring a classical approach, the study of forms taken from classical Greek mythology instead of Turkish themes and his tolerance to the infiltration of modern, Cubist tendencies within the studios.[144] İsmail replied that it was the Academy's ideal to raise artists like Cézanne and Matisse, who could not be attained through an academic approach but through the study of classical forms.[145] He maintained that the French

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[144] Ali Sami Boyar, 'Resim Mektebimiz ve Ressamlığımız Ne Halde?', *Cumhuriyet*, 10 January 1932, p.4.
[145] Namik İsmail, 'Akademi ve Ressamlık Münakaşası', *Cumhuriyet*, 23 February 1932, p.4.

Academy had created its own genre through the study of classical forms (citing the *Prix de Rome*) and asserted that a Turkish Delacroix would one day rise from the students of the Academy as it did from thousands of students of the French Academy.[146] Throughout his lifetime, Ali Sami continued to criticize modernist tendencies (Cubism) in painting and reject any affiliation of his generation with Western movements (Impressionism), supporting the idea that his generation only tried to lay the foundations of an academic style of Turkish painting.[147]

Namik İsmail died in 1935, but various diplomatic bodies did carry on with his nationalist art project as we have seen. Further numbers are not known, but in 1933 when İsmail penned his report, the Ministry of Education had purchased ten paintings from similar state-led exhibitions at a total value of 3175 Turkish liras, all of which, incurring from their titles, referred to the nationalist struggle.[148] Yet the overall project never reached the wide-span public penetration to incite a popular culture of the revolution, its span remained limited within an urban elite. Even the 1937 Ankara Train Station mural project was discontinued most likely after Mustafa Kemal died in 1938. However, this discussion on what was a mouthepiece of the PRP regime between the representatives of two generations Ali Sami and Namık İsmail, shows us that the republican elite was in no way monolithic. It was composed of a body of actors whose understanding and delegation of non-human actors such as painting (or public statuary) for a simultaneous material manifestation of the national and the modern did not always overlap and for worse constantly shifted and assumed different meanings depending on their background, education and views. When it came to the accountability of the nation-state in the development of arts, what must have been a general concern and a source of pride for the republican intelligentsia was more likely to be on matters of quantity (rather than generational disagreements on form) and the nationality of the artist. In 1937, this was suggested by the visual hierarchy implicit in the exhibition panel titled *Arts* at the exhibition of the second Congress of Turkish History, held under the aegis of Mustafa Kemal. The panel dedicated two rows to *Imperial Arts*, undermining its cosmopolitan and

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146 Ibid.
147 Ali Sami Boyar, 'Biz Memlekete Hangi San'atı Getirdik?', *Radyo Mecmuası*, 14.2(1947), p.6.
148 For a list supplied by painter Hikemt Onat, see, Gültekin Elibal, *Atatürk ve Resim, Heykel,* pp.64-65.

singular nature; palaces and nineteenth-century buildings built by cosmopolitan architects, all sunken in the black background. Republican arts, however, were foregrounded with a white background and given three rows of photographs depicting a zealous industriousness; handcrafts, the polyphony of Western music, paintings by *Group D* painter Halil Dikmen, the Academy's populated student workshops and Ankara's modern architecture with its monuments [Fig.3.23].[149]

Figure III-23: La Turquie Kemaliste (1937). *'The "Arts" panel at the exhibition of the Third Congress of Turkish History'* ©British Library, London.

As for Tör's ardent use of photography in the practices of the Directorate of Press, its span was likely limited. Jens Jager argues that picturesque photography became fused with patriotism in mid-nineteenth-century Britain thanks to the infrastructure of photography artisanship and developed travel facilities, all of which culminated in an ideological basis for the identification of the picturesque with patriotism.[150] In contrast, Jager argues, Germany's patriotism remained largely operational on a literary basis.[151] Similar to the more recently unified Germany and Italy, in the 1930s Turkey still lacked a sense of

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[149] 'Numéro Spécial Consacré au IIᵉ Congrès d'Histoire Turque et à l'Exposition d'Histoire, 20-26 Septembre 1937', *LTK*, 21-22 (1937), p.91.
[150] Jager, p.139.
[151] Ibid., p.124.

historically coherent territorial boundaries. Traveling among regions was difficult and photography artisanship was not widespread. Moreover, its settled civic traditions were dispersed at the end of WWI with the mass deportations and exchanges of populations.[152] Among them the eradication of Armenian communities could point to the vacuum in photography artisanship, since those communities had a central role in the provinvcial spread of the medium.[153] This explains the dominant but circumscribed role played by Istanbul in the cultural sphere and Tör's frustration with the amateurish level of provincial photographers where only a generation ago provincial artisans, like the Dildilian photography studio with subsidiaries in Merzifon and Sivas were influential actors within the cultural sphere of provincial Anatolia.[154] Thus, like its German counterpart, we might say that Turkish patriotism remained largely at a literary level. If only, visual imagery was addressed to express literary content as is exemplified with the widespread references to the *Ergenekon* myth, revived by Gökalp.

III.III Decennial Anniversary Celebrations: A Gown of Lights

In 1935, on *Ülkü*, the propaganda journal of PRP, journalist-historian Enver Şapolyo (1900-1972) drew rather a grim picture of Ankara on the day when the new state was proclaimed as a republic in Ankara in 29 October 1923;

> *Hakimiyeti Milliye* Square was covered in dust and earth and bulks of stones here and there. Next to the Ministry of Culture there was a lot where grass and thorns have grown all over…On the important meetings of the General Assembly, thousands would gather here until midnight. There was not a single lantern on this

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[152] For a detailed picture of the demographic and cultural changes in Anatolian towns, see, Kezer, pp.157-197.
[153] David Low, 'Photography and the Empty Landscape: Excavating the Ottoman Armenian Image World', *Études Arméniennes Contemporaines*, 6 (2015) 31-69.

[154] Armen Marsoobian, *Reimagining a Lost Armenian Home: The Dildilian Photography Collection* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2017).

square. People would take in illumination from the faintly burning petroleum lamp inside the Great National Assembly.[155]

Two years ago on October 1933, the Republic had reached its tenth anniversary. As portrayed on *Cumhuriyet*'s partisan cover illustration [Fig.2.20], in many ways the republican elite saw this as an important benchmark; the 1920s separatist insurgencies were crushed, opposition suppressed, the reforms and statist industrial investments were underway. This required an official choreographing of the commemorations to underscore the supremacy of the nation-state. As is suggested by Şapolyo's account of 1923, the association of the materiality of light with the material progress of the Republic was to become a frequently addressed rhetoric in the accounts of the republican elite. Thus, this section argues that increasingly after 1933, the republican elite delegated commemorative illumination technologies as a non-human actor in state-sanctioned representations of the new republic in the built environment during the republican pageants. The discursive space on the official restructuring of republican pageants suggests that the materiality of electric light, which was globally becoming an efficient and widespread technology, was associated to materialise and disseminate the republican rhetoric on technological superiority, in contrast with its allegedly obsolete imperial predecessor. Conversely, this merely reflected the social significance attributed to technology as electric power supply still largely depended on plants built during the late Ottoman era. As David Edgerton points the modern myth of technological progress perpetuates by denying its' antecedents, its' progressional history.[156] Eschewing the techno-centric accounts of Western modernity, as he suggests, this section will thus look into the use of technology rather than its innovative promises.

A first step towards this direction was taken when in 1925, the Republic Day, the 29 October, was proclaimed as a national holiday, which has led to its bureaucratic, top-down restructring as a visual manifestation of the official narrative, through an official choreography quite different from the earlier grass roots adoption of the commemorative

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155 Enver Behnan Şapolyo, 'Cumhuriyet Nasıl İlan Edildi?', *Ülkü*, 6.33 (1935), 194-202 (p.195). To note, both *Ülkü* and *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (later *Ulus*) were published in the *Hakimiyeti Milliye Press*, later referred to as *Ulus Basımevi* in purer Turkish.
156 David Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900* (London: Profile Books, 2008), pp.XV-XVIII.

day as recounted by Şapolyo.[157] In fact, well into 1930s, the nation was officially commemorated both on the republican 29 October and 23 July, the Young Turk *Iyd-i Milli* (National Holiday) later adapted as *Hürriyet Bayramı* (Freedom Holiday). Melis Süloş argues that the growing opposition in the aftermath of the 1925 failed attempt for a multi-party system and the complacency of former CUP members in the derailment of this opposition movement both triggered an official response to eradicate the Freedom Holiday from the official calendar with the proclamation of the decree on National and General Holidays in 1935.[158] As argued in the second chapter, this was nonetheless part of a greater project of Mustafa Kemal to discredit and antagoise any CUP legacy due to its connotations of defeatism even at the cost of disavowing the continuity between the former religious nationalist period with its role in the national resistance.[159]

What had made the Freedom Holiday an acceptable legacy up to that point were its secular character and its mutual denigration of the Hamidian regime. The Young Turk contempt for the reign of the last absolute sultan, Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909), referred to as *istibdad* (despotism), its association with irrationalism and bigotry resonated with the repulican sensibilities. In 1929, for instance, the pro-PRP daily *Cumhuriyet* commemorated the Freedom Holiday on its cover with a satirical drawing pointing to the common enemy [Fig.3.24]. The satirical image portrays a David-like hero having just broken his leg cuffs, and raising a sword towards a desperate demonic Goliath figure who is oddly wearing a western style crown with a crescent top while the caption reads "10-23 July, When We Hit the First Strike on the Despot (*Istibdad)* Evil".[160]

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[157] Şapolyo, p.200 and Birol Caymaz, *Cumhuriyetin Onuncu Yıl Kutlamarı*, p.121.
[158] *Ulusal Bayram ve Genel Tatiller Hakkinda Kanun Lahiyasi ve Dahiliye Ercumeni Mazbatası,* 1/184, 13.05.1935, No:130, Başvekil:İnönü, in Melis Süloş, 'Cumhuriyet Döneminde 1908 Hürriyet Bayramı Kutlamaları', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 151 (2006), 72-75.
[159] Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, p.172.
[160] '10-23 Temmuz-İstibdad İfritine İlk Darbeyi İndirdiğimiz Gün', *Cumhuriyet*, 23 July 1929, p.1. As argued earlier in the first chapter 10 July is the Julian equivalent of Gregorian 23 July then in use in the Ottoman Empire.

Figure III-24: Cumhuriyet (1929). *'Cumhuriyet's cover image illustrating the istibdat'* ©Cumhuriyet Archives.

Many republican intellectuals and former CUP members shared a common antipathy for Abdülhamid's reign. In his memoires journalist and PRP deputy Falih Rıfkı Atay (1894-1971) recalls his childhood years under *istibdad* as rather a dark period where even electricity was "banned" until the 1908 revolution.[161] This same period was delineated in yet another famous poem, *Sis* (The Fog) by the leading modernist poet Tevfik Fikret (1867-1915). Fikret metaphorically referred to the rule of Abdülhamid as an obscuring veil, a fog that took over Istanbul while it fell into a numbing sleep of indifference. The poem, eventually banned under Hamidian censorship, must have been influential for Atay's generation whom, as he recalls, had clandestinely memorized it by heart.[162] When on the morning of 23 July 1908 the censorship was repealed, Atay, then only fourteen, was thrilled to see the poem printed on the daily *Tanin*'s -the official press organ of CUP- cover page.[163] Ironically, the dissolution of the Hamidian oppression had also allowed the inauguration of the new coal-driven *Silahtarağa* power plant in 1914, as a CUP achievement. Although slightly delayed due to war economy it was far behind other imperial hubs like Salonika and Izmir who had enjoyed some form of electric power since the early 1900s, pointing to Abdülhamid's heedful measures.[164] Only as of 1920 electricity provided by *Silahtarağa*

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[161] Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Batış Yılları*, p.18.

[162] Ibid., p.17.

[163] Ibid., p.36.

[164] Zafer Toprak also suspects the complicity of Hamidian oppression and the sultan's fear of security in the belated arrival of electricity in Istanbul as other major Ottoman cities as Salonika and Damascus had already been given concessions for electrical infrastructure, see Zafer Toprak, 'Aydınlatma: Tanzimat Dönemi', in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, 476-478 (p.478). Necla Geyikdağı similarly mentions Abdülhamid II's fear of electricity and his rejections of concessions for its production in the capital. Necla Geyikdağı, *Foreign Investments in the Ottoman Empire*, p.116. For details on the construction of the Silahtarağa plant also see, 'L'Usine d'Electricité de Silighdar', *Ameli Electric*, 1.2 (1926), 11-14 (p.12).

could be channeled for the urban illumination of Istanbul.[165] Thus, the associations of the materiality of light with the philosophy of rational enlightenment and emancipation first in the 1908 constitutional revolution and later in the official narrative of Republic Day as delineated by Şapolyo are suggestive cues in understanding the rhetoric of the republican elite with urban illumination and display of technology on the commemoration of the Republic. After all, as we have seen in the first chapter, festive illumination was also assigned a role by the CUP ruling elite in Salonika in 1910 during Sultan Reşad's visit, for the legitimation of the rhetoric on Ottomanism and as a homogenizing allegory for an ethnically and religiously diverse city.

What was controversial with this rhetoric was by the 1920s, in Turkey's biggest city, Istanbul, nights were still dark. For a full nighttime illumination of the city twenty to thirty thousand lampposts would be required whereas all throughout the city (the peninsula, Galata and Üsküdar) there were placed only 8474 lampposts, largely lit by gas and very few arch lamps, which only illuminated main avenues and its adjoining streets.[166] Following the proclamation of the Republic, in 1923, about 1228 electric lampposts were placed which illuminated Beyazıt, Yeniköy and Bakırköy and partially Fatih neighborhoods by electricity.[167] Gradually, as the city prospered in the post-war economy, the demand for electricity also increased.[168] Yet, as the actress Şirin Devrim (1926-2011) recalls, Istanbul was still a dark city with scarcely lit streets in 1936, in contrast to Berlin where she had been astonished by the city lights.[169]

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[165] Prior to that there was not a general plan for the illumination of Istanbul, the contract made with foreign companies in return for getting their concessions on the production and marketing of electricity would oblige them to place a certain amount of free lampposts in the name of the municipalities but these liabilities were not adequately executed during war years, see Toprak, p.478.

[166] Toprak, p.478.

[167] Ibid.

[168] Ibid., p.479. In 1949 there were a total of 11,138 lampposts. With a steady rise it totaled up to 18,569 in 1955, see, *IETT Işletmeleri Umum Müdürlüğünün Tarihçesi, Teşkilatı, Mevzuatı ve Faaliyeti* (Istanbul: IETT Yayınları, 1956), p.40. In 1941 in a total consumption rate of 457,4 Gwh, only 11.8 Gwh was for urban illumination, in 1950 this rose to 22 Gwh within a total of 789,6 Gwh, see, *Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı*, ed. by Melek Düzgüneş (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1973), p.398.

[169] Şirin Devrim, *Şakir Paşa Ailesi: Harika Çılgınlar*, (Istanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1996), p.118.

Throughout the 1930s Istanbul's electricity was still supplied by the prolonged concession given to the Belgian *Sofina* group, which had founded the *Societé des Tramways et d'Electricité de Constantinople* (Constantinople Tramways and Electricity Company) in 1911 and had then acquired the *Silahtarağa* plant around 1914.[170] A most prominent contributor to the debate on electric modernity was the company's journal *Ameli Electric*, published in French and Turkish between 1926 and arguably up until the nationalisation of the company in 1937.[171] In 1926 the company had a total of 38,500 subscribers rising up to 107,156 (of which 80,217 were households) in 1937 for a city of 880,000 habitants.[172] Thus, if we assume that the journal *Ameli Electric* mainly circulated amongst electricity subscribers, it can be asserted that it addressed a circumscribed segment of urban, upper and middle-class citizens, for the promotion of up-to-date electrical appliances (kettles, electro-radiators, irons) where electricity was presented as an indispensible part of modern everyday life. As Victor Margolin also notes after Bozdoğan, peculiar to the print culture of the era, *Ameli Electric* too presented modernity as an aspiration rather than a reality.[173] In doing this, the journal did not merely endorse the republican rhetoric on national modernity with electric commodities but in its first issue it published a photograph of Mustafa Kemal on the first page, in 1928 it celebrated the inauguration of Canonica's Taksim monument and in 1933 it illustrated a full-page photograph of Mustafa Kemal in honor of the decennial commemorations [Fig.3.25].[174] This endorsement of the nation-state is likely to arise from a need to establish a sustainable communication with the government as in the uncertainty of the inter-war period European

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[170] The Silahtarağa power plant was already constructed and had started operating in 1914 when the Belgian Sofina group had purchased its concessions from the Hungarian *Societé Anonyme d'Electricité Ganz*, see Geyikdağı, p.116.

[171] The latest issue of *Ameli Electric* is dated November 1934, see, Salt Research, Istanbul, <www.saltresearch.org> [accessed 28 December 2017]. After the Great Depression, the Sofina group financially deteriorated and eventually was bought in by the Turkish state in 1937, see Toprak, p.479.

[172] *Ameli Electric*, 2.12, November 1926, p.109. Of the 80,217 households in 1937, 3,543 were of discounted tariff and added to that was 25,283 commercial institutions, 1,625 official ones and thirty one free of charge, see, *IETT Işletmeleri Umum Müdürlüğünün Tarihçesi,* p.40. There is no census of Istanbul available for 1933, however in 1927 it totaled up to 806,863 and then in 1935 to 883,599, see, 'Istanbul Büyük Şehir Belediyesi', *Istatistikler* (2018) <http://www.ibb.gov.tr/trTR/BilgiHizmetleri/Istatistikler/Documents/demografi/t211.pdf > [accessed 10 July 2018].

[173] Victor Margolin, *World History of Design, Vol. II,* p.624.

[174] Respectively, *Ameli Electric*, 1.1, December 1926, n.p.; *Ameli Electric*, 1.1, December 1926, p.1.; *Ameli Electric*, 5.32, January 1929, n.p.; and *Ameli Electric*, 9.64, November 1926, n.p.

companies like *Sofina* were eager to hand over their investments to the national government.[175]

Figure III-25: Ameli Elektrik (1933) *'The journal's commemoration of the decennial anniversary of the Republic'* ©SALT Archives.

This very first issue of the journal presented an essay on illuminated advertisements by the use of the Eiffel Tower for the Citroën Company. It alluded to how this "enormous carcass of iron" celebrated the glory of the *citrons* (referring to the new Citroën 5HP) as "not only a brutal proclamation of the company itself but also a real artistic wonder". Then the editorial asked, "Advertisement is definitely the most audacious modern power […] Here it is, reaching 300 meters…When is it the turn of…the Galata Tower?..."[176] Later in 1929, *Ameli Electric* publicized the advancements on floodlighting, translating the term as *ziya dalgaları* (light-waves), alluding to the new technology's gentleness to the eye unlike

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[175] Pamuk, p.182.
[176] 'La Tour Eiffel au Service de la Publicité Lumineuse', *Ameli Electric*, 1 December 1925, p.6.

the former incandescent bulbs, which made one "step back from illuminations" with dazzled eyes.[177] It went further on to suggest that "there's nothing as elegant and attractive as floodlighting when it's done appropriately" and that marble palaces and parks could offer pleasant views under such lights.[178] It then appealed to unions and municipalities who could afford such an effect, with moderate costs.[179] This was followed by the journal *Mimar* in 1932, publishing an article on the new technological advancements on floodlighting, underlining how it articulated architectural details through the examples of Berlin's *Karstadt* department store and Paris' *Arc de Triomphe* and Concorde Square.[180] In other words, in Turkish print media of the early 1930s floodlighting had already already been assigned its role to enact national modernity.

There were also global technological advancements that propelled this discourse, especially the replacement of the carbon filament with tungsten in incandescent light bulbs as of 1914. This paved the way for large-scale public use of illumination, making floodlighting a widely available and current topic in the early 1930s.[181] In September 1931, the International Illumination Congress gathered in London for the occasion of which a month-long floodlighting of the city monuments and especially the Clock Tower of the Houses of Parliament in London took place. The congress, on the eve of the Great Depression, aimed to stimulate the gas and electrical industries, the promoters of which declared to *The Illustrated London News* that floodlighting revealed "the architectural glories of historic buildings far better than the daylight".[182] Notwithstanding, was *La Féerie* of the Paris Colonial Exhibition the same year, a light parade with fountain jets. These were global contemporary materialities that mediated the experience of modernity, and circulating through print media, they must nevertheless have influenced the republican elite's commemorative conceptions in the years to come.

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[177] 'Flood-Lighting – Ziya Dalgaları', *Ameli Electric*, 5.32, January 1929, pp.4-10.
[178] Ibid., p.5.
[179] Ibid.
[180] 'Mimaride Tenvirat', *Mimar*, 15 (1932), 82-85.
[181] Gavin Weightman, *Children of Light* (London: Atlantic Books, 2011), p.160.
[182] 'The Centre of British Government under Flood-Lighting: The Houses of Parliament', *The Illustrated London News*, 5 September 1931, p.345.

As David Nye suggests no technology can have a social meaning before being placed in a context and used for some social purpose by a dominant section of the society.[183] Overall in Turkey, the number of households with electric supply did not exceed fifteen per cent of the total well into the early 1950s.[184] Hence, electric modernity cannot be seen as a technology having triggered drastic social changes in the 1930s Turkey. Rather it was a social meaning attributed to technology by the elite, a role technology was expected to enact in the communication of national modernity for the projection of a new social sphere. Nye argues that in the early twentieth century, technology was increasingly woven into the history of the American nation as a "technological foundation story" where the natural landscape was assimilated to a secondary technological creation.[185] In other words, Americans created their new social world through a narrative on the subjugation of nature to technology. This section similarly argues that for the republican elite, technological foundation stories and especially festive illumination technologies have been equally pragmatic in projecting a rhetoric, which differentiated itself from any imperial legacy, to construe its own social reality.

Light and commemoration

With the specific lack of a large-scale industrial output and venues of consumption, any commercial uses of floodlithgting in the 1930s Turkey would have been limited. The 1929 editorial of *Ameli Electric* on floodlighting had also underlined this particular aspect, appealing to an everyday commercial use of the technology not circumscribed to commemorative occasions with the following words;

> The value of floodlighting for pageants is not only in the grace it generates but it could also be used in more practical areas such as supporting advertisement demonstrations […] since there is no occasion for a festive floodlighting on a daliy

[183] David Nye, *Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1990).
[184] Pamuk, p.28.
[185] David Nye, *America as Second Creation: Technology and Narratives of New Beginnings* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003), pp.9-20.

basis, illumination in the form of floodlighting too is slowly entering our custom as other things that cheer up life.[186]

Despite the call of the journal, in the statist economy of the 1920s and 1930s with limited private entrepreneurship, the association of floodlighting with industry was not economically viable. Although there had been attempts to support private entrepreneurship as seen in the efforts to create a national merchant class, the 1949 Thornburg report later stated that Turkey's economy in the 1930s functioned rather like a poorly managed capitalist economy, which by supplying all the capital rather discouraged private incentives.[187] Hence, any illumination work at a scale the journal advocated could scarcely be applied by the private sector. Thus floodlighting's association with pageantry and commemorative ends largely remained operational for the display of the nation-state's technologic superiority in official commemorations. Oral histories also indicate that in the collective memory of the first republican generation, the decennial anniversary celebrations of 1933 are particularly emphasised, which is resonant of this.[188]

The decennial anniversary proved a particular challenge for the one party rule of PRP since it was an ultimate occasion for the fixation of its narrative as the unsurpassed modernizer of the country. Therefore, as the discursive space around the materialities deployed for the anniversary also suggest, the celebrations had to be given adequate care. In June 1933, a new act passed for the regulation of the affairs concerning the decennial anniversary commemorations. This envisioned a three-day long public holiday for the occasion and the constitution of a qualified committee in the capital to work in collaboration with provincial bodies for the definition of the modalities of commemorations, which were to demonstrate the "successes of the Republic, past and future".[189] Recep Peker (1889-1950), as the general secretary of PRP, chaired this committee in Ankara and seems greatly accountable in the orchestration of the form and content of the celebrations.[190] The span of the commemorations over three days and several

[186] 'Flood-Lighting – Ziya Dalgaları', *Ameli Electric*, 5.32, January 1929, pp.9-10.
[187] Comments of M.W. Thornburg and others quoted in Lewis, pp.287-288.
[188] Arzu Öztürkmen, 'Milli Bayramlar Şekli ve Hatırası', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 5.28 (1996), 29-35 (p.31).
[189] 'Cumhuriyetin İlaninin Onuncu Yıldönümü Kutlma Kanunu', *Resmi Gazete*, 26 June 1933.
[190] Caymaz, p.115.

new practices aimed at the demarcation of a different milestone, clearly delineated on a guide titled *10. Yıl Rehberi* (Tenth Year Guide) published by the committee.[191] This guide shows us a very vivid picture on which materialities were thought of by the republican elite to materially extend the republican rhetoric, to place it out in the world where it could be seen and enacted upon. It first of all stated that special care should be given to the ornamentation of official buildings, PRP headquarters, schools, homes, stores, avenues, ports, transport vehicles and sports clubs with flags and laurel branches and red and white ribbons.[192] The public squares hosting the pageants were to be christened as "Republic Square" where a commemorative obelisk would then be erected.[193] On these squares the president of the republic's speech would be directly broadcast from the radio at ten o'clock, followed by the start of pageants.[194] The navy too would be decorated and moored first in Istanbul and then in Izmir. The air force would be flying all over the country to spread bills in the national bicolour, printed with mottos of revolution.[195] The guide's tone on the delegation of illumination was equally strong. It advised all structures to be illuminated within the reach of available means; by torches, gas lamps or electricity, decorated with banners inscribed with the mottos of revolution.[196] As such the guide is another implicit avowal that the attribution of meaning to the materiality of light through its connotations on the republican rhetoric far preceded the physical span and availability of electric illumination technologies.

What is interesting for this study is that this official choreography crystallized differently in Ankara than Istanbul. In the national capital, the celebration ground was the *Hakimiyeti Milliye* Square, a focal point for official rituals following the erection of Krippel's *Zafer* monument in 1926. The square, renamed as *Cumhuriyet Meydanı* (Republic Square), is described in the daily *Cumhuriyet* as adorned with ornamental arches and filled with masses where soldiers march in procession, followed by scout girls and boys

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[191] Ibid., p.119.
[192] 'Bayram Hazırlığı Bitti', *Vakit*, 27 October 1933, p.9.
[193] Ibid. An example of this can still be seen in Izmir's Republic Square where the obelisk was re-erected in 2001.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Ibid.
[196] 'Bayram Hazırlığı Bitti', *Vakit*, 27 October 1933, p.9.

and spectators.[197] Right down the square, two floodlit graphic panels were siding the PRP headquarters building, communicating a dichotomy between two historical treaties. The right panel delineated an abstracted logo-map of Turkey as partitioned by the Allied Powers according to the Sèvres Treaty (1920) signed by the Ottoman government [Figs.3.26, 31].[198] The dichotomy was complete with the left panel on the other wing of the building, demonstrating the treaty of Lausanne (1923) where the Ankara government had succeeded in imposing on the Allied Powers the borders of new Turkey.


Figure III-26: Cumhuriyet (1933). 'The floodlit panel delineating an abstracted logo-map of Turkey as partitioned by the Allied Powers according to the Sèvres Treaty'@Cumhuriyet Archives.

Such graphic arrangements worked to contrast the imperial past with the republican present. Maps too were widely used graphic elements in the publications of the republican elite thanks to their simultaneous manipulability both as scientific and political representations, as argued previously.[199] The panels were two major examples of a series eulogizing the rationalism of the new state, which as Şapolyo recalls included several other dichotomies of the old versus new regimes on education or marriage law.[200] The following

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[197] 'Ankara Eşsiz bir Gün Yaşadı', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1933, pp.1, 9.
[198] On the same day, the daily *Cumhuriyet* also published an editorial, titled 'Sèvres is death, Lausanne is life!' with a similar logo-map illustrating the partition as envisioned by the treaty, see, *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1933, p.4.
[199] Pinder, p.184.
[200] Şapolyo in Caymaz, p.122.

day on a page dedicated to young readers, the daily *Cumhuriyet* had also published similar graphics titled *Cumhuriyet Neler Yaptı?* (The Accomplishments of the Republic*)* juxtaposing old and new sartorial styles and education through abstracted graphics and ISOTYPE [Fig.3.27].[201] This highlights to the propagandistic propensities of the socialist promise of ISOTYPE, wider access to education through abstracted pictorial language, which was an appealing communication strategy for the republican elite.

Figure III-27: Cumhuriyet (1933). The Accomplishments of the Republic ©Cumhuriyet Archives.

Ankara's commemorative arrangements also made claims on the technological superiority of the nation state. On the same square the Republic of Turkey Railroads built a floodlit pyramidal arch. Like *Cumhuriyet*'s cover illustration for the anniversary discussed in the second chapter, this one also had a map imposing the new railroad network on the geography with the planned Eastern routes shown under construction [Fig.3.28]. Another floodlit arch by the Turkish Army had columns in the shape of giant screws and alluded to the up-to-date appliances used by the army through props of canons and automatic guns, adorning its canopy [Fig.3.29].

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[201] 'Cumhuriyet Neler Yaptı?', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1933, p.5.

Figure III-28: İzzet Kaya (1933). Cumhuriyet'in 10. Yıl Hatıraları *'The pyramidal arch built by the Republic of Turkey Railroads with a map'* @TBMM.

Figure III-29: İzzet Kaya (1933). Cumhuriyet'in 10. Yıl Hatıraları *'The arch arch built by the Turkish Army'* @TBMM.

Similar displays of republican technological superiority were also voiced in pro-PRP dailies. *Cumhuriyet* claimed that in as little as ten years the Republic had constructed forty-one bridges whereas the Ottomans had built merely ninety-four in four decades.[202] It fervently praised the potentials offered by new scientific methods with the use of reinforced concrete, over the old stone bridges. The Ankara daily *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, similarly published an extensive photo essay titled *Ankara'nın Büyüyüşü* (The Development of Ankara) [Fig.3.30], where photographs of the main city arteries (*İstasyon*, *Anafartalar* and *Necati Bey* avenues) as they were in 1923 and then in 1933 were juxtaposed, contrasting the material progress of the Republic with the fire-stricken Ottoman town.[203] The daily fervently proclaimed that Ankara was Mustafa Kemal's own project to found a civilisation in the middle of neglected Anatolia.[204] It then added that Ankara was not merely about "constructing apartment blocks" but was "above all a paragon of the fight with nature in the middle of a steppe".[205]

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[202] Also see, 'Osmanlı Imparatorluğu Altı Buçuk Asırda 94 Köprü Yapmıştı Cumhuriyet On Senede 41 Köprü Yapti', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1933, p.10 and '10 Senede On Misli', *Cumhuriyet*, 31 October 1933, p.5.

[203] 'Ankara'nın Büyüyüşü', *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 29 October 1933, p.89.

[204] Ibid.

[205] Ibid.

Figure III-30: Hakimiyeti Milliye (1933). Ankara'nın Büyüyüşü @National Library.

To project this rhetoric on the physical space of the national capital, floodlighting seems to have offered a pragmatic tool. In a contemporary photography album titled *Cumhuriyetin Onuncu Yıl Hatıraları* (Memoirs of the Tenth Anniversary of the Republic) by photographer İzzet Kaya we see the use of the illumination technology for Ankara's modern republican landmarks; the İş Bank headquarters, the National Assembly building, the PRP headquarters, the Ethnography Museum, the *Ankara Palas* hotel, the *Zafer* monument and the aforementioned panels and arches [Fig.3.31].[206] Floodlighting singles out this rhetorical trope of the republican elite on technological modernity in the background of the night. It would not be misleading to argue that for the republican elite,

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[206] This is a bound and titled album by İzzet Kaya himself, composed of his photographs taken both in Ankara and Istanbul during celebrations, see İzzet Kaya, 'Cumhuriyet'in 10. Yıl Hatıraları', Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Büyük Millet Meclisi Acık Erisim Sistemi, (1933) <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/xmlui/handle/11543/2286> [accessed 13 January 2018].

the materiality of Ankara built by a nationalist agency and its attributed republican ethos in 1933 stood very self-evidently for the technological superiority of the republican regime over its obsolete Ottoman predecessor, perhaps even more than a new coat of arms or a nationalist pictorial art. It was this "technological foundation myth" that had presented a tool to the republican elite in making the "original landscape" disappear to be replaced by their own technological creation. As David Nye argues for the American technological foundation myth, its Turkish counterpart was also projected back in time as well as forward into the future and its partial incoherencies did not matter so long as it was convincing.[207]

Figure III-31: İzzet Kaya (1933). Cumhuriyet'in 10. Yıl Hatıraları *'Some of he floodlit monuments of Ankara, the Zafer monument –left- and the PRP headquarters'* @TBMM.

As to the festive atmosphere of Istanbul, illumination was an equally important emphasis of the commemorations, albeit through different agencies and associations. The daily *Cumhuriyet* announced the festive preparations in the city in "a never seen before manner" with some 120 triumphal arches built by private institutions in Beyoğlu, Üsküdar, Kadıköy and Boğaziçi neighborhoods.[208] It also zealously added that each household was

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[207] Nye, America as *Second Creation*, p.4.
[208] 'Büyük Bayram Nasıl Tesit Edilecek', *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1933, p.2.

decorated in flags, electric bulbs and laurel branches.[209] The Istanbul daily *Vakit* noted that big corporations in Istanbul were preparing meticulously, almost rivaling each other, so that the illuminations for the Republic Day "would surpass any other in beauty".[210] Of these, the illuminations of the headquarters of the Electricity Company in Tünel, the Haydarpaşa Station and Leander's Tower whose fittings were prepared by the Coast Guard (*Tahlisiye İdaresi*) were "likely to be very beautiful".[211] The decorations of Istanbul municipality's Karaağaç facilities were particularly highlighted, where four thousand bulbs were placed, drawing the outline of the building, along a fountain with jets of water that would rise as high as three and a half meters with projected lights.[212] The next day, the daily suggested that this was a "never seen before atmosphere of festivity" and that all private and public institutions were ornate with flags and equipped with electrical illumination.[213] It especially noted the PRP headquarters "adorned very specially and attractively with illuminations of exquisite taste".[214] It also mentioned the triumphal arches, amounting to over two hundred only between Beyazıt and Taksim (now Cumhuriyet) Squares.[215] The daily then underlined that the commercial institutions had commissioned purpose-built arches, all celebrating the motto "Turkish Industry, the Work of the Republic".[216] As is evident from the daily's tone, the vast quantity of the arches suggests a centrally designed projection. That very same year the accomplished architects of the Turkish Fine Arts Union had designed plans of similar structures in various types, asserting that their construction would be simple and economic, requiring less material, especially suited for provincial municipalities.[217] Ideally then, some of these arches as well could have been constructed from these standard designs of the Union. Similar to *Cumhuriyet*, *Vakit* concluded with the zealous remark that Istanbul "probably" had never prepared itself for a holiday "with a thrill so full heartedly".[218]

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[209] Ibid.
[210] 'Donanma için Yarış', *Vakit*, 28 October 1933, p.9.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.
[214] Ibid.
[215] 'En Büyük Bayramımız', *Vakit*, 29 October 1933, p.2.
[216] Ibid.
[217] 'Birlik Faaliyetleri', *Aritekt*, 33.34(1933), p.330.
[218] 'En Büyük Bayramımız', *Vakit*, 29 October 1933, p.2.

The fine-tuning of tone in the pro-PRP dailies in delineating the atmosphere of the national capital and Istanbul is suggestive. While Ankara's festive atmosphere is a corollary reflection of its national modernity, in Istanbul it is as if public and private enterprises are rivaling with each other for what is an exceptional occasion to prove their place in the theatre of the nation. Ideally, illumination and the display of technology seem to have taken a different path in Istanbul. Even though the city had a small number of corporate enterprises (the Electric Company, Wagon-Lits, Şirket-i Hayriye to name a few) these were all the more absent in bureaucratic Ankara. Moreover, as Bernard Lewis argues, the depression of 1929 had brought with it an anti-Western and anti-capitalist wave where imperialism and capitalism were understood as equals.[219] The government was not eager to attract foreign capital after the struggle to end foreign interference and local capitalist enterprise was not encouraged.[220] This presented some tensions with Istanbul's commercial class, composed largely of Christian and Jewish minorities, manifest in the cultural assimilation campaigns of early 1930s, like *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş* (Citizen Speak Turkish).[221] The aforementioned *Citizen use national products* campaign also emerged in this era for the promotion of nationally produced goods to avoid capital loss following the 1929 depression. This was also orchestrated by Tör, who in 1929 had chaired the *Milli İktisad ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti* (Society for National Economy and Savings) which sought to instill a model of consumption exemplified by the Western middle classes in contrast with the extravagance of the previous Ottoman elite.[222] The Society started a campaign week in every December, promoting nationally produced goods through exhibitions and contests where shop owners competed to espouse the rhetoric with their showcase displays.[223] On a

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[219] Lewis, pp.282-283. The association seems to have precedents as well since as early as 1924 the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement had compiled a list of non-Muslim employees of the Water Utility of Istanbul and later had asked the Üsküdar-Kadıköy Water Utility Company to fire them, a majority composed of Armenians and Greeks, see, Çağaptay, p.28.

[220] Lewis, pp.282-283.

[221] Ibid. Ten years ago in 1922, 1202 out of 4267 commercial institutions, namely the twenty eight percent belonged to Muslim Turks, see, Ahmet Hamdi Başar, quoted in Murat Koraltürk, 'Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında İstanbul', *Toplumsal Tarih* 59 (1998), pp.38-42. Such assimilation policies were rather targeting the Jewish communities whose integration to the nation was still expected and desired whereas Christian communities were still held responsible for treason in WWI and were thus rather marginalized, see, Çağaptay, pp.27-28.

[222] Victor Margolin, *World History of Design, Vol. II,* p.619.

[223] Tör, p.17. See also, 'Dün Vitrinler Gezildi', *Cumhuriyet*, 16 December 1931, p.1. Bozdoğan argues that even though the improvement of nationally produced goods in quality, strength, and elegance was the main objective for this campaign, no systematic effort to focus on matters of design, craft, or production

contemporary photograph of photographer Selahattin Giz (1914-1994), the storefront display of clothing retailer *N. E. Skarlatos* from Istanbul's Pera district is seen providing such a display composed of national products, as the sign in the centre attests "This showcase is composed of national goods".[224] Along with Skarlatos' new Latin-Turkish-spelled signboard, these must also have worked towards the ideological integration of the non-Muslim businesses especially with the financial hardships posed by the Great Depression [Fig.3.32].

Figure III-32: Selahattin Giz (c. 1933). *'The showcase display of clothing retailer N. E. Skarlatos for the promotion of national products'* @SALT Research.

As argued with respect to monuments, in contrast to Ankara's material malleability to a homogenous national capital thanks to the disintegration of its civil society in WWI, Istanbul's still complex and all the more affluent cosmopolitan social and material composition made any commemorative effort of the republican elite crystallize in a peculiar way. Moreover, due to the allocation of funds for construction works in Ankara, Istanbul

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ensued from the movement, see, Bozdoğan, p.137.

[224] *Beyoğlu 1930: Selahattin Giz'in Fotoğraflarıyla 1930'larda Beyoğlu*, ed. by Ali Özdamar (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayıncılık, n.p.), p.40.

remained in its post-WWI dilapidated condition well into the mid-1930s.[225] Hence, the rhetoric of illumination and technology was more pragmatic in Istanbul's landscape in "highlighting" particular aspects and "concealing" others. For the non-Muslim commercial class or the private sector, which ran largely on foreign capital, it must have worked to conceal their alleged non-national attributes in an increasingly nationalist social sphere. For the public sector, it was just another means of overlaying the imperial landscape with a republican layer of technology.

It is possible to get a sense of the established republican dichotomies between Ankara and Istanbul as echoed in the pre-1928 illustrated press. In July 1927 the satire journal *Papağan*, edited by Seyfi published a cover illustration for the occasion of Mustafa Kemal's first visit to Istanbul after the foundation of the Republic. Executed once again by Tahir the illustration placed Mustafa Kemal in the middle of two female allegories for the two cities [Fig.3.33].

Figure III-33: Ratip Tahir Burak for Papağan (1927).You are both mine! ©National Library.

[225] Nur Altınyıldız, 'The Architectural Heritage of Istanbul and the Ideology of Preservation', in *Muqarnas,* pp.281-305, (pp.281-285).

The sartorial codes of the allegories are suggestive here and draws us back to fashion history. Istanbul's allegory on the right is wearing a loose dress with lower hem and waistlines, reminiscent of the contemporary western fashion. The allegory for Ankara on the other hand is depicted wearing a traditional salwar with a tunic top, connoting an ethnic profile. The caption reads, "You are both mine!"[226] Although both figures have a secular look, the Ankara allegory has a strikingly indigenous character suggested by her sartorial codes, attributing an odd foreignness to Istanbul. This dichotomy existed at a local level within Istanbul as well, between the two flanks of the Golden Horn; Galata as modern, non-Muslim and foreign and Fatih, the peninsular old Istanbul as traditional, Muslim and thus national. In 1926 the satirical journal *Karagöz* of cartoonist Ali Fuat published a satire where a *mahya*, a vernacular form of illumination, was seen stretched over the Golden Horn, between the Galata and Beyazıt towers [Fig.3.34] reading, "Istanbul (the old city) should try to be as modern as Beyoğlu [read Galata]".[227]


Figure III-34: Kozma Togo for Karagöz (1926). ©Atatürk Library.

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[226] Ratip Tahir, *Papağan*, 13 July 1927, 228, p.1.

[227] Kozma Togo, *Karagöz*, 20 March 1926, 1879, p.1. *Mahya* is a festive (mostly during Ramadan nights) form of hanging illuminations in practice as of the seventeenth century. It consists of lanterns placed between the minarets of a mosque, forming messages of piety, see, İpek Türeli, 'Nighttime Illumination in Istanbul', in *Cities of Light*, ed. by Sandy Isenstadt, Dietrich Neumann and Margaret Maile Petty (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp.1-9 (p.2).

Alluding to Gökalp's renowned distinction between culture and civilisation, *Karagöz* suggested its Muslim readers could lead European-style modern lives and yet have their hearts full of the virtues of Islam and Turkishness.[228] Such material and social contrasts between the old and new parts of the city were also a recurring theme of Turkish novel as of the late nineteenth century.[229] Ironically, despite this fervent endorsement of national modernity, *Karagöz*, in print as of 1908 was sold to PRP in 1928 during the turmoil of the illustrated press with the script law crisis.[230] Nevertheless, these illustrations are not just peculiar representations but are rather a material extension of the socially and culturally embedded values of the republican ethos in the era.

What marked this divide further was also the aforementioned dilapidated condition of old Istanbul. In contrast to the northern neighborhoods of Galata, after long years of war, fire damage and the Muslim refugee crisis, in 1933 the old city, within the confines of the walls, lay in ruins.[231] Its population had been halved with vast fire-stricken zones and about a third of its landscape were wastelands.[232] Thus PRP's commemorative rhetoric on technology and illumination could also work to even out these discrepancies within the city.

Capturing the light of the Republic

What is equally important is to look at how the commemorative setting of the decennial anniversary was documented by photographers as actors acting upon a social practice and as actors who were indeed officially affiliated with the republican network on national commemoration. In the early 1930s Galata's cosmopolitan network of artisans were still operating since Istanbul had been exempt from the mass population deportations.

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[228] Gökalp drew on the ideas of sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies and made a distinction between 'culture' (values and habits current within a community) and 'civilisation' (a rational international system of knowledge, science and technology). He maintained that the Turkish culture was strong enough but nevertheless saw it submerged in a mix of backward medieval influences of Arabic and Byzantine ways. According to Gökalp, the only viable option was in replacing the civilisation with a modern European one, while holding on to Turkish culture, see, Zürcher, p.131.
[229] Evin, p.20.
[230] Turgut Çeviker, *Ali Fuat Bey: Osmanlı Tokadı* (Istanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1996).
[231] Altınyıldız, pp.281-285.
[232] Ibid., p.288.

Of photographers, Jean Weinberg, his apprentice Othmar Pferschy and İzzet Kaya were active in capturing the 1933 commemoration settings.[233] Weinberg was a photographer of Romanian Jewish origin, who had settled in the Ottoman capital in the late nineteenth century, where he established the *Photo-Français* studio in the Galata district.[234] This was the same studio where Pferschy had also worked when he had arrived in Istanbul in 1926 until he decided to establish his own photography business in 1931, which he subsequently quit for Tör's offer at the Directorate of Press in 1933, as stated in the second chapter.[235] Kaya on the other hand, was originally a Russian with the name Jules Kanzler. He had fled the 1917 revolution to seek refuge in Istanbul and later naturalized himself with a Turkish name, arguably to facilitate his business with the Ankara government.[236] Like Kaya, Weinberg had also worked as the semi-official photographer within the diplomatic circles of Ankara, having extensively photographed its political and military elite, but more prominently, Mustafa Kemal himself, his close circle and the Turkish intelligentsia.[237] However, in June 1932, a new legislation for the promotion of a national class of artisans in various businesses including photography restricted the commercial activities of non-nationals.[238]

Tensions arising from the ethnic, religious provenances of cosmopolitan artisans have long lingered around. In 1914 at the break of the Balkan War, when crown Prince Yusuf İzzettin was leaving Istanbul via train, photographer Ferit İbrahim Özgürar (1882-1953), acclaimed as the first Turkish Muslim photographer in Galata, recalls that despite holding a press identity card, he was not granted access to take photographs while seeing

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[233] For Jean Weinberg's photographs of Istanbul's decennial anniversary celebration illuminations, see, IBBAK, fol.Alb_000115. It is possible to argue that Othmar Pferschy also took photographs at the same time, since the French *L'Illustration* published one of his frames, see, 'Le Xᵉ Anniversaire de le République Turque', *L'Illustration*, 18 November 1933, 4733, pp.368-369.

[234] Engin Özendes, *Cumhuriyetin Işığında Othmar Pferschy Fotoğrafları* (Istanbul: Graphis Matbaa, 2006), p.6. The earliest record on *Photo Français* photography studio in the trade directories pertains to 1921, see, *Annuaire Oriental: Commerce, Industrie, Administration, Magistrature, 1921* (Constantinople: Alfred Rizzo, 1922), p.820.

[235] Özendes, p.6.

[236] Burçak Evren, 'Pera'da bir Beyaz Rus Fotoğrafçı: Jules Kanzler', *Geniş Açı*, 22 (2002) 82-84 (pp.83-84).

[237] I owe this perspective on Kanzler's body of work to our discussion with photography collector Burçak Evren on 8 October 2018.

[238] 'Türkiye'de Türk Vatadaşlarına Tahsis Edilen Sanat ve Hizmetler Hakkında Kanun', *Resmi Gazete*, p.1564.

Weinberg perform his job.[239] Özgürar notes this anecdote as the saddest instance of his professional life with the resentment of being denied his profession, whilst "Jews could take photographs".[240] Like most remaining actors of the cosmopolitan print culture of the imperial capital, Weinberg probably had not been naturalised due to the advantages of former concessions given to foreign businesses. This obliged him to cease his professional activities within a year from the issue of the law. Kaya most likely evaded the law given his earlier naturalisation with a Turkish name. Pferschy on the other hand, ironically started a new career as the official photographer of the Directorate of Press in the midst of this political turmoil.

It is arguable that espousing nationalist tensions were the likely motivations for the survival of photographers whose non-national backgrounds were in conflict with the new nation-state. For instance in February 1933, Weinberg had published a monograph titled *Gazi'nin Eseri* (The Works of the Gazi). Illustrating the *Zafer* monument on its cover with robust art-deco typography, *Gazi'nin Eseri* is like a visual praise to the nation-state, bringing together some five hundred photographs of ornately framed portraits of political and military actors, material progress of Ankara in before and after juxtapositions, the republican monuments and even the Turkish Miss Universe of 1932 [Fig.3.35].

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[239] Orhan Koloğlu, *Basınımızda Resim*, p.60. On most national historiographies Ferit İbrahim is recounted as the first Turkish photographer in Galata's cosmopolitan network of artisans, see, Taha Toros, 'İlk Türk Fotoğrafhanesi ve Ferit İbrahim', *Fotoğraf*, n.d. (1990) 17-22.
[240] Ferit Ibrahim, quoted in Koloğlu, *Basınımızda Resim*, p.60.

Figure III-35: Jean Weinberg (1933). Gazi'nin Eseri 'The cover page and excerpts showing photographs of Mustafa Kemal, the material progress of Ankara and Miss Universe Ece Keriman' ©Atatürk Library.

The copy in the Atatürk Library, Istanbul today is autographed by him, dedicating the album to the *İnkılap Muzesi* (Museum of Revolution) to be inaugurated by the municipality, which will "eternalize the Gazi's great revolutions […], from the man himself who inscribed the memories of the revolution with pride".[241] *Cumhuriyet* promoted the album as a peerless work composed of Weinberg's dedication of a great deal of his time and capital, noting that he was the first artist, nine years ago, to go to Ankara to take the *Gazi*'s (Mustafa Kemal) pictures. The album, the daily added, was published in exquisite condition with a modest cost of 150 piastres to be sent through mail to Weinberg's post box in Istanbul.[242] It is hard to assert Weinberg's motivations in publishing *Gazi'nin Eseri* with any certainty. Given that in July 1933 he was arranging the transfer of his business to Cairo, it might be a last resort to generate some income from his vast repertoire on the

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[241] İBBAK, fol.Alb_000086, *Gazi'nin Eseri*, p.12.

[242] 'Gazi'nin Eseri-M. Veinberg Güzel bir Albüm Neşretti', *Cumhuriyet*, 17 February 1933, p.4.

genesis of the nation-state.[243] That same month, the album was advertised again, now at half price, possibly to boost sales.[244] Another motivation of Weinberg's might have likely been the legitimisation of his business against the backdrop of the assimilation campaigns.[245] Since Weinberg saw himself as a proud chronicler of "the memories of the revolution", the decennial commemorations must have presented him with a final opportunity.[246] A remark made by *Cumhuriyet* on the commemorative setting of Istanbul is also the unusual participation of non-Muslim minorities, who were so far "indifferent to the commemorations" but that this time they had "joined the masses with the same level of sincerity and fervor".[247] The participation of minorities in the national holidays was sought after since it helped in the legitimisation of the commemorations.[248]

These tensions present us clues on the social sphere where these photographers operated during the decennial celebrations. As photographers in the 1930s Turkey, Kaya, Pferschy and Weinberg crystallize the dilemma in the new nation-state; on the one hand their pivotal role in documenting a national genesis, on the other, the very regime's initiatives in creating a homogeneous formulation of artisans which excluded their cosmopolitan identities. This is exemplified in Weinberg's transfer to Cairo, and Kaya's naturalisation with a Turkish name. Although the hiring of Pferschy suggests continuity with the imperial tradition of commissioning Galata's cosmopolitan network of artisans - following the examples of Paul Tarkoul (Phébus) and Abdullah Frères- as Burçak Evren argues, it nonetheless points to the general collapse of the established Ottoman photography studios, which were facing the same end as Weinberg.[249] Pferschy's corpus for *LTK* in no way exempted him from the nationalist formulation. After thirteen years of service at the

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[243] Özdendes, p.8.

[244] 'Gazi'nin Eseri', *Cumhuriyet*, 12 July 1933.

[245] It is possible to argue that Weinberg published *Works of Gazi* in an effort to prove a patriotic attachment to the new nation. As argued above, the assimilation policies targeted more the Jewish communities who were expected to assume a patriotic attitude and speak Turkish as well as bear Turkish names. Throughout the 1920s, there was increasing anti-Jewish resentment among Turks and Muslims in the commercial centers of Western Turkey, namely, Istanbul, Izmir, Edirne, Bursa, Tekirdağ , and Çanakkale, where the majority of the Turkish Jewish community lived, see, Çağaptay, pp.25-28.

[246] 'Gazi'nin Eseri-M. Veinberg Güzel bir Albüm Neşretti', *Cumhuriyet*, 17 February 1933, p.4.

[247] 'Dün Gündüz Her Tarafı Taklarla, Bayraklarla Süslenen İstanbul Gece de Nurdan bir Elbise Giydi', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1933, p.8.

[248] Arzu Öztürkmen, *Milli Bayramlar Şekli ve Hatırası*, p.32.

[249] Burçak Evren, 'Othmar Pferschy: Genç Türkiye'nin Gözü', *Geniş Açı*, 40 (2005), 38-45 (p.40).

Directorate of Press he was still not permitted commercial activity and his application for naturalisation was denied in 1947.[250]

A gown of lights

One significant aspect of the photographs taken by Weinberg, Kaya and Pferschy during the decennial celebrations of 1933 is the remarkable use of night photography. As a genre, night photography had presented some technical challenges at its very beginnings; the lack of strong light and thus the long exposure times often outlasting the wet collodion coated plates.[251] However, cameras became more compatible for night with the invention of the highly sensitive dry plates in 1870s.[252] Nevertheless, throughout the nineteenth century there have been experimentations with low light but these were often manipulations on regular negatives to create a nighttime effect.[253] Istanbul publishers Max Fruchtermann and E. F. Rochat also published postcards of this genre, depicting the Golden Horn or Leander's Tower at the turn of the century.[254] These were resonant of the influence of photographers, William Fraser and Alfred Stieglitz in the late nineteenth century, whose works popularized nighttime photography. Especially, the publication of Brassaï's *Paris de Nuit* in 1932 seems to have set a milestone as the first monograph published in the genre with a remarkable influence on contemporary night photography.[255]

It is possible that Istanbulite photographers were also following these global trends as they captured the illumination works for the decennial commemorations. These are documented in an album titled *Album for the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the Republic of Turkey* in the Atatürk Library, which contains both Weinberg's and Kaya's

[250] Evren, *Othmar Pferschy*, p.41.
[251] Sophie Leighton, 'Night Photography', in *Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography, Vol.I*, 1006-1008 (pp.1006-1007).
[252] Ibid.
[253] Lance Keimig, *Night Photography: Finding Your Way in the Dark* (Oxford: Focal Press, 2010), pp.56.
[254] IBBAK, fols.Krt_015606; Krt_004334 and Mert Sandalcı, *Max Fruchtermann Kartpostalları, Vol.I*, pp.78-89.
[255] Keimig, p.17.

photographs.[256] The album acts as a crystallization of both the photographer's agency embedded in a social practice and as a frame which shows us how the republican rhetoric on commemorative illumination was materialized. We can assert for instance that especially Weinberg followed a certain order, starting from sunset on, trying to document the festive illuminations of the imperial capital. This followed the choreography of the processions, polarized between the old, dilapidated town centre in Beyazıt to the south of the Golden Horn and the modern Taksim (then christened as *Cumhuriyet*) Square to the north. Beyazıt Square had recently been recodified in that summer as the former Ottoman Ministry of Defence building with its nineteenth-century monumental gateway (Marie-Auguste Antione Bourgeois, 1877) had been handed over to *Darülfünun* (House of Sciences), which was also transformed into a modern university. This was part of a big conversion as two-thirds of its teaching staff lost their tenure, leaving only sympathizers of the Kemalist credo.[257] The transition renamed the institution as Istanbul University, which was inscribed on Bourgeois' gateway with an epigraph covering the former Ottoman epigraph for the ministry, and the removal of the imperial monogram. *Cumhuriyet* celebrated the transformation noting, "despite all support from the republican administration, *Darülfünun* was not performing its national and scientific duties".[258] Within this background, a photograph by Kaya reveals that commemorative light arrangements worked in a similar fashion as a material extension of this rhetoric which recodified the institution on Beyazıt Square with Bourgeois' gateway through republican codes. [Fig.3.36]. A series of incandescent bulbs form beams of light emanating from a central star, which then correspond to dates 1923 and 1933 on each side and below a caption reads, "Long Live the Gazi".

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[256] In the album, Weinberg's photographs are watermarked whereas Kaya's are signed enabling us to distinguish them, see, IBBAK, fol.Alb_000115.

[257] Zürcher, p.181.

[258] 'Darülfünun'dan Üniversiteye', *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1933, p.18.

Figure III-36: İzzet Kaya Kanzler (1933). Album for the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the Republic of Turkey *'View of the monumental gateway of the new Istanbul University'* ©Atatürk Library.

Given its poor urban conditions, the stress of the technological foundation myth seems to have resonated with a striking contrast in the southern areas of the Golden Horn, as is also hinted by these illuminated water jets on Beyazit Square. Here too as in Ankara, panels for the graphic display of dichotomies of the old and new regimes adorned the walls.[259] A few meters away, on Sultanahmet (Hippodrome) Square, which was being remodeled as a park, a mammoth column of twenty-five meters, commissioned by PRP and designed by architect Seyfettin Arkan (1903-1966) was erected, as seen in another photograph by Kaya [Fig.3.37] in the album. This was made of stretched cloth over a timber skeleton with a play of masses and geometric abstractions, which could be illuminated from within.[260]

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[259] 'Dün Gündüz Her Tarafı Taklarla, Bayraklarla Süslenen İstanbul Gece de Nurdan bir Elbise Giydi', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1933, p.7.
[260] 'Onuncu Yıl Tak ve Sütunları', *Mimar*, 35 (1933), 351-353 (pp.351-353).

Figure III-37: İzzet Kaya Kanzler (1933). Album for the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the Republic of Turkey *'Photograph of the illuminated PRP column on Sulthanahmet Square, designed by Seyfi Arkan'* ©Atatürk Library.

On the northern side of the Golden Horn, the illumination displays were equally ardent. *Cumhuriyet* tells that the procession moved towards Taksim Square around two o'clock in the afternoon, after the direct broadcast of the president's speech, followed by the governor's speech and the pageants.[261] Weinberg captures this passage of the procession from the old town to the modern Taksim area on Galata Bridge in what is the only day-lit photograph in the album [Fig.3.38]. It is followed by another shot from a similar angle, which at a later hour captured the illuminated light column of architect Abidin Mortaş (1904-1963) –a founding editor of the journal *Mimar* (later *Arkitekt*)-, commissioned by the Istanbul PRP municipality [Fig.3.39]. This was made of iron to "match the aesthetics" of

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[261] 'Dün Gündüz Her Tarafı Taklarla, Bayraklarla Süslenen İstanbul Gece de Nurdan bir Elbise Giydi', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1933, p.8.

the Galata Bridge and consisted of a play of masses with long perpendicular grooves, crowned at the top with a projector, reminiscent of the art-deco style [Fig.3.40].[262]

Figure III-38: Jean Weinberg (1933). Album for the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the Republic of Turkey. '*View of the Golden Horn from Banques Française des Pays d'Orient*' ©Atatürk Library.

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[262] 'Onuncu Yıl Tak ve Sütunları', *Mimar*, 35 (1933), 351-353 (p.353).

Figure III-39: Jean Weinberg (1933). Album for the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the Republic of Turkey. *'View of the Golden Horn from Banques Française des Pays d'Orient with Abidin Mortaş' ligth column on the Karaköy Bridge'* ©Atatürk Library.


Figure III-40: Arkitek journal (1933). Tenth Anniversary Arches and Coulumns. *'View of the Karaköy Bridge with Abidin Mortaş' ligth column'* ©Arkitekt Database

On Taksim Square, lighting arrangements were constructed in conjunction with water displays arranged by Istanbul Water Authority. Here, a bolder Art Deco style was dominant. Seen from Weinberg's photograph is the floodlit Taksim monument of Canonica, surrounded by new electric illumination units with geometric abstraction designs [Fig.3.41]. A similar shot by Kaya shows the bold, clear-cut Art Deco typography work with undulating and straight lines characteristic of the style [Fig.3.42]. In fact, these light units were exact replicas from the 1931 Paris Colonial Exhibition and *L'Illustration* publishing a very similar shot by Pferschy, had also noted this connection pointing to the "magic aspects" of the illumination works [Figs.3.43].[263] That a Western artefact inspired by machine aesthetics and designed for the display of global industry could be deployed along the commemoration of a particular national modernity attests to the interchangeability of modernity and nationalism in the peripheral modernities.

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[263] 'Le Xᵉ Anniversaire de le République Turque', *L'Illustration*, 18 November 1933, 4733, pp.368-369.

Figure III-41: Jean Weinberg (1933). Album for the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the Republic of Turkey. '*View of the Taksim Square with the geometrically designed illumination units*' ©Atatürk Library.

Figure III-42: Izzet Kaya (1933). Album for the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the Republic of Turkey. '*The Art Deco typography work of Istanbul Water Authority on Takism Square*' ©Atatürk Library.

Figure III-43: Othmar Pferschy for L'Illustration (1933). 'View of Taksim Square with displays of water jets and the geometrically designed illumination units, exact replicas of the those used in the 1931 Paris Colonial Exhibition' ©SALT Research.

The album shows many illuminated building facades and triumphal arches built in the Galata area; to name a few, the headquarters of the Wagons-Lits & Cook, *Şirket-i Hayriye* (Passenger Ferry Company), Ottoman Bank and the PRP headquarters [Fig.3.44]. Interestingly, as an anonymous photograph in the Atatürk Library shows us, on one of these arches built by the Ministry of Endowments (*Evkaf*), ironically the institution responsible for the maintenance of Ottoman monuments, visuals flanking above the columns contrasted a dilapidated rural view with oxcarts next to modern airplanes, as the motto read "Long Live Gazi" further stressing the technological supremacy of the nation state [Fig.3.45]. Weinberg's photographs go further to capture the illumination works in the Bosphorus with the Leander's Tower, Haydarpaşa Station and the navy ships, which *Cumhuriyet* described "glided as if drawn by light in front of the Dolmabahçe Palace".[264]

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[264] 'İstanbul'da Büyük Bayramın İkinci Günü de Birinci Günü Kadar Heyecanlı, Hararetli ve Neşeli Geçti', *Cumhuriyet*, 31 October 1933, p.5.

Figure III-44: Jean Weinberg (1933). Album for the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the Republic of Turkey
'Excerpts from the album, photographs of the Ottoman Bank, Şirket-i Hayriye and Wagon-Lits & Cook headquarters'
*in Galata neighborhood'* ©Atatürk Library.

Figure III-45: Anonymous (1933). 'Photograph of the arch of the Ministry of Endowments juxtaposing a
dilapidated rural view with modern airplanes' ©Atatürk Library.

For this latter Weinberg's diligence to capture the technologic touch of the nation-state to the imperial capital is materially inscribed [Fig.3.46]. In his shot overseeing the Bosphorus, with the illuminated navy warships, Weinberg adds airbrushed searchlights emanating from one of the ships. This is a detail hard to capture at the level of high-exposure he uses. For a photographer imbued in a social and cultural practice as Roland Barthes argues, a deliberate inclination to materially –photographically- manipulate and enhance that which is already a material extention of the nation state's social vision should not be surprising. [266]

Figure III-46: Jean Weinberg (1933). Album for the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the Republic of Turkey. *'Photograph of the navy moored in the Bosphorus with airbrushed searchlights'* ©Atatürk Library.

On the second day of the commemorations *Cumhuriyet* declared, "Istanbul, Adorned at Day with Arches and Flags, Wore a Gown of Light at Night". [267] The daily fully quoted the speech of the governor, Muhittin Üstündağ, who called to the students within the new premises of Istanbul University that "[…] This is our most dear holiday, superior to any other, it is as *bright as the illumination that comes after dark*. Did we have another

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[266] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida.*

[267] 'Dün Gündüz Her Tarafı Taklarla, Bayraklarla Süslenen İstanbul Gece de Nurdan bir Elbise Giydi', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1933, p.7. To note here, up until 1933 *Cumhuriyet* was not published following festive days, so this issue marks a milestone.

holiday as this? We did not, right?"[268] Both the governor's speech and *Cumhuriyet*'s tone are resonant of the rhetoric on the illuminated modernity of the republican elite as it was materialized and projected through a layer of electric technology over Istanbul. For the imperial capital thus, this rhetoric of illumination and technology seems to have concealed its aforementioned developmental, religious and ethnic discrepancies and presented the imperial landscape in a national context through a layer of technology that was consonant with the Republican foundation myth. Bozdoğan argues that any explanation of the ideological derives behind these night illuminations (and its accompanying architectural elements) with respect to Turkish politics would be inadequate.[269] However, as Nye suggests, illumination has always had symbolic associations and it is never simply a matter of visibility but rather a deliberate will to make particular things stand out.[270] This use of technology to homogeneously cloak an originally cosmopolitan Mediterranean port-city is reminiscent of the adornment of Salonika for Sultan Reşad's visit in 1910, detailed in the first chapter.

Floodlighting eventually became an integrated part of Republic Day celebrations. The following year, in 1934, the journal *Arkitekt* published an extensive essay on floodlighting, pointing on its use for the first time on the sixteenth-century Süleymaniye Mosque and for the illumination of the Ottoman Bank and Metro Han (headquarters of the Sofina Group) during the Republic Day.[271] By 1937 with the full technical application of floodlighting, and especially in the following year, for the fifteenth anniversary celebrations in both Ankara and Istanbul commemoration and floodlighting went hand in hand.[272] It became so synonymous with official culture that when in 1953 Hagia Sophia was not floodlit during the politically controversial quincentennial celebrations of Istanbul's conquest, the daily *Cumhuriyet*, taking an opponent stand towards the new Democrat Party

[268] Ibid. Italics are my emphasis.
[269] Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, p.95.
[270] David Nye, 'Foreword', in *Cities of Light*, pp.IX-XI (p. XX).
[271] 'Binaların Tenviri', *Arkitekt*, 37 (1934), p.28.
[272] 'Bol Işıklı Ankara'da Bayram Geceleri', *Ulus*, 31 October 1937, p.6; 'Ankara'da Bayram Geceleri', *Ulus*, 30 October 1938, p.7; 'Geceleyin İstanbul: Şehir Milli Bayramı Tepeden Tırnağa Nurlara Boyanmış Olarak Karşıladı', *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1938, p.7.

government, interpreted it as a willful act to downplay on nationalism.[273] The discursive space on the materiality of light echoed similarly in the ethnically diverse southeastern provinces. In 1935 when the railroad network finally reached its Diyarbakır terminus, *Cumhuriyet* declared that the train, the powerful "steel arms of the Republic" had finally penetrated through the steep rocks, arriving to a city entirely illuminated by electric light.[274]

Discrepancies were common between these zealous reports and the contemporary infrastructure. As mentioned above, even within Istanbul the household supply of electricity was limited. Well into the 1950s, and even after Sofina's nationalisation in 1937, this display of technological progress still depended on the *Salihtarağa* power plant, as the sole power supplier of the city, a legacy of late Young Turk modernisation.[275] Moreover, it wasn't until the late 1930s that provincial centers had their own power plant.[276] Although the production of electricity had been augmented ten times from 1923 to 1943, as late as 1953 only 0.025 percent of Turkey's 40,000 villages had been connected to the electrical grid.[277] This indicates that in 1933, the infrastructure of electricity was very limited even in the urban centres to be accountable for any social change. As has also been asserted by Edgerton, in this Turkish experience too the myth of technological progress had less to do with innovation *per se* but more with the particular use of the floodlighting technology to suggest a new social meaning.[278] Thus as has been argued, it was rather the idealized connotations of the materiality of electric light that technology was made to enact the communication of the republican elite's social vision.

The ensuing nationalisation of foreign companies like Sofina has also been entangled in this narrative. As mentioned above, these were eager to withdraw from Turkey in the uncertainty of the interwar period. However, when they were nationalized during the late 1930s, the pro-PRP media recounted these concessions as threats to the independence and security of the nation. In 1939 when Istanbul tramways were nationalized, the journal

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[273] 'Terbiyemiz Bakımından Fetih', *Cumhuriyet*, 8 Haziran 1953, p.1.
[274] 'Diyerbekirin Bayramı', *Cumhuriyet*, 27 December 1935, p.1.
[275] There has been a subsequent capacity increase in the 1940s, see, Toprak, p.480.
[276] Zürcher, p.193.
[277] Ibid., p.206.
[278] Edgerton, pp.XV-XVIII.

Cumhuriyet Çoçuğu (Child of the Republic) published a photograph of a former tram accident, noting that for years the company operated with great danger. The journal asserted that security was to prevail now that the company was nationalized.[279] The stand of the journal is just another manifestation of the rhetoric on the nation-state's superiority attributed through the association of technology.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the delegation of of graphics, visual arts and urban illumination technologies by which the republican elite aimed to project and mobilise its ideological rhetoric in the first decades of the nation-state. It was able to do this by virtue of the discursive space on contests, guides, reports and manuals regulating the official representation of the nation state. What it suggests is that the coat of arms did allow for a ground where romanticized historical ruptures as the *Ergenekon* myth could be made to permeate into state iconography. However, its' ambiguous associations with an ethnie resonated differently within the republican network of intellects and diplomats, as represented by the discrepant views of the Minister of Education Mustafa Necati and pan-Turkist historian Fuat Köprülü. On the other hand, the life cycle of the artefacts construed around the wolf myth suggests the shifts in the network within which the wolf motif operated, pointing to a political marginalization in the hectic interwar years. This also attests to the republican elite's discrepancies in the formulation of nationalism, its affinity with cultural and ethnic definitions despite its theoretical adherence to the constitutional models of citizenship. This is ironically consonant with the reluctance of the Tanzimat reformers to change the orthodox Sunni Muslim character of official identity despite their commitment to a modern, unifying empire.[280]

The delegation of pictorial arts and photography for the dissemination of the republican rhetoric through a pictorial patriotism was equally problematic, since it similarly

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[279] 'Tramvay Şirketi Satın Alındı', *Cumhuriyet Çoçuğu*, 15 (1939), p.247.
[280] Ersoy, Ottoman Arcadia, pp.54-55.

led to discrepancies in the republican network of artists in the understanding of formal aspects of arts to represent the nation. On the one hand a state-endorsed stylistic adherence to the modernist ideals of Cubism with a socialist realist agenda, on the other an older generation of painters unwilling to reconcile national identity through Western forms. Overall the discursive space on the creation of these graphic, pictorial and photographic artefacts attests that the republican elite was in no way monolithic and the actors' understanding of what was modern and/or national did not always overlap, as is shown in the pictorial dispute between İsmal Namik and Ali Sami Boyar. In other words, especially for Ottoman/Turkish artists, formal aspects of pictorial arts were by no means an underrated element in the definition of national identity, merely imported from the West without a concomitant intellectual discourse as is argued by Wendy Shaw.[281] However, just like the nationalist objections to the foreign agency on monuments did not entail questioning the representational disruptions on monuments, as argued in the second chapter, likewise, to the political elite the formal aspects of visual arts mattered less so long as they were made by national artists and in quantity could be shown to surpass their imperial predecessors. Even so, these were really utopian projects since they did not have the social basis to have a grip on the cultural life beyond major cities. The deprivation of the civic life in the provinces caused by the vacuum of mass deportations had given Istanbul a monopoly in cultural production, which is still discernable today. After all, the permeation of monuments as logos in commemorative print ephemera should not be surprising as once virtualized they were less ambigious graphic elements therefore more successful for compensating the lack of the historicity of the nation-state caused by the self-imposed denial of the near past.

It seems, however, that neither graphic nor pictorial projects could have been equally successful in communicating the republican rhetoric since neither could be made to act upon the republican technological foundation myth as much as the delegation of festive illumination technologies. Light was also inscribed in the republican ethos, through advocates of modern literature, as an allegory for the modernity of the nation state. It was

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[281] Wendy M.K. Shaw, *Ottoman Painting: Reflections of Western Art in the Ottoman Empire*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), p.39.

also a global phenomenon, which could be deployed interchangeably for connoting modernity and nation-hood. Like the monuments miniaturised as logos, floodlighting too was more flexible and thus deprived of the representational ambiguities both the coat of arms and pictorial propaganda had faced. Illumination technologies were more compatible with the literary basis of Turkish nationalism, where non-representational, metaphorical elements as light could be easily deployed to act upon the republican foundation myth.

Overall, what such representational ambiguities and insecurities of the republican elite, artists and intellects, argued in this chapter, suggest is, as Gülsüm Baydar underlines, their uncertainty as to the nature of the cultural identity they sought to adopt, unlike their Ottoman predecessors.[282] The paradox of their national identity, as Baydar notes for the architectural discourse, lay in their commitment to reconcile an anti-orientalist discourse, originating from western cultural constructs, with a modernist one. Whereas the former required the sublimation of nativist and nationalist perspectives, modernism required their suppression. This is something that is discernable also in the delegation of representative and commemorative visual elements for the nation-state by the republican elite. Above all else, festive illumination technologies seem to have offered a material tool that highlighted both the desired aspects of nationness in the built environment, allowing a selective adoption of imperial past, whilst innately recalling aspects of modernity through the materiality of light. However, such graphic representational paradoxes continued well into 1940s, as manifest in the design of new money bills with Romanized Turkish script and the communication of Istanbul's urban renewal scheme through municipal journals during the presidency of İsmet İnönü, to be discussed in the next chapter.

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[282] Baydar, *Between Civilization and Culture* p.67.

IV Chapter / Consolidating the Republic in the İnönü Era

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the father of Turks, with his given surname in the laws of 1934, passed away in November 1938. At an extraordinary party congress in December, the People's Republican Party (PRP) declared him 'eternal party chairman' and İsmet İnönü, the former prime minister and now the succeeding president of republic, the 'permanent party chairman' in a title conferred upon him as "*milli şef*" (chief of nation).[1] This period of roughly a decade, until the post-war transition to a multi-party electoral system in 1946, is marked by the shortages and limitations of a war economy on the one hand and the increasing tightening of single-party political suppression on the other, especially given Turkey's neutrality in the Second World War. Despite this neutral status, Turkey's increased defence expenditures had fueled inflation, which was dealt with harsh policies such as *Varlık Vergisi* (Capital Levy) and compulsory labour camps, at the expense of marginalizing affluent and/or non-Muslim classes.[2] Eric Zürcher argues that although the popularity of the regime was never widespread among the masses, the inability of providing the provinces with increased standards of life, health, education and communication services, and especially the suppression of expressions of popular faith, had further eroded the ideological bonds between the state and its subjects.[3] The ensuing crystallisation of these republican politics around the new leader, İnönü's persona would be at odds with the increased intervention of the central state in public life.

This chapter continues to deal with the paradox of representing and commemorating a new Turkish nation with respect to the appropriation of Ottoman legacy, through the official initiatives of the İnönü era political elite in what was the first post-Atatürk era of

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[1] Eric-Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p.142.
[2] For economic constraints during WWII and the impact of the Capital Levy on the deprivation of affluent mercantile non-Muslim minorities which were accounted for about fifty three per cent of the total tax collection, see, Ezel K. Shaw and Stanford J. Shaw, *The Rise of Modern Turkey*, pp.398-399.
[3] Zürcher, pp.206-207. Zürcher makes a distinction between the mass of the population (composed of peasants and industrial workers), which had not seen drastic improvements in their standard of living and the Kemalist elite (the officers and bureaucrats, the Muslim traders in the towns and the landowners in the countryside) on which the regime had been built.

the nation-state. It focuses primarily on the first Turkish banknotes with Romanized script, as particular materialities of the era crystallising representational preoccupations of the political elite. In architecture history this period is especially known as a diversion to a classicized, nationalist aesthetic that became consonant with İnönü's policies in this era (1938-1946) that took a peculiar shape during Turkey's isolation in the WWII, in contrast with the Mustafa Kemal-led radical modernism of the 1930s.[4] However, Gülsüm Baydar argues that this historiographical distinction associating the 1930s with internationalist tendencies and the later 1940s with nationalist ones needs to be re-evaluated. Baydar notes that for Turkish architects and their foreign colleagues operating in Turkey at that time, the rising interest in the 1940s in vernacular forms did not necessarily originate from equally rising nationalist sentiments but rather from the architects' comittmment to locate a rationalist essence in those forms and thus quite contrarily be understood as a modern approach.[5]

This chapter suggests that this might also be true for the larger representational polemics of the nation-state in the İnönü era. At first glance, an apparent manifestation of this hardened classicism in the visual field seems to have occurred with the E2 series of banknotes (circulation, 1937-1944) commissioned by the Turkish Central Bank in the late 1930s to mid-1940s, where upon Atatürk's death, İnönü's portrait had succeeded the former as head of state. Going beyond this iconographic twist, the chapter argues that the distinctiveness of the E2 and E3 series lies not merely in this clash of personality cults but more so in their hybrid iconography. As the bills continued to dwell on the definition of a national memory landscape with the self-referential mirroring of Ankara's republican monuments, their historicist graphic ornamentations came at odds with Ankara's new modern "German architecture" (namely by architects Ernst Egli, Clemens Holzmeister and Bruno Taut). A larger look on the network of economic and art historical actors behind the commissioning of the banknotes allows us to approach this transformation rather as an

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[4] For a similar discourse, see, Sibel Bozdoğan and Esra Akcan, *Turkey: Modern Architectures in History*, pp.75-78.
[5] Baydar, *Between Civilization and Culture.*

aesthetic symbiosis to connote a peculiar sense of Turkish modernity through the circulating banknotes. Especially for nationalist art historiographers such as the prominent Celal Esad Arseven (1876-1971), a classicized pre-eighteenth century Ottoman patrimony could be reformulated with the modernist philosophy of aesthetics –simplicity and rationality- for a contemporary perception of Turkish decorative arts and architecture. The chapter thus suggests that the the bills in the late 1930s and 1940s Turkey were delegated as agents by the political elite where a nationally designated cultural patrimony could be reconciled with modernist graphic elements to communicate a sense of a distinct but modern nation.

An equally important phenomenon, as was in the money bills, is the new personality cult around İnönü and its corresponding statuomania through major urban interventions, especially in Istanbul. Despite the criticism of the nationalist modernist *Group D* artists like Nurullah Berk (1906-1982) and Zühtü Müridoğlu (1906-1992), İnönü continued the tradition of working with foreign designers for public monuments and urban renewal schemes, with now Rudolf Belling (1886-1972) as the head of sculptor studio in the Istanbul Academy of Fine Arts (1937-1952).[6] Ideally, these were in continuity with Mustafa Kemal's practices of secularizing public spaces and condensing a new collective identity, but through their discursive space the chapter substantiates how they have become targets of criticism given İnönü's unpopularity, especially in the liberal post-war atmosphere. Particularly in Istanbul, İnönü's attempts to modernize the urban texture of the imperial capital and instill in it secular republican spatial codes have been more pervasive.[7] These had to be fervently advocated through persuasive modern visual communication tools in the propaganda publications of the Istanbul Municipality -namely *Güzelleşen İstanbul* (*GI*, Embellishing İstanbul, 1943) and *Cumhuriyet Devrinde İstanbul* (*CDI*, Istanbul in the Republican Era, 1949) published by the PRP mayor Lütfi Kırdar.[8]

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[6] The criticism and even denigration of foreign commissions of monuments increasingly continued in the late 1930s, see for instance, Zühtü Müridoğlu, 'Abideler Meselesi', *Ar*, 1.5 (1937), 4-12.
[7] İpek Akpınar, *The Rebuilding of Istanbul Revisited*, p.64.
[8] *Güzelleşen İstanbul (GI), XX. Yüzyıl,* 2nd edn (İstanbul: İstanbul Maarif Matbaası, 1944) and *Cumhuriyet Devrinde İstanbul (CDI)*, (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1949).

Through the discursive space the journals attributed to the urban development and historical preservation the chapter highlights the concomitant desire of the İnönü era republican elite to modernize the urban space of the imperial capital and to redefine its dynastic legacy into a classical past for the nation. This is similar to the aesthetic symbiosis argued for the money bills of the period where cultural patrimony could be used interchangeably with modern design elements. Moreover, the discrepancies in tone and materiality between the two publications are key in understanding the shifting emphasis of a liberalizing PRP regime in urban planning and historical preservation and their interwoven relations with print culture.

IV.I A New Icon, a New Aesthetics?

As was asserted in the third chapter, the discrepancies on the connotations of the *Ergenekon* myth that had occurred through its republican life cycle entailed its discontinuation in the official culture in the early 1930s. Its failed association on the new nation-state's coat of arms also resonates in the ensuing E2 series of banknotes (1937-1944) where the wolf motif was abandoned. After the emission of first republican banknotes in 1926, the İnönü government under Mustafa Kemal's presidency had stabilized the number of banknotes in circulation instead of following Keynesian methods, increasing money emission to liven the economy.[10] But the war had abruptly raised the demand for additional financing with a nonetheless growing economy, which required higher rates of money supply.[11] The E2 bills that were printed out of this demand by London's Thomas de la Rue Company replaced historicist painter Ali Sami's former wolf motif by a picturesque iconography marked by the PRP elite's will to represent the nation-state through its own memory landscape or its *lieu de memoir*.[12] The bills also introduced the new president İsmet İnönü's official three-quarter portrait replacing that of Mustafa Kemal following his death

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[10] Pamuk, p.191.
[11] *Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı*, ed. by Melek Düzgüneş, pp.341, 342.
[12] Pierre Nora, *Between Memory and History.*

in 1938.[13] The series pictured the new monuments of *Zafer* and *Güven* (Trust) on the two-and-a-half and five-lira bills, pastoral views of the Ankara citadel on the ten and fifteen-lira bills, and the Roumelian Castle (Bosphorus) with the Çanakkale strait (the Dardanelles) on the hundred and five-hundred. A certain political hierarchy within this iconography can be understood through the exchange value of the bills. By 1939 the GDP per capita had risen to roughly 120 liras yet in 1936 a mid-Anatolian peasant had a per capita income of only thirty-two liras.[14] Therefore it is suggestive that the lower-value bills all evoked the new memory landscape of the national capital whereas the depiction of the straits on higher-value bills is consonant with a display of diplomatic power at an international level, since their full control had recently been handed over to Turkey in the 1936 Montreux Convention [Fig.4.1].[15]

Figure IV-1: Thomas de la Rue (1937-1944). *'The 100 and 500-bill notes of E2 series of banknotes'* ©Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara.

While this logoisation of the memory landscape circumvented the unresolved heraldic quests of the late 1920s, the overtly historicist graphic ornamentation style of the E1 series was maintained in the new bills; borders arching towards the centre in various historicist arch forms; flat, segmental, shouldered or bulbous. Especially in the five and the later

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[13] Cüneyt Ölçer, *50 Yılın Kağıt Paraları*, p.10.
[14] *Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı*, ed. by Melek Düzgüneş, p.241 and Feridun Ergin, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda ve Atatürk Döneminde Fiyatlar ve Gelirler*, p.84.
[15] Zürcher, p.202.

thousand-lira bills, the recently completed *Güven* monument (Joseph Thorak and Anton Hanak, 1935) with its' cubic mass, came in contrast with these flamboyant historicist decorations [Fig.4.2].[16] In order to grasp the meaning of this aesthetic symbiosis we need to see how modern architecture and respectively decorative arts were understood and defined in the context of 1930s Turkey.

Figure IV-2: Thomas de le Rue (1937-1944). *'The five and thousand-bill notes of E2 series of banknotes, picturing the Güven Monument'* ©Central Bank.

Güven monument was assigned to Austrian architect Clemens Holzmeister (1886-1983) in 1932. For the monument envisioned on the triumphal extremity of his majestic Government Complex, a stripped down, brutal mass, Holzmeister choose to work with his compatriot sculptor Anton Hanak (1875-1934).[17] Hanak's stark, bold lines, reminiscent of German Expressionism embraced the new modernist aesthetics favored by Mustafa Kemal [Fig.4.3]. But his sudden death in 1934 entrusted the completion of the southern façade to German Josef Thorak who was a notable sculptor of the Third Reich with a substantial contribution to its political-aesthetic ideal through his works celebrating the young, powerful, and often male, body cult.[18] Similar to his famous interlaced *Comradeship* group he executed for the German pavilion of the 1937 Paris Exposition, his facade on the *Güven* monument is a bolder statement than Hanak's, reminiscent of fascist propaganda art in

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[16] 'Yeni Beş Liralıklar Bugün Tedavüle Çıkıyor', *Ulus*, 15 October 1937, p.1
[17] Gültekin Elibal, *Atatürk ve Resim, Heykel*, pp.218-220.
[18] Ibid. See also, 'Ankaradaki Emniyet Abidesi', *Arkitekt*, 59-60 (1935), p.358.

conveying ideas of unity, authority and trust in the beholder, thus the namesake of the monument [Fig.4.4].[19]

Figure IV-3: Anton Hanak (1932). *'The northern façade of the Güven monument'* ©Artun Özgüner.

Figure IV-4: Josef Thorak (1934). '*The southern façade of the Güven monument'* ©Artun Özgüner.

The bold, unornamented lines of the *Güven* monument were not a singular case, this was part of a shift in the official appreciation and endorsement of aesthetics. Already in 1926 Mustafa Kemal had rejected architect Giulio Mongeri's proposal for a presidential residence in Ankara in the National Style, asserting that the style had become obsolete.[20] Consequently in 1930, modernist architect Ernst Egli (1893-1974) was appointed to the Academy's architecture studio, thus the National Architecture Renaissance (retrospectively labeled as the First National Style) gradually lost its prominence in the official culture to an austere modernism. In the 1930s Ankara turned into a hotspot for like-minded German and Austrian modernists. Architects Holzmeister, Egli and Bruno Taut (1880-1938) followed a radically modern style where flat roofs, unornamented facades, symmetrical massive blocks, colonnades and elevated entrances suggested authority and stability (hence the

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[19] For Thorak's work in the Paris Expo of 1937, see, '1937 Beynelmilel Paris Sergisi', *Arkitekt*, 79 (1937), 180-190, p.185. Elibal argues that Thorak merely executed Hanak's plan for the southern façade but his interpretation seems suggestive, see, Elibal, p.220. Earlier photographs of the monument only show Hanak's herculean two figures on the northern façade, see, 'Ankaradaki Emniyet Abidesi', *Yeni Adam*, 1935 (57), p.5.

[20] Özlem İnay Erten, *Şişli'de bir Konak*, p.79.

Second National Style).[21] As Baydar points, such architectural froms became popular among Turkish architects and were equally well received by the educated urban elite as "signs of contemporaneity and progress and as solid images of the self-conscious break with the past"[22] Initially coined as the "*Yeni Mimari*" (New Architecture) or "Viennese Cubic Architecture", these were extensively pictured in *La Turquie Kemaliste*'s (*LTK*) photo essays titled *Ankara Construit* (Ankara Constructs) with a similar pride [Fig.4.5].[23] Nonetheless, Turkish architects and their German colleagues were simultaneously informed by a search of rationalist essence in the vernacular forms as well.[24] For the German architects this stemmed from a grounded wariness on the ills of capitalism and urbanism whereas for their Turkish colleagues, lacking such critical stand in the materially deprived years of the early republican era, it was more likely motivated by the search for a new cultural identity oscilliating between an undesired past and a determinate future.[25]


Figure IV-5: LTK (1935). Ankara Construit. '*A collage of Ankara's new cubic architecture.*' ©British Library, London.

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[21] Sibel Bozdoğan and Esra Akcan, *Turkey: Modern Architectures in History*, pp.25, 54.
[22] Baydar, p.67.
[23] See for instance a collage made of Holzmeister's new governmental edifices, 'Ankara Construit', *LTK*, 5 (1934), n.p.
[24] Baydar, p. 69-70.
[25] Ibid.

As to decorative arts and crafts, there seems to be a lack of a similar prolific discourse on its redefinition to serve such cultural politics of the new modern nation. The official aesthetic appreciation clung tightly on to the historicity and Turkish provenance of decorative arts as seen in the design of E2 bills. The journal *LTK* simultaneously promoted Ankara's modern architecture *vis-à-vis* a nationally defined, historicist crafts tradition. Since its publication by the Directorate of Press in 1934, headed by Vedat Nedim Tör, it instigated a promotion of Turkish artefacts on its frontispiece.[26] This was a trademark of the journal, a very high-quality print (in resolution and exact colour detail obtained via colur separation) of a selection of Turkish artifacts; from tiles, miniatures, carpentry works, embroidery to calligraphy tools. In paper quality as well, it stood out from the body pages with a thick, coated paper [Fig.4.6]. These objects were presented to the viewer like a book illumination behind a semi-translucent paper upon turning the cover page, they were singled out in a cropped-out white background and enlarged to fill the page, informed by modern ways of representation. They subtly suggested a new genealogy of national artifacts of diverse provenances. At times, when their cosmopolitan legacy could not be avoided then the stress was put on geographic locality; and they were presented as *Travail d'Istanbul* (Work of Istanbul).[27] More than an attempt of re-writing history, as the objects presented, nonetheless had roots within the large Turkish-Ottoman tradition, the representation of the frontispiece artefacts aimed to retrofit the cultural heritage into a nation-tight suit, to present a sense of pastness for the nation.

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[26] Although it appeared on the recto side, next to the copyright page, I will refer to this as frontispiece for the sake of convenience.
[27] *LTK*, 13 (1937), n.p.

Figure IV-6: LTK (1935). *'Various artefacts printed for the journal's frontispiece'* ©British Library.

This editorial endeavor of Tör is reminiscent of what Benedict Anderson calls as claiming "alternative legitimacies", an attempt to produce the nation-state on print media through the endorsement of a cultural heritage that is defined according to the desired characteristics of selected landmarks and artefacts.[28] That the frontispiece objects were dated predominantly to sixteenth century points to Tör's editorial motivation to canonize this period as a classical one for Turkish arts and crafts. This is reminiscent of the first dynastic art-historical text, *Usul-i Mi'mar-i 'Osmani* of 1873, delineated in the first chapter, which canonized pre-eighteen-century Ottoman architecture and arts and provided a guide for early republican national art-historiographies.[29] Surely this was followed at the onset of the twentieth century with more deliberate attempts to Turkify and popluarise the imperial past, as with the foundation of the Ottoman History Committee, since Ottomanism had

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[28] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* p.182.

[29] Although *Usul* formulated the eighteenth-century as beginnings of foreign influence and stylistic decay, it nonetheless included the early eighteenth-century Ahmed III (1729) and Azapkapı (1732) fountains in its canon for their dexterity on surface ornaments, see, Shirine Hamadeh, 'Westernisation, Decadence, and the Turkish Baroque: Modern Constructions of the Eighteenth Century', in *Muqarnas,* pp.185-197, (pp.187).

begun to lost its sway.[30] As Sibel Bozdoğan also argues, this dynastic genealogical quest had been highly influential in the early republican art historiographies of Celal Esad Arseven, Sedat Çetintaş (1889-1965) and Behçet Ünsal (1909-2006), who were overtly preoccupied with the definition of an exclusively ethnic Turkish architecture whose exalted rationality and simplicity could be interpreted by modernist frameworks.[31] Especially Arseven who was a prominent art historian, critic and professor of art history at the Academy, had simultaneously advocated for national art historiography and European Modernism.[32] A clue to understanding how a modern framework was set for the redefinition of a national tradition of decorative arts and crafts can be thus found in Arseven's writings on Turkish decorative arts, which appeared as early as 1927, claiming an indigenous national essence in the historicity of ornamental forms.

In 1926, Arseven wrote an extensive treatise in the art journal *Hayat*, published by the Ministry of Education, arguing the origins and the exclusive characteristics of Turkish decorative arts.[33] For prominent art historians of the time and especially for Arseven, the eleventh century Seljuks were transmitters of an Asiatic Turkish national essence into Ottoman architecture.[34] Nevertheless, Arseven argued that it was rather the Ottomans who excelled in achieving a less decorative, purer architecture.[35] In *Hayat*, following the canonical periodisation of Central Asian, Seljuk and Ottoman eras, Arseven similarly claimed that the Seljuk decorative arts acted like a bridge, carrying central Asian origins to Anatolia along with a certain degree of influence from their Indian and Chinese neighbors. He warned his readers however, that once they had settled in Anatolia, the Seljuks were reserved towards any Byzantine influence and even loathed those "strange, Christian forms".[36] Arseven dismissed any Byzantine influence as merely architectural and set up a scheme for an indigenously Turkish decorative arts tradition. Equating alleged national characteristics with arts, he asserted that, as Turks were candid and despised deceit so were

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[30] Karpat, *Historical Continuity and Identity Change*, p.13.
[31] Sibel Bozdoğan, 'Reading Ottoman Architecture Through Modernist Lenses: Nationalist Historiography and the 'New Architecture" in the Early Republic', in *Muqarnas,* pp.199-221 (p.202).
[32] Ibid., p.200.
[33] Celal Esad Arseven, 'Türk Sanatında Tezyinat', *Hayat*, 1.20 (1927), 389-394.
[34] Bozdoğan, *Reading Ottoman Architecture Through Modernist Lenses,* p.205.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Arseven, p.391.

their decorative arts and ornamentation; "sincere and rational like the ancient Greeks".[37] Hence, he confidently concluded; what was Greek art to Europe was as Ottoman art to Asia.[38]

Arseven was not alone in his endeavor to locate a glorified classical past which could be made to reconcile with modernist formal ideals. Such claims for the historicity of an indigenous Turkish art must have become more prevalent with the *Turkish History Thesis* (1930) and the *Sun Language Theory*.[39] By postulating that Turks had migrated to Europe in prehistoric times and were thus descendants of the Hittites (an indigenous civilisation of Bronze Age Anatolia) both theories claimed a central role for Turkish language and culture in the genesis of Western civilisation. As Bozdoğan also maintains this had tremendous implications on the official culture and archeology of 1930s and despite their overt nationalist bias they posed a challenge to dominant Eurocentric and oriental views of art historiography.[40] The 1936 *Turkish Arts and Crafts Exhibition* in Ankara, organized by the Ministry of Economy (*İktisat Vekaleti*) is another materialisation of this rhetoric. Presenting various artefacts from lecterns, helmets, ceramics to textiles, this exhibition aimed to propose a nationally defined crafts tradition [Fig.4.7]. That the exhibition was held within the modernist shell of Ankara's newly inaugurated constructivist *Sergi Evi* (Exhibition Hall, Şevki Balmumcu, 1934), seems at first glance controversial with this historicist content and message of the event [Fig.4.8]. Yet its curatorial agenda seems equally preoccupied to locate a modern, universal essence in this nationally defined crafts tradition, echoing the official historical postulations.

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[37] Ibid., p.392.
[38] Ibid., p.393.
[39] In 1930 the Turkish Historical Association published a 606-page treatise on Turkish history titled 'The Outlines of Turkish History' with a hundred copies, followed by an abridged version in 1931, titled 'The Introduction to the Outlines of History', which got printed around thirty thousand copies to be circulated in schools, see, Gavin D. Brockett, *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk,* p.74
[40] Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, pp.243-244.

Figure IV-7: LTK (1936). Craftwork Exhibition in Sergi Evi, Ankara. ©British Library.

In an essay that appeared in *LTK* these curatorial aims becomes all the more apparent. Written by Hermann Kvergic, a philologist of Austrian origin whose work had been of remarkable influence to the *Turkish History Thesis*, the essay claimed that the meaning of the exhibition lay in its ability to take the viewer "to the distant times when the craftsmanship of Central Asia had fertilized the Mediterranean and the West".[41] For Kvergic the works of the past Turkish artisans were tantamount to a precision mechanics in the industrial era, awaiting to be discovered by Kemalist industrialization.[42] This view, as was endorsed by *LTK*, attests to the interchangeable use of modern frameworks in the redefinition of a national lineage of a historical crafts by the republican elite as the latter were seen to possess a modern essence in origin.

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[41] Dr. Herman F. Kvergic, 'Kleinkunst Ausstellung Im Sergi Evi Ankara', *LTK*, 16 (1936), 23-30.
[42] Ibid.

Figure IV-8: LTK (1934-1936). 'Various snapshots of the Exhibition Hall featured in the journal' @British Library

Such discursive space around the historicity of decorative arts by the republican elite in the early 1930s allows us to understand how modern tendencies were reconciled with a premodern cultural past, as the latter was interpreted to be equally modern. Within this backdrop, the earlier argument on the concomitance of historicist decoration styles and Ankara's New Architecture on the E2 money bill series is more suggestive since it seems to present a reconciliation with the republican elite's modernist aspirations and historicist claims in the official cultural politics. Indeed Arseven had also penned *Yeni Mimari* (New Architecture, 1931), a document of propaganda for the state-led modernist architecture of 1930s, which postulated modernism as a rational evolution of Turkish architecture.[43] Far from seeing them as dichotomies and with little respect to the modernist neglect of history, Arseven contended that since Turkish architecture was distinguished by its rationality and conformity to contemporary ideas, the New Architecture would not be foreign to Turks.[44] In that respect, the concomitance of the cubic mass of the *Güven* monument appearing inside a Seljuk style ornamented frame with floral abstractions on the E2 five and thousand-lira bills of 1937 should not be surprising. This is also suggested by the partial adoption of sans-serif

[43] Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, p.99.
[44] Bozdoğan, *Reading Ottoman Architecture Through Modernist Lenses,* p.218.

typeface for the *Türk Lirası* (Turkish Lira) text embedded in the decorations of the E2 bills [Figs.4.1, 2]. For modern graphic designers in the 1920s who sought to establish a canon of international typographic standards, sans serif typefaces, like that of Paul Renner's Futura of 1928, were ideologically appealing given their unadorned machine aesthetics and efficient, rational ease of comprehension, unlike embellished and complex lettering.[45] However, their claim to universal perception was at odds with the cultural politics of the rising authritarian national states. As is argued by Jeremy Aynsley similar tensions were also reflected in interwar Germany where graphic design was often assigned a dual purpose in both conforming to official nationalist ideals and the more popular modern approaches.[46] In Turkey too, for a wider republican intelligentsia the reconciliation of premodern cultural patrimony with such modernist aspirations must have been equally instrumental in overcoming global tensions, to immunize them with modernity and tame them with a classicized aesthetic ideal. Arseven had similarly sought for a classical essence in the nation's art historiography, claiming that Turks, just like the ancient Greeks "had sought for beauty not in exaggeration but in the harmony of forms and lines".[47]

Ahmet III fountain, a halva shop?

In the post-war era the negotiation of these tensions ensued. Although it is rather based on the design of the first golden coins with the new Turkish Latin script, an article published in the journal *Yeni Adam* (New Man) in May 1944 casts some light on the consecutive reception of the republican intelligentsia on money design. *Yeni Adam* was published by historian and art critique Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1886-1978) who, similar to Arseven, advocated for a modernist interpretation of aesthetics in his fervent nationalist interpretations of Turkish art.[48] In the article, Baltacıoğlu proposed that the coins had to be

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[45] David Crowley and Paul Jobling, *Graphic Design,* pp.140-144. See also, Gennifer Weisenfeld, 'Japanese Typographic Design and the Art Letterforms', in *Bridges to Heaven*, ed. by Silbergeld Jerome, Ching Dora C. Y., Smith Judith G. and Murck Alfreda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011) 827-848, p.842.
[46] Jeremy Aynsley, '"Gebrauchsgraphik" as an Early Graphic Design Journal, 1924-1938, *Journal of Design History*, 5. 1 (1992), 53-72 (pp.63-65).
[47] Arseven, p.348.
[48] Bozdoğan, *Reading Ottoman Architecture Through Modernist Lenses,* pp.206-207.

simple and clear, complying with the "foremost tradition in Turkish arts".[49] He added that they should only refer to symbols of Turkish origin (abstain from non-Turkish motifs, e.g. laurel and oak leaves) with a striking crescent-star and a central wheat motif.[50] Baltacıoğlu then concluded that national currency was not only the symbol of a nation's sovereignty but also of its taste, for it could permeate into where architecture and painting could not.[51] That same month the golden coins were struck in the new facilities of the Istanbul State Mint with variations of both İnönü and Atatürk as head-of-state accompanied merely by a wreath of oak leaves and wheat on the retro side [Fig.4.9].[52] It is not plausible to assert that Baltacıoğlu's suggestions would have had any affect on the design of these coins at such short notice but it nevertheless suggests the aforementioned reconciliatory approach between premodern cultural forms infused with national characteristics on the one hand and tensions with global modernism on the other, peculiar to the aesthetic appreciation of the contemporary educated elite.

Figure IV-9: Istanbul State Mint (1944). The first gold coins with Turkish Latin script.

A subsequent addition to the new E4 series bills in 1947, were the ten-lira bills, picturing for the first time an Ottoman monument apart from the former fifteenth-century military fortresses of the straits in the E2 series. This was the eighteenth-century Ahmet III Fountain [Fig.4.10]. The bills were printed by the American Banknote Company (ABNC), which had taken over the commissions from the former German *Reichsdruckerei* since 1942, as a result of Turkey's gradual alignment with the liberal West in the post-war era.

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[49] 'Yeni Cumhuriyet Altınlarımız Nasıl Basılacak?', *Yeni Adam*, 490 (1944), p.3.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] 'Cumhuriyet Altınları', *Cumhuriyet*, 28 May 1944, p.1.

Figure IV-10: ABCN (c. 1947). *'The ten-lira notes of E4 series, picturing the Ahmet III Fountain'* ©Central Bank.

Although further details of the commission have not been found in this research, the republican endorsement of the Ahmet III Fountain seems less likely to be a diversion from 1930s radical modernism to classical heritage but more likely to be understood as the culmination of the aforementioned reconciliatory approach. The Ottoman landmark circulated concomitantly with Othmar Pferschy's constructivist propaganda photographs, printed in the E3 series of bills by ABNC in 1942, with an equal mix of decorative and sans serif lettering and historicist ornamental borders [Fig.4.11].

Figure IV-11: ABNC (c. 1942). 'The ten and thousand-lira bills of E3 series of banknotes, picturing Othmar Pferschy's photographs' ©Central Bank.

The fountain itself was extensively treated as a classical landmark of dynastic Ottoman architecture, as discussed in the first chapter, with its replica representing the Ottoman

Empire in the Universal Exposition of Vienna in 1873 amidst the modernising empires of the time.[53] Thus as an icon accustomed to compete with modern rivals, the fountain was assigned a new, republican life cycle where it was similarly delegated by another political elite to stand for the modernity of the nation-state through a pun on cultural superiority. As Anthony Smith also argues, the friction of global versus national cultures does not override nationalisms but creates an eclectic culture where cosmopolitan references are combined with national (ethnic, folk) in a manner of bricolage.[54] This suggests the unsettled strains in the aforementioned reconciliation of the historical legitimacy of the nation *vis-à-vis* its claim on Western modernity, evident in the art historiographies of Arseven and Baltacıoğlu. Arseven, who had written *Yeni Mimari* in 1931 as a treatise for the conformity of Turkish architecture to modernism, had ironically lamented in 1928 in his *Türk Sanatı* (Turkish Art, published by the Ministry of Education) that the Ahmet III Fountain did not attract the attention of young architects as much as a halva (sweet) shop.[55] The later republican banknotes thus attest to this Janus-faced aspiration where as Javier Gimeno-Martinez asserts, a paradoxical construction of identity follows the blending of cosmopolitan references with the nation's own products.[56] This interplay of graphic elements simultaneously claims the future of the nation within global design paradigms and the nation's historicity through architectural and decorative forms. The official view was likely to be favoring this art historical perspective. In 1952, İnönü, now as head of the opposition, sent a note to Arseven, paying him gratitude for having received his monograph, *Les Arts Decoratifs Turcs* (Turkish Decorative Arts, 1951, published by the Ministry of Education), "a treasure" he asserted, "the work of an enlightened lifetime.[57] Although it comes a couple years after the end of the single-party regime, this correspondence substantiates the contemporary aesthetic sensibilities of the republican elite in the İnönü era.

Iconography wise, İnönü's replacement of Mustafa Kemal on these bills had wider implications. A writer and a diplomat, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889-1974) later

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[53] For the incorporation of Ahmed III Fountain in *Usul*, see, Ahmet A. Ersoy, *Architecture and the Late Ottoman Historical Imaginary*, pp.16-19 and 82-86.
[54] Anthony D Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp.157-159.
[55] Celal Esad Arseven, quoted in Behçet Ünsal, 'Kaybettiklerimiz', *Arkitekt*, 1 (1972), 33-35, (p.34).
[56] Javier Gimeno-Martinez, *Design and National Identity*, p.25.
[57] IBBAK, fol.Bel_Mtf_003694.

recalled in his memoir that this iconographic swap had exacerbated prevailing polemics against İnönü's persona, especially within the public resentment towards Mustafa Kemal's coffin still laying in state in Ankara's Ethnography Museum, with a mausoleum yet to be built.[58] The tensions were mostly due to his autarkic wartime economic measures, high inflation and fix prices, which had been profitable for big farmers, traders and officials whom handled government concessions.[59] This was at the expense of small farmers and businesses, which were decimated in this economy.[60] Charged in the late 1940s by the cumulating opposition on cultivating a personality cult on his behalf, İnönü replied that since Atatürk had died, he -even as a person respecting his legacy- had to declare his own leadership rather than remain under his shade.[61] On a further note, he supported this practice by stating that they had agreed with Atatürk from the onset on the official representation of the head-of-state as omnipotent as the former sultan as a necessary measure against the prevailing public assumption that the president of republic was less powerful than the former.[62] Conversely, in 1950, when the DP came to power, a new legislation passed, known as the Atatürk law, which restricted the depiction of living subjects as head-of-state on official documents merely to the imagery of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[63] Yet by that time an era of İnönü through new monuments and urban development projects had already been somewhat substantialised.

İnönü monuments

In 1944, plans of a mammoth equestrian monument of president İnönü on Istanbul's Taksim Square were proudly declared on the cover illustration of PRP's Istanbul municipality's propaganda journal *GI* [Fig.4.12].[69] This was part of the ongoing urban

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[58] Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), pp.171-172.
[59] Zürcher, pp.199-200.
[60] Ibid.
[61] İsmet İnönü, quoted in Tanju Demir, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Paralarında Siyaset ve İdeoloji*, p.26.
[62] İsmet İnönü, *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki konuşmaları: 1920-1973, Vol.2, 1939-1960* (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, 1993), pp.241-242.
[63] 'Dairelerde Yalnız Atatürk'ün Fotoğrafı Bulunacak', *Cumhuriyet*, 31 May 1950, pp.1, 3.
[69] *GI*, (1944), n.p.

renewal scheme of the imperial capital, under the mayor Lütfi Kırdar between 1938-1949. Kırdar was a medical doctor who had served during the War of Liberation, and had later jump-started a political carrier as a PRP deputy. As such he was a significant actor during the modernisation of public spaces in Istanbul, consonant with the İnönü era. The sheer size and equestrian style of the monument were quite audacious in a series of İnönü monuments constructed in the late 1930s in Anatolian towns.[70] Notably, the 1942 monument of Erzincan by sculptor Ratip Aşir Acudoğu (1898-1957), built to commemorate the victims of the 1939 earthquake, which had devastated the city. Acudoğu's sculptural group replicated a photograph of the president embracing an elderly victim of the calamity in agony, which had widespread circulation, likely serviced to the press by the single-party regime [Fig.4.13].[71] What was more interesting, the disregard for national entries in the contest for the Erzincan monument fuelled once again a national zeal for a single agency in the commissioning and building of the monuments. A former contest for a monument in Erzurum in 1937 had created a scandal in that the city's municipality had rejected sculptor Ali Hadi Bara's winning project on grounds that it lacked national fervor.[72] On a later attempt that draw large criticism from the art circles, the ministry annulled the contest in 1938 and consigned the project to Rudolf Belling, the head of sculpture at the Academy. Nevertheless the project was dismissed.[73] Wary of these criticisims, the Minisry of Culture's specifications for Erzincan's earthquake memorial contest clearly stated that admission was restricted to "national sculptors only".[74]

There were similar outcries for İnönü's Taksim monument as well. In 1943 Kırdar's Istanbul municipality had already constructed the mammoth-sized plinth for the monument, designed by the municipality's French urban planner Henri Prost (1874-1959). Recalling the bureaucratic attitude in the contest for the Erzurum monument, the design of this plinth

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[70] 'Erzincan'da Ölü Miktarı Yüzde 50', *Ulus*, 31 December 1939, p.1.

[71] 'Erzincan Abidesi Müsabakasında Heykeltraş Ratib Birinciliği Kazandı', Cumhuriyet , 11 July 1944, p.11. For the photograph, see, *Cumhuriyet*, 04 January 1940, p.1; *Akşam*, 04 January 1940, p.1; *Son Posta*, 04 January 1940, p.1; *Vakit*, 04 January 1940, p.1. Later in February, the literary journal *Yücel* too published a similar shot with the president facing the viewer, see, Yücel, 5.60 (1940), p.1.

[72] Mahmud Cuda, 'Abide Jürisi', *Cumhuriyet*, 09 March 1938, p.7.

[73] Peyami Safa, 'Yalnız Bize Mahsus Garabetler', *Cumhuriyet*, 29 August 1938, p.3. İsmet İnönü himself had observed Belling's model for the Erzurum monument in 1941, see, 'Milli Şef İnönü', *Cumhuriyet*, 16 September 1941, p.3.

[74] 'Erzincan Abidesi', *Cumhuriyet*, 14 September 1942, p.2.

had also disregarded the national entries who had been declared winners, exacerbating the prevalent tensions between foreign and national artists, the journal *Arkitekt* calling the whole undertaking "a poorly run project."[75] Similarly in 1946, Belling's direct commissioning for another Kırdar project, for the bas-reliefs of the new İnönü Stadium (Vietti Violi, 1939-1948) seems to have equally conflated a great deal of criticism.[76] Thus, as was argued for the late1920s in the second chapter, in early 1940s too, the foreign agency in monuments was more appalling to the nationalist sentiments of an emerging class of national artists and intellects than the works of foreign architects working in government commissions in Turkey, as is evident in their zeal to overlap a single nationalist agency in the commissioning and making of monuments.

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[75] According to *Arkitekt*, the winning design of Akkozan and Handan, a cenotaph like plinth, was later modified by Henri Proust's supervision, the municipality's new urban planner. *Arkitekt* fiercely criticized the municipality for the substitution of the committee's hours of work with a single man's decision and lamented that neither the jury nor the contest had clearly delineated where the monument would be located (the park or the square), see, 'Taksim İnönü Abidesi Kaide Müsabakası', *Arkitekt*, 5-6 (1943), 103-105. See also, 'Milli Şef Heykelinin Kaidesi', *Cumhuriyet*, 27 July 1943, p.2 and 'Milli Şef Heykelinin Kaidesi Yapılıyor', *Cumhuriyet*, 28 July 1943, p.2.

[76] 'İnönü Stadına Konulacak Barolyefler', *Cumhuriyet*, 03 May 1947, p.3.

Figure IV-12: Mazhar Resmor for Istanbul Municipality (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul (Embellishing Istanbul).
'Rudolf Belling's Taksim İnönü Monument pictured on the cover of Istanbul Municipality's propaganda publication' ©SALT Research, Istanbul.

Figure IV-13: Ratip Aşir Acudoğu (c.1942). *'Commemorative monument for the Erzincan earthquake victims'*.

Taksim's new equestrian İnönü monument was to be erected in a new secular public space planned at the heart of the central Taksim area, the *İnönü Gezisi* (İnönü Promenade, named after the president). With the ongoing disregard of national artists, the monument

was again consigned to Belling but as with Acudoğu's Erzincan memorial, it would be placed on a similar mammoth-scale plinth, almost dwarfing Canonica's 1928 Taksim monument nearby.[78] Indeed, in Kırdar's transformation of the imperial capital's public spaces, a sense of rivalry with the national capital seems evident. As was hinted on *LTK*'s zealous commentary in 1943, that Ankara's first equestrian monument (*Zafer*, 1926) distinguished the city from Istanbul since it made the onlookers feel that it is "Atatürk's city, embodying the spirit of new Turkey", which is "hard to find in Istanbul" [Fig.2.3].[79] As has been argued in the second chapter, for the republican elite Ankara's malleability to a homogenous national capital, after the disintegration of its civil society in the calamities of WWI, was a source of pride while Istanbul's still complex cosmopolitan structure was a challenge. The sense of rivalry was thus manifest in the representation of Istanbul as a republican city, a triumph for İnönü's office and Kırdar's mayorality where the president would be re-introduced in the Roman equestrian tradition, tantamount to Ankara's *Zafer* monument of Mustafa Kemal. As daring as this was in the former imperial capital, stylistically as well, Belling's classical modernism, especially the unadorned surfaces of Prost's plinth, a stripped-down cenotaph, accentuated with vernacular chamfered corner details seems to recall the aesthetic symbiosis on the money bills of the time [Fig.4.14].

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[78] Milli şef Heykelinin Kaidesi', *Cumhuriyet*, 27 July 1943, p. 2 and 'Milli Şef Heykelinin Kaidesi Yapılıyor', *Cumhuriyet*, 28 July 1943, p.2.
[79] 'Ankara-İstanbul', *LTK*, 47 (1943), pp.37-49 (p.44).

Figure IV-14: Rudolf Belling (sculptor) and Henri Prost (plinth) (c.1944). *'Details of the plinth for İnönü's Taksim monument, with stripped surfaces and chamfered corners'.*

The desire by political bodies to materialize and fixate permanence in monuments attests rather to their weakness. This is also implied by Lewis Mumford when he asserts that the more shaky the institution, the more solid the monument.[80] As was with Mustafa Kemal so with İnönü, these personality cults served partly to compensate the ideological incoherencies and the lack of emotional appeal of the republican regime beyond the elite.[81] In the early 1940s, PRP Prime Minister Refik Saydam's standard pricing policy on agricultural output had unleashed an outright opposition of the agricultural class in rural Turkey against the single-party regime of PRP.[82] Added to that were, as mentioned above,

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[80] Lewis Mumford, quoted in Koshar, p.32.
[81] Zürcher, p.193.
[82] Pamuk, pp.206-207.

the increased defence expenses leading to inflation, raised taxes and suppression of public expressions of faith. These exacerbated the already evident discontent against the İnönü-led PRP regime in rural areas, still home to some eighty per cent of the population.[83] With the opposition becoming legal through the establishment of an opponenet political party, the DP in 1946, these nationalist resentments were increasingly voiced by the DP's populist tone and by civil organizations such as the right-wing *Türk Milli Talebe Birliği* (Turkish National Student Union). The Union targeted Kırdar's urban renewal project and the construction of a monument for İnönü during the economically deprived war years with high inflation rates under İnönü's autarkic regime.[84] Ironically, whilst it demoted İnönü's office, it started a counter-campaign to erect an Atatürk statue in Istanbul University.[85] When the single-party regime of PRP finally ended in 1950, a decision by the city council of Istanbul aimed to change the name of Taksim İnönü Promenade to "*Cumhuriyet Gezisi*" (Republic Promenade) and to remove the empty plinth from its location.[86] In 1954, the Union declared its plans to repurpose the plinth for a monument depicting the youth's commitment to Atatürk.[87] This ambitious project was never carried out and soon the plinth fell to negligence and at most became a contested seating area with a view during the Republic day celebrations.[88] Throughout the 1950s, years marked by oppoent the Democrat Party led liberalization of Turkey, the epitaphts of the plinth remained covered by wooden panels. In 1959, the right-wing poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek referred to the plinth as an analogy for the pretentiousness of PRP's single-party regime, which he condemned it for it, crying "let this empty plinth be your (PRP) guillotine".[89] Nevertheless, this change was not that straightforward, it was rather a gradual shift in the communication of the imperial capital's urban renewal scheme, as will be shown in the next section of this chapter through the communication strategies of Kirdar's PRP majorality.

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[83] From 1927 to the census of 1955 areas with a population of less than 10,000 fluctuated between eighty three to eighty one per cent of the whole population, see, *Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı*, ed. by Melek Düzgüneş, p.78.

[84] 'D.P. nin Pahalılığı Protesto Mitingi Dün Yapıldı', *Cumhuriyet*, 9 May 1948, pp.1,4.

[85] 'Atatürk'ün Üniversiteye Dikilecek Heykeli', *Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1951, pp. 1, 5 and 'Anıt-Kabir 10 Kasımda Bitmiş Olacak', *Cumhuriyet*, 4 December 1951, pp. 1, 5.

[86] 'İnönü Gezisinin Yeni İsmi', *Milliyet*, 10 March 1951, p.1, 5. This wasn't put into action until the early 1980s.

[87] 'TMTF Çalışmaları Devam Ediyor', *Milliyet*, 22 July 1954, p. 3

[88] 'Cumhuriyet Bayramı Heyecanla Kutlandı', *Milliyet*, 30 October 1951, p. 1.

[89] Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, 'Heykelsiz Kaide', *Büyük Doğu*, 14 (1959), n.p.

IV.II Embellishing the Imperial Capital

In his memoirs, the former German ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (1917-1918) Count Bernstorff recalls his return to Istanbul after the First World War with the following words;

> The war years, indeed, lay heavy on an already overburdened land; the Young Turk government had certainly improved the pavement of the roads and constructed trains, which now seemed out of place in that romantic city.[90]

Despite his condescending, orientalising tone, Bernstorff's observations may be partially right. Since the turn of the nineteenth century, the city had suffered from constant disorder; the arrival of Muslim refugees from southeastern Europe and southern Russia had caused serious shortages of accommodation. This was overcome regardless of building regulations, leading to 117 great fires between 1853 and 1906, consequently leaving a third of the Muslim population homeless in 1882 and diminishing the city's capacity to rebuild itself.[91] Added to that were the hardships in developing public spaces, the imposition of sharia law, valuing user's rights over property rights, and making confiscation or expropriation of property impossible.[92] Nonetheless, as Zeynep Çelik also notes, there had been considerable efforts to solve these urban problems of Istanbul.[93] Throughout the period of 1838-1910s the reformers of the *Tanzimat* restoration period (1839-1876) and later their Young Turk successors had tried to regularize the old street network, introduce a new building code (stone or brick, defined as *kargir* instead of the former timber) and a modern transportation system (trams, bridges, ferryboats) to aesthetically embellish the city. These remained limited to small-scale interventions due to the city's highly traditional life style or lack of

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[90] Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, *The Memoirs of Count Bernstorff,* trans. by Eric Sutton (Surrey: Windmill Press, 1936), p.144.

[91] The city addressed here is still the old Istanbul confined to the Byzantine walls exclusive of Galata (north side of Golden Horn), see, Nur Altınyıldız, *The Architectural Heritage of Istanbul and the Ideology of Preservation,* p.283.

[92] Norman Stone, *Turkey: A Short History* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2017), p.84.

[93] For a brief survey on the urban developments in the *Tanzimat* era see, Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul,* pp.79, 158-159.

interconnection between planned areas, confined to fire-affected zones.[94] As a result, as discussed also in the third chapter, in the 1930s much of Istanbul's historic peninsula still contained vast fire-damaged areas, had remianed undeveloped and in ruins, a dilapidation exacerbated by Ankara's primacy in funding for the construction of a national capital.[95]

In as much as the *Salihtarağa* power plant had been an invisible actor of late Ottoman modernity in the republican display of technology through electric illumination for the 1933 Republic Day, so would the rhetoric of modernizing Istanbul become a contested field to be monopolized by İnönü's republican narrative. Hence, for the political grip of İnönü and the PRP political elite, modernizing Istanbul must have offered an opportunity for instilling a republican presence in the imperial capital as was also evident in the 1933 illumination efforts. Keeping in line with the tradition of working with foreign expertise, in 1932 the municipality of Istanbul organized a planning contest where renowned foreign planners were invited to participate.[96] On this undertaking the proposals of the French planners were deemed too intrusive and financially costly, while the German planner Herman Elgötz's plan was opted for due to its rationality and attainability, although it was not implemented.[97] Consequently, in 1936 Henri Prost, the chief planner of the city of Paris was invited once again by the municipality of Istanbul to work as a councilor on urban planning and thus began his role as Istanbul municipality's head urban planner until 1950.[98]

In the light of the public dissent towards İnönü's tight and marginalizing economic

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[94] Ibid. As argued earlier, *Tanzimat*, literally translated as reforms, is a restoration period in the Ottoman Empire from 1839 to 1876 that aimed at the centralisation and Westernisation of the Ottoman state.

[95] Nur Altınyıldız argues that the dilapidation of the historic peninsula was also an outcome of the increasing centralisation of jurisdiction as of 1836, which had curtailed the power of local pious foundations, previously in charge of the maintenance and repair of monuments and neighborhoods, see, Altınyıldız, pp.281-285.

[96] The planners who were invited to the contest were; Donate Alfred Agache, the planner of Buenos Aires, German planner Herman Elgötz and the chief planner of Paris, Henri Prost who was replaced by Jacques Lambert, upon his refusal of the invitation, see, Cana Bilsel, 'Remodelling the Imperial Capital', in *Power and Culture: Identity, Ideology, Representation*, ed. by Jonathan Osmond and Ausma Cimdina (Pisa: Plus-Pisa University Press, 2007), pp.95-115, (p.98).

[97] Akpınar, p.77.

[98] Ibid.

policies and suppressions of expression of popular faith, PRP's urban improvement works in a post-war era of increased press freedom had to be scrupulously disseminated. Thus Kırdar's municipality published two propaganda journals titled *Güzelleşen İstanbul* (*GI*, Embellishing Istanbul) in 1943, followed by *Cumhuriyet Devrinde İstanbul* (*CDI*, Istanbul in the Republican Era) in 1949 to campaign for and disseminate the public improvement works planned by Prost. These were published during the office of the new PRP mayor Lütfi Kırdar whose active role in the publications was frequently cited, closely supervising the preparation of the journals. They targeted most of all the persuasion of a literate urban population but in their visual communication strategies they nonetheless adhered to new graphic data visualisations to make their messages widely intelligible. Although precise circulation numbers are not known, *GI* made a second print run in 1944 and possibly had a wider reach.[99]

For the dissemination of an official narrative, journals offer a more flexible medium than banknotes. This is because of practical reasons; publications allow more space for images and their accompanying textual messages. Their tone can be tuned to prospective issues according to public response. Finally, a wider range of graphic elements can be implemented in them without a predominant concern on their denotation of the nation-ness. The discursive space dedicated to the imperial monuments of Istanbul in the two publications allow us to investigate how the aforementioned aesthetic sensibilities in the İnönü era redefined a nationalist historicity of the imperial capital which was stressed through interventions of historical preservation informed by a global modern discourse on urban planning. In their discrepant and varying tones on these aspects, the journals also offer us hitherto unknown cues into the shifting political sensibilities of a liberalizing PRP in the post-war era.

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[99] *GI*, (1944), n.p.

Embellishing Istanbul

      With an adequate diligence on its print quality, *GI* was printed in the state-of-the-art *Maaarif Matbaası* (the Printing House of the Ministry of Education) the former State Printing House where *LTK* was also printed. Its' graphic design was entrusted to Mazhar Resmor (1901-1977), a graduate of *Paris École Nationale des Arts Décoratifs* where his training as a stained-glass artist had given him a versatility of professional skills ranging from painting, caricature and graphic design.[100] Thus for *GI* he deployed a subtle combination of a wide range of styles, oscillating between modern and traditional lines. The cover offered an epic narrative with a lower-angle, monumentalizing photomontage of the yet to be erected Taksim İnönü monument [Fig.4.12]. The transitions in between sections were accompanied by thematic illustrations blending mixed-media with photomontage [Fig.4.15].

Figure IV-15: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul *'Resmor's mixed-media thematic illustrations as section headings'* ©SALT Research.

Constructivist horizontal abstract lines created a composition on the inner pages where the use of indexical arrows in the photo essays invited the viewer to navigate between the

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[100] Ömer Durmaz, *İstanbul'un 100 Grafik Tasarımcısı ve İllüstratörü*, p.50.

before and after views [Fig.4.16]. This contrast of the old and new regimes was an often-consulted rhetoric of the republican elite as also argued in the third chapter, since it helped to underline the superiority of republican material advancement at the expense of the denigration of imperial legacy.

Figure IV-16: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul 'Use of horizontal lines in the composition (left) and indexical arrows to navigate the viewer between before and after views (right)' ©SALT Research.

It is worth discussing the context of the publication of *GI* to understand the political importance and the role the PRP bureaucracy attributed to the journal. Coinciding with the mid-1940s war economy with considerable limitations in print industry, the publication of *GI* seems a remarkable attempt. There was a tremendous shortage of technical equipment and paper, given the restrictions on trade with the war-stricken West.[101] From 1942 onwards the major dailies of Istanbul were officially restricted to print on four pages five to six days a week and could only run with six pages on remaining days.[102] This was probably exacerbated through the İnönü government's autarkic policies, namely the restrictions on imported paper. At the first Turkish Press Congress in 1939, organized by the minister of

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[101] Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın*, p.197. Such technical shortages were brought by the impossibility to import paper, machinery or spare parts due to the halt of production in Europe.
[102] Ibid.

education Hasan Ali Yücel (1897-1961); notable publisher Ali İhsan Tokgöz lamented that the state paper plant, (Izmit, 1936) was not cost-efficient and was responsible for the rise in paper prices since for its promotion, custom tariffs on imported paper had been escalated.[103] Moreover, the economic stagnation made it harder for publications to collect advertising revenues to which as of 1937, the state responded via subventions of official adverts (*resmi ilan*) further making the press dependent.[104]

These hardships were materialized even in the main state propaganda publication *LTK*, whose sporadically printed issues between 1942-1948 lacked their former lure in tactile and visual qualities, when examined at hand.[105] A note has also to be made here on *LTK* whose post-war issues (1944-1948) never focused on Istanbul's urban transformation although they extensively continued to announce the contemporary constructions in Ankara.[106] Moreover, in an essay in 1943, delineating the experience of an average tourist, the journal still accentuated the imperial city's heterogeneous demographics (Russian restaurants, Greek porter, Armenian courier) claiming that a visitor might find nothing much about contemporary Turkey in Istanbul. It rather praised Ankara as a "Shangri-La", built from scratch with its modern train station, wide, paved avenues, boosting fine-arts, all breaking away from the old and embodying the new spirit of Turkey that Istanbul simply did not possess.[107] That the main state propaganda journal still dwelled on these binary oppositions between the two cities when Kırdar's major republican interventions under Prost's supervision were underway is all the more suggestive of why Kırdar's municipality needed a propaganda device. If the construction of a modern national capital was only meaningful through a binary, at the expanse of Istanbul's deliberate alienation, the

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[103] Ali İhsan Tokgöz , quoted in Ibid., p.183.
[104] Koloğlu, p.132.
[105] The journal was out of print throughout 1942, only to be back in print in 1943 with the forty-seventh issue and then published two more annual issues sporadically in 1947 and 1948. Particularly, on the forty-seventh issue (1943), the shortage of paper is sensible on the frontispiece, as it is printed in a less flamboyant manner, on a page similar in tactile qualities to the body matter, rather than the customary use of thicker, coated paper.
[106] 'Ankara Construit', *LTK*, 48 (1947), pp.44-47. There is an instance where snapshots of Istanbul's then major tree-lined boulevard the Cumhuriyet Boulevard in Şişli is pictured, yet this is not a major part of Prost's plan, see, *LTK*, 43 (1941), n.p. Although Cumhuriyet Boulevard might have had a retouch in this period and had been subject to further development, its realisation as a wide tree-lined avenue dates back to 1869, see, Çelik, pp.69, 72.
[107] 'Ankara-İstanbul', *LTK*, 47 (1943), pp.37-49.

transformation of imperial Istanbul to a modern national city must have been then a trophy for Kırdar's office. This is also evident in the fact that while the construction of a modern national capital with respect to a dilapidated Istanbul was addressed to a global audience; the transformation of imperial Istanbul to a modern national city was somehow reserved to a national one. In other words, the leveling and evening out of the dichotomy of a dilapidated imperial town/modern national capital suggested national pride in so far as it turned the former into the historical depository destined for the glorious rise of the modern nation-state. Although these were not explicitly expressed messages of the republican elite, these discursive sedimentations on print media allow us to observe them in an amplified manner.

Open spaces

The creation of secular, open spaces was an equal concern of Kırdar's urban renewal scheme as stated in *GI*. İpek Akpınar argues that the new plans were not merely motivated by the city's urban problems but derived particularly from a need to instill in the former Ottoman capital a new spatial reform conducive of a secular national life style that in the Ottoman use of public spaces, regulated by religion, simply did not exist.[108] Not surprisingly, *GI* dealt extensively with the creation of *espaces libres* (open spaces), a notion asserted by Eugène Hénard (1949-1923) as essential for public well being.[109] The journal illustrates the clearing of the Eminönü, Sirkeci, Beyazıt and Üsküdar squares to make way for vast open spaces, emphasizing the grandeur of the monuments. It promotes the construction of various parks of which the Taksim İnönü Promenade was one, replacing the nineteenth-century eclectic Topçu Barracks.[110] Resmor subtly delineated this transformation with before and after shots of the same viewpoints where the reader is guided by indexical arrows pointing to the present view of the squares with neat expressive lettering [Fig.4.17]. On the frames depicting the former status, a bold graphic line outlining the silhouette of the

[108] Akpınar, p.65.
[109] Hénard quoted in Ibid., p.73.
[110] The İnönü Promenade was only one of the three vast park areas designated in the Prost plan, the other two were the botanic park and the archeological park to be located on the historic peninsula, see, *GI*, n.p.

demolished structures subtly suggests the amount of work done. As argued earlier, such graphic visualisations of data might have increased the comprehension of the publication to a wider audience since in the post-war period literacy rates had only risen to sixty percent in cities and half that amount in rural areas.[111]

Figure IV-17: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul *'The new espaces libres in Eminönü (left) and Sirkeci (right)'* ©SALT Research.

A particular focus in the creation of these spaces was on modern aspects of childcare. *GI* substantiates this with the claim that "children only grow in light and become sturdy and healthy only if they run in the open air and play with earth".[112] The journal illustrates this in its photo essays for *Çocuk Bahçeleri* (Children's Playgrounds) accompanied by Resmor's illustration of a mother, walking elegantly in her up-to-date fashion pushing a stroller [Fig.4.18].[113] On previous pages, three women, one of them again with a stroller, are seen walking through the brand new alleys of the Taksim İnönü Promenade.[114] By the turn of the century childhood in the developed world had lost its economic value to a more sentimental

[111] For literacy rates in the 1940s, see, Shaw and Shaw, p. 427 and Koloğlu, p.201.
[112] 'Vali ve Belediye Reisimiz Dr. Lütfi Kırdar'ın İnönü Gezisinin Açılış Nutku' and 'Çocuk Bahçeleri', *GI*, (1944), n.p.
[113] Ibid.
[114] In another sequence *LTK* also allocates one shot for a similar scene with a single mother and her stroller, entering the refurbished Taksim Municipal Gardens, see, *LTK*, 44 (1941), n.p.

one, placing children at the core of social conerns.[115] There were worries in the political elites of USA and Europe that unsupervised children would be more inclined to delinquency within the precarious urban environment.[116] To overcome this, reformers increasingly advocated adult-supervised physical activity in fresh air with urban playgrounds appearing first in Germany and in the USA.[117] The modernisation of motherhood, on the other hand, had wider implications on aspects of gender. Angela Davis asserts that motherhood stands at the intersection of various discourses relating to education, health care, psychology and state intervention.[118] She underlines that new motherhood models emerging increasingly after WWII introduced dramatic changes in the role of young urban women whom had grown up with "images, commodities, and experiences, representing a world beyond the family, home, and the locality".[119] However, the global modernisation of motherhood as a corollary effect of expanding industrialisation, scientific knowledge and central government complicated motherhood ideals and did little to cope with its gender essentialist approach confining child-rearing to women.[120] What is important here is how these global debates also echo in the mixed gender policies of the republican spatial codes, which as *GI* also illustrates, seemingly emancipates women but does not reiterate their gender-essentialist confinement.

[115] Joseph M. Hawes and N. Ray Hiner, 'Introduction', in *A Cultural History of Childhood and Family in the Modern Age*, ed. by Joseph M. Hawes and N. Ray Hiner (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp.1-20 (p.4).
[116] Ibid., pp.8-9.
[117] Pamela Rinye-Kehberg, 'Environment', in Ibid., pp.77-98 (p.86).
[118] Angela Davis, *Modern Motherhood, Women and Family in England 1945-2000* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), pp.1-3.
[119] Judy Giles quoted in Ibid., p.3.
[120] Jodi Vandenberg-Daves, *Modern Motherhood, An American History* (London: Rutgers University Press), pp.2-3.

Figure IV-18: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul. *'Chidlren's play ground section and Taksim İnönü promenade (upper left)'* ©SALT Research.

Legitimacy for the undertaking of these new public spaces, operating without admission fees, was provided from their Western antecedents.[121] *GI* referred to this long discourse on Western city planning with the following lines;

> […] there is no great or small city in the world without beautiful parks inside or around them. The *Bois du Boulogne* in Paris, Hyde Park in London, the *Tiergarten* in Berlin, the *Stadpark* in Vienna, the Margaret Island in Budapest and Central Park in New York are beautiful examples of this kind.[122]

As Zeynep Çelik also notes this was an aspiration eminent also in the works of the nineteenth-century *Tanzimat* reformers, who after serving in diplomatic missions in the then rapidly changing urban environments of Western capitals, had come back with the same urge to transform the Ottoman capital.[123] Likewise, they justified the necessary expropriations and destructions to clear open spaces, with the emulation of a Western effect rather than to follow a rationale of planning. This is an inclination also evident in 1940s

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[121] 'Vali ve Belediye Reisimiz Dr. Lütfi Kırdar'ın İnönü Gezisinin Açılış Nutku' and 'Çocuk Bahçeleri', *GI*, (1944), n.p.
[122] 'Parklar ve Korular', *GI* (1944), n.p.
[123] Çelik, p. 3.

republican reformers as *GI* justifies the recent demolitions on Beyazıt Square with the incapacity of the former administrations in not recognizing the vastness of the square tantamount to the Parisian *Place de l'Étoile*.[124] What this denigration of Ottoman refomers eclipses is the earlier clearing of the surroundings of Hagia Sophia and Süleymaniye mosques to accentuate their monumental character in the late nineteenth century.[125]

One major criticism of the demolitions, foreseen in the Prost plan was their selective evaluation of history. Prost was highly scrutinized by Turkish art historians and architects such as the prominent, Sedat Çetintaş (1889-1965) to value Roman and Byzantine heritage over Muslim-Ottoman, especially in his archeological park complex envisioned at the tip of the historic peninsula [Fig.4.19].


Figure IV-19: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul. 'The map showing intervention areas in the historic peninsula, with the archeological park located at the tip of the historic peninsula' ©SALT Research.

Apart from the Sultan Ahmet Mosque, the park comprised the Hagia Sophia, the Hippodrome Square and the covered remains of the Byzantine Great Palace; to which Çetintaş raised the question of whether for Prost the monument was confined to the

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[124] 'Dünkü ve Bugünkü Beyazıt Meydanı', *GI*, (1944). n.p.
[125] Çelik, pp.49-63.

Byzantine.[126] Cana Bilsel also argues that Prost's interest in the Roman-Byzantine heritage of the city was obvious as suggested in his other ambitious projects such as the reconstruction of the Forum of Tauri by the enlargement of Beyazıt Square.[127] Seen from a wider perspective, however, there seems nonetheless to be a growing acknowledgement of the historical importance of especially Roman and Byzantine era monuments, given their universal importance, which must have culminated through a photographic interest instigated by Ottoman illustrated journals, as Ersoy also points.[128] Deringil also mentions that in official Ottoman mythology the Sultan was seen as as the successors of Rome and Byzantium.[129] A connection with the Roman legacy must have been politically legitimating for the republican elite too since in Ankara as well the surroundings of the Temple of Augustus were cleared to honor the emperor's two-thousandth anniversary celebrations.[130] Thus, arguably Prost was not acting on his behalf on these projections but projecting the sensibilities of wider network of urban educated actors.

A similar plan, delineated in *GI*, was foreseen on the Hippodrome Square, whose southern tip was to be cleared of buildings to overlook the Sea of Marmara. Here a grandiose monument to *İnkılap* (revolution) would stand, visible from the sea night and day, turning the square into a material reconciliation of the city's palimpsests; Byzantine, Ottoman and Republican.[131] On a section titled *Yarınki İstanbul* (Istanbul of Tomorrow) this was represented as a victorious landmark to be completed until the quincentenary commemorations of Istanbul's conquest and a possible hosting of the Olympic Games in 1953.[132] Similarly, the projection of this utopian monument did not address the destruction of many late nineteenth-century Ottoman-revivalist style landmarks, which had by then

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[126] Sedat Çetintaş, quoted in Altınyıldız, p.292.
[127] Bilsel, pp.107-111
[128] Ersoy, *Ottomans and the Kodak Galaxy*, p.350.
[129] Deringil, *Well Protected Domains*, pp.28-29.
[130] Bilsel, p.109. In mid-1930s the Ministry of Education had issued a decree to every school stating that all historic works attested to the creativity and culture of the Turkish race regardless of denominations like Hittite, Roman or Byzantine, which the decree claimed "only designated periods", see, Altınyıldız, p.291. In 1945 architect Zeki Arıkan had urged for the foundation of an Institute of Byzantine Institute to preserve and scientifically study those monuments, see, Zeki Sayar, *Arkitekt*, 157.158(1945), p.26.
[131] 'İstanbul Fethinin 500 üncü Yılının Kutlanması', *GI*, n.p.
[132] 'Yarınki İstanbul', *GI*, (1944), n.p. The closest Olypmic Games were held a year earlier in 1952, a detail possibly missed by the zealous declaration of the journal.

acquired attributes of patrimony and thus would draw further criticism.[133]

If imperial monuments, be it Ottoman or Byzantine had their particular advocates, the loss of any civil architectural legacy went unnoticed by the critiques as in *GI*'s delineation of the restoration works of *Mısır Çarşısı* (the Egyptian Bazaar). The works prioritized the revelation of an idealized seventeenth-century essence in the structure. As argued earlier, the prevailing aesthetic assumptions of republican nationalist art historiographies deemed this period as the purest manifestation of Turkish character.[134] This was because historiographers maintained that until the eighteenth century, before the beginnings of Western influence, Ottoman art and architecture had preserved a Turkish essence.[135] *GI* similarly justified the removal of the nineteenth-century storefront timber canopies, as merely "haphazard patches, aesthetically amounting to nothing".[136] Through a selective restoration of the artistic qualities of a particular era these restoration works deprived the monument of an age value, a general sense evoked in the beholder by the passage of time according to Aloïs Riegl.[137] It was thus the material legacy of imperial Istanbul's cosmopolitan mercantile classes that had to be obliterated for the recreation of the structure's classical glory. Moreover, the demolition of the Harim Mosque and the row of shops in front of the Egyptian Bazaar meant the loss of complex relationships between the religious and commercial activities of the former Ottoman social sphere.[138] Overall, the

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[133] Bilsel argues for instance that the restoration of the Forum of Tauri would have necessitated the demolition of old Ottoman monuments such as the *Simkeş Han* and thus provoked the reaction of Turkish intellects and architects alike. The critics targeting the Prost plan for favoring the Byzantine heritage over the Ottoman echoed further well into 1950s, see, İsmail Danışmend, 'Bizansçılık İlleti', *Milliyet*, 13 February 1952, p.2.

[134] Hamadeh, pp.184-197.

[135] Ibid. For the influence of nationalist art historiographies on early twentieth-century nationalist aesthetic perceptions, see, Bozdoğan, *Reading Ottoman Architecture Through Modernist Lenses,* pp.213-214.

[136] 'Mısır Çarşısı', *GI*, (1944), n.p.

[137] Aloïs Riegl, *Moderne Denkmalkultus : sein Wesen und seine Entstehung*, (Vienna: K. K. Zentral-Kommission für Kunst- und Historische Denkmale : Braumuüller, 1903). Translation first published as Aloïs Riegl, 'The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin,' trans. Kurt W. Forster and Diane Ghirardo, in *Oppositions*, n. 25 (1982), 21-51(p.24). Furthermore, later restoration works in the 1950s were inspired from idealized drawings from recently emerging nationalist art historiographies like Sedat Çetintaş's, see, Altınyıldız, pp.293-299.

[138] Birge Yıldırım points for instance to the demolition of the Harim Mosque and the row of shops in front of the Egyptian Bazaar, see Birge Yıldırım, 'Transformation of Public Squares of Istanbul Between 1938-1949', *The 15th International Planning History Society (IPHS)*, 15–18 July 2012, n.p.

restoration must have entailed an amnesia annihilating the former social relations and functions of the structure.

The journal visually enhances this transformation with retouched dust rays in the before shot, which are contrasted with a vividly clear view of the bazaar. Resmor graphically anchored ideas on the obsolescence of the demolished parts with illustrative spider webs [Fig.4.20]. As Tom Allbeson argues for Britain's wartime visualisation of destruction and reconstruction, photographs had a central role for the "negotiation of ambiguity" to secure and channel a favored meaning either through captions or retouching that worked hand in hand with mass media communication to shape the public sphere.[139] Similarly *GI*, through subtle plays with the indexical and symbolic attributes of photography, that is as a simultaneous medium of objective representation and emotional expression, visually and verbally reconstructed the photographs to condition a favorable public opinion on the demolitions.[140]

<http://www.fau.usp.br/15-iphs-conference-sao-paulo-2012/abstracts-and-papers.html> [accessed 7 March 2018].
[139] Tom Allbeson, *Visualising Wartime Destruction and Postwar Reconstruction.*
[140] Ibid.

Figure IV-20: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul. *'The before after photographs of the Egyptian Bazaar'*
©SALT Research.

Disregard for former social attributes of the urban texture was globally a common trait in urban planning. Prost's former work in Casablanca's *Place de France*, had left the 30-metre *arabisant* clock tower isolated in the midst of rising concrete blocks, cutting its connection with the demolished Jewish quarters and parts of the old city wall.[141] Robert Hewison argues that the valorisation of certain material objects from others constitutes the past in the present, the physical world we live in with its heritage.[142] Heritage in this sense functions like myth; despite its ahistorical elements it supports a cultural truth that is widely revered by people. This is important for the cultural value heritage adds in the definition of identities and nations. Rudy Koshar also argues that just as building national monuments responds to the mobilisation of a complex society in need of new forms of collective identity, so does the articulation of various historical buildings at the expense of others reflect the simultaneous processes of fragmentation and consolidation.[143] The fervent graphic and photographic communication of the Egyptian Bazaar's restoration also

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[141] Daniel E. Coslett, 'Broadening the Study of North Africa's Planning History: Urban Development and Heritage Preservation in Protectorate-era and Postcolonial Tunis', in *Urban Planning in North Africa*, ed. by Carlos Nunes Silva (Oxon: Ashgate Publishing, 2016), pp.115-132.

[142] Robert Hewison, 'Heritage: An Interpretation', in *Heritage Interpretation Vol.1, The Natural and the Built Environment*, ed. by David Uzzell (London: Belhaven Press, 1989), pp.15-23 (p.17).

[143] Koshar, p.53.

suggests this. At the expense of annihilating the civil history of the city's cosmopolitan past, the municipality's works have restructured an idealized classical image of the landmark through which the ruling elite wished it to be remembered as.

Touristic appeal

An equal endeavor of Kırdar's project was to make the city more appealing to an international community of tourists, a frequently addressed issue in *GI*. As he noted in the journal, of the two major aims in rebuilding Istanbul, turning the historic centre of the city into a tourist destination even preceded creating a modern city on the principles of modern urban design.[144] The restoration of Byzantine and Ottoman monuments, *GI* stated, was to "take them out of the pages of books and place them for the whole world to see, as a presence in various parts of the city" a mission of "obvious significance for tourism, archeology and history".[145] Jill Steward argues that as of the nineteenth century, similar programs of redevelopment and beautification undertaken by modernizing municipal authorities had initiated a new cultural politics where the urban elites became highly concerned and aware about the ways their city was perceived by the outside world.[146] *GI*'s fervent propagandist tone similarly works to convince Istanbulites on the legitimacy of their new public spaces to be sustained by prospective visitors.

Conversely though, a particular tourist attraction in *GI* was not a historical monument but the new Florya Beach complex, presented not merely as a local amenity but also as an attraction for tourists. *GI* stated that many European cities had similar bathing facilities and that even those inland had constructed artificial lakes like Berlin's *Wannsee*.[147] As a matter of fact, the plan for the Florya lido complex by architect Seyfi Arkan (1903-1966) was consulted by Martin Wagner who had designed the *Strandband Wansee* in 1930, with a very similar low, horizontal layout and closed-roof colonnades as walkways.[148] The Florya

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[144] 'Vali Dr. Lütfi Kırdar'ın Mektubu', *GI*, (1944), n.p.
[145] 'Tamir Edilecek Tarihi Binalar', *GI*, (1944), n.p.
[146] Jill Steward, *The Attractions of Place: The Making of Urban Tourism*, p.258.
[147] 'Florya', *GI*, (2004), n.p.
[148] 'Floryayı İmar için Hummalı Faaliyetler', *Cumhuriyet*, 11 June 1935, pp.1, 7.

complex was the epitome of the new secular spatial codes as it allowed men and women alike to bathe in their modern swimwear on the beach, alongside foreign visitors [Fig.4.21]. Despite the lack of accommodation facilities, voiced in the press, the conditioning of Istanbul for a foreign community of tourists meant rather convincing a national community on the international meaning and purposing of their new secular spaces.[149] This was a common way of fashioning services, as the journal, *Ameli Electric* had also done as far back as in 1926. In an editorial to promote its tramway network to both its readers and to foreign visitors, the journal claimed that despite the large span of the city, its tramway network easily allowed access to principal curiosities, simply by following a table of itineraries.[150] Thus, as Steward argues for the nineteenth-century metropolitan cities, in 1940s Istanbul as well the developments of goods and services and tourism shaped the conceptions of locality, nation and the perception of cities.[151]

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[149] The journalist Şevket Rado pointed much later in 1950 that Istanbul still lacked modern accommodation facilities both in quality and quantity, see Şevket Rado, 'Bir Güzel Şehir ki Otel Yok!', *Akşam*, 2 December 1950, p.2. This would lead in 1952 to the expropriation of parts of the Gezi Park for the construction of Hilton Istanbul, a great preservation dilemma between the PRP bureaucracy and the new Democrat Party liberal policies.

[150] 'Comment Visiter en Tramway Constantinople et ses Environs', *Ameli Electric*, 12 (1926), p.103.

[151] Steward, p.256.

Figure IV-21: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul *'Seyfi Arıkan's new Florya beach complex'* ©SALT Research.

New ways of showing

A prominent feature of *GI* was its communication of complex quantitative information through data visualisations and infographics. The journal's editors were eager to prove to Istanbulites that the municipality had carried out the redevelopments despite a stagnant war economy and it repeatedly emphasized this.[152] Therefore, quantitative information had to be conveyed in a persuasive manner through data visualisations. Resmor illustrated the background of these charts to hint on the theme treated; an engraving of an Ottoman fountain for the water consumption chart or a collage of fashionable sportsmen for sports investments [Fig.4.22]. In certain cases objects were used as pictograms; milestones for the road construction chart, lampposts for illumination works and a republican "average man" with Homburg hats for tramway passenger numbers [Fig.4.23].[153] These graphically enhanced the communication of otherwise complicated statistical data, and their alleged upward trend implicitly hinted at ideas of progress and development in a war-stricken era.

[152] 'İnönü Devri'; 'Yollarımız' and 'Yarınki İstanbul', *GI*, (1944), n.p.

[153] 'Avarge man' or *'l'homme moyen'* was a term coined by mathematician Adolphe Quételet in his anthropometrical research (*Sur l'homme*, 1835) to express a measurable unit stripped of individual traits, see, Frank Hartmann, *Visualising Social Facts*, p.284.

Scientific communicability of social facts through pictograms without respect to abstract numerical and linguistic expressions was laid out in 1930s by sociologist Otto Neurath and graphic designer Gred Arntz in Britain, coined as ISOTYPE picture language.[154]


Figure IV-22: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul *'Use of thematically illustrated graphic charts'* ©SALT Research.

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[154] Resmor's use of ISOTYPE defies Neurath's rule of symbolizing quantities through the serialisation of the same graphic elements and uses instead a variation of scales, see, Ibid., pp.282-283 and 286-287. Nevertheless, the emulation to a pictorial communication is evident.

Figure IV-23: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul *'Various graphic elements used in charts'* ©SALT Research.

In creating an inclusive, systemised pictorial language, Neurath aimed to democratise knowledge by extending its intelligibility to disadvantaged classes with disproportionate access to education, a socialist endeavor to visually educate adults.[155] These new scientific ways of graphic communication of data were appealing propaganda instruments, used also in the Soviet Russia for the *USSR in Construction* journal, employed by designers El Lissitzky and Sophie Küppers.[156] In Turkey, a propagator of this trend was the State Institute of Statistics (1926) with the exhibitions of the *Milli İktisad ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti* (Society for National Economy and Savings, 1929), chaired by Vedat Nedim Tör. It was this society whom had built Ankara's constructivist *Sergi Evi* (Exhibtion Hall, 1934) where it organized the propaganda exhibitions of *National Economy* in 1933 and *Before and After Lausanne* in 1934 with large three-dimensional panels, ISOTYPE and data visualisations contrasting the imperial legacy with the republican rhetoric on technological advancement.[157]

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155 Ibid., p.283.
156 Victor Margolin, *The Struggle for Utopia.* Also see, Margolin, *World History of Design, Vol. II* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p.620.
157 Tör, p. 17 and *LTK*, 'Die Erste Ausstellung im Neuen Ausstellungs: Gebäude in Ankara', 4 (1934), pp.23-28.

From the statistics on *GI* an obsession with new materials is also observable; namely with asphalt and concrete. Elizabeth Shove suggests that material culture studies should not only concentrate on objects but should also consider the socially symbolic aspcects of material substances, of which *GI* offers a remarkable glimpse.[158] Epitomized as the most modern construction materials for roads and buildings, the duo almost denoted modernity in the journal. The literature on modern architecture and urbanism is likely combined with these materials as their introduction provided new perspectives in design. However, here the concern is on the socialsymbolic, communicative value of these materials, as argued by Shove, that the republican elite imbued them with.[159]

The pages of *GI* abound in brand new concrete, constructivist constructions with unornamented facades, the Florya beach complex, the new Cerrahpaşa health centre, the Kadıköy and Eminönü People's Houses, the Taksim Municipality Club (*Belediye Gazinosu*) to name a few. This latter, designed by Rükneddin Güney (1938-1940), with its reinforced concrete structure, double-height dining hall and a semicircular bay window overseeing the Bosphorus, is accounted for introducing in Istanbul secular norms of recreation and entertainment [Fig.4.24].[160] The promotion of educational facilities was equally prominent, with forty-seven new edifices constructed in the previous five years as the journal states, illustrating the new Fatih and Aksaray elementary school buildings with their horizontal, linear plans [Fig.4.25].[161] Fire was still an eminent threat for the promotion of these reinforced concrete structures. In June 1944, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, pointing to the increased occurrences of fires in timber structures, had published a decree, obliging schools, hotels and commercial institutions to replace their facilities with concrete ones within two months.[162]

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[158] Elizabeth Shove, *The Design of Everyday Life* (Oxford: Berg, 2007), p.18.

[159] This section discusses mainly the representation of buildings and building materials in print rather than architectural building plans. For the spread of concrete-reinforced modern architecture in the post-war era, see, Bozdoğan and Akcan, pp.105-138. For the discussion of Marshall-plan-led construction of a modern highway network in Turkey, see, Begüm Adalet, *Hotel and Highways*.

[160] Bozdoğan and Akcan, p.112.

[161] 'Maarif', *GI*, (1944), n.p.

[162] 'Ahşap Evlerde Islahat', *Vakit*, 23 June 1944, p.3.

Figure IV-24: Mazhar Resmor (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul *'The Taksim Municipality Club'* ©SALT Research.

Figure IV-25: Istanbul Municipality (1944). Güzelleşen İstanbul *'The new Fatih and Aksaray elementary school buildings'* ©SALT Research.

To a certain extent, concrete structures were practical in reducing the risk of fire as well as construction costs with their bare facades.[163] Although at the beginning, in 1920s, the

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[163] Already in 1926 when architect Arif Koyunoğlu was working on the Turkish Heart Association (later People's House) headquarters of Ankara, given the unavailability of master craftsmanship he himself had worked for four months for the gypsum, see, İnci Aslanoğlu, 'Evalutation of Architectural

domestic production and import of cement was hindered by high costs of transportation and variable pricing, in 1930s there were four cement factories operating (added to that was a new factory in Sivas in 1937) in Turkey. Evetually, also with cement imported from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the supply evened out so much so that the slogan "Today's building policy is cement policy" became widespread in architectural publications.[164] However, in a cartoon image on *Cumhuriyet*, in 1946, Cemal Nadi Güler (1902-1947) satirized the obsession with the new material [Fig.4.26]. In this, two gentlemen are seen watching a concrete apartment block on fire. While one contends that thanks to concrete structure the fire would not spread, turning millions of national wealth to ashes; the other can't help but notice that it is rather because of the sheer size of new concrete housing that now millions burned in just one edifice.[165] It seems, as much as the *Tanzimat* reformers praised *kargir* over traditional timber, the republican rhetoric seems to have been swayed by concrete. That Le Corbusier's urban development plan for Istanbul was rejected on the basis that it suggested the preservation of its timber architecture heritage also attests to this fetishisation of the material with its ideological connotations of modernity and anti-orientalism beyond its practical use.[166]

Developments in Turkey within the Socio-Economic and Cultural Framework of the 1923-28 Period', *ODTU Mimarlık Fakültesi Dergisi*, 7.2 (1986), 15-41 (p.22)

[164] Ibid., p.24 and Zeki Selah, 'Türkiye'de Çimento bir Lükstür', *Mimar*, 5 (1934), 155-156 (p.156).

[165] Cemal Nadi Güler, *Cumhuriyet*, 23 January 1946, p.1.

[166] Le Corbusier later noted that it was a strategic, even foolish mistake of his to suggest keeping Istanbul intact that had led to his competitor Prost taking the job, see, Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, p.42 and Şemsa Demiren, 'Le Corbusier ile Mülakat', *Arkitekt*, 11-12 (1949), 230-231 (p.231).

Figure IV-26: Cemal Nadi Güler (1946). Cumhuriyet '*A satirical cartoon of two gentlemen watching a concrete building on fire*' ©Cumhuriyet Archives.

Inferring from *GI*, asphalt seems another symbolically charged material for road construction, even though compared to cobblestone it was argued to lessen tire wear. *GI* stated, since roads were as essential to a city as the vascular system to a body is, construction works had not ceased despite the hardships of war.[167] On Resmor's illustrated charts, asphalt is the most highly consulted construction material for over twenty kilometers of roads [Fig.4.23].[168] As a new material, its use seems particularly reserved for the modern neighborhoods of Harbiye, Taksim, Beşiktaş, Yıldız on the European side and Suadiye, Göztepe, Erenköy on the Asian.[169] Neighborhoods of upscale residence and leisure along the European coast of the Bosphorus with business districts in Galata and Karaköy were also given asphalt roads as the new modern *espaces libres* in Eminönü and Taksim.[170] Nevertheless, even the pro-PRP press found the use of asphalt pretentious since the material was imported and the lack of infrastructure meant frequent construction works that left uneven patches on the roads, causing more discontent than the former cobblestone.[171]

Roads were also ideologically charged, as they helped to reconcile the discrepancies between the urban development in predominantly non-Muslim Galata and old Istanbul, as

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[167] 'Yollarımız', *GI*, (1944), n.p.

[168] If compared separately to other materials (stone pavement, cobblestone, macadam etc.) the use of asphalt was leading but in total it still lagged behind them, see, 'Istanbul Belediyesinin 6 Senelik yol Grafiği', *GI*, (1944), n.p.

[169] 'Yollarımız', *GI*, (1944), n.p.

[170] Ibid.

[171] 'Asfalt Sevdası', *Cumhuriyet*, 2 March 1941, p.2.

was argued in the third chapter.[172] This was still a prominent cultural divide in the city. Reminiscent of Kozma Togo's 1926 satirical cartoon in the third chapter, it is fascinating how *GI* similarly narrates this divide as "two communities facing each other yet distant and consumed in their own particular universe, like two different cities" [Fig.3.34].[173] This is for the promotion of the new Gazi Bridge, connecting Unkapanı and Azapkapı on the Golden Horn, which *GI* asserts would connect and unify the two neighborhoods as a blood stream, longed for centuries in Istanbul.[174] Or when arguing for the demolition works around Eminönü Mosque, that the mosque is now "overlooking the opposite shore boasted with pride…challenging".[175] As argued at the onset of the chapter, the evening out of Istanbul's social, religious discrepancies was necessary to turn the former imperial capital into the nation-state's historical depository for a glorious past.

Istanbul in the republican era

Four years after the publication of *GI*, in 1949 the Istanbul municipality published another propaganda journal, *Cumhuriyet Devrinde İstanbul* (*CDI*, Istanbul in the Republican Era).[176] The publication of a second propaganda journal is intriguing given that the municipality was still under the mayoralty of Kırdar -with Prost still the chief planner- and most of the plans delineated in *GI* were still incomplete. However, in 1946 the political environment had considerably changed. In 1945 the Turkish government was one of the co-signatories to the United Nations Charter and as such new Westerns ideals of democracy and liberalism seemed inevitable for the PRP elite. A corollary effect of this was the recognition of a multi-party democratic system by the PRP in 1946, consenting to the "four rebels" of the party; Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan and Fuad Köprülü to establish a legal opposition movement, known as the Democrat Party (DP) in 1946. DP had lost the first elections in 1946 but the political rivalry had caused the PRP to loosen its

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[172] Galata was highly reconstructed in the nineteenth-century with modern building standards (*kargir*) therefore had been far less subject to fire damage ever since, compared to peninsular Istanbul, see, Çelik, pp.155-158.
[173] 'Gazi Köprüsü', *GI*, (1944), n.p.
[174] 'Gazi Köprüsü', *GI*, (1944), n.p.
[175] 'Eminönü Meydanı', *GI*, (1944), n.p.
[176] *CDI*, (1944).

authoritarian tone and follow a similar program of liberalisation, abolishing İnönü's titles of "permanent PRP chairman" and "Chief of Nation".[177] Whilst free enterprise was advocated, a Ministry of Labour for the interests of the working class was established, the control on the sale and pricing of goods was relaxed and most importantly press law was amended, hindering arbitrary closures of press organs unless by judiciary channels.[178] Nevertheless, as Zürcher also notes with the emerging effects of cold war, DP and PRP found themselves in a mud-slinging campaign in which they constantly accused each other of being lax on communism.[179]

Kırdar's urban development scheme was also lagging behind the promises of *GI* and this had also drawn criticism. In 1948, even the pro-PRP daily Cumhuriyet inquired about the missing facilities to host the Olympic Games during the quincentenary commemorations of Istanbul's conquest in 1953 and the lack of hotels for tourists, adding that with six and a half million liras deficit in the municipality budget, it wasn't even possible to resume the urban development plan.[180] This section argues that with the publication of *CDI*, Kırdar aimed to respond to these criticisms with a more liberal tone and a classically informed editorial graphics, suggesting the reconciliation of the redefined nationalist legacy of the imperial capital with his undergoing modern urban embellishment project. A reorientation of the public opinion on the PRP-led urban renewal of Istanbul was necessary given that the second general elections were also scheduled to take place in 1950, slightly a year after *CDI*'s publication. In a way the actors were same but within the changing political environment they were acting in a different, more populist way. A second journal could prove to be useful in this. It could tone down the pro-İnönü

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[177] Zürcher, pp.209-215.

[178] Shaw and Shaw, p.401. Measures such as licenses and money deposits for publishing new dailies were also abolished and as a result newspapers doubled and journals saw a thirty percent rise in number, see, Koloğlu, p.101. This is not to say that the transition was smooth. Left-wing, pro-Soviet dailies such as *Tan* (of Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel) who had also supported the 'four rebels' faced serious threats and finally got sacked by a mob of students inflamed by anti-communist sentiments leaving their printing press destroyed in December 1945, see, Lewis, p.309.

[179] Zürcher, p.213.

[180] 'İstanbul'un İmarı', *Cumhuriyet*, 09 August 1948, pp.1, 3. The daily's main concern was that the municipality, already in financial deficit got no share from governmental institutions in the city (ports, trams, trains, electricity, ferries etc.) and it asked for the recognition of the city's share in those incomes, warning that for a big city as Istanbul, public improvement was a state issue and not the municipality's, see, 'İstanbul'un Hakkı İstanbul'a Verilmelidir', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 August 1948, pp.1, 3.

propagandist tone of the former *GI*, revisiting the criticisms and asserting the budget constraints for ongoing works.

CDI was also printed in the Printing House of the Ministry of Education, this time its supervision was undertaken by Kırdar's recently reorganized *İstanbul Belediyesi Neşriyat ve İstatistik Müdürlüğü* (Istanbul Municipality Directorate of Press and Printing), which was as *CDI* stated, a product of "Kırdar's democratic endeavor", allowing a straightforward communication with the press through regular, monthly meetings and stronger public relations with feedbacks on questions and complaints.[181] Although *CDI*'s general tone is equally partisan, it is not surprising to see the underscoring of a more democratic tone with the press and public within the general political shift.

In fact, what strikes today's reader in comparing *GI* and *CDI* is the prominent populist and defensive tone of *CDI*. The cover illustration of the journal avoids the İnönü-cult epic narrative style of Resmor's *GI* cover, setting a less fervent tone by a clever use of negative space and flat shapes, depicting the imperial Ortaköy Mosque [Fig.4.27]. The flatness of the image and the illustrated elements (imperial mosque, carnation) recall a visual aesthetics from the courtly arts of miniature painting and the sixteenth century Iznik tiles. This was the work of Kenan Temizan who had studied in Berlin's *Reimann Schule* and had worked there extensively for the German film and car industry in the 1930s.[182] As argued earlier, although a plinth had already been constructed for Belling's equestrian İnönü monument in 1943 it could not have been erected due to raised right-wing opposition. Thus, the illustration of the mosque on the cover with a twist of vernacular and modern graphic elements must have been a safer communication strategy, referencing the city's imperial past rather than focusing on its stillborn secular republican monument. Meanwhile it also accommodates the aforementioned aesthetic sensibilites of the era reconciling vernacular forms with modern graphic elements.

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[181] 'Neşriyat ve İstatistik İşleri', *CDI*, (1949), p.197.
[182] Durmaz, p. 32.

Figure IV-27: Kenan Temizan (1949). Cumhuriyet Devrinde İstanbul ©SALT Research.

The discursive space the journal allocated to the material heritage of the city also espoused hybrid populist historical references to the city's imperial and republican past. This was ideally to advocate for a nationalist position to the current PRP municipality within the new political rivalry. It began with a discourse on Mehmet II, asserting that the history of the city's public works dated back to his reign.[183] It then underlined that Mehmet II, after conquering the city in 1453 "like Atatürk who had saved it twice in 1915", rebuilt it and gifted it to Turkishness as "the cradle of a new civilisation".[184] This was to follow a defensive tone for the PRP administration's neglect of Istanbul in its first decades. The journal stated that the city had subsequently lost its glory in the final periods of the empire because of incompetent late Ottoman *Tanzimat* reformers who did not wholly grasp the Western knowledge of urbanism, and were inept to organize the city into a prosperous state (despite millions spent), leaving it thus in a dilapidated condition to the Republic in 1923.[185]

Along with İnönü's equestrian monument, the journal also lowered its tone on the construction of Prost's archeological park and his mammoth *İnkılap* monument. Prost

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[183] 'İstanbul'un İmarı', *CDI* (1944), p.12.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.

himself was still employed as chief planner of the municipality, but no parts of his plan on these utopian projects were further promoted in *CDI*. These seem to have been suspended, either due to their historicist selectivity or to more pressing financial shortages.[186] At a conference in Paris, Prost had made a call to a Western audience, asserting that there was opposition in the public to the restoration of the monuments predating the conquest whilst the Ottoman monuments still lay in ruins.[187] Thus, it is likely that the budgetary deficit often mentioned as an excuse on *CDI*, seems to have set the journal's defensive tone, as none of the urban works publicized on *GI* had had any substantial progress in four years, whilst the most extravagant ones were left aside.[188] It seems also likely that even with an adequate budget, Prost's archeology park was now a utopia as it challenged the new political sensibilities after Mustafa Kemal's death. While Prost was pleading for international financial support for the project in Paris, he added, had Atatürk been alive, he would have had his support for his archeology park project.[189]

Prost's lamentation for the changing political climate is likely also a factor for *CDI*'s toned-down tone. It points to the growing circle of criticism gathered around the members of the *Güzideler Komisyonu* (Committee of Connoisseurs) a committee founded by Çetintaş in 1939, for the preparations of 1953 quincentenary celebrations of Istanbul's conquest.[190] Among the committee members, architecture historian Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi (1899-1984) voiced opposition, accusing republican intellects and authorities of hostility against Ottoman culture and fondness towards "even the shards of the Romans and Byzantines".[191] It is possible to sense resentment in Ayverdi and Çetintaş who were trained by prominent advocates of the National Architecture Renaissance at the Academy; Mimar Kemalettin,

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[186] Both are likely to have occurred, as the plans for the archeological park seem to have surfaced again in 1955, under the direction of new planner Ertuğrul Menteşe, see, Ertuğrul Menteşe, 'İstanbul'un İmarı', *Arkitekt*, 1 (1955), 27-38 (p.33).

[187] Henri Prost, 'İstanbul'un Arkeolojik Durumu ve Tarihi Abideleri', *Arkitekt*, 201-204 (1948), 235-236 (pp.235-236).

[188] In terms of finances, the journal was bluntly saying that the increase on the budget in the last decade was thanks to revenue collections and not to an increase on the municipality's incomes and taxes, which were 'all the more restrained'. It then added that despite all efforts of savings, the municipality could hardly go beyond keeping up the services, see, 'İstanbul Tramvayları', *CDI* (1949), pp.186-191.

[189] Prost, p.235.

[190] Altınyıldız, p.292.

[191] Ayverdi, quoted in Ibid., p.293.

Vedat Bey and Giulio Mongeri who were, as argued in the second chapter, replaced by German modernists (Ernst Egli 1930-1935 and Bruno Taut 1936-1938).[192] But as Bozdoğan also argues following the relaxation of the radical secularism of the state by the end of the single-party period, formerly disregarded tendencies by the official culture have been allowed to reestablish continuity with classical Ottoman models.[193]

What followed was thus the construction of the first republican mosque (1945-1949) on Istanbul's predominantly non-Muslim neighborhood of Şişli. For its design, architect Vasfi Egeli (1890-1962), a representative of the former academic tradition, had followed the pre-eighteen-century classical canon in line with Bozdoğan's above commentary, but this has nonetheless instigated a huge debate in the illustrated press on whether mosque architecture could be modern or not.[194] Called as the last exquisite work of Turkish classical architecture in the journal *Arkitekt*, the Şişli mosque is given a full-page endorsement in *CDI*, as were the classical Ahmet III Fountain and the Süleymaniye Mosque [Figs.4.28, 29].[195] These were printed in a monochrome palette with yellow, purple and greenish hues as separation pages in between sections, presenting the imperial monuments in their new republican setting (the Valens aqueduct cut accross by the new Ataturk Boulevard, the newly restored Covered Bazaar and a refurbished Hippodrome Square), suggesting the arrival of a new republican mosque within this redefinition of the imperial patrimony. What is bizarre is that despite this implicit visual endorsement, *CDI* makes no full-fledged references neither to construction works of the mosque, nor to the mayor's generous donation. Although the Şişli Mosque was constructed through public subscription to a committee (Society for the Construction and Sustenance of Şişli Mosque) its land, where

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[192] Egli and then Taut reformulated the education system in the architecture department of the Academy of Fine Arts. Breaking with the former Beaux-Arts tradition they put an emphasis on rational and functional design, see, Bozdoğan and Akcan, p.51.

[193] Bozdoğan, *Reading Ottoman Architecture Through Modernist Lenses,* p.218.

[194] The idealisation of classical seventeenth-century architecture for new mosques is a whole subject that has to be dealt at length. Celal Esad Arseven who was critical of Prost's plan was an advocate of this view and in his writings he alluded to a romanticized vernacular architecture tradition accompanied by the illustrations of Münif Fehim Özerman, see, Celal Esad Arseven, 'Eski Camilerimiz Nasıl Yapılırdı?', *Yedigün*, 320 (1939) 7-8. See also, Celal Esad Arseven, 'Cami ve Modern Mimari', *Yeni İstanbul*, 1 January 1955, p. 7.

[195] 'Haberler', *Arkitekt*, 7-8 (1948), 181-183 (p. 181).

military barracks stood, was allocated to the society by none other than mayor Kırdar.[196]
Such editorial precautions attest to the concomitance of still prevalent secular tensions with
new populist traditional inclinations and PRP's secular origins.[197]

Figure IV-28: Istanbul Municipality (1949). Cumhuriyet Devrinde İstanbul *'The new Şişli Mosque'* ©SALT
Research.

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[196] Vasfi Egeli, 'Şişli Camii', *Arkitekt*, 9-12 (1953), 169-177 (p.176), p.169.
[197] Only references to the new Şişli mosque in *CDI* are a full-page photograph with a caption that reads
'The new Şişli mosque, constructed by the people with the municipality's help', see, *CDI*, (1949), p.167.

Figure IV-29: Istanbul Municipality (1949). Cumhuriyet Devrinde İstanbul *'Pre-eighteenth century landmarks of Istanbul illustrating the journal'* ©SALT Research.

Despite their fervent visual communication strategies both the *GI* and *CDI* were merely visual accompaniments of a limited urban embellishment program. In December 1950, an article appeared in the daily *Akşam*, describing the dilapidated condition of *Küçük Ayasoyfa* neighborhood, located at the southern end of the Hippodrome Square.[198] It pointed to the still horrifying vastness of fire-stricken zones, the lack of a sewage system "causing hideous smells" and proper pavements "once one turned away from main avenues".[199] The scope of 1940s embellishments then was perhaps only slightly larger than those of the *Tanzimat* era reformers but it had partially succeeded in bringing republican spatial politics at the heart of the imperial capital.

In 1949 Kırdar resigned from his post and following DP's 1950 electoral victory, the party's new municipal body decommissioned Prost on the grounds that he was "foreign to the city".[200] Ironically though DP would later continue to work with foreign experts, particularly with Hans Högg (1901-1974), and even re-invite Prost in 1957, thereby

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[198] 'Küçükayasofya Mahallesinin Perişanlığı', *Akşam*, 5 Aralık 1950, p.4.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Akpınar, pp.87-88.

keeping up the PRP tradition, despite its former claim on Prost's foreignness.[201] In 1956, the new Prime Minister of DP, Adnan Menderes announced that the time had come "to conquer Istanbul once again" with Högg's plan of fifty to sixty meters-wide avenues (*Millet* and *Vatan* Avenues, literally translated as Nation and Motherland) that cut across the historic peninsula through the demolition of 7289 buildings and reconnected northern Istanbul with its Ottoman heritage, as in "Haussmann's Paris" as the daily *Cumhuriyet* commented.[202] Especially with the introduction of an American-led International Style through the 1948 Marshall Plan, the dissemination of an aesthetic of modernism through socially symbolic maaterials; asphalt roads, highways and reinforced concrete structures became consonant with social transformation.[203] This was epitomized in the construction of the Istanbul Hilton, a cubical concrete structure, controversially confiscating parts of Prost's Taksim Promenade (the former Inonu Promenade) area, yet greatly alleviating Istanbul's chronic tourist accommodation problems and furthermore becoming an architectural template throughout the 1950s.[204]

Beyond their discrepancies and calculated effect, both *GI* and *CDI* instigated a new propaganda culture that continued in the DP years. In 1955, a photojournalist Hilmi Şahenk (1903-1972) held an exhibition titled *Değişen ve Güzelleşen İstanbul* (Changing and Embellishing Istanbul) at the municipality gallery, composed of photographs documenting Istanbul's changing face.[205] Notably, Şahenk's aerial photographs of DP's major urban development schemes, the new large boulevards that cut across the historic peninsula became trademarks of neo-republican, liberal vistas in Istanbul [Fig.4.30]. The aesthetic appreciation of aerial photography had emerged through the technological advancements before and after the World Wars, and it must have been sort of a novelty for a Turkish audience in the 1950s.[206] As an art form aerial photography readily connoted modernist

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[201] Ibid.

[202] 'Şehircilik Mütehassısı Mimar Högg Dün Geldi', *Cumhuriyet*, 15 January 1957, pp.1, 5.

[203] Adalet, pp.131-150.

[204] Ibid., p.179.

[205] 'Değişen ve Güzelleşen İstanbul', *Cumhuriyet*, 2 December 1956, p.2 and 'Fotoğraf Sergisi', *Cumhuriyet*, 6 December 1956, p.5.

[206] Especially George Eastmen's allocation of Kodak's Research Labratories' resources had led to subsequent advancements in aerial photography during WWI, see, Elizabeth Brayer, 'George Eastmen', in *Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography, Vol.I*, 463-466 (pp.464-465).

viewpoints reflected in the society's consciousness of powered flight.[207] This must have resonated with the republican rhetoric on material advancement, which as seen in the third chapter, from 1930s on was continuously projected on Istanbul's memory landscape.

Figure IV-30: Hilmi Şahenk (1955). Once Upon a Time Istanbul ©SALT Research

In returning to Count Bernstorff's orientalist argument that traces of modernity disrupted the romanticism of Istanbul, it is perhaps clearer to see now why the urban development schemes of Istanbul particularly interested the political pursuits of a ruling elite. The stagnant romanticism, which the West projected on to the East, was repulsive to the self-assured modernity of Ottoman modernizers and their republican successors who relentlessly wanted to represent the patrimony through Western canons of urbanism.[208] Similarly in 1909, *The London Illustrated News* had announced the planned destruction of Istanbul's Roman city walls for enlargement plans, as mere vandalism.[209] However, in proposing the demolition of the walls, the Young Turks were aspiring to Vienna's

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[207] Martin Rupert, quoted in David Mattison, 'Aerial Photography', in *Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography, Vol.I*, 12-15 (p.12).

[208] Deringil also mentions that the effort of Ottoman reformers to picture themselves as 'modern or even normal' was at odds with their Western image as the 'unchainging Orient, see Deringil, *Well Protected Domains*, p.156.

[209] 'Young Turkey, The Vandal: World-Famous Byzantine Walls of Constantinople Which May Be Demolished', *London Illustrated News*, 18 December 1909, pp.892-893.

Ringstrasse that came out of the demolition of the city's walls, a level of emulation, which often overlooked the real necessities and discrepancies of their own city, but which more ironically was interpreted as vandalism by their source of emulation.[210] The two journals also suggest this self-assertive pursuit of an ideal modernity, which by the late 1940s must have become a character of Turkish modernity. The discursive space of the journals on the urban renewal and historic preservation works of Istanbul in the İnönü era and their communication through modern graphic design strategies attests to efforts of the urban and political elites to harmonize an imperial legacy with global trends on modernity.

Conclusion

This chapter has delineated a network composed of PRP bureaucrats, art historians, academics, state officials whose ideas have increasingly been influential in the redefinition of classical and vernacular forms and imperial legacy in the İnönü-led, post-Atatürk Turkey. Throughout the sections, the chapter abstained from looking at this period as one where new strains in nationalism, prompted by Turkey's wartime isolation, have eased the settlement of a stripped-down, hardened classicism, a return to traditional, revivalist forms. It has rather suggested, in line with Gülsüm Baydar's views in architecture history that vernacular, traditional forms and architectural heritage were in fact reinterpreted, perhaps disruptively, to fit modern frameworks of simplicity and rationality and used interchangeably with modern design tools, be it graphics for money design, print or urban planning or historical preservation.

As was argued in the former chapter, these representational ambiguities and insecurities of the republican political and educated elite points, as Baydar underlines, to their uncertainty about the nature of the cultural identity they were to adopt under the new nation state.[211] The paradox of their national identity lay in their commitment to reconcile an anti-

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[210] Zeynep Çelik argues that the projections of building a strip road overlooked the growth pattern of the two cities; Vienna had grown in a concentric way, which necessitated the demolition of its walls whereas Istanbul was growing northward outside the city walls, see Çelik, p.170.

[211] Baydar, *Between Civilization and Culture*, p.67.

orientalist discourse with a modernist one, but while the former meant the sublimation of nativist and nationalist perspectives, modernism meant their suppression.[212] This subjugation of native and/or nationalist elements nevertheless found legitimate material supports and outlets, through modern frameworks other than the quests for architectural froms as this chapter has shown. In the later 1950s such discourses permeated into the public, everyday life culminating in a boom of illustrated historical journals, advertorial giveaways on historic themes, comic strips of Ottoman navy and military heroes, through new American popular print formats. This was also prompted by the rivalry between the PRP in opposition and DP in government within the context of the highly politicized 1953 quincentenary commemorations of Istanbul.[213]

What seems like a resurgence of public memory in the 1950s though seems more likely to be a reclamation of the past through a nationalist lens which had already been established through republican material practices on how the past could be appropriated to fit the political pursuits of the present. As Baydar also ads, if the rationalism of the 1930s stripped history from its cultural context to project it to a homogeneous future, the later populist and thereby more traditionalist approaches sought to locate the future in an imaginary past, thereby both equally stripping forms of their context.[214] Ironically, all republican attempts at representing and commemorating the nation have depended on this basic Aristotelian assumption, that objects could fixate the fleeting memory from mental decay, yet as later exemplified by Freud, memory has a much more profound relation to forgetting.[215] As Adrian Forty also adds, remembering only becomes interesting through its struggle with forgetfulness, a struggle when materialized in art makes the representation of collective

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[212] Ibid.

[213] For comic strips see, Ratip Tahir Burak, 'Barbaros'un Son Seferi', *Hürriyet*, 1950; 'Plevne', *Yeni Sabah*, 1953; 'İstanbul'un Fethi', *Akşam*, 1964; 'Hürrem Sultan', *Akşam*, 1965; 'Barbaros'un Son Seferi', *Hürriyet Pazar İlavesi*, May 1950, and also Fuat Yılmaz Samim, *İstanbul'un Fethi: 500 üncü Fetih Yılı* (Istanbul: Şaka Matbaası, 1953). A most notable illustrated historical journal was *Resimli Tarih Mecmuası* (1950-1958), with popular advertorial giveaways of the journal *Cumhuriyet*, Reşad Ekrem Koçu, 'Türk İstanbul', *Cumhuriyet* , 7 June 1953, Reşad Ekrem Koçu, 'Osman Gazi'den Atatürk'e', *Cumhuriyet*, May 1954.

[214] Baydar, p.73.

[215] Adrian Forty, *The Art of Forgetting*, ed. by Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler (Oxford: Berg, 1999), pp. 2-6.

memory all the more meaningful.[216] The following is an account of a likely opportunity, unfortunately lost.

In May 1960, when a military coup overthrew the DP government a group of left-wing University students destroyed the wooden panels covering the marble epitaphs of what was merely the plinth of İnönü's unerected Taksim monument.[217] Remarkably, a journalist from the daily *Milliyet* then asked "…should this plinth be left empty to symbolize the whole character of an era?" [Figure 5.37].[218] The valuable suggestion of the journalist must have recognized the plinth's simultaneous ability to both make remember and forget, -or rather to make remember what is not there- and for once in the history of Turkish modernity to recognize form, an artifact, within its context. Afterall, in its subsequent life cycle in the politically turbulent 1970s, the plinth had even become a backdrop for the political graffiti of civil organizations.[219] Yet, it seems to have gone unnoticed and forgotten with the transfer of the plinth to another location in 1982.[220] Writing for the new totalitarian new world order, following the fall of the Berlin Wall Jacques Derrida asks about the possibility of considering a history without a past/present demarcation where ghosts, as reminders of the unacknowledged, unresolved remainders of the past, which disrupt and dislocate linear chronologies of time, are taken into account.[221] The empty plinth on Taksim Square could have been such a material reminder of Derrida's ghosts, which nevertheless still keep haunting the square.

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[216] Ibid., p. 16.

[217] 'İnönü Heykelinin Kaidesi Etrafındaki Tahtalar Dün Söküldü', *Milliyet*, 20 June 1960, p.1

[218] 'Bu Kaide Ne Olacak?', *Milliyet*, 21 June 1960, p. 1 and 'Elde Kalan Abide', *Milliyet*, 22 June 1960, p. 1.

[219] A glimpse of these, remarkably that of the left-wing *İlerici Gençler Derneği* (Progressive Youth Organisation) can be seen in the movie, *Neşeli Günler*, 1978.

[220] 'İsmet İnönü'nün Taşlık Semtine Dikilecek Heykeli İçin Çalışmalara Başlandı', *Milliyet*, 29 January 1982, p. 3 and '39 Yıl Bekleyen Heykel Lozan'ın Yıl Dönümünde Açıldı', *Milliyet*, 25 July 1982, p. 1.

[221] Jacques Derrida, in Deborah Cherry, 'Statues in the Square: Hauntings at the Heart of Empire', in *Location*, ed. by Deborah Cherry and Fintan Cullen, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp.128-165 (pp. 688-693).

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters this thesis has aimed to indicate how the joint use of intentional commemorative objects with electric illumination, graphic design, photography and print media, as material tools of national modernity functioned as devices to materialize a distinct sense of nationhood, which was then projected to a new political community. The thesis has delineated a common thread that runs through the material commemorative practices, first by Young Turks in late Ottoman Empire and later by the republican elite of modern Turkey. It has attended closely to the prolific discourse of a network composed by a political elite and intelligentsia around the production and reception of its material extensions and their subsequent life cycles. It demonstrated how this network intended to disseminate a material narrative of a modern, national identity with the ruling elite's particular distortions and reformulations of history. This offers remarkable contributions to knowledge in terms of design history and material culture as well as in studies of national modernity in Turkey and beyond, as I will try to underline.

One underlying aspect of the thesis has been the prevalence of myths and its relation to design and this relates to the design historical contribution. In as much as in prehistoric times, in the modern era too myth still presents a real cultural dimension given how our understanding of the physical world is shaped through language. Forty argues that from a Structuralist point of view modern societies are no different than pre-modern ones in seeking resort to myths in order to mitigate the tensions between society's beliefs and everyday experiences.[1] Forty underlines, however that in the modern era, myths are no longer conveyed through stories but the more contemporary mediums of films, journalism and advertising; in short, visual media. Daniel Miller makes a similar point when he argues that as for the modern so for pre-modern societies, it is not our intellectual capacities that prompt our social evolution, in a Hegelian sense, but rather our capacity to create an artificial, material world.[2] We make objects out of nature, which then we use to see our

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[1] Adrian Forty, *Objects of Desire: Design and Society since 1750*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1986), pp.4-5.
[2] Daniel Miller, *Stuff,* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), p.132-134

reflection in and understand who we are.[3] Objects are our extensions we use to project our mental capacities back on to the world where we see ourselves and then strive to develop that reflection / objectification.[4] Therefore in as much as we make them, they make us too. In a similar fashion this study aimed to demonstrate the tensions out of which the modern myth of the Turkish nation and its material supports have sprung from; to point out, to the role assigned to these supports through visual material culture and design to mitigate, mask and/or reconcile the social conflicts and paradoxes of nationalism.

In the revived Turkish national genesis myth it was also thanks to an object, the blacksmith Ergenekon's hammer, that he had melted down the rocky passage, the mountain, to free the entrapped Turkish clan. The hammer was magic not so much in a supernatural way but quite naturally/denotationally in many functionally empowering ways. It was within such an alignment that painter Ali Sami, a fervent advocate of historical revival through painterly ways, had depicted the mythic blacksmith in the 1926 stamp series [Fig.3.4]. For as much as a hammer could be an empowering object for an iron age Central Asian clan so were stamps for a modernising nation's elite, which had been swayed by global modernity. Yet, it is hardly likely that anyone will talk about a modern era designer/maker as possessing a mythical power because they illustrated a stamp design, took a photograph, executed a monument to project a mental concept of nationness to the material world. These objects have become too commonplace nowadays for us to notice the power invested in them, we are so accustomed to them that we cease to notice their power. Yet, as Miller describes his theory of things, he asserts that it is this underrated comonnes, ubiquitousness of objects that subtly tells us what is appropriate and what is not in the social sphere.[5] Objects provide a frame for the content of social life and in as much as we are less likely to notice the frame of an artwork more than the work itself, we similarly get blinded to those objects that regulate our social lives.[6] The less we notice them the more powerful they get.[7] Objects conceived and made to represent and/or commemorate an idea of nationness are no different, once products of certain agency, in time they become

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[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., p.115-116.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.

settings of our lives, they blend in. As this thesis has tried to show, it was no different for Turkish/Ottoman political and educated elite who has endeavored to create an exclusively Turkish material world, which would act as a cultural frame for everyday life, reconciling the tensions between cultural identity and global modernity.

A second kind of contribution concerns the studies of Turkish national modernity, as I will try to explain. In the making of this artificial world of nationness, the foundational years of a nation state play a dominant role with the ruling elite's unmatched zeal in the making of those objects, which present an opportunity to look at this history from the perspective of material culture. Thus this underlines a more general, methodological contribution to the literature of national modernity on Turkey, beyond the field of History of Design. Susan Steward argues that children are more inclined to prefer mass-produced souvenirs (representations, commodities) to real individual physical experience, precisely because they haven't had time to gather enough of the latter and thus are in need off objectifying the unknown world that surrounds them and thereby get to know it.[8] As a rough analogy, this also applies to supposedly "new born" nation-states, where the reformers impose their self-assumed denial of history on new nationalist narratives, which prompts a new lust for new materialities of a new nationalist and supposedly *sui generis* kind to convey those myths, as the thesis has argued.

A design historical, artefact-led approach, offered in the thesis, helps us understand the construction of this exclusive nationalist material conglomerate with respect to the creation of the Turkish nation state. Through a continuous approach between imperial and republican material histories, the thesis has aimed to demonstrate how in its definition, the other's (ethnicity, nation and/or the imperial legacy) objects were either not wanted or they were seen as irrelevant to this kind of objectifying the world in a nationalist way. This is only normal as for a nationalist myth to be persuasive; it needs to deny and/or suppress its own historical development, its antecedents, in order to present the genesis of the nation as *sui generis*. It was this exclusivity that classified the material world of imperial legacy as other and interpreted it for the newly defined national material layer. Thus in all

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[8] Steward, pp.138-139.

materialities argued, design trajectories have been pragmatic for Turkish political elites in the negotiation and communication of the dillemna between avowed legacies *vis-à-vis* those disavowed. This was shown through the antecedents of a cosmopolitan print culture in the 1908 zeal with postcards to commemoreate the constituon and the ensuing Young Turk attempts to popularize the Ottoman sovereign for social cohesion policies. In the second chapter, the conception and construction of republican monuments has argued how these disrupted the former material threads of the urban texture and even redefined the legacy of the War of Liberation through new representational codes, later the monuments themselves becoming graphic elements compensating for the republican elite's self-imposed denial of history in a new national print culture. The third chapter has shown the endavors of the republican elite to find a peculiar visual counterpart for the imperial coat of arms in graphics, visual arts and photography, which within their peculiar oscilliation between historical and ahistorical tendencies remained unserolved. Finally, the fourth chapter delineated the ensuing quests of PRP bureaucrats, art historians, academics, state officials in redefining the historical, vernacular forms to accommodate modern frameworks on money design, urban planning or historical preservation, thereby disruptively stripping forms of their context. Overall, the discursive space and object histories on the construction of an exclusively national material world as argued by the thesis, contributes to a multi-layered understanding of Turkish national modernity with a focus on the experiences of the particular.

There is also a more poignant aspect of the contribution on Tukish national modernity. Paradoxically, as the thesis finds, the republican elite and intelligentsia simultaneously claimed the rootedness of their new material world through the appropriation and or reinterpretation of that very imperial material legacy they allegedly excluded from the definition of nationness. A secular Turkish national identity, which was cast top-down and was thus unpopular amongst the masses could not risk being ahistorical. In other words, it was based on the very material accumulation it rhetorically rejected but was dependent to derive its meaning thereof even negatively. The metareialities created for the representation and commemoration of the new nation state also attest that in their disavowals of the imperial heritage the Kemalist elite until 1930s have, perhaps unwillingly, contributed more

to the national reinterpretation and inheritance of an imperial past tailored for a modern nation state than reject that legacy. This nevertheless entailed a disruption of history in commemorative practices. Yet, the historically disruptive representations of the nation by the Young Turks and the later republican elite need nevertheless be seen within the context of the traumas of long years of wars starting in 1877 and ending in 1922. Trauma, as Freud asserts, has less to do with forgetting but to the contrary, more likely to stem from the incapacity to forget the repressed material.[9] It is the misrecognition and misrepresentation of the repressed material in an attempt to overcome the breadth of loss and the clinging to those phantasmagories instead of facing repressed memories of agonising events and part with them. Trauma makes those phantasmagoric misrepresentations more pertinent, pervasive and persistent, veiling the real memories, obscuring history. The thesis thus points out how design trajectories, outside the central Western industrial paradigm, have become a mnemonic tool of the ruling elites to cast those misrepresentations into material and to project them to the outer world, as has been shown for Turkish national modernity.

This seems to be a shared characteristic of early modern Turkish designers and their statesmen comissioners, as this thesis also finds out. As they tried to embrace and interpret the modernist influx of forms, they felt nonetheless compelled to deploy these as a tool in their search for a cultural identity, stemming from the self-imposed denial of history of the early republican ethos. However, the experience of their Ottoman predecessors was no different in their own oscilliations between modern frameworks and vernacular cultural forms. As Deringil asserts, in trying to circumvent the attribution of "exotic" or object to what Edward Said has termed "representations as representations, not as 'natural' depictions of the Orient" Ottoman statesmen were nevertheless claiming their right to exist in a modern world.[10] Both elites shared this paradox and used design tools to create new materialities to mitigate it, either in the claim of a place as an imperial power amongst European rivals or as an emerging ahistorical nation-state. Perhaps a mere solution to the clash of tradition and modernity is a balanced recognition that, as Kemal Karpat has argued both the Ottoman past and Islamic culture are as much parts of the Turkish national identity

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[9] Sigmun Freud, quoted in, Adrian Forty, 'Introduction', in *The Art of Forgetting*, pp.5-6.
[10] Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, pp. 151-156.

as its modern Europen component.[11]

A final contribution relates more generally to the study of design history within the more general national modernities. An equally interesting finding the thesis points is the perception of dualities like West/non-West and modernity/tradition in the lived experience of designers as the unfolded making of the discussed commemorative objects point out. Despite current developments in design literature, modernist experience outside the dominant Western design paradigm is still generally understood as the permeation of the latter and not through the particular experiences of local design actors who were struggling to reconcile tradition with modernity. Recognising modernity as a plural, cultural phenomenon, as has been argued by Bill Ashcroft, the thesis also points out that the understanding of these dichotomies was not necessarily so straightforward and antagonistic.[12] As Baydar also underlines, within different cultural contexts, the modern and the traditional assume various attributions depending on their use by modern or antimodern positions.[13] As the thesis has argued, tradition could be reinterpreted to fit modernist claims just as likely as modernist frameworks were used to accentuate ties with an imaginary past in the rhetoric of various republican design actors. Therefore, by a focus on the particular, as Baydar contends for her own study, this thesis too has aimed to reveal "the critical powers and emancipatory premises of modernity to construct a cultural politics of difference beyond nationalistic chauvinism and anonymous universalism."[14] In thinking about non-Western projects of national modernity this is a crucial aspect in recognizing the role of design as both a tool of social cohesion and of social emancipation rather than its outright denunciation as emulation.

Nevertheless, one striking difference in the definition of nationalist sentiments through these dualities, is that, unlike in architectural practice, in the making of commemorative materialities (monuments, photographs, postcards) the Turkish republican elite and

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[11] Kemal Karpat, 'Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern, Muslim, Ottoman and Turk', in *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, pp.1-28 (p.28).

[12] Bill Ashcroft, 'Alternative Modernities: globalization and the post-colonial', *ARIEL: a review of international English literature* 40.1 (2009), 81-105, (pp.82-84).

[13] Baydar, *Between Civilization and Culture*, p.66.

[14] Ibid., p.73

intelligentsia was increasingly motivated by forging a single nationalist agency in the commissioning and making of these. Such attitudes have been described through the criticism of foreign artists working in state commissions, and the clash between the artists/designers on the emulation of Western painterly styles and symbols as opposed to vernacular and historical motifs. It is interesting that the same nationalist sentiments were not projected to the works of many European architects operating in Turkey in the same era.[15] This might point to the medium-specific attributes of these undertakings, that is, to the high degree of awareness of the intelligentsia that these materialities were indeed made irrevocably to embody and mediate a sense of nation-ness.

The association of nationalist sentiments with commemorative objects can also be explained through the social perception of cultural exchange *vis-à-vis* its nature. In the context of earlier cultural exchanges between the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman state, which here might stand for the contemporary West/non-West dichotomy, Cemal Kafadar argues that nationalist polemics obscure the way "influence" should be understood as an active relationship both from the standpoint of the influencer and the influenced.[16] He rather asserts that in cultural exchange, the influenced is deliberately enagaged in interaction and is therefore not an "allegedly passive receiver" as opposed to an active influencer with a static notion of cultural goods.[17] Evidently such a politicized view on cultural exchange, as was also evident in the findings of the thesis, has had serious implications for contemporary Turkish design history, as it casts a shadow on the hybrid nature of design. Kjetil Fallan and Grace Less-Maffei argue that the national and regional influences are equally important factors impacting design processes as the "global, hybrid nature of design and designers".[18] Similarly, Anna Calvera also notes that rather than merely registering influences, design historians should highlight the peculiarities of local design processes, the adaptation and synthesis of foreign aesthetic influences or technologies.[19] Therefore going beyond the influencer/influenced duality also enabled the arguments of this thesis to fully appreciate the potentials of the medium with which designers were engaged, without falling in the

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[15] Ibid., p.68
[16] Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds,* p.24.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Kjetil Fallan and Grace Lees-Maffei, *Made in Italy,* p.27.
[19] Anna Calvera, *Local, Regional, National, Global and Feedback*, pp.376, 380.

pitfalls of "nationalistic chauvinism and anonymous universalism" as highlighted by Baydar. In return this aspect highlights the importance of questioning binary constructs in the study of design history within the more general national modernities.

Within this non-dichotomic framework of design, the thesis also acknowledges that the mutual perception of the cultural politics of nationalism with modernity has nevertheless helped in the creation of a new class of artists and designers as of 1930s and increasingly after 1940s, with the "chronological delay of cultural experiences" attributed by Anna Calvera to peripheral countries.[20] This is exemplified in the career of Ratip Tahir Burak, whose immense knowledge of anatomy and colour was the outcome of his state-funded education, similar to graphic designers Kenan Temizan, Mahzar Resmor and to the first generation of Turkish sculptors, Ali Hadi Bara and Kenan Yontunç to name but a few. Their works constitute a canon of modern Turkish design, a struggle of modernity with tradition in the absence of dominant design paradigms and industry. The numerous state commissions they worked for also highlight the relation of the nation-state with design and the importance attributed to its communicative power in the cultural politics of the republican elite. Sadly though, the prolonged relation of politics and design has often been a limitation for designerly innovation and creativity in a topography where democracy has been systematically interrupted. The use of design's communicative forces to mitigate the suppression of traumatic historical events as argued above was further facilitated by the military coups that followed in 1960, 1971, 1980 and finally in 2016 following which a new official rhetoric by Turkey's currently ruling *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party) elite with its monuments and toponyms began to take hold.

I do acknowledge that this thesis does not offer a conclusive study of the commemorative practices of the Turkish/Ottoman nation-state. Such an undertaking would require a further anthropological and ethnological approach. This thesis has focused on print/visual media on monuments and the monuments themselves, yet, there remains of course further areas for exploration. Aspects contingent to rituals, bodily participation and personal remembrance remain to be explored, which would enrich the analysis I have

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[20] Ibid., p.373.

offered here. I equally recognize that this is not a thorough survey of the development of a particular design discipline/profession with respect to nationalist politics since the study confines itself to commemorative artefacts and works across practices. Such a survey remains as yet to be done including either sculpture and graphic design and how such state commissions left an impact on the development of these disciplines.

There are also serious implications on gender issues arising from the thesis as it highlights the predominantly masculine spaces with the invisibility of women in state culture. There were nonetheless female actors; painter Mihri Müşvik (1885-1954) whose body of work has recently been exhibited at SALT Istanbul, having painted a portrait of Mustafa Kemal in the late 1920s.[21] Sculptor Sabiha Benütaş (1904-1992) had worked as Canonica's assistant during his work on the Taksim monument and had later executed a number of Mustafa Kemal monuments.[22] However, these remain as marginal cases without a similar impact on discursive space and out of the limit of a restricted PhD thesis, needing to be inserted at large.

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[21] *Mihri, Modern Zamanalrın Göçebe Ressamı* (2019) <https://saltonline.org/tr/1956/mihri-modern-zamanlarin-gocebe-ressami> [accessed 20 April 2019].
[22] Elibal, *Atatürk ve Resim, Heykel,* p.208.

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